著者
平田 陽一郎
出版者
東洋史研究会
雑誌
東洋史研究 (ISSN:03869059)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.70, no.2, pp.225-259, 2011-09

The fubing system that was a driving force in the creation of Sui and Tang dynasties is generally thought to have begun with the twenty-four army system of the Western Wei, and its military power too have been composed of local militias of Han people in Western Wei and Northern Zhou during which the influx of warriors of the northern Xianbei peoples were not numerous. Nonetheless, the term fubing zhi, the fubing system, is not found in contemporary sources, and was invented in a later period. Tracing the fubing system back to the Western Wei is also nothing more than a distortion created by later hands. The local military organizations that comprised the military force of the twenty-four army system were both chronologically, geographically, and ethnically extremely diverse, and the local Han militias of Guanlong 關隴 were no more than one part of it. In the Western Wei and Northern Zhou levies of military service were generally imposed on households, but they resorted to having the local gentry organize military bands and thereby continued the selection and implementation of a method of operating as a pseudo-tribal militia. In addition the existence of a unique system of groups of close advisers, called qinxhin 親信 and kuzhen 庫眞, whose lineages could be traced to the inner officers of Northern Wei court, made it possible to control the vast military organization that was the twenty-four army system. Judging from these special characteristics, the twenty-four-army system can be understood as a pseudo-tribal militia system that was supported by the traditions of the Xianbei. In this regard, it should be positioned in the historical context as a military system located precisely within the lineage of the nomadic military systems such as the twenty-four chiefs of the Xiongnu and of the Mongol thousand-household system. The imperial edict of the tenth year of Kaihuang, which was promulgated the year after Sui destroyed the Chen, has been taken as revolutionary in creating the ground-breaking fubing system, but in actuality, the purpose of the edict was the transfer and settling of military groups who had served for years in Guanzhong, and their essential character as pseudo-Xiangbei tribal militia was maintained thereafter. A common element underlay both the purpose of the imperial edict of the tenth year of the Kaihuang reign and the Northern-Wei policy of dismantling the tribe-centered state, and in order to decipher this reality, one must seek a point of view from which both can be mutually examined and compared.
著者
中島 樂章
出版者
東洋史研究会
雑誌
東洋史研究 (ISSN:03869059)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.66, no.2, pp.267-299, 2007-09

Toyotomi Hideyoshi began the invasion of Korea in 1592, but as warfare became mired in a stalemate from 1593 through the ninth month of 1596, peace negotiations between Japan and the Ming dynasty dragged on interminably. In this article, I examine the relationship of the arguments within the Ming court over whether a tribute relationship should be opened with Japan and its relationship to changes in the trade order in the East Asia of the time. In the course of the peace negotiations, Hideyoshi continued to demand the cession of the southern portion of the Korean peninsula and resumption of official trade between Japan and the Ming. In response, the Ming dynasty saw the cessation of Korean territory as out of the question and continued to debate whether to invest Hideyoshi with the title King of Japan and whether to permit the tribute trade. The great majority of the bureaucracy opposed both the investment of Hideyoshi and permission of the tribute trade, and in the fifth month of 1594 the Wanli Emperor first ordered the denial of the investment and tribute trade, but then reversed himself and agreed in the twelfth month to permit the investment alone, but not to recognize the tribute trade. Those who opposed opening trade with Japan argued that such trade with would invite worsening of the peace and public order on the southeastern coast and bring about financial costs similar to those of the Mongol trade. Furthermore, Grand Secretary 内閣大學士 Shen Yiguan 沈一貫, who was from Ningbo, which was to be the entrepot for the Japanese tribute trade, feared the worsening of public order in Ningbo and opposed the resumption of trade. In contrast, thosewho advocated the resumption of trade with Japan were a distinct minority. Among these, Chen Yidian 陳懿典 argued articulately that trade involving Japanese silver and Chinese commercial products would be unlike the Mongol trade and would benefit the Ming dynasty. Moreover, Zhao Shizhen 趙士愼, who was famed as the author of Shenqi pu 神器譜, submitted a memorial to the throne advising the toleration of trade with Japan. In addition, Grand Secretary Zhang Wei 張位, while opposing recognition of tribute trade with Japan, proposed a plan that would permit Chinese maritime traders to sail to Japan and conduct trade. However, in the end the argument against trade with Japan was stronger and the trade was not resumed. The East Asian tribute trade system that had existed since the early Ming deteriorated in the latter half of the 16th century, and in addition to the tribute trade the countries surrounding China carried out mutual trade 互市 in Guangdong and on the northern borders and utilized the trade routes of the Chinese maritime merchants from Fujian to Southeast Asian, thereby forming the gongshi 貢市 system that combined aspects of the tribute and private trade. Japan alone was left out of the system due to fears of its aggressive actions. Reflecting the interest of the merchants of Sakai and Hakata, Konishi Yukinaga 小西行長 and So Yoshitoshi 宗義智 , who were in charge of the Japanese side in the peace negotiations, sought to realize peace by resuming trade between Japan and the Ming. On the other hand, those on the Ming side who groped for a peaceful resolution on the basis of the resumption of the tribute trade were centered around Grand Secretary Zhao Zhigao 趙志臯 and the Military Commissioner 經略 Song Yingchang 宋應昌, who came from Zhejiang, in addition to Chen Yidian and Zhang Han 張瀚, who was also from Zhejiang and argued forcefully that maritime trade on the southeastern coast would be financially beneficial and unlike trade on the northern borders, which had incurred financial burdens. However, in the end the gap between the positions of Hideyoshi, who stubbornly clung to demands for territory, and Ming bureaucrats, who opposed trade with Japan, remained and brought about the breakdown of the peace negotiations.
著者
糟谷 憲一
出版者
東洋史研究会
雑誌
東洋史研究 (ISSN:03869059)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.70, no.1, pp.100-126, 2011-06

The aim of this article is to elucidate the changes in the power structure in Joseon during the period from the Kabo Reform (July, 1894) to eve of the Russo-Japanese War (February, 1904). The author has previously examined the power structure of the Taeweongun 大院君 regime and the Min clan 閔氏 regime. The method of analysis involved a survey of those appointed to bureaucratic offices in the upper levels of the regime, clarifying to which of Four Sects (Sasek Tangp'a 四色黨派) and clans they belonged and calculating the ratios. As a result, the author made clear that within the Taeweongun regime, the ascendancy of Noron 老論, the largest faction, was unshaken, and that in the second half of the Min clan regime (December 1884 to July 1894) the ascendancy of the Noron faction became even stronger, and the power of the Yeohung Min 驪興閔 clan, which was a part of the Noron faction and was associated with the matrilineal side of the royal house, increased dramatically. In this article I survey appointees to the central government posts of Minister, Vice-Minister, and to the Department of the Imperial Household and analyze their affiliation with factions and clans. As this period was one of major political change, my analysis is based on distinguishing four periods: 1) that of the Kabo Reform, 2) that when the King resided in the Russian legation (February, 1896 to February, 1897), 3) that of the unfolding of the Independent Club's push for reform (February, 1897 to January, 1899), and 4) that of imperial despotism (January 1899 to February 1904). As a result, I have been able to clarify the following points. First, in regard to the Noron, the power of the Noron and influential clans, such as the Yeohung Min, declined within the upper levels of the government following the Kabo Reforms, but they maintained great influence in upper ranks of the Department of the Imperial Household. The power of the Noron in the upper levels of government was restored to the level of the latter half of the Min clan regime after the Independent Club began promoting reform. During that period, the Noron continued to occupy positions of power in the upper levels of the Department of the Imperial Household, and the power of the influential clans in the Noron faction was completely restored. Second, during the period of imperial despotism, the power of the Noron, from which ministerial appointments were made, increased, and the strength of the Noron in the upper levels of the Department of the Imperial Household grew to 50 percent. I believe this is an important factor in considering the foundation that supported imperial despotism.
著者
後藤 裕加子
出版者
東洋史研究会
雑誌
東洋史研究 (ISSN:03869059)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.66, no.4, pp.663-631, 2008-03

In Islamic historical writing the canonical Hijra calendar was ordinarily used to date historical events. In the area where Persian was the main written language of the inhabitants, historians began to write in Persian, but the Hijra calendar remained in use. After the Mongol invasion, the cyclical Chinese-Uighur calendar, in which the years were represented by a series of twelve animals, was introduced and used in parallel with the Hijra calendar in Persian historical writing and in dating the issuance of farmans (royal decrees). After the fall of the Il-Khanid dynasty in the first half of the 14th century, the use of the solar animal calendar in Persian historiography became rare, even though it was still in use in administrative affairs. The Safavid dynasty, which had taken control of Persia in 1501, revived the use of the animal calendar, in the form of the Turkish calendar, sal-i turki. A special characteristic of this calendar is the conformity of New Year's Day with nauruz (New Year's Day) of Persian origin. Then in the later reign of Shah Tahmasb I and that of Shah Sultan Muhammad Hudabandah, most of the farmans that were issued between the late 960's (the early 1560's) and the late 990's (the late 1580's) had a corresponding animaldesignated year in addition to a Hijra date. This period corresponds to the period when the Turkish calendar was given precedence over the Hijra dates in the Safavid chronicles, and both calendars were used in tandem. In the reign of 'Abbas I, dates based on the coronation of the shahs were added to supplement the dates from the Turkish and Hijra calendars. These chronicles were written by munsis (secretaries) who were in charge of drawing up farmans with animal-designated years. From this period onward the nauruz festival began to be celebrated in the Chihil-Sutun palace in the capital Qazwin and was established as an important ceremony of the royal court. The Safavids had struggled up to this point to escape the influence of the Qizilbas tribes and construct a centralized government. The introduction of the Turkish calendar and the nauruz festival are aspects of a policy that sought to establish a strong Safavid kingship.
著者
山下 將司
出版者
東洋史研究会
雑誌
東洋史研究 (ISSN:03869059)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.72, no.4, pp.553-587, 2014-03

During the Yuanhe 元和 era (806-20) of the Tang, the Xianzong 憲宗 emperor achieved a certain degree of success in restoring the centralization of power after a period in which the power of military governors had gone largely unchecked, and this achievement resulted in the so-called "Yuanhe restoration." An important factor behind the restoration was that the subjugation of military governors opposed to the central government had proceeded favourably, and the driving force in these campaigns against the military governors has been considered the Army of Inspired Strategy (shencejun 神策軍), made up of reinforced units of the imperial army. Nevertheless, among the series of military campaigns conducted during the Yuanhe era, it was only in the first campaign that the government relied primarily on the power of the Army of Inspired Strategy, and the main function of the Army of Inspired Strategy was coercion and control of military governors rather than actually fighting. The series of military campaigns against military governors opposed to the central government was conducted by combining the forces of supportive military governors, as was done during the Dezong 德宗 era. In these campaigns against recalcitrant military governors, a noteworthy figure was Li Guangyan 李光顏, a chieftain of the Tiele-Adie 鐵勒阿跌 tribe. He participated as either a regional commander under the military governor of Hedong or as the commander of the army of the Zhongwu 忠武 circuit in the principal campaigns against the military governors from the Yuanhe to Changqing 長慶 eras and was always active as a central force in the government armies. The realization of the Yuanhe restoration was in fact due to a large extent to his military exploits. Then, what sort of troops would he have led when participating in the campaigns against the military governors? When one reads source materials relating to the Li family, consisting chiefly of the epitaphs of Li Guangyan and his father and elder brother, it becomes clear that by marrying into the Turkic Ashina 阿史那 clan across two generations and by becoming related by marriage to the Turkic Sheli 舍利 clan, Li Guangyan and his father and brother established close relations with Turkic groups living within Tang territory. Consequently, Li Guangyan and his brother were given command by the Tang of nomadic groups in northern Hedong from the time of the Dezong 徳宗 emperor, and in the campaigns against the military governors during the reigns of Xianzong and his successor Muzong 穆宗, Li Guangyan participated at the head of Turkic nomadic groups consisting of the Tiele and Shatuo 沙陀 tribes, as well as Turks living within Tang territory and achieved the greatest military results with his mounted forces. In other words, it was precisely because it was possible to commit Turkic mounted troops from northern Hedong to the campaigns against the military governors by employing Li Guangyan and his brother that the Xianzong emperor was able to achieve the military successes that brought about the Yuanhe restoration.
著者
中 純夫
出版者
東洋史研究会
雑誌
東洋史研究 (ISSN:03869059)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.67, no.3, pp.464-502, 2008-12

Yun Geun-su 尹根壽 was involved in arguments with Lu Guangzu 陸光祖 over the differences between the Zhu and Lu 朱陸 (or Zhu and Wang 朱王) schools in the 21th year of the Myeong-jong 明宗 era (Jiajing 嘉靖 45 or 1566) during his mission to Beijing as Bu-yeon envoy 赴燕使. The contents of the arguments are recorded in the "Zhu-Lu ron-nan" 朱陸論難 chapter of the Ueol-jeong jip 月汀集. Yun Geun-su argued from a position firmly grounded in the school of Zhuxi and criticized the Lu-Wang school. In contrast, Lu Guangzu took the opposite side, affirming the Lu-Wang school and criticized the school of Zhuxi. During the reign of Seon-jo 宣祖 in the period between the Japanese invasions of the Im-sin oaeran 壬辰倭亂 and Jeong-yu jae-ran 丁酉再亂, there were some who came from China to Joseon and who had been involved in Zhu-Lu or Zhu-Wang disputations, and there were also those who gone to China from Joseon as Bu-yeon envoys who had participated in similar disputes with those from the Chinese side. They included (1) Yu Seong-ryo 柳成龍, who was the Seo-sang goan 書状官 (official secretary) of the Seong-jeol sa 聖節使 embassy of the second year of the reign of Seon-jo (1569), (2) Heo-bong 許篈, who was the Seo-sang goan of Seong-jeol sa embassy of seventh year of the reign of Seon-jo (1574), (3) Huang Hongxian 黄洪憲 and Wang Jingmin 王敬民 who were emissaries in the 15th year of Seon-jo (1582), (4) Song Yingchang 宋應昌 who was Jinglue-Chaoxian 經略朝鮮 in the 26th year of the reign of Seon-jo (1593), and (5) Yuan Huang 袁黄 who was Jinglue zanhua 經略贊畫 in the 26th year of the reign of Seon-jo (1593). In each of these cases a common pattern is visible: those from the Chinese side displayed their admiration of the school of Lu-Wang and those from the Joseon side had absolute faith in the school of Zhuxi and rejected Lu-Wang thought. In this respect, the "Zhu-Lu ron-nan" was exactly the same. However, the "Zhu-Lu ron-nan" recorded what was among the first disputations on the Zhu-Lu schools between the two countries, and it was also superior in terms of the quality and quantity of its contents. In addition, it was, along with the work of I-hoang 李滉, one of the earliest critiques of the Lu Wang school in Joseon. Moreover, Lu Guangzu was a top official, who served as Minister of Ministry of Personnel 吏部尚書, and although he was an important figure in the political history of the Ming, little light has been shed on the content of his thought. In his secondary collection known as the Lu Zhuang-gong yigao 陸莊簡公遺稿 one sees fragmentary evidence that indicate a relationship with Buddhist thought and that of Wang Yangming, but the truth of his belief in the Yangming school is unclear. On the basis of the existence of the Joseon source "Zhu-Lu ron-nan, " it has become possible to elucidate the theoretical position of Lu Guanzu. For this reason also the value of the "ZhuLu ron-nan" is particularly high.
著者
石見 清裕
出版者
東洋史研究会
雑誌
東洋史研究 (ISSN:03869059)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.68, no.1, pp.1-33, 2009-06

In 1995 I analyzed the Fuyi-ling 賦役令 , the Tang dynasty tax codes for alien peoples who had been subjects of the empire. This was in order to understand the character of the Tang dynasty as a multi-ethnic state. The three articles of the regulations that I examined at that time were 1) the regulation exempting naturalized subjects from paying taxes for ten years; 2) the regulation exempting the Yidi 夷狄 from paying taxes for three years; and 3) the regulation on paying taxes in silver currency or sheep. However, with the publication of the newly discovered Tiansheng-ling 天聖令 in 2006, it became possible to view the original text of the laws promulgated in the 25th year of the Kaiyuan reign. It thus became necessary to revise my analysis. The first and second regulations are combined in a single article of the Tiansheng-ling, and the word Yilao 夷獠 is used instead of Yidi. The Yilao were people who inhabited areas of southern or southwestern China. The second regulation was created when they were incorporated into the territory of the empire. Therefore, the concept Yidi does not appear in the legal code. As regards ancient Japanese administrative law, which was influenced by the Tang codes, the term Yidi has been thought to refer to people in an intermediate state (neither Japanese nor foreign) and this interpretation must now also be revised. The third regulation does not appear in the Tiansheng-ling, which was promulgated in Kaiyuan 25. However, since this article indisputably existed in the Tang legal system prior to this point, it is clear that it was eliminated from the code of Kaiyuan 25. As other special regulations concerning taxes were also removed, it can be surmised that the tax code was simplified in the code of Kaiyuan 25. Moreover, it has been thought that during the Tang, foreign lands were divided into fan'yu 蕃域, those territories closest to China, and jueyu 絶域, the outer limits of the earth. However, it is clear that these conceptions were not stipulated in the administrative law of the Tang, and thus these principles of classification did not exist in Tang times. In conclusion, the Tang dynasty's method of ruling alien peoples changed over time and according to the period, and these changes can be understood as the process of the maturing of the Tang state.
出版者
東洋史研究会
雑誌
東洋史研究 (ISSN:03869059)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.3, no.6, pp.503, 1938-09-28
著者
石井 壽夫
出版者
東洋史研究会
雑誌
東洋史研究 (ISSN:03869059)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.7, no.1, pp.20-30, 1942-05-20
著者
糟谷 憲一
出版者
東洋史研究会
雑誌
東洋史研究 (ISSN:03869059)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.70, no.1, pp.100-126, 2011-06

The aim of this article is to elucidate the changes in the power structure in Joseon during the period from the Kabo Reform (July, 1894) to eve of the Russo-Japanese War (February, 1904). The author has previously examined the power structure of the Taeweongun 大院君 regime and the Min clan 閔氏 regime. The method of analysis involved a survey of those appointed to bureaucratic offices in the upper levels of the regime, clarifying to which of Four Sects (Sasek Tangp'a 四色黨派) and clans they belonged and calculating the ratios. As a result, the author made clear that within the Taeweongun regime, the ascendancy of Noron 老論, the largest faction, was unshaken, and that in the second half of the Min clan regime (December 1884 to July 1894) the ascendancy of the Noron faction became even stronger, and the power of the Yeohung Min 驪興閔 clan, which was a part of the Noron faction and was associated with the matrilineal side of the royal house, increased dramatically. In this article I survey appointees to the central government posts of Minister, Vice-Minister, and to the Department of the Imperial Household and analyze their affiliation with factions and clans. As this period was one of major political change, my analysis is based on distinguishing four periods: 1) that of the Kabo Reform, 2) that when the King resided in the Russian legation (February, 1896 to February, 1897), 3) that of the unfolding of the Independent Club's push for reform (February, 1897 to January, 1899), and 4) that of imperial despotism (January 1899 to February 1904). As a result, I have been able to clarify the following points. First, in regard to the Noron, the power of the Noron and influential clans, such as the Yeohung Min, declined within the upper levels of the government following the Kabo Reforms, but they maintained great influence in upper ranks of the Department of the Imperial Household. The power of the Noron in the upper levels of government was restored to the level of the latter half of the Min clan regime after the Independent Club began promoting reform. During that period, the Noron continued to occupy positions of power in the upper levels of the Department of the Imperial Household, and the power of the influential clans in the Noron faction was completely restored. Second, during the period of imperial despotism, the power of the Noron, from which ministerial appointments were made, increased, and the strength of the Noron in the upper levels of the Department of the Imperial Household grew to 50 percent. I believe this is an important factor in considering the foundation that supported imperial despotism.
著者
愛宕松男著
出版者
東洋史研究会
巻号頁・発行日
1959
著者
羽田亨著
出版者
東洋史研究会
巻号頁・発行日
1957

1 0 0 0 朝鮮史研究

著者
内藤雋輔著
出版者
東洋史研究会
巻号頁・発行日
1961
著者
西村元佑著
出版者
東洋史研究会
巻号頁・発行日
1968