著者
高木 智見
出版者
東洋史研究會
雑誌
東洋史研究 (ISSN:03869059)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.47, no.4, pp.727-757, 1989-03-31
著者
宮崎 市定
出版者
東洋史研究会
雑誌
東洋史研究 (ISSN:03869059)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.20, no.2, 1961-10
著者
加藤 直人
出版者
東洋史研究會
雑誌
東洋史研究 (ISSN:03869059)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.45, no.3, pp.p452-478, 1986-12

The rebellion of Lobjang danjin that arose in the first year of Yongzheng 雍正 (1723) was carried out by the chiefs (tayiji) of the Qosuɣud tribe of Koke-naɣur and by the Tibetans and Muslims who were attached to them. Among them were also included many lamas (blama). The rebellion was quite carefully planned; nevertheless, it proved to be no match for the Qing army, and in less than one month it was thoroughly repulsed. Moreover, because there was dissension within the Qosuɣud tribe, in a little over four short months they were completely subjugated. One reason that can be offered for the defeat of the rebellion is that Lobjang danjin was too optimistic in his estimate of the tribe of Jegun-ɣar. The rebellion took place at a time when the chief of the jegunɣar, Cevang rabtan, was trying to improve his relations with the Qing and was trying to establish his influence in the areas of Kazakh and Kirgiz. And at this time, he still harbored a serious grudge against the Qosuɣud because previously, the chiefs (tayiji) of the Qosuɣud tribe had united with the Qing and had wiped out the army of Jegun-ɣar which had entered Tibet. It was impossible from the beginning for the Qosuɣud to request reinforcements from this Jegun-ɣar. A second reason that can be offered for the defeat is that on the Qing side, the preparation against the rebellion, especially of commander Nian Gengyao 年羹堯, was meticulous, and the response was swift. Nian personally made his way to Xining 西寧, the main target of the Qosuɣud attack, and there he recruited troops and prepared for the assault. And the Qing side was able to rally the tayiji of the pro-Qing faction who had fled and other defectors, while the leaders of the rebellion were left in isolation. The Qing took this opportunity after the suppression of the rebellion to introduce the Banner system (niru-jasaɣ) into Koke-naɣur, and thereby to establish direct control over the area.
著者
宮崎 市定
出版者
東洋史研究会
雑誌
東洋史研究 (ISSN:03869059)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.18, no.3, 1959-12

It has been known that the Yung-cheng emperor paid special attention to the local administration and adopted some new policies for it. Here the author asks what degree the emperor's intentions were realized. He tries to offer an answer through analysing Lan Ting-yuan (藍鼎元)'s Lu-chou-kung-an (鹿州公案), i.e. the original records of the struggle against the interrupters of his administration when he was Chih-hsien (知縣) at P'u-ning and Chao-yang prefecture, Chao-chou-fu (潮州府), Kuang-tung (廣東) province. Most disturbances were arose from the activities of Shu-li (胥吏), Tu-hao (土豪), Wo-tao (窩盜) and Sung-shih (訟師). Inspite of victoryover them, he was removed from his post because of his chief's unreasonable hatred. However the emperor did not leave such a talented officer tosuffer unjustly. Later he was restored his honor and promoted to Chih-fu (知府). The author concludes from the above story that the emperor's efforts for the local administration had actual results in practice.
著者
岡本 隆司
出版者
東洋史研究會
雑誌
東洋史研究 (ISSN:03869059)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.58, no.1, pp.84-117, 1999-06
著者
福井 重雅
出版者
東洋史研究會
雑誌
東洋史研究 (ISSN:03869059)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.34, no.1, pp.24-57, 1975-06-30
著者
稻葉 穰
出版者
東洋史研究会
雑誌
東洋史研究 (ISSN:03869059)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.69, no.1, pp.174-151, 2010-06
著者
上田 早苗
出版者
東洋史研究會
雑誌
東洋史研究 (ISSN:03869059)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.28, no.4, pp.283-305, 1970-03-31
著者
細谷 良夫
出版者
東洋史研究會
雑誌
東洋史研究 (ISSN:03869059)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.49, no.4, pp.p644-670, 1991-03

Man Wen Lao Tang 滿文老檔, which is materials on the history of the early Ching period, is the compilation of Man Wen Yuan Tang 滿文原檔 (owned by the National Palace Museum at Taipei), which was published as Chiu Man Chou Tang 舊滿洲檔. Many things in this period are clarified through Yuan Tang. To examine Lao Tang, I investigated Huang Tzu Tang 黄字檔, a collection of ejehe (rescripts) in Yuan Tang. As a result I pointed out the need to clarify later amendments, such as unknown deletions, rewritings, corrections, and so on. To reexamine Lao Tang which records the amendments made to Huang Tzu Tang, we must restore the original copy of Huang Tzu Tang without these amendments and clarify the age when it was amended. While I restored the ejehe about Asan brothers in Huang Tzu Tang supposed to be the one of the 11th year of T'ienming 天命 by Lao Tang and clarified the process of amending to it, I compared their careers. Then the following becomes clear. Huang Tzu Tang is likely to have been copied in the 8th month of the 10th year of T'ienming. It is clear that the amendments made to it reached the 8th month of the 3rd year of T'ients'ung 天聰. The ejehe of Huang Tzu Tang tells the situation of the 3rd year of T'ients'ung against the accounts of Lao Tang.
著者
澁谷 浩一
出版者
東洋史研究会
雑誌
東洋史研究 (ISSN:03869059)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.70, no.3, pp.608-572, 2011-12

The peace agreement between Qing and Zunghar of 1740 was a historical turning point in which the two parties established for the first time peaceful and amicable relations, but the understanding of the circumstances and contents of the agreement has been insufficient. This study of the process of the negotiations for a peace agreement and the content of the peace agreement through a detailed examination of newly discovered Manchu language sources addresses the peace agreement from the viewpoint of international relations in central Eurasia and focuses in particular on the influence of the conclusion of the Treaty of Kyakhta of 1728. From the opening of negotiations both sides were strongly conscious of their relations with Russia. From the start the Yongzheng emperor attempted to determine the national boundary in manner of the Treaty of Kyakhta in which the details of the national border in the region was decided after the agreement. The Qing side thus advocated establishing a buffer zone and the permanent guard posts, karun, in the negotiations on the basis of the experience of negotiations with Russia on determining the border. On the other hand, the Zunghar side, while exploring the strengthening of ties with Russia in the early stage, stressed to the Qing that amicable relations with Russia existed even though the border had not been settled, and thereafter it consistently upheld the position that the settling the border was not desirable. The Qianlong emperor, who succeeded Yongzheng, yielded to Galdan Tseren who rejected the Qing proposal for a national border set at the Altai Mountains, and agreed to a peace that left the national border undemarcated. The ultimate peace agreement involved mutual recognition of maintenance of the current pasture lands that did not go beyond the Altai mountains or Zavkhan River, and additionally recognition of status quo in regard to the Zunghar Ulyanhai tribe, located on the northern side of the Altai range, which is an important clause that has not previously been recognized. This clause reflected the intention of the Qing side to confirm a resolution with the Zunghar the issue of sovereignty over the Ulyanhai that had been resolved with the Russians in the Treaty of Kyakhta. It is fair to say that the peace agreement made at this time was predicated in its entirety on the conclusion of the Treaty of Kyakhta between Russia and the Qing and established under its influence as can also be seen in the stipulations on emissaries and trade that were made at the same time during which relations with Russia and the Treaty of Kyakhta were in mind throughout.
著者
井谷 鋼造
出版者
東洋史研究會
雑誌
東洋史研究 (ISSN:03869059)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.47, no.1, pp.116-149, 1988-06-30
著者
川本 正知
出版者
東洋史研究會
雑誌
東洋史研究 (ISSN:03869059)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.42, no.2, pp.285-317, 1983-09-30