著者

間野 英二

出版者

東洋史研究会

雑誌

東洋史研究 (ISSN:03869059)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.63, no.1, pp.126-132, 2004-06

出版者

東洋史研究会

雑誌

東洋史研究 (ISSN:03869059)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.8, no.1, pp.41-43, 1943-03-31

著者

中島 樂章

出版者

東洋史研究会

雑誌

東洋史研究 (ISSN:03869059)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.74, no.4, pp.755-792, 2016-03

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From 1542 to 1544, the Portuguese arrived successively in Ryukyu, Japan and Korea. Here I investigate the development of intra-Asian trade carried out by Portuguese private traders in the mid-16th century, focusing on the pepper trade in particular. The lifeline of the Portuguese seaborne empire was the export of pepper produced on the Malabar Coast to the European market via the carreira da ĺndia (route to India). In theory, trade in pepper was designated a monopoly of Portuguese crown ships, and private trade in pepper was prohibited. Only the crews of royal ships were permitted to load pepper on board to trade privately. From the mid-16th century, however, it gradually became common for Portuguese kings to confer on certain persons the right to engage in commercial navigation by a specified route. Simultaneously, private trading in pepper gradually increased, too. On the other hand, Chinese smuggling trade to the Southeast Asia, especially to Malacca, also escalated. Smugglers mainly set sail from the coastal region of Zhangzhou 漳州 Bay in Southern Fujian 福建, violating the maritime prohibition policy enforced by the Ming dynasty. In the 1530's and the 1540's, The capitães (captains) of Malacca, such as Estêvão da Gama (in office 1534-39) and Pêro de Faria (in office 1539-42) created their own trade networks in the Southeast and the East Asian seas, where many private traders engaged in intra-Asian trade. In addition, in the 1540's, smuggling traders, who came from Huizhou 徽州 prefecture in Southern Anhui 安徽 province, advanced into the maritime trade in the South China Sea, and developed close connections with Pêro de Faria and his successors. They drew the Portuguese private traders, who were called as "folangji" by the Chinese, into the smuggling trade at 雙嶼 Shuangyu port, located in the Zhoushan 舟山 Islands off Ningbo 寧波. Under the open trade policy of Martin Afonso de Sousa, Governor of Estado da ĺndia (in office 1542-45), intra-Asian trade by Portuguese private traders expanded even more. But his successor, João de Castro (in office 1545-48), planning to tighten discipline in maritime trade in Asian seas, called a conference concerning the intra-Asian trade of pepper. The opinions submitted to the governor by the participants at the conference after the gathering reveal that a large quantity of peppers shipped to the Chinese market by the Portuguese traders remained unsold in 1543 and 1544. And 1543 is precisely the year the Portuguese first arrived at Tanegashima 種子島 on board the junk of Wang Zhi 王直, who later became a leader of wokou (Japanese pirates) in the 1550s. It is estimated that their ship set sail to Japan from Patani, which was a hub port for the exportation of pepper to China, and arrived at Tanegashima via China, probably from Zhangzhou 漳州 or Shuangyu. In 1543 and 1544, the price of pepper in China had plummeted due to excessive supplies. It seems that, as a result, the Portuguese private traders embarked on their voyage to Kyushu, and exchanged their cargo of pepper and Chinese commodities for Japanese silver. The first arrival of the Portuguese in Japan was not only the result of expansion of the trade network of Chinese maritime traders in the East China Sea, but also a consequence of the growth of intra-Asian trade of Portuguese private traders in the mid-16th century.

著者

キム ハンバク

出版者

東洋史研究会

雑誌

東洋史研究 (ISSN:03869059)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.76, no.4, pp.589-618, 2018-03

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This paper analyzes the background of the excessive number of military exiles in China proper in the 18th century and the countermeasures employed by the Qing dynasty to address the problem. The Qing dynasty provided for three kinds of exile, that is, common exile (流刑 liuxing), military exile (充軍 chongjun), and deportation (發遣 faqian), the harshest punishment, second only to the death penalty. The former two types sent exiles to prefectures (州 zhou) and counties (縣 xian) in China proper. This differed from the system during the Ming era, when soldiers found guilty of crimes were sent to military units (衞所 weisuo) as military exiles, in place of punishment. However, military exile was drastically transformed from the Ming ideal, becoming a punishment not unlike common exile. Evidence of changes in military exile can be seen, for example, in alteration in the place of exile, elimination of forced labor, permission for an accompanying spouse as determined by law, and the possibility of monetary compensation. As a result of this transition, military exile, originally established as a stronger punishment, was no longer more severe than common exile. This brought about some problems in the hierarchy of criminal law. Meanwhile, these changes in military exile caused an administrative problem. Exiles sent to prefectures and counties had to support themselves, but it was hard to make a living thousands of li 里 away from their hometowns. Because they were criminals who had already committed serious crimes, governors of the Qing considered them risky elements. In addition, the number of exiles being sent to prefectures and counties grew larger and larger. Daolibiao 道里表, a scheme designed to allow exiles to be sent more efficiently made the situation worse because it was more concerned with fairness than flexibility. Under this circumstance, the Qing government granted pardons to those who lived more than five years in their place of exile in an attempt to reduce the number of exiles. The standpoint of the criminal law that caused the excessive number of exiles in the 18th century and that was discovered in the process of responding to the problem showed the inertia inherited from traditional China, and the Qing was truly in the position of protecting this.

著者

五十嵐 大介

出版者

東洋史研究会

雑誌

東洋史研究 (ISSN:03869059)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.66, no.3, pp.505-475, 2007-12

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With the implementation of the highly systematic and well organized Iqta system, which depended on the completion of the cadastral survey (1313-25), referred to as al-rawk al-Nasiri, in Mamluk ruled Egypt and Syria (1250-1517), the Mamluk state and political system were constructed on this foundation. In this manner, the regimes of foreign military rulers, which were based on the Iqta system, which had been developed in the Arab-Muslim world since the latter half of the tenth century, reached an apex in the highly systematized Mamluk regime. As the fundamental land system of the period, the Iqta system served as the axis of political, military and governmental systems and formed the system that was the core of the ruling structure in which the Mamluks, who comprised the ruling class, controlled rural areas through possession of the Iqta lands and thereby held a grip on the supply of food, public works, economic and religious activities of the cities through the redistribution of the wealth obtained from the rural areas, and this influence reached throughout the entire society. However, the rapid expansion of the amount of land designated as waqf (religious endowment) following the latter half of the fourteenth century had a great influence on the Mamluk regime. This was not limited to the fact that due to the transformation of the state's land (amlak bayt ai-mal) into the waqf, the amount of land that could be distributed for the Iqta's was decreased and the economic foundation of the Mamluks continued to shrink. The increasing importance of the waqf, which was fundamentally independent from state control, as a self-regulating system for the redistribution of wealth that linked the cities and rural areas is thought to be link to the problem of relativizing and reduction of the social role of the Iqta system. From this point of view, I employ narrative and archival sources in this study to consider the sudden expansion of the waqf, whose social role from the late fourteenth century to the early sixteenth century in Egypt and Syria reached a stage that could not be ignored, the influence of the expansion of the waqf on the Mamluk regime, and amidst these factors, how the Mamluk military ruling class maintained the ruling structure, particularly in regard to the economic aspect. As a result, I make clear that they were involved at various levels in the waqf system as donators and beneficiaries, as administrators, and as leaseholders of waqf land, and thereby they were able to obtain wealth and social influence and were also able to maintain the Mamluk regime of ruling structure by incorporating the waqf system within it.

著者

德永 洋介

出版者

東洋史研究会

雑誌

東洋史研究 (ISSN:03869059)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.73, no.4, pp.577-610, 2015-03

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Many instances of illegal activities are recorded in the Song historical literature. These involved not only unlawful trafficking in items that were government monopolies, but also transregional operations of organized crime across districts and administrative units. These organized groups of burglars and/or bandits, were called qundao 群盜or junzei 軍賊. The gradual increase in the scale and number of crimes and the better organization of these groups caused significant social unrest in the Song. Deeply concerned, the dynasty answered by improving the law enforcement system to arrest these criminals and developed a mechanism to maintain the security of local communities at the neighborhood level. Strict measures were taken against burglary and banditry, and several rural areas were named top priority areas (zhongfa difen 重法地分), where an all-out crackdown was carried out. These legal measures were collectively called Daozei zhongfa 盜賊重法. The Daozei zhongfa was in effect for 43 years during the late Northern Song period. It started with the institution of the Wocang Zhongfa 窩藏重法 in 1065 (the second year of the Zhiping 治平 era) under the reign of Emperor Yingzong 英宗, and was followed by the Jiedao Zhongfa 劫盜重法 introduced the next year. What was groundbreaking about the Wocang zhongfa was that it was security legislation aimed not at the criminals themselves, but at collaborators and acts of support, such as harboring criminals (wocang 窩藏), providing renegades hideouts and offer necessary services and goods. The law was intended to destroy criminal organizations by clamping down on those who helped them. Wocang zhongfa punished the family members of the criminals. The Jiedao zhongfa stipulated that the authorities could punish those criminals more heavily than preceding punitive laws. Both these laws were indeed harsh. However the jurisdiction of the new legislation, Daozei zhongfa, was very limited from the time of its promulgation. Its maximum geographic range was reached in 1086, the first year of the Yuanyou 元祐 era of Emperor Zhezong 哲宗. However, even at that time it never extended beyond Kaifeng 開封, the capital city of the dynasty, and some other main prefectures and counties along the transport network in the middle and lower reaches of the Yellow River and the Huai River which were linked to Kaifeng nor beyond the mountainous area of Fujian. As time went on, the burglars and bandits became stronger and more daring, and the situation worsened. The Daozei zhongfa was tested by this reality and its effectiveness was increasingly questioned. The Song authorities' response wavered. On the one hand, the central government as a temporary measure expanded the legislation's jurisdiction beyond the original areas, and also repeatedly attempted to appy the Wocang zhonfa as a nationwide legal norm. The zhongfa difen were quickly abolished in 1108, the second year of the Daguan 大觀 era under Emperor Huizong 徽宗. The aforementioned context was the underlying cause, but the law had become more and more inconsistent and most of the Wocang-related regulations in the legislation were incorporated in the general laws (海行法) of the Chiling geshi 敕令格式. In the Southern Song the general laws also included an article on family collective responsibility and a provision providing rewards from confiscated property. This fact indicates that these measures were then reckoned effective to combat the problem of wocang. It also means that the regulations that were in the beginning a stopgap measure in the interim legislation of zhongfa finally became formal components of universal law. Put into historical perspective, this legal environment of the Song dynasty proved to have paved the way for the appearance of the Qiang qie daozei wozhu li 强竊盜賊窩主例 of the following Yuan dynasty and the Daozei wozhu fa 盜賊窩主法 of the later Ming dynasty.

著者

板橋 曉子

出版者

東洋史研究会

雑誌

東洋史研究 (ISSN:03869059)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.78, no.2, pp.326-358, 2019-09

著者

小澤 実

出版者

東洋史研究会

雑誌

東洋史研究 (ISSN:03869059)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.71, no.3, pp.438-423, 2012-12

著者

石濱 裕美子

出版者

東洋史研究会

雑誌

東洋史研究 (ISSN:03869059)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.64, no.2, pp.400-407, 2005-09

著者

ギーレ エノ

出版者

東洋史研究会

雑誌

東洋史研究 (ISSN:03869059)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.63, no.2, pp.203-239, 2004-09

著者

村井 章介

出版者

東洋史研究会

雑誌

東洋史研究 (ISSN:03869059)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.66, no.2, pp.229-266, 2007-09

著者

内藤 戊申

出版者

東洋史研究会

雑誌

東洋史研究 (ISSN:03869059)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.7, no.2-3, pp.186-186, 1942-07-01

著者

倉田 淳之助

出版者

東洋史研究会

雑誌

東洋史研究 (ISSN:03869059)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.8, no.4, pp.247-257, 1943-11-25

著者

真下 裕之

出版者

東洋史研究会

雑誌

東洋史研究 (ISSN:03869059)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.71, no.3, pp.534-489, 2012-12

著者

五十嵐 大介

出版者

東洋史研究会

雑誌

東洋史研究 (ISSN:03869059)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.66, no.3, pp.505-475, 2007-12

---

With the implementation of the highly systematic and well organized Iqta system, which depended on the completion of the cadastral survey (1313-25), referred to as al-rawk al-Nasiri, in Mamluk ruled Egypt and Syria (1250-1517), the Mamluk state and political system were constructed on this foundation. In this manner, the regimes of foreign military rulers, which were based on the Iqta system, which had been developed in the Arab-Muslim world since the latter half of the tenth century, reached an apex in the highly systematized Mamluk regime. As the fundamental land system of the period, the Iqta system served as the axis of political, military and governmental systems and formed the system that was the core of the ruling structure in which the Mamluks, who comprised the ruling class, controlled rural areas through possession of the Iqta lands and thereby held a grip on the supply of food, public works, economic and religious activities of the cities through the redistribution of the wealth obtained from the rural areas, and this influence reached throughout the entire society. However, the rapid expansion of the amount of land designated as waqf (religious endowment) following the latter half of the fourteenth century had a great influence on the Mamluk regime. This was not limited to the fact that due to the transformation of the state's land (amlak bayt ai-mal) into the waqf, the amount of land that could be distributed for the Iqta's was decreased and the economic foundation of the Mamluks continued to shrink. The increasing importance of the waqf, which was fundamentally independent from state control, as a self-regulating system for the redistribution of wealth that linked the cities and rural areas is thought to be link to the problem of relativizing and reduction of the social role of the Iqta system. From this point of view, I employ narrative and archival sources in this study to consider the sudden expansion of the waqf, whose social role from the late fourteenth century to the early sixteenth century in Egypt and Syria reached a stage that could not be ignored, the influence of the expansion of the waqf on the Mamluk regime, and amidst these factors, how the Mamluk military ruling class maintained the ruling structure, particularly in regard to the economic aspect. As a result, I make clear that they were involved at various levels in the waqf system as donators and beneficiaries, as administrators, and as leaseholders of waqf land, and thereby they were able to obtain wealth and social influence and were also able to maintain the Mamluk regime of ruling structure by incorporating the waqf system within it.

著者

仲山 茂

出版者

東洋史研究会

雑誌

東洋史研究 (ISSN:03869059)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.68, no.4, pp.661-670, 2010-03

著者

宇都宮 淸吉 藪内 淸

出版者

東洋史研究会

雑誌

東洋史研究 (ISSN:03869059)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.5, no.4, pp.271-282, 1940-06-30

著者

青木 健

出版者

東洋史研究会

雑誌

東洋史研究 (ISSN:03869059)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.65, no.3, pp.614-583, 2006-12

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This study begins with a reexamination of the research of S. Wikander that was conducted 60 years ago on the geographical transition of the iconography of the imperial ideology of the Sassanian kingdom. The study also incorporates the achievements of research on Zoroastrianism, from Wikander to the present day, and then hypotheses that the reason that the Sassanid kings moved their place of pilgrimage to Azerbaijan after the 5th century was associated with the sacred fire, Adur Gusnasp, in Siz and the imperial throne, Takht-i Taqdis. The author has drawn upon evidence from archaeological and written material (in Pahlavi, Arabic, and early-modern Persian) and art historical hypotheses, to create a compilation of fact, legend, and theories on both. As a result, I was able to come up with a chronology based on the weight of the facts. In addition, I sought the reasons for the changes seen in the chronology in light of advances in the study of Zoroastrianism since the time Wikander. As a result the following prospect on the holy fire and the sacred throne were attained. Firstly, the author conjectures that as regards the holy fire, Adur Gusnasp, there was a relationship in which "changes in Zoroastrian thought" resulted in the "modification in imperial ideology of the Sassanid kingdom." In short, there was a chain of influence during the 5th century, from the "linking of the legend of the founder to of Azerbaijan" to "royal pilgrimage to Azerbaijan after the king's enthronement" to the "iconoclastic movement" and finally to the "destruction of stone relief of Xwarnah, symbolizing the right to rule" and the "increase in the importance of the sacred fire of Adur Gusnasp." As regards Takht-i Taqdis on the other hand, it appears to have been a temporary phenomenon based on the initiative of Khosrow II, and I am unable to posit any influence of Zoroastrian thought. The imperial throne can be thought of as an artifact of the attempt by Khosrow II, who held a firm grasp on imperial legitimacy inherited from his grandfather Khusrow I to construct his own imperial ideology free from Zoroastrian thought by highlighting the glory of his military exploits. However, due to a lack of detailed records, it was impossible to specify just what the nature of ideology that might have been.

著者

山本 進

出版者

東洋史研究会

雑誌

東洋史研究 (ISSN:03869059)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.75, no.2, pp.241-272, 2016-09

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Traditional studies of the history of firearms in East Asia have placed great importance on specifying the time when European guns were first introduced and technical comparison of guns made in each East Asian country. Although the authors differ in some respects, they have a common understanding that the gun introduced into Japan by Portuguese in 1542 or 1543 inaugurated a new epoch in the history of firearms in East Asia. However, there are few studies that discuss how guns were used on the battlefield. This article reexamines the history of the development of guns during the Joseon period of Korea history from the point of view of their tactical use. Guns had been introduced into Korea from China during the late Goryeo 高麗 period, and Joseon's King Sejong 世宗 attempted the full-fledged development of firearms, but few were used in battle as a result of their inaccuracy and a shortage of gunpowder. After the king's death, the guns were only used for fireworks. But after the pillaging of the Japanese piracy during Jiajing 嘉靖 era (1522-66), China and Korea made large-scale guns and Portuguese-style cannons that could be loaded on warships. In contrast, the harquebus spread as a battlefield weapon among the warring lords of Japan. At the beginning of the Japanese invasion in 1592, Japanese harquebus overwhelmed Korean bows, and Japanese forces were able to advance to Pyeongyang in a short time. However, after the Ming army entered the conflict, the Chinese troops fired cannons from outside the effective range of harquebus, triggering a Japanese response that revealed the weak points of the harquebus--its inaccuracy, short range and the difficulty of reloading. Japanese forces were put on the defensive. In the end, logistic superiority decided the war. After the war, the Joseon government attempted to maximize firearms by having each district supply a regular quantity of guns, powder and bullets every month, but this led to mass production of inferior goods. On the technical side, a long-range harquebus called a "thousand-step gun" was developed, but its use did not spread. As a result, the late Joseon was unable to mount a strong army, and we see that Joseon chose military tactics designed to outrange its enemies by shooting many guns from a long distance. The tactic of using guns to create a barrage and not at narrowly defined targets was used not only in Joseon but also by Western countries.

著者

森山 央朗

出版者

東洋史研究会

雑誌

東洋史研究 (ISSN:03869059)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.72, no.4, pp.748-716, 2014-03-31