著者

河 明生

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.30, no.4, pp.59-78, 1996-01-30 (Released:2010-11-18)

著者

金 明洙

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.44, no.3, pp.3_3-3_30, 2009 (Released:2012-03-23)

---

The present paper aims to shed light on the actual performance of corporate management by the Japanese people who resided in colonial Chosen, with the main emphasis placed on a case study regarding Chosen Agricultural Encouragement Company. JRCCs went over korea mainly in the latter part of Meiji period. Also I would like to pay attention to the Kada Family that undertook CAEC in 1917. Because CAEC continued from 1907 up until Japan was defeated, the case of CAEC helps analyzing corporate management of JRCC. The research results are as follows.First, the background for the Japanese enterprises which were established in Chosen after the Japanese Russian War consisted of three components: (1) the colonization policy for Korea, (2) the investment for Korea of the regional level, and (3) the entrepreneurs who supported those policies. The case of CAEC is that of Yamaguchi prefecture, and the whaling traders of Yamaguchi prefecture played a important role in establishing CAEC and managing it.Second, the corporate management of JRCC had a feature that JRCC reacted sensitively to various policies of the Chosen governor—general prefecture and sometimes changed business items with adjusting to policy change of CGGP.Third, the case study of CAEC shows that the entrepreneurs of a group in the colonial period were pursuing their business activities from the viewpoint of the whole Japanese empire. In case of the Kada Family, the management cooperation of Tokyo Kada group, Taiwan Kada group, and CAEC was supposed.Last, the alternation of generation of JRCC entrepreneurs brought some changes to the corporate management of them, i.e., the change to a special manager from a venturesome and police-dependent businessman.By the way, when the plans related to trust business etc. failed, CAEC came to pursue speculative real estate activities, effectively utilizing the increased demand for the factory site which accompanied “Korean industrialization” in the 1930's. In other words, CAEC put emphasis on the activities of the so-called “land broker” in 1932 onwards.

著者

四宮 正親

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.29, no.3, pp.35-72, 1994-10-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

---

The purpose of this paper is to examine how the foreign affiliated companies contributed to the Japanese modernization of management system in production, marketing and employment mechanism in the pre-war period. In production, the Japanese companies studied production technology, mass production system and Taylor system. In marketing, the Japanese companies studied franchise system and sales in installment system. In employment mechanism, the Japanese companies did away with subcontract system and introduced the direct employment. In conclusion, the Japanese modernization of business management has been done throughout the transfer of business system that the foreign affiliated companies had introduced. At the same time, both the Japanese companies and the foreign affiliated companies have taken a positive attitude to R & D.

著者

山藤 竜太郎

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.44, no.2, pp.2_3-2_29, 2009 (Released:2012-03-23)

---

The purpose of this article is to determine how and why Mitsui & Co. abolished the comprador system at its Shanghai branch. We investigated the case of Mitsui & Co. because it is the oldest and biggest general trading company (GTC), and it has increased its Chinese branches in the years straddling the 1900s. We focus on Mitsui & Co.'s Shanghai branch because it was the first Chinese branch for Mitsui & Co., and it served as the headquarters for its Chinese branches. Mitsui & Co.'s Shanghai branch abolished the comprador system in 1899. This was a precedent for the other Chinese branches of Mitsui & Co. and other companies, for example, other Japanese and German trading companies.We illustrate three reasons for the abolishment of the comprador system at Mitsui & Co.'s Shanghai branch. The first reason was Mitsui & Co.'s comprador himself. The comprador had a distinctive character. He drew salary as an employee, earned commission as an agent, and had a group of staffs. A typical comprador has the character of an employee and an agent and a group of staffs.The second reason was the influence of the off-the-job training (off-JT) program. The overseas off-JT program was launched in April 1898 and January 1899. Preceding studies advocate that the off-JT program undermined Mitsui & Co.'s comprador system. However, Mitsui & Co. abolished the comprador system in July 1899 at its Shanghai branch; thus, the trainees employed thereafter were on training and not on the job.The third reason was the human resource practices of Mitsui & Co. Employees that they cultivated during their professional practice in Mitsui & Co. and went on to become managers to deal with some goods in 1899.Mitsui & Co. cut down costs on the salary and commissions provided to the comprador, increased its trading partners, and adopted a long-term marketing strategy because of the abolishment of the comprador system.

著者

小早川 洋一

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.16, no.1, pp.42-64, 1981-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

佐藤 達男

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.50, no.3, pp.26-51, 2015-12

著者

坂出 健

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.45, no.1, pp.1_3-1_27, 2010 (Released:2014-05-23)

---

This article focuses on the decision-making process of Prime Minister Heath's administration toward the corporate failure of Rolls-Royce. I chose this process in light of the fact that modern airliner projects were too big to be managed by private corporations. I will examine not only the question, “Why did Rolls-Royce go bankrupt?”, but also “Why did the Heath administration leave Rolls-Royce to go bankrupt?”In March 1968, Rolls-Royce made a contract for producing RB211 engines for Lockheed's TriStar airliners. At that time, Lockheed and Rolls-Royce expected the TriStar/RB211 to enjoy a monopoly in the medium-range wide-bodied airliner market. However, the expected production quantity for the RB211 had been shrinking. Rolls-Royce, therefore, could not absorb the escalation of the development costs of the RB211 project and, consequently, suffered a severe liquidity crisis. At the time of the first liquidity crisis in October 1970, the Heath administration pulled out of a commitment from the City as money lenders to Rolls-Royce. At the time of the second liquidity crisis in January 1971, the Heath administration decided to leave Rolls-Royce to go into bankruptcy. If the RB211 were to be cancelled, it would certainly cause the chain bankruptcy of Lockheed. As a result, Lockheed, the United States Nixon administration, the British Heath administration, and the United States bank group started negotiations over the continuation of the TriStar/RB211 project. By June 1971, the United States bank group agreed to provide a new $250 million loan to Lockheed subject to a debt guarantee by the United States government. With this new loan, Lockheed had the room to raise the price of the RB211 engines.Faced with the crisis of this prestigious national corporation. the Heath administration did not bail out Rolls-Royce by limitless government financial commitment but rather ‘bailed in’ concerned business interests — namely, the City, Lockheed, and the United States bank group.

著者

中島 裕喜

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.33, no.3, pp.1-27, 1998-12-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

---

This paper focuses on Electronic Components makers (of mainly capacitors, resistors, transformers, speakers) from 1945 to 1960. Though most of them were small and medium firms, they established a high volume of production with many new components that large scale firms were unable to make. They also achieved a high growth in their scale of operations from less than 10 workers to more than 300, sometimes 1000 workers within only a 15 year time period. These firms will be referred to as Specialty Components Makers. Here I study how they achieved such progress. In doing so, this period will be divided into two eras of Reconstruction (1945-52) and Growth (1953-60).During the Reconstruction era, many electronic components makers were founded. The founders didn't require expensive capital equipment because electronic components were labor intensive. They sold their products through merchants mainly located in Tokyo and Osaka. The merchants established a wide marketing network and components makers could increase their sales through these networks. To increase production without much investment they formed many cooperative associations. Furthermore, they needed to acquire much electronic technology and founders pursued various cooperative investigation by the support of public research institutes.During the growth era, the radio and television industries began developing quickly. Main customers of component makers switched to radio and television assembling makers. To catch up with increasing demand, components makers had to expand their product line. Much of investment was put into building factories and firm scale expanded. They also needed to produce high quality components. However such a huge investment created a lack of funds for research. So they were still strongly dependent on cooperative investigations. As a result, many components makers became specialized components makers, accumulated high technology within the firm, and achieved high volume production by the end of 1950s.

著者

黒澤 隆文 久野 愛

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.53, no.3, pp.29-45, 2018 (Released:2020-12-30)

著者

片岡 豊 平野 隆 松本 貴典

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.28, no.4, pp.66-83, 1994-01-30 (Released:2010-11-18)

著者

松原 日出人

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.49, no.3, pp.3_3-3_27, 2014 (Released:2017-11-10)

---

During the 1970s and 1980s, most of the Satsuma mandarin-producing regions of Japan faced a crisis owing to excessive supply. However, around this time, the town of Mikkabi in Shizuoka Prefecture, whose key industry is the production of mandarin oranges, recorded remarkable market growth. This study examines the competitiveness acquired by the mandarin producers in Mikkabi that helped them survive the crisis that crippled the rest of the industry.Among the various fruit industries in Japan, the Satsuma mandarin industry experienced the most dramatic vicissitudes of fortune. The industry grew remarkably in the 1950s and 1960s, but began to decline during the 1970s and 1980s due to oversupply. During this period of crisis, the mandarin producers in Mikkabi not only survived but actually prospered. However, Mikkabi's success in overcoming the decline remains incompletely understood. This study describes how the Mikkabi mandarin-producing region overcame the difficulties plaguing the rest of the industry and succeeded by actively building competitiveness in the volume retailer market.Based on the analysis, we conclude that Mikkabi transformed itself in response to changes in the market and established core competitiveness in the newly growing market—the volume retailer market. Specifically, while entering the volume retailer market, mandarin producers in the Mikkabi region switched to the more competitive Aoshima variety to increase the competitiveness of their large lot produce. Thus, Mikkabi built new competitiveness in the growing volume retailer market, not in the existing small retailer market that was on the decline.

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.54, no.3, pp.38-76, 2019 (Released:2021-12-30)

著者

今城 光英

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.13, no.2, pp.51-66, 1979-03-25 (Released:2010-11-18)

著者

山内 雄気

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.44, no.1, pp.1_3-1_30, 2009 (Released:2012-03-23)

被引用文献数

1

---

This paper examines the fashion business by focusing on the entrepreneurship of a Japanese wholesales merchant Inanishi & Co. in the 1920s in order to demonstrate the dynamism of the creation of fashion. Inanishi played a central role in making season colors and designs using the silk textile “Meisen,” which was one of the first leading commodities accepted by the masses in Japan.In the late 1910s department stores in Japan enjoyed increased bargaining power in the consumer market. Against the backdrop of this power they decreased the volume of trade with wholesalers while starting to deal directly with the silk textile producers. The reason for this shift was to increase the number of sales promotions and shift their strategy to fit the mass market. For that purpose they made use of Meisen.Inanishi was deeply concerned about their weakening power as a middleman and wanted to find a place for themselves in business relations with department stores. As the Meisen market expanded from the late 1910s, Inanishi noticed that achieving both product differentiation and mass production had become the new business challenge for the textile industry in the 1920s.Inanishi designed a unique fashion creation system by utilizing both silk textile producers and department stores. Inanishi tried to survive by collecting fashion information from major department stores, and then spreading it to silk textile producers by publishing the monthly magazine “Sensyoku-no-Ryuko” and organizing a textile fair twice a year. By getting information from these two channels, producers may also have been attempting to decrease the uncertainty in the distribution process. As a result of complicated interaction between the department stores, the wholesalers and the silk textile producers, the fashion creation and diffusion system was constructed.

著者

林 采成

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.48, no.3, pp.3_27-3_50, 2013 (Released:2016-03-18)

参考文献数

41

---

This paper examines the constitution of JNR Workplace Committee and its administration from the prewar to the wartime periods and analyzes the process and the reality of JNR labor movement that subsumed into the Familism. The Workplace Committee attempted to internalize the labor movement by letting the laborers display their dissatisfaction as well as the demand as a part of adaptation mechanism within the internal organization, sometimes offering the opportunities for fringe benefits and promotion. This was the reality of the labormanagement relations that subsumed into the JNR’s Familism. Even though the Workplace Committee functioned as the passage to obtain better working environment during the 1920s, in the 1930s, it became to be a defensive mechanism that dealt with delayed follow-ups for the issues brought up by the pay raise and the promotion. In the background of such transformation, there was the existence of the antagonistic labor union that pressured the authorities to consider the demand of the Workplace Committee, as well as the JNR’s economic foundation that enabled its realization. The adaptation of the Workplace Committee to the JNR system deepened in the 1930s and it transformed into ‘the Service Society’ during the wartime period. The price of “service” was the improvement of labor treatment and the stability of livelihood. The postwar JNR labor-management relations began on the basis of these factors.

著者

鄭 安基

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.32, no.3, pp.25-54, 1997-10-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

被引用文献数

1

---

Kanebo was one of the major textile companies in prewar Japan. This paper analyzes Kanebo's industrial structure and organization. In 1941 when the Pacific War broke out the economy turnd more clearly into wartime economy. At the end of 1938, the Kanebo group already established a new company “Kanegafuchi Jitsugyo” (hereafter Kanejitsu) to cope with wartime regulations. This was one of the steps of a deeper reorganization of the group. The Kanebo group whose main business was textiles turned into an industry organized as two main businesses, the old Kanebo and the new war-oriented Kanejitsu. Later, in 1944 these two companies were integrated into one called “Kanegafuchi Kogyo” (hereafter Kaneko). During the wartime economy and the subsequent expansion of munition industries, why was it necessary for the group to merge and form one new company?The conclusions of this paper can be summarized as follows.1. As the War advanced the wartime controls became more and more strict. These controls forced Kanebo's factories and equipments to be put to other uses. But, Kanebo was able to deal with these controls in the framework of its own group through its core subsidiary, Kanejitsu.2. The wartime economy forced Kanebo's textile industry to shrink in Japan, though in the colonies there was a continuous expansion of the industry. As the textile industry became more militarized the group had to make major efforts to obtain various raw materials.3. Kanejitsu was involved in mining, machinery, chemicals, and steel industries so on and had diversified so rapidly to supply the necessities of the military that the new company had become larger than Kanebo, its parentat the end of 1943.4. With the application of the wartime regulations the framework of the administration of industries changed and the government controls increased. This forced the Kanebo group to move its center of administration from Kanebo to Kanejitsu, and at last these two merged to form a new company, Kaneko.5. The textile companies at the time followed two patterns in dealing with diversification to meet the needs of the military. One, exemplified by Toyobo, used investment and indirect administration and the other, exemplified by Kanebo, used a reorganization of the group companies and direct administration.

著者

牧 幸輝

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.46, no.2, pp.2_49-2_73, 2011 (Released:2014-09-10)

---

This article aims to explore the business vision of Risaburo Toyoda and examine his management of Toyoda Gyoudan [Toyota Industrial Group(TIG)] with emphasis on his entrepreneurial network. Although, Kiichiro Toyoda is well known as the “founder” of Toyota Motor Corporation, in fact, he was not in a position to make final decisions. His brother-in-law, Risaburo, was the president of Toyota Motor Corporation as well as the CEO of TIG. Therefore, the study of TIG including Toyota Motor Corporation must devote special attention to Risaburo. Nevertheless, he has not been judged rightly, and has often been regarded as a hindrance to Toyota's rise in the automobile business. This article aims to reexamine his positive role and the organizational structure of TIG, regarded as a “local Zaibatsu”.One of the most important facets of Risaburo was why he decided to enter the automobile industry. This article shows that in the 1930s, he had predicted the rise of Japan's heavy industry and the decline of its textile industry, and he managed to convert TIG's basic business from textiles to heavy industries.It is well known that Zaibatsu and Emerging Corporate groups were disorganized during the wartime economy due to diversification of affiliated companies. On the other hand, TIG, which was a late-comer in the corporate group, was still primarily controlled by the Toyoda family. A lack of external capital needed to enter the automobile business along with wartime corporate controls had threatened its management structure, but Risaburo secured cooperative stakeholders and reorganized TIG, making Toyota Kinyu [Toyota Finance Company] a holding company. Consequently, TIG kept the family-controlled management structure. In this process, Risaburo made the most of his entrepreneurial network and exercised leadership as the CEO.

著者

金子 良事

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.42, no.3, pp.5-34, 2007-12-25 (Released:2010-03-19)

参考文献数

195

著者

田付 茉莉子

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.37, no.4, pp.1-24, 2003-03-25 (Released:2010-11-18)

---

After World War I, Japanese shipping suffered for a long time from an excess of tonnage and severe competition. How could Japanese shipping companies cope with the depression when they were mostly latecomers with less cargo and with small company size? The smaller trampers and owners were disadvantaged by these circumstances because they could not keep sufficient volumes of cargo to operate their ships. Many of them, of course, went bankrupt. But a considerably large number of small companies survived, changing their strategies; some of them found cargo in Near Seas, and others specialised in ownership. It was the growing demands of in the chartering market that offered them new business opportunities.S. Tsutsui and Kaiyo Steamship Co., which he established later, were also small owners. Although a very small owner, he became acquainted with G. Hori, a broker in Yamashita and achieved steady growth, chartering out his ship mainly to Yamashita. Kaiyo Steamship took advantage of the government's “scrap and build policy” and acquired bigger ships, which brought good performance to its business. Kaiyo Steamship grew steadily even under the wartime economic controls and built new ships. They chartered them out to the shipping authority and lost most of them in Japan's defeat in World War II.The growth of small owners was, undoubtedly, a consequence of the development of Japanese shipping. I would like to put emphasis, however, on their contribution. Operators could not have extended their business rapidly and widely without chartering significant tonnage at greatly reduced fees, because they had to play second fiddle in the world shipping market. From this point of view, the activities of small owners are one characteristic of Japanese shipping, though it was evident not only in shipping but also in most manufacturing industries.

著者

長島 修

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.32, no.2, pp.1-26, 1997-07-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

---

Japan's iron and steel supply depended upon the import from European countries. Japanese traders could hardly deal with the imported goods because foreign traders almost occupied the iron and steel import dealing. Hikitorisyo (Japanese import trader) intermediated between Japanese distributors and foreign traders. Tsuda Katsugoro who came from Hikitorisyo was one of the most famous distrbutors at Osaka. At first when he worked for Kawasaki Shipbuilding Co., he was headhunted by H.E. Reynell who lived at Kobe and imported wine, spirits and so on. He worked for Reynell and Co. After he was independent of Reynell's financial help because of his bankrupt, Mitui Bank, one of the biggest Japanese bank, gave him the financial help so that Tsuda, though he could refuse foreign trader's financial dependence, deeply had to depend upon Mitsui's finance. He started as the dealer, chiefly sold to government office and Navy, and built his local branches in order to sell foreign goods. He sold ship equipments, steel machines, steel goods and so on, which he imported through foreign merchants and big home traders, to home small traders and iron makers. After his independence from Reynell, he changed his business strategy, firmly dealt with the imported iron and steel and distributed them to local merchants, because he also experienced the risk of Hikitorisyo business in spite of the fact that he made a profit during Japan China War (1894-95). In the Meiji era extending business chance, he was one of the innovative successful merchants in a short period. The small merchant such as Tsuda played an important part in the industrialization in Meiji era.