著者

柿崎 一郎

出版者

横浜市立大学

雑誌

横浜市立大学論叢. 人文科学系列 (ISSN:09117717)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.66, no.2, pp.1-36, 2015

著者

柿崎 一郎

出版者

横浜市立大学学術研究会

雑誌

横浜市立大学論叢. 人文科学系列 (ISSN:09117717)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.66, no.3, pp.41-85, 2015

著者

柿崎 一郎

出版者

京都大学東南アジア地域研究研究所

雑誌

東南アジア研究 (ISSN:05638682)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.60, no.1, pp.73-75, 2022-07-31 (Released:2022-07-31)

参考文献数

2

著者

柿崎 一郎

出版者

東南アジア学会

雑誌

東南アジア -歴史と文化- (ISSN:03869040)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2010, no.39, pp.52-85, 2010 (Released:2016-12-14)

参考文献数

29

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The aim of this article is to describe the characteristics of Japanese military transport on Thai railways during World War II, by analyzing the train schedules now held in the National Archives of Thailand. These schedules contain such data as the number and type of carriages on each train together with their origin and destination for almost every day from the beginning of the War until September 1945. Although the author initially compiled the data from these schedules hoping to grasp the overall volume of Japanese military transport, it soon became evident that the data did not cover all types of activity, because there were not enough train movements from Malaya to Thailand in the schedules. This forced the author to complement the schedules with an analysis of bills for Japanese military transport issued by the Thai railway department. The author divides the war time period into four stages for analysis: 1) front-line-expansion (December 1941-June 1942), 2) construction of the Thai-Burma line (July 1942-October 1943), 3) the opening of the Thai-Burma line (November 1943-December 1944) and 4) network division (January-September 1945). During stage 1), the main transport flows were found on two routes: from Bangkok to Malaya via the Southern line and to Phitsanulok or Sawankhalok via the Northern line, corresponding to the Malaya Operation and the Burma Operation, respectively. Other flows originated from Cambodia to the same destinations via the Eastern line and Bangkok. During stage 2), flows from Bangkok to Malaya and from Cambodia to Bangkok still existed, although their volumes were reduced. On the other hand, new flows emerged from either Bangkok or Malaya to the starting point of the Thai-Burma line to supply its construction. Stage 3) experienced an increase in transport due to the opening of Thai-Burma line and the Imphal Operation. Flows to Malaya and the Thai-Burma line still accounted for the majority of the transport, but flows to the Isthmus of Kra and the North also increased to supplement the Thai-Burma line. Finally, during stage 4), transport volume further expanded, while the total distance of transport dramatically dropped, as many lines were halted at several points due to Allied bombing, to the extent that all long-distance transport was suspended, except on the Eastern line. The characteristic features of wartime Japanese military transport through Thai railways are threefold: 1) long-distance railway transport as a substitute for maritime transport, 2) supplementary transport to the Burmese front-lines, and 3) the existence of commodity transport unrelated to troop movements. This transport concentrated on supplementing the Burmese front-line rather than transport to Malaya, except during the Malay Operation period. As Japanese forces arrived at Saigon or Singapore for deployment to Burma, military transport on Thai railways became the main form of long-distance “international” movement. Before the War, Thai railways were of little importance as international lines compared to maritime transport. This “international” railway activity, while limited only to military transport, eventually emerged for the first time in Southeast Asia through the creation of “international” rail links with Cambodia and Burma, and a shortage of maritime vessels during wartime. Furthermore, there was a considerable amount of commodity transport apart from troop movements, a fact which has not been sufficiently dealt with in the “official” histories of the War.

著者

柿崎 一郎

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.55, no.4, pp.20-38, 2009-10-31 (Released:2014-09-15)

参考文献数

20

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This article discusses two private railways built in Thailand in the 1890s and 1900s. It analyzes the attempts of these two lines to develop into urban railways, and explains why they eventuallyfailed to do so.The two private lines discussed are (i) the Paknam Railway, the first railway in Thailand, which opened in 1893 and connected Bangkok to the mouth of the Chao Phraya river at Paknam; and (ii) the Thachin Railway, connecting Bangkok to Thachin (Samut Sakhon), which opened in 1905 and was extended in 1907 to Maeklong (Samut Songkhram) and was thereafter named the Maeklong Railway.Although initially both railways functioned as inter-city lines, by increasing their service frequency they soon began to serve functionally as intra-city or urban lines. The Paknam Railway introduced a motor-tramcar service within the Bangkok urban area in 1908, which was replaced in 1912 by an electric tramcar. A plan in the 1920s to electrify the entire line was discouraged by the government’s opposition to any extension of the concession period. Although the Paknam Railway was eventually electrified, its intra-city service was largely substituted by the newly extended tramline along it. The Maeklong line also began an electric tramcar service along one section to serve the Bangkok urban area, but global depression prevented it from realizing its full potential.The Thai government, having no intention to renew the private railway concessions, instead purchased the lines outright at the end of the concession periods. However, state ownership resulted in little further investment in the lines. The Paknam line suffered in competition with road transport, and soon became a loss-making venture. The Maeklong line, in contrast, which did not suffer from direct road competition, witnessed an increase in traffic volume, but this enhanced its inter-city, rather than its intra-city, functions. Prime Minister Sarit’s policy of ‘beauty’ brought the closure of the Paknam line in 1959. The Maeklong line also faced closure, but only one section was actually abandoned in the 1960s.There are three reasons why these railways failed to become true urban railways. First, the government’s state-oriented railway policy exhibited excessive caution towards foreign investors. Second, the foreign investors that did exist restrained their investments, particularly in the final periods of their concessions, partly in reaction to government policy. Third, the government failed to recognize the potential of these railways to provide urban mass transport. As a result of these reasons, Bangkok failed to maintain urban railways and developed post-war along a path of automobile-dependency, a path that has brought numerous transport and environmental problems in its wake.

著者

柿崎 一郎

出版者

横浜市立大学学術研究会

雑誌

横浜市立大学論叢. 人文科学系列 (ISSN:09117717)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.65, no.2,3合併, pp.125-156, 2014

著者

柿崎 一郎

雑誌

横浜市立大学論叢. 人文科学系列 (ISSN:09117717)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.66, no.3, pp.41-85, 2015

著者

柿崎 一郎

出版者

横浜市立大学学術研究会

雑誌

横浜市立大学論叢. 人文科学系列 (ISSN:09117717)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.64, no.2, pp.1-42, 2013

著者

柿崎 一郎

出版者

横浜市立大学学術研究会

雑誌

横浜市立大学論叢. 人文科学系列 (ISSN:09117717)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.72, no.1・2, pp.29-71, 2021-03

著者

柿崎 一郎

出版者

横浜市立大学学術研究会

雑誌

横浜市立大学論叢. 人文科学系列 (ISSN:09117717)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.65, no.1, pp.183-216, 2013

著者

柿崎 一郎

出版者

横浜市立大学学術研究会

雑誌

横浜市立大学論叢. 人文科学系列 (ISSN:09117717)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.66, no.1, pp.51-94, 2014

著者

柿崎 一郎

出版者

東京外国語大学

雑誌

言語・地域文化研究 (ISSN:13419587)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2, pp.327-352, 1996-03

著者

柿崎 一郎

出版者

横浜市立大学学術研究会

雑誌

横浜市立大学論叢. 社会科学系列 (ISSN:09117725)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.65, no.1, pp.203-234, 2014

著者

柿崎 一郎

出版者

京都大学

雑誌

東南アジア研究 (ISSN:05638682)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.49, no.2, pp.268-299, 2011-09-30

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This article aims to reveal urban transport policy in Bangkok in the eras of "development" and "democratization"from the end of the 1950s to the mid 1970s, focusing on the politicization of bus services. A unification plan of numerous bus operators led by the Ministry of Transport surfaced at the beginning. Subsequently, Bangkok Municipality's plan, supported by the Ministry of Interior, came out. However,both suffered setbacks through public opinion and leadership fights within the government. Private operators finally pushed forward with unification independently, though this ultimately failed.When a fare hike in 1968 was withdrawn due to fierce civic resistance, a policy of reducing expenditure instead of introducing fare hikes was considered. As a result of this, a conclusion was reached that there was no method apart from expenditure reduction through unifying existing operators. This unification plan was carried over into the era of "democratization" after the collapse of the Thanom government in 1973, and it made progression within the limits of the license renewal in 1975. Eventually, the plan was settled by the installation of a state-owned company. Then, it was reorganized into the public authority; the Bangkok Mass Transport Authority.As the politicization of bus services progressed, the unification plan became a tool for materializing populist style policy. Political decisions made in regards to countermeasures during general elections andthe realization of campaign pledges greatly influenced the realization of unification. Unification in the form of a public authority was finally achieved in order to realize the Khukkrit Government's populist stylepolicy; free bus services for the poor. However, since the bus service has deteriorated, it has not functionedto the degree that politicians expected.