著者
網谷 祐一
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.48, no.1, pp.35-48, 2015-07-31 (Released:2015-11-08)
参考文献数
17

In Realism and Naturalizing Knowledge (Keisho Shobo, 2013), Ryo Uehara carefully formulates the homeostatic property cluster theory of natural kinds and expands it by applying this framework to artifacts and knowledge and thereby drawing them in the naturalistic picture of the world. This is a substantial addition to the development of naturalistic philosophy in Japan. In this essay I shall make general comments on his account of natural kinds in the following respects: Uehara's distinction between real and nominal kinds, his objection to the species-as-individual thesis, the relative lack of attention to the distinction between the realism of natural kinds and the scientific realism, and finally, races as possible natural kinds.
著者
網谷 祐一
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.41, no.1, pp.1_79-1_94, 2008 (Released:2009-07-31)
参考文献数
32

Gerd Gigerenzer's views on probabilistic reasoning in humans have come under close scrutiny. Very little attention, however, has been paid to the evolutionary component of his argument. According to Gigerenzer, reasoning about probabilities as frequencies is so common today because it was favored by natural selection in the past. This paper presents a critical examination of this argument. It will show first, that, pace Gigerenzer, there are some reasons to believe that using the frequency format was not more adaptive than using the standard (percentage) format and, second, that Gigerenzer's evolutionary argument and his other arguments such as his historical description of the notion of probability are in tension with each other.
著者
網谷 祐一
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.48, no.1, pp.35-48, 2015

In <i>Realism and Naturalizing Knowledge</i> (Keisho Shobo, 2013), Ryo Uehara carefully formulates the homeostatic property cluster theory of natural kinds and expands it by applying this framework to artifacts and knowledge and thereby drawing them in the naturalistic picture of the world. This is a substantial addition to the development of naturalistic philosophy in Japan. In this essay I shall make general comments on his account of natural kinds in the following respects: Ueharas distinction between real and nominal kinds, his objection to the species-as-individual thesis, the relative lack of attention to the distinction between the realism of natural kinds and the scientific realism, and finally, races as possible natural kinds.
著者
網谷 祐一
出版者
京都大学文学部科学哲学科学史研究室
雑誌
科学哲学科学史研究 (ISSN:18839177)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.5, pp.1-20, 2011-02-28

The species problem is the longstanding puzzle concerning the nature of the species category or how to correctly define "species." Many philosophers, as well as biologists, have attributed the recalcitrant nature of the species problem to the gap between the essentialistic nature of the species concept, on the one hand, and the vague boundaries of actual species, on the other. In this paper I will examine two possible readings of this account. On the first reading, the gap comes from the lack of non-essentialistic definitions of "species." The second reading suggests that the gap comes from biologists' psychological disposition to hold essentialistic conception of species, even when non-essentialistic definitions are available to them. Then I will argue that evidence favors the second reading over the first.
著者
網谷 祐一
出版者
京都大学文学部科学哲学科学史研究室
雑誌
科学哲学科学史研究 (ISSN:18839177)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.5, pp.1-20, 2011-02-28

The species problem is the longstanding puzzle concerning the nature of the species category or how to correctly define "species." Many philosophers, as well as biologists, have attributed the recalcitrant nature of the species problem to the gap between the essentialistic nature of the species concept, on the one hand, and the vague boundaries of actual species, on the other. In this paper I will examine two possible readings of this account. On the first reading, the gap comes from the lack of non-essentialistic definitions of "species." The second reading suggests that the gap comes from biologists' psychological disposition to hold essentialistic conception of species, even when non-essentialistic definitions are available to them. Then I will argue that evidence favors the second reading over the first.
著者
網谷 祐一
出版者
京都大学文学部科学哲学科学史研究室
雑誌
科学哲学科学史研究 (ISSN:18839177)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2, pp.133-149, 2008-01-31

Robert Elliot's criticism of ecological restoration is a classical work in environmental ethics. He argues that a restored nature, because of its lack of natural origin, does not have the kind of intrinsic value an original nature has (the anti-restoration thesis). His work shares with many environmental philosophers an assumption that if nature is proved to have intrinsic value then this gives us philosophically sufficient guidance on practical environmental problems. This paper examines his justification for the anti-restoration thesis and this assumption. I shall agree with Elliot that the antirestoration thesis is justified by appealing to the naturalness of origin. However, this does not necessarily help us decide whether or not a particular restoration project should be done. Not all discussions of intrinsic value help us solve practical problems of restoration. Environmental pragmatists are right in this regard.