著者

佐金 武

出版者

京都大学哲学論叢刊行会

雑誌

哲学論叢 (ISSN:0914143X)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.35, pp.82-93, 2008

著者

佐金 武

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.42, no.1, pp.1_15-1_28, 2009 (Released:2009-09-30)

参考文献数

12

---

The central thesis to presentism is that only the present exists; what is past no longer exists and future does not exist yet. One problem with this position is how to explicate the asymmetry of time. In ordinary talk, we say that the past is fixed whereas the future is still open. How can we cash out such metaphors? The answer, however, will not automatically follow from presentism itself because past and future are said to be ontologically on par, both being nonexistent. In this essay, I first introduce a theory of presentism, which I call Tensed-Property Presentism, and show how it can explicate the asymmetry of time.

著者

佐金 武

出版者

京都大学哲学論叢刊行会

雑誌

哲学論叢 (ISSN:0914143X)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.32, pp.94-101, 2005-09-01

著者

佐金 武

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.44, no.1, pp.1_59-1_74, 2011 (Released:2011-10-13)

参考文献数

18

---

In his book Metaphysics of Temporal Modality, Prof. Isashiki takes a very unique and intriguing approach to philosophy of time. He begins with raising the following three questions. (i) What does it mean to say that the past is determinate or fixed whereas the future is open? (ii) Why is it impossible to see temporal transition from the present to the past? (iii) Does the present have no duration? Answering to those questions, he declares that he does not assume any linear representation of time. In this review, I shall examine to what extent the attempt succeeds and in what respects it fails.

著者

佐金 武

出版者

京都大学哲学論叢刊行会

雑誌

哲学論叢 (ISSN:0914143X)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.33, pp.67-78, 2006

---

"David Chalmers claims that the nature of consciousness as a subjective quality constitutes an independent subject area and that its existence cannot be reduced to anything else. In particular, reductive explanations to physical theories as well as functionalism about mental states are hopeless for this purpose (perhaps they assume the existence of the conscious mind, in that failing to explain what we seek to understand about its very nature). His argument for mind-body dualism, which is supposed to sustain the claim above, proceeds as follows: 1) what is conceivable is possible; 2) There is at least one conceivable world where one’s physical duplicate has no consciousness, which is called a zombie-world; therefore, 3) the zombie-world is possible; 4) if it is possible, then physicalism or materialism is false; therefore, 5) physicalism is false. The central concern of this essay is to critically examine Premises 1) and 2). Concerning Premise 1), which I shall call the “Conceivability-Possibility Thesis,” some precedent arguments based on similar theses can be found throughout the history of western philosophy (e.g. the Cartesian argument for mind-body dualism and Hume’s denial of the reality of causality), and many contemporary philosophers discuss their validity and force (e.g. van Cleve, 1983 & Yablo, 1993). It should be noted, however, that Chalmers uniquely defends the thesis, as seen in his developed theory known as “epistemic two-dimensionalism,” and I shall begin with its survey (Section 2 and 3). Through this examination, it will be realized that 1) and 2) are not independent premises, and that 1) can never be established as a general rule applicable to all cases until conceivability of the zombie-world is shown to be a priori. I shall argue that no such a priori reasoning for non-existence of consciousness is incomplete (Section 4). (Note also that if this is correct, the zombie case, pace Chalmers, will fall under the “twilight zone” in his terminology and even be in danger of becoming a counter-example to his Conceivability-Possibility Thesis. It therefore should be admitted either that conceivability of the unconscious mind is incomplete, or that the thesis that is expected to encompass something that is merely, or only allegedly conceivable, cannot be maintained. In effect, the zombie argument will turn out to be undone. Following this, responses to six possible objections will be set forth (Section 5)."

著者

佐金 武

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.55, no.2, pp.3-18, 2023-03-30 (Released:2023-03-31)

参考文献数

34

---

The contemporary debate on time which was opened up by J. E. M McTaggart tends to focus on metaphysical issues framed in the dispute between tensed theories and tenseless theories. In the history of the philosophy of time, on the other hand, the subject matter looks strikingly different, and the focus is more wideranging. At least three main categories should be considered: idealism, realism, and relationism. This paper aims to offer an insight into contemporary and classical philosophy of time from a systematic perspective and thereby to suggest a research program worth exploring.

著者

佐金 武

出版者

京都大学大学院文学研究科哲学研究室

雑誌

京都大学文学部哲学研究室紀要 : Prospectus

巻号頁・発行日

vol.10, pp.72-84, 2007-12

著者

太田 紘史 佐金 武

出版者

京都大学大学院文学研究科哲学研究室

雑誌

京都大学文学部哲学研究室紀要 : Prospectus

巻号頁・発行日

vol.12, pp.106-118, 2010-02

著者

佐金 武

出版者

京都大学大学院文学研究科哲学研究室

雑誌

京都大学文学部哲学研究室紀要 : Prospectus

巻号頁・発行日

vol.11, 2009-03

著者

太田 紘史 佐金 武

出版者

科学基礎論学会

雑誌

科学基礎論研究 (ISSN:00227668)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.39, no.1, pp.1-11, 2011-11-25 (Released:2017-08-01)

参考文献数

28

---

Temporality is an essential part of our conscious experience. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of a conscious individual who does not know what it's like to "experience time." For instance, we know what it's like to see bubbles in a glass rising up to the surface, to hear music playing, and even to feel time passing. In this paper, we first clarify three temporal characteristics of conscious experience: change, duration, and direction. Next, we criticize a memory-based account of those characteristics and suggest a representationalist account as an alternative approach. We also consider some objections to the representationalist account raised by B. Dainton, and try to reply to them. Finally, we give an outline of a systematic representationalist theory of all the three temporal characteristics.

著者

佐金武 梶本尚敏

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.45, no.2, pp.131-134, 2012 (Released:2016-01-15)

被引用文献数

1 1

著者

佐金 武

出版者

京都大学哲学論叢刊行会

雑誌

哲学論叢 (ISSN:0914143X)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.34, pp.84-90, 2007

著者

佐金 武

出版者

京都大学哲学論叢刊行会

雑誌

哲学論叢 (ISSN:0914143X)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.34, pp.25-36, 2007

著者

佐金 武

出版者

京都大学哲学論叢刊行会

雑誌

哲学論叢 (ISSN:0914143X)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.33, pp.126-137, 2006

著者

土屋 貴志 佐金 武 野末 紀之 新ヶ江 章友 石川 優 濱野 千尋

出版者

大阪公立大学

雑誌

挑戦的研究(萌芽)

巻号頁・発行日

2022-06-30

---

性行動の実証的調査および文献テクスト分析を踏まえ「性愛および『性的倒錯』とはそもそも何なのか」という問題について考察する。「性的倒錯」とは (i)「本来の性愛」からの逸脱、(ii)性愛に関する社会・文化的規範に対する違反、を含むが、両者は必ずしも重ならない。また、「本来の性愛」なるものを疑う立場もあれば、「本来の性愛」の普遍性から社会・文化的規範の恣意性を批判する立場もある。本研究では、従来のセクシュアリティ/ジェンダー研究の成果も踏まえつつ、性愛をとりまく社会・文化的背景について深く考察すると同時に、性愛および「性的倒錯」それ自体を問題とする根柢的な探究を行う。

著者

佐金 武

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.53, no.2, pp.191-213, 2021-03-31 (Released:2021-03-31)

参考文献数

54

被引用文献数

1

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The issue of (in)compatibility between presentism and time travel has intrigued many philosophers for the last few decades. Keller and Nelson [2001] have argued that, if presentism is a feasible theory of time that applies to ordinary (non-time travel) cases, then it should be compatible with time travel. Bigelow [2001] and Sider [2005], on the other hand, have independently argued that the idea of time travel contradicts the presentist conception of time because it involves the ʻspatialisation of timeʼ (in a metaphysical sense), which is something that presentists should resist. In support of the latter claim, I offer a new argument via a different route. More specifically, I clarify basic components of the view that I take as ʻorthodoxʼ presentism by examining how presentists have considered temporal notions of the existence of things and their property possession. It is because of these notions that presentists can sensibly maintain a dynamic theory of time and should not believe in time travel.

著者

鈴木 真 佐金 武 田中 泉吏 網谷 祐一

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.50, pp.129-143, 2017-12-20 (Released:2019-05-02)

著者

佐金 武

出版者

科学基礎論学会

雑誌

科学基礎論研究 (ISSN:00227668)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.41, no.1, pp.37-61, 2013-11-30 (Released:2017-08-31)

参考文献数

62

---

Presentism is the thesis that everything is present, which implies that there are no past (or future) things or events. It is sometimes said to be imcompatible with the claim that every truth must have some ground on being. In this paper, I will examine the efficacy of such an argument in favor of presentism. In my view, however, how to respond to the grounding objection depends on what kinds of past truths we deal with: (i) truths about how present things were, (ii) general truths about things that no longer eixst, and (iii) singular truths about wholly past things. Before discussing this, I will also give an overview of the grounding project.

著者

佐金 武

出版者

科学基礎論学会

雑誌

科学基礎論研究 (ISSN:00227668)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.40, no.2, pp.57-78, 2013-03-25 (Released:2017-08-01)

参考文献数

60

---

Time should be defined as the dimension of change because it passes. In this figurative talk, I believe, there is some truth that everyone should admit. In this paper, I aim to show what is behind the idea of time's passage, based on the presentist program originated by Arthur Prior, the founder of tense logic. For Prior, the presently existing things, and how they are, exhaust reality. Assuming this, he maintains that some statements may change in their truth-values since things, which those statements are about, do change in their properties. This is just what we mean by saying that time passes. I shall clarify and defend Prior's line of thought in the contemporary context of philosophy of time.

著者

佐金 武

出版者

京都大学哲学論叢刊行会

雑誌

哲学論叢 (ISSN:0914143X)

巻号頁・発行日

no.33, pp.67-78, 2006

---

"David Chalmers claims that the nature of consciousness as a subjective quality constitutes an independent subject area and that its existence cannot be reduced to anything else. In particular, reductive explanations to physical theories as well as functionalism about mental states are hopeless for this purpose (perhaps they assume the existence of the conscious mind, in that failing to explain what we seek to understand about its very nature). His argument for mind-body dualism, which is supposed to sustain the claim above, proceeds as follows: 1) what is conceivable is possible; 2) There is at least one conceivable world where one's physical duplicate has no consciousness, which is called a zombie-world; therefore, 3) the zombie-world is possible; 4) if it is possible, then physicalism or materialism is false; therefore, 5) physicalism is false. The central concern of this essay is to critically examine Premises 1) and 2). Concerning Premise 1), which I shall call the "Conceivability-Possibility Thesis," some precedent arguments based on similar theses can be found throughout the history of western philosophy (e.g. the Cartesian argument for mind-body dualism and Hume's denial of the reality of causality), and many contemporary philosophers discuss their validity and force (e.g. van Cleve, 1983 & Yablo, 1993). It should be noted, however, that Chalmers uniquely defends the thesis, as seen in his developed theory known as "epistemic two-dimensionalism," and I shall begin with its survey (Section 2 and 3). Through this examination, it will be realized that 1) and 2) are not independent premises, and that 1) can never be established as a general rule applicable to all cases until conceivability of the zombie-world is shown to be a priori. I shall argue that no such a priori reasoning for non-existence of consciousness is incomplete (Section 4). (Note also that if this is correct, the zombie case, pace Chalmers, will fall under the "twilight zone" in his terminology and even be in danger of becoming a counter-example to his Conceivability-Possibility Thesis. It therefore should be admitted either that conceivability of the unconscious mind is incomplete, or that the thesis that is expected to encompass something that is merely, or only allegedly conceivable, cannot be maintained. In effect, the zombie argument will turn out to be undone. Following this, responses to six possible objections will be set forth (Section 5)."