著者

古賀 政利 井上 学 園田 和隆 田中 寛大 塩澤 真之 岡田 敬史 池之内 初 福田 哲也 佐藤 徹 猪原 匡史 板橋 亮 工藤 與亮 山上 宏 豊田 一則

出版者

一般社団法人 日本脳卒中学会

雑誌

脳卒中 (ISSN:09120726)

巻号頁・発行日

pp.10776, (Released:2020-03-30)

参考文献数

46

被引用文献数

3 1

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要旨:脳梗塞の診断にはCT もしくはMRI による画像評価が必須である.再開通療法の可能性があれば速やかに最低限必要な画像評価で再灌流療法の適応を決定することが重要である.2018 年に改訂された米国のガイドラインでは,来院から20 分以内に画像診断を行うことが推奨されたが,わが国のガイドラインには画像診断までの時間の推奨はない.わが国では普及率が高いMRI で急性期脳梗塞を評価している施設が多い.機械的血栓回収療法の適応判定には脳実質の評価に引き続き速やかな頭頸部血管評価が必要である.米国では発症6 時間超の脳梗塞に対してCT もしくはMRI を使用した脳虚血コア体積や灌流異常の評価による機械的血栓回収療法の適応を推奨しているが,わが国では灌流画像評価や迅速解析に対応した自動画像解析ソフトウェアが普及していない.急性期脳梗塞に対する適切な再灌流療法を行うための,わが国の医療環境にあわせた画像診断指針が必要であろう.

著者

板橋 亮平

出版者

日本法政学会

雑誌

法政論叢 (ISSN:03865266)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.47, no.1, pp.73-87, 2010-11-15

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Rawls is currently a very popular research topic. Although this is a desirable situation, studies on Rawls are full of inaccurate discourses. In Japan, too, studies especially on reflective equilibrium-are full of errors. In this paper I will demonstrate this, especially in the case of Japanese research.

著者

板橋 亮

出版者

日本神経治療学会

雑誌

神経治療学 (ISSN:09168443)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.40, no.3, pp.269-271, 2023 (Released:2023-08-21)

参考文献数

10

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Japan Stroke Society Guideline 2021 for the Treatment of Stroke (GL2021) is the totally revised version from the 2019 update version. The clinical question format was partially introduced, and we employed five grades of recommendation originally developed by the Guideline Committee and three levels of evidence. For the first time as Japan Stroke Society Guideline of the treatment of stroke, GL2021 was published also in English. The part of the main topics in GL 2021 are as follows : left atrial appendage closure, acute dual antiplatelet therapy, dual antiplatelet therapy including cilostazol on the chronic phase, optimal target for antihypertensive therapy in patients with stroke on the chronic stage, antithrombotic therapy for patients with cryptogenic stroke or embolic stroke of undetermined source, and so on. After the publishment of GL 2021, following topics have been introduced : mechanical thrombectomy for patients with large ischemic core, mechanical thrombectomy skipping intravenous thrombolysis, mechanical thrombectomy for basilar artery occlusion, and prasugrel for secondary stroke prevention. The next update 2023 Japanese version will be published in early summer 2023. We are just in the process of creating this update.

著者

板橋 亮平

出版者

日本法政学会

雑誌

法政論叢 (ISSN:03865266)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.45, no.1, pp.103-124, 2008-11-15 (Released:2017-11-01)

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The purpose of this paper is to clarify the different views in Rawls's The Law of Peoples from Kant's Perpetual Peace. The reason why I write this paper is that Rawls says The Law of Peoples depends on Kant's Perpetual Peace and he himself doesn't indicate the different points. First, by comparing the international law with the law of peoples, I demonstrate that there are different points as to the theoretical construction between them. Secondly, I indicate that there is a different stance as to self-defense of war between them. Thirdly, I maintain that the political that Rawls thinks of is different from the political that Kant states. Fourthly, I emphasize that the relation the international law supposes is different from the relation the law of peoples supposes.

著者

板橋 亮平

出版者

日本法社会学会

雑誌

法社会学 (ISSN:04376161)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2008, no.68, pp.212-230, 2008 (Released:2017-01-31)

著者

板橋 亮平

出版者

日本法政学会

雑誌

法政論叢 (ISSN:03865266)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.45, no.1, pp.103-124, 2008-11-15

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The purpose of this paper is to clarify the different views in Rawls's The Law of Peoples from Kant's Perpetual Peace. The reason why I write this paper is that Rawls says The Law of Peoples depends on Kant's Perpetual Peace and he himself doesn't indicate the different points. First, by comparing the international law with the law of peoples, I demonstrate that there are different points as to the theoretical construction between them. Secondly, I indicate that there is a different stance as to self-defense of war between them. Thirdly, I maintain that the political that Rawls thinks of is different from the political that Kant states. Fourthly, I emphasize that the relation the international law supposes is different from the relation the law of peoples supposes.

著者

板橋 亮平

出版者

日本法政学会

雑誌

法政論叢 (ISSN:03865266)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.42, no.2, pp.164-177, 2006-05-15

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The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate how possible political consensus is given a fact of pluralism of comprehensive doctrines, good and values. Firstly I indicate that Rawlsian political conception of justice is not constructed from the historical or religious background or the inherent logic but that the conception is transcendental. Secondly I maintain that the political conception of justice is derived not from the comprehensive doctrines or moral values but from a moral Kantian conception of free and equal citizens or persons. Thirdly I make it clear that the political conception of justice based on tha moral Kantian conception does not destroy pluralism of comprehensive values but makes the reasonable overlapping consensus possible, while unreasonable values or doctrines independently of the overlapping consensus enjoy the liberties.

著者

板橋 亮平

出版者

日本法政学会

雑誌

法政論叢 (ISSN:03865266)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.44, no.1, pp.154-183, 2007-11-15

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The purpose of this paper is to distinguish "limited liberalism" which has the political notion that the political conception or principle of justice is established independently of comprehensive doctrines or one's own good as self-determined value from "comprehensive liberalism" which has the political thought that the political conception or principle of justice is formed based on the logic or the substance of the comprehensive doctrines or the cultural identity. By doing this I maintain that the latter rawlsian liberalism contains both limited liberalism and comprehensive liberalism which are incompatible with each other. And as a whole I indicate that a mixture of two kinds of liberalism is also inherent in the former rawlsian liberalism. This demonstration makes the general view that Rawls is a covert who abandons the former rawlsian liberalism and adopts the latter rawlsian liberalism cause a misunderstanding. Firstly I emphasize an ingenious idea of Rawls's own which distinguishes the essential definition of justice from the substance of justice differently from the others who construct the theory of classical social contract. Secondly, however, on the other hand, I indicate that the essential definition of justice is diluted and that the logic of the substance of justice is emphasized by using the theoretical device of reflective equilibrium. Thirdly I dinstiguish the reasonable pluralism from the pluralism. I demonstrate that the reasonable pluralism as a normative conception can be realized after the latter that the comprehensive doctrines is incompatible with one another is relieved. And I maintain that this resolution also contains both limited liberalism and comprehensive liberalism and that in this point the former rawlsian liberalism is identical with the latter rawlsian liberalism.