著者

岡 道男

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典學研究 (ISSN:04479114)

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vol.6, pp.101-105, 1958-05-10

著者

久保 田中 美知太郎

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典學研究 (ISSN:04479114)

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vol.26, pp.175-176, 1978-03-23

著者

田中 あや

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.62, pp.39-50, 2014 (Released:2017-01-31)

著者

神崎 繁

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.41, pp.139-142, 1993

著者

岩崎 允胤

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典學研究 (ISSN:04479114)

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vol.6, pp.68-82, 1958-05-10

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アリストテレスは矛盾律と排中律を定式化した入として知られるが,彼はまた運動の論理について鋭い考察をおこなつている.本稿は,形式論理學と辮證法的論理學との關係をアリストテレスにまで遡つて,とくに矛盾律・排中律と運動の論理との關係を検討しようとするものである.

著者

廣川 洋一

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典學研究 (ISSN:04479114)

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vol.20, pp.40-48, 1972-03-25

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As the forerunners of philosophy, we have no small numbers of semi-philosophical cosmogonies written both in verse and prose. Almost all cosmogonies in verse such as that of Hesiod and of Epimenides are composed in hexameters. While even in the age of philosophy hexameters were still influential as one of the effective means of expression, lyric meters on the other hand are scarcely found used for semi-philosophical as well as philosophical ideas. Although it has been admitted that lyric poets had perhaps so great an influence on the shaping of philosophy, it is to be noted that no philosopher set forth his thoughts with the aid of lyric meters. Alcman's cosmogony in lyric meters, viewed in this light, arouse a great deal of interest. However, serious problems, such as the fact that the cosmogonical subjects from thenceforward had not been treated in lyric meters are by no means answered here. In this article, as the first step towards solving these problems, merely some remarks on his cosmogony will be given. Though we may regard Thetis, poros and tekmor as characteristic of his cosmogony, we do not subscribe to the opinion which holds that by emphasizing Thetis' character as a craftsman too much, it is alien from the early Greek cosmogonies. It is perhaps more suitable, when considering the nature of his cosmogony, to draw a comparison with the Hesiodic cosmogony than with the Near Eastern cosmogonies. Indeed, some close parallels are found between Alcman and Hesiod: (1) The original state of the world in their cosmogonies is a confused, undifferentiated mass. (2) Thetis, poros and tekmor can be considered to make a group and have the same function, -differentiation; differentiation, however, in the same sense as the formation of Chaos implying a vast gap comes into being. τηζ θετιδοζ γενομενηζ κ. τ. λ. (vv. 15-16) is therefore equivalent to χαοζ γενετ' (v. 116). (3) The formation of Daylight, the moon and stars out of Darkness (vv. 22-27) corresponds well to that of Aither and Daylight out of Night (v. 24). From what we have seen above, we may conclude that Alcman's cosmogony follows Hesiod with considerable accuracy even after having given careful consideration to the point that while Hesiod, as G. S. Kirk (Pres. Ph.) suggests, places emphasis on the nature of the gap itself, Alcman, on the other hand, takes a vivid interest in the act of separation at the first stage in the formation of a differentiated world.

著者

吉田 俊一郎

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.63, pp.87-98, 2015

著者

岩田 靖夫

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典學研究 (ISSN:04479114)

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vol.27, pp.15-28, 1979-03-29

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"What is Place?" To this question Aristotle proposes four possible answers: form (ειδο&b.sigmav;) , matter (υλη) , the empty interval (διαστημα) between the extremities of the containing body and the limit of the containing body (περα&b.sigmav; του περιεχοντο&b.sigmav;), and examines these possibilities one by one. First, both place and form contain things so that we could say they are similar in this respect. But, while form is the boundary of the contained body and not separable from it, place is the boundary of the containing body and separable from the contained one. So we must say place is not form. Second, both place and matter receive qualities or other limitations, and in this respect they somehow seem to resemble each other. But, while matter is neither separable from the thing nor contains it, place is separable from it and contains it. So, also in this case, we must say matter is not place. The third possible answer, that is, the empty interval seems to be most appropriate as the explanation of place. But Aristotle denies even this answer. His main argument is as follows. If there were an interval which existed by itself(καθ' αυτο ειναι) , it would be a hypostatized κενον, which would further demand its own place to be in, so that there would be a place of place ad infinitum. (This argument of Aristotle seems in my opinion not to be so successful. But even if it fails, it reveals, by his strong denial of the existence of κενον, his conception of κοσμο&b.sigmav; which matters to us. Thus the only remaining answer is the fourth, that is, "the first unmoved limit of the containing body(πρωτον ακινητον περα&b.sigmav; του περιεχοντο&b.sigmav;)" which is indeed to be the final definition of place by Aristotle. This definition has two important characteristics. One point : Place as Aristotle understands it, is not an independent reality but the relation of a containing body to a contained one. In other words, place is an attribute of bodies. Another point: Although place as above said is the relation between bodies, it does not necessarily mean that place is a relative phenomenon. Rather, he says, the containing body realizing the role of place must be unmoved. From this it follows that place as a relation must be based on an absolute measure. This measure is just the everlastingly revolving circumference of the universe (κοινο&b.sigmav; τοπο&b.sigmav;)and the four ringed layers of the elements fire, air, water, earth-(οικειο&b.sigmav; τοπο&b.sigmav;)whose unalterable absolute arrangement in the incessant change into one another imitates the constant movement of the heaven. This fact that the elements have a natural tendency to move towards their own(respectively different)places is the very reason why he denied so strongly the existence of the void which implies the negation of all differentiation. Conclusion: the universe which is reflected in his theory of place is a finite(πεπερασμενον) and complete (τελειον) universe which is so densely filled (πληρε&b.sigmav;) by bodies that it has no empty interstices at all. Actually there exists no infinite thing. In ontology he was essentially the most genuine successor to Parmenidean theory of being.

著者

片山 英男

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典學研究 (ISSN:04479114)

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vol.34, pp.115-117, 1986-03-18

著者

片山 英男

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典學研究 (ISSN:04479114)

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vol.29, pp.114-118, 1981-03-30

著者

吉武 純夫

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典學研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.37, pp.23-33, 1989-03-15

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It has often been said that if Ajax is manifesting his decision not to kill himself in his third speech, we have to assume that Ajax is lying But this is not true Ajax can at the same time be sincere throughout the third speech After abandoning suicide at the beginning of the third speech, Ajax comes to understand, first at 666 f and then at 677, what will be the result of his longer life, if he purges his "defilements", escapes the anger of Athena and buries his sword to hide it, he will come actually to obey the gods and honor the Atreidae, learning discipline Now these thoughts of Ajax make him realize the fact that reconciliation with fatal enemies will be inevitable if he continues to live A close examination of 666 f and 677 leads to such an interpretation of the third speech And if we are right in this interpretation, there is no question as to how and why Ajax, behind the stage, decided again to kill himself after the third speech, for the first speech has shown how dominant is the hatred for the Atreidae in the mind of Ajax Though gentle enough to abandon suicide in response to his wife's entreaty, he is so obstinate in his hatred as to refuse reconciliation with his enemies at the cost of his own life Ajax' hatred, shown in the play as an element always leading him to ruin, is continued by his wife and brother after his death And again, at the end of the play, dead Ajax' hatred is mentioned as an important dramatic motif Thus the play is unified by Ajax' hatred However, it is always presented in contrast to other mental elements the sense of honour and humanity It follows that Sophocles gave a dynamism (rather than a pathos) of the mind of Ajax to the traditional monotonous image of hateful Ajax

著者

今道 友信

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典學研究 (ISSN:04479114)

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vol.19, pp.1-15, 1971-03-31

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By quoting several Greek philosophers, the author tries to distinguish the judgement from the description. According to his opinion, the description is nothing other than the task of the eye and its act is the objective exactitude. The judgement is on the contrary the personal decision concerning internal responsibility, and its act is the truth. Many thinkers utilize their objective description about the external world for their judgement. But Plato concentrates on the judgement. Because his theory goes on the level of logos, which is the correlative of the reason, and not on the dimension of pragma, which is the object of the sense. His theory of ideas is not the inductive reference from sense-data, but from this theory as principle the lot of true propositions are deduced. (Interpretation of Phaidon) The subject of thinking in Plato is neither the sense nor the reason of human beings. The human reason does love the true thinking which is the business of God. The act of the human reason is to become the horizon for the thinking of God. Periagoge tes psyches (conversio animae) to the Being-itself is the principle for the homoiosis toi theoi. Because the service for God (latreia tou theou) is the most important task for us, we must know what God thinks and we must do as we know. This is the reason why the thought and deed can be one in Platonic system. (Interpretation of Apologia and Politeia)

著者

國原 吉之助

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典學研究 (ISSN:04479114)

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vol.3, pp.171-173, 1955-05-10

著者

大牟田 章

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典學研究 (ISSN:04479114)

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vol.8, pp.104-107, 1960-03-29

著者

永井 滋郎

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典學研究 (ISSN:04479114)

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vol.15, pp.52-62, 1967-03-23

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It is the object of the present article to analyze and understand the characteristics of peace consciousness of Polybius who lived in the Hellenistic age of chronic wars and wrote a world history in the true sense. We can see in his book, especially in IV. 31. 3-8 and IV. 74. 3, what kind of attitude he took toward the problem of peace. There he wrote as follows: "That war is a terrible thing I agree, but it is not so terrible that we should submit to anything in order to avoid it. ......Peace indeed, with justice and honour is the fairest and most profitable of possessions, but when joined with baseness and disgraceful cowardice, nothing is more infamous and hurtful." Thus, Polybius insisted that liberty and justice were indispensable conditions for peace. We can also recognize the same idea of connecting peace with liberty and justice in many other Greek politicians and historians such as Thucydides. The Greek thought of peace, however, was metamorphosed gradually by historical conditions in the development of the ancient world. Thucydides advocated the war for justice and took a rather aggressive attitude against other city-states such as Sparta, putting stress on Athenian hegemony, although he admitted that peace was naturally desirable. His conception of peace could never depart far from the narrow idea of ομονοια within a πολι&b.sigmav;. The Greek idea of peace was widened by Isocrates to Panhellenistic homonoia, but he had a strong antagonism against Barbaroi. In the historical development of peace theory, the Hellenistic age played a very important role, giving birth to the cosmopolitan pacifism. This kind of pacifism, however, could not become a historical force to attain world peace, because it had a tendency to escape from reality. Though Polybius was influenced by Stoicism he was able to reach a sort of realistic pacifism and wanted to cooperate with Rome, cherishing the idea of a united and organic world consisting of the cultural Hellas and the political Rome, where the common freedom of Hellas should be fundamentally respected. Moreover, he evaluated highly the value of unions of city-states such as the Achaean league. He had not merely a Stoic, philosophic and abstract idea of cosmopolitanism, but a positive, ego-involving and realistic attitude of international cooperation. Thus, the freedom of Hellas as a condition of peace was connected by him with a kind of internationalism and with a Hellenistic idea of one organic world founded on the principle of equality among races and nations. In this sense, we may recognize that Polybius was indeed a pioneer of realistic pacifism, that is of internationalism, though of course in an ancient pattern, which has its limitations for us. It was regrettable after all that the ancient world could not develop this kind of pacifism, but had to seek for a key to solve its problems in Pax Romana and eventually in Pax Dei.

著者

松原 俊文

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典學研究 (ISSN:04479114)

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vol.51, pp.78-93, 2003-03-20

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Diodorus' accounts of the Sicilian Slave Wars have been a source ofcontroversies This paper deals with two particular problems among them the blaming of C Gracchus' equestrian jury in the aetiology of the First War, a notorious anachronism that has vexed scholarship since Mommsen, and the accusation against 'Italian' landowners as having encouraged the highway robbery by their slaves, but whose presence in any large number on Sicilian soil at this period is not much attested by other evidence Some scholars maintain that these passages go back to Posidonius, whose contribution, to whatever extent, as a source to the Diodoran narrative of the First War is beyond doubt I shall below present some likeliest routes for the transmission of the information that has caused these problems 1) Roman Sources The ubiquitous criticisms of Roman magistrates in the narrative smack of narrow partisan hostility within the ruling oligarchy, and it has been suggested that our difficulties result from Posidonius' use of a Roman source coloured by conservative pique against the knights Among Posidonius' Panaetian connexions the most important was P Rutilius Rufus, whose semi-autobiographical history in Greek was certainly one of Posidonius' sources, and whose sorry experience at the repetundae trial in 92 might well suggest a Rutilian origin of the troublesome passages Yet evidence reveals Rutilius' attentiveness to the niceties of law, and his work, like other Republican memoirs, was written primarily for his own political apologia Thus I doubt that this Roman Stoic dared jeopardise the whole credibility of his apologia by a trifling distortion of the history of the extortion court Furthermore, if we allow for an interpreter, Posidonius' potential Roman sources need not be restricted to works written in Greek The annals of Fannius, if the historian is to be identified with C Fannius M f, yet another disciple of Panaetius and the anti-Gracchan consul in 122, are a strong possibility Another candidate would be Sempronius Asellio, who, like Rutilius and Posidonius, belonged to the same Polybian school of history and whose kinsman Diodorus alone in ancient traditions praises for his governorship of Sicily immediately after the Second War 2) Posidonius' Narrative Pattern Many scholars have perceived a structural and thematic parallelism between the accounts of the two wars One school of thought further stretches this deductive tendency of Posidonius the Philosopher-Historian into a strictly formulated 'narrative pattern', claiming that the philosopher, for want of information, retrojected the conditions in Sicily around the time of the Second War, or those in Southern Italy at the time of the Spartacus War, to the island of the 130s, and that in this process he 'reduplicated' an equestrian/Italian involvement in the First War Yet in my view the whole idea of a narrative pattern stands on far too many unattested premises, and hence to attribute our particular problems to this nebulous paradigm risks circularity In fact the similarities between the two Diodoran accounts are no more striking than the obvious differences This fact suggests that the author had fairly detailed knowledge of each war, thus rendering it unlikely that he, simply out of horror vacui, made up part of the account of one war on the analogy of another 3) Local Sources These details include 'folkloric' anecdotes, which all concern Sicehot Greeks, and without doubt go back to the same community But how did they find their way into the current text? Posidonius' famous trip to the West may have included an investigative sojourn in Sicily, but Diodorus himself was a Sicilian, born in a town only a few tens of miles away from the epicentres of both wars within thirty years after the Second War Thus he would have been as well placed as Posidonius to draw on locals for first-hand information The fact that in Bk 11 Diodorus added his own digression on the sanctuary of the Palici, with a cross-reference to the Second War, shows that he had at least some local knowledge of this war Thus the censure against the equestrian jury and the 'Italian' landowners may also have been transmitted through the same intermediary, echoing provincial indignation among Diodorus' contemporaries, if not of the historian himself whose critical views of the Romans and the Italians are known from other examples, over the activities of the equestrian businessmen and Rome's laissez-faire policy The past Quellenkritik has variously attempted to explain these problems, but the desperate dearth of external control precludes any definitive conclusion Yet internal evidence points to two distinctive groups of ultimate informants, Roman and Sicilian The passages in question could derive from either of them If the former is the case, I suggest Posidonius transmitting a non-Rutilian, alternative source If the latter, however, it could have been any provincial Siceliot, Diodorus included, who had garbled part of the picture of the First War

著者

南雲 泰輔

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

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vol.62, pp.91-102, 2014

著者

高橋 久一郎

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典學研究 (ISSN:04479114)

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vol.37, pp.45-55, 1989-03-15

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Many scholars emphasize the importance of prohairesis in Aristotle's Ethics as a key concept in explaining human action However, its precise nature remains obscure In this paper I will attempt to explicate Aristotle's answer to a fundamental question concerning prohairesis-viz "How should we individuate prohaireton?", and then locate it in the practical syllogism This task is of importance, since we cannot understand Aristotle's views on action as energeia without understanding his conception of action as chosen for its own sake As a preliminary, in section I I defend and develop constituent-innterpretation of ta pros to telos A clue to the solution of this dispute is the fact that the bodily movement performed pros to telos must be an action in itself It must be telos in a sense, otherwise the relation of telos and ta pros to telos would be external Aristotle may be a consequentialist in a broad sense, but not a utilitarian (As a corollary of this point I suggest that we cannot use description of bodily movement as a tool of action mdividuation ) In section II I propose my interpretation of prohairesis by examining Cooper's excellent explanation of deliberation My contentions are as follows 1)We cannot accept his assertion that to kath' hekaston means not the individual, but the atomon eidos We do not deliberate on individuals, as Aristotle says, but use recognition of individuals as premisses of deliberation 2) We should admit that the deliberation ends at prohairesis to perform an act of some suitably specific type Prohairesis is not mere desire, but a unity of desire and belief, which is caused, via deliberation, by having a wish and some appropriate beliefs as to circumstances, but it is not an action We identify (future) action as such not by rinding a uniquely applicable description, but by specifying its type Future action cannot be referred to. 3) We must think that the conclusion of the practical syllogism is an action It seems to me that Cooper's and Mele's argument are not convincing 4) Prohaireton is the major premiss of the practical syllogism Aristotle's examples of the major premisses, however, are not always prohaireton Some of them do not fully specify the types of action to be performed 5) Therefore we must distinguish between the practical syllogism, conceived as including deliberative process, and the so-called "practical" syllogism, which has only two premisses As for human action, the latter is the last step leading to action, and in animal movement it is the only step In section III I criticize and modify Nussbaum's anankastic model of so-called practical syllogism 1) As Nussbaum says, misfire of action is explained either by not wanting G or by not believing it necessary to do A But the hypothetical necessity of A-ing is not relevant to the necessity for action, since if an agent does not want G, he will never do A, even if he believes it necessary for G We should take a parallel with the theoretical syllogism more seriously If one does not believe in premisses because of their falsity, one will not assert (phanai) the conclusion, even if one recognizes it as validly reasoned An action is performed only when both premisses are actualized, as akrates illustrates it negatively Aristotle's contention in asserting the necessity of action lies in the rejection of the third element, e g will, to explain action 2) As to a chosen act, the anankastic model should be modified As argued above, prohairesis is a unity of desire and belief Nonetheless, it is not an action, but a desire I suggest the following modification pN [{wanting G & believing (A for G)} and (believing now & here to A)→acting A] Akrates has both premisses, but he does not use his major premiss he does not stay in prohairesis (Elsewhere I argued for this unorthodox interpretation of akrasia) My arguments in this paper are rather sketchy and need elaboration Nevertheless, I should say that the present paper has taken a step in the right direction toward understanding action as enevgeia

著者

岩田 靖夫

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典學研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.8, pp.136-139, 1960-03-29

著者

平山 晃司

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典學研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.49, pp.86-97, 2001-03-05

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There has long been a controversy among scholars about how pharmakoi, or ancient Greek human scapegoats, were treated at the end of the ritual, namely, whether they were killed or not The disagreement among modern scholars has been caused by that among ancient writers some state that the pharmakoi were put to death, while others indicate their being driven out of the community But it makes little difference whether they were slam or expelled Greater significance is to be attached to the fact that some of those scholiasts and lexicographers who refer to the pharmakos ritual assert that stoning was performed in it Of the two sources for the pharmakos ritual at Abdera the scholiast on Ovid(Ibts 467)states that in that city the scapegoat was killed with stones every year, whereas the commentator on a Callimachus line (fr 90 Pfeiffer) asserts that he was stoned until he was driven over the borders There is a similar discrepancy between the two sources for the purificatory ritual at Massalia while Servius states that the ritual was performed as often as the citizens were suffering from pestilence and that it culminated in mere casting out of the scapegoat, according to 'Lactantius Placidus' the ritual was held annually and at the end of it the scapegoat was led out of the city beyond its boundaries and then was stoned to death What caused these discrepancies? As for the latter case, one could surmise that for some reason Servius and 'Lactantius' both misconstrued the following circumstances in Massalia in very ancient times, whenever they suffered from pestilence, they would kill a scapegoat with stones so as to save their own lives, this practice was gradually established as an annually performed ritual for averting pestilence, and subsequently the final treatment of the scapegoat changed into banishment from the city, possibly accompanied by a ceremonial stoning Such may be the case also with Abdera and the scholiast on Ibis may have made a mistake similar to that of 'Lactantius' The following two sources provide some support for this view (1) According to Helladius, the pharmakos ritual held at Athens has its origin in the unlawful death of Androgeos and the ensuing pestilential disease this suggests that the Athenians purified their city with scapegoats to survive the plague What was the ultimate fate of the original pharmakoi ? An account of Plutarch (Mor 297b-c) and an episode in Philostratus (VA 4 10)enable one to conjecture that they were stoned to death And we are informed by Harpocration that the Athenians would expel two pharmakoi during the festival of Thargelia Thus the same process of change as is supposed for Massalia (and perhaps for Abdera) can be detected here (2) According to Ister, as cited by Harpocration, a man named Pharmakos stole the sacred bowls of Apollo and was stoned to death, and at the Thargelia (of an unknown Ionian city) certain things were performed in imitation of this event Very probably the principal thing performed during the rite was a ceremonial stoning (or pelting with harmless objects such as, for example, squill bulbs) accompanying the expulsion of the pharmakos Here too the above-mentioned process can be well perceived From the materials shown above it may be inferred that in very ancient times in some Greek cities, on the occasion of crises such as plague or famine or drought, to purify the city they would stone to death either the perpetrator of a sacrilegious act which was regarded as the cause of the disaster, or scapegoat(s), if it was of unknown origin Such a practice was gradually established as an annual event with the purpose of averting calamity, and subsequently the expulsion of scapegoat (s) from the community became the essential element of the ritual and stoning changed into a symbolical, ceremonial act performed in casting out the scapegoat (s)