著者

中野 卓

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.10, no.1, pp.102-106, 1975-08-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

渡辺 尚

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.9, no.2, pp.1-27, 1974-11-25 (Released:2009-10-19)

著者

工藤 雄一

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.9, no.2, pp.28-54, 1974-11-25 (Released:2009-10-19)

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Private enterprise in Great Britain has caused problems of industrial pollution in local communities since the Industrial Revolution. For instance, the Leblanc soda industry established in the context of the Revolution, was one of the most notorious pollution-producing industries, because in its early days it allowed itself to escape “muriatic acid gases” (HCl), destroying property, comfort, and health of the local inhabitants and deteriorating their 'quality of life'. James Muspratt, who became the founder of the soda industry in Lancashire in 1823, was confronted with the problems of atmospheric pollution by HCl and the antipollution movements of the inhabitants around his works in Liverpool, St. Helens, and Newton, as his forerunners and his followers were. None of them took any means to prevent the gases from escaping into the atmosphere, while the French inventor of the soda process tried to do so by building a large ceramic container and a large lead chamber from the beginning of his operations. It was owing to considerable burdens of the prevention costs that they did not do so.The object of the present author is to elucidate what process the entrepreneur Muspratt applied to soda making, how he and his sons managed their chemical firm, what damages he did to his neighbours, how much he compensated for the damages, what means he took to prevent them, and whether they were effective for the purpose or not.In sum, the Muspratts were forced to close their works, remove them, and pay the compensations, and to adopt various means of abating the HCl nuisances. Thus they changed their business policy from externalisation of 'social losses' and the prevention costs in their early days of operations through mere internalisation of them to higher internalisation of them in the mid-nineteenth century. It seems that they tried to improve the inhabitants' 'quality of life' through pollution abatement and so perform 'social responsivity of private enterprise for local community' as possible as they could.They, however, had to deal still with the problems of soil, water, and air pollution by “alkali waste” which became nationally serious in the 1870s.

著者

麻島 昭一

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.9, no.3, pp.1-17, 1974-06-25 (Released:2009-10-19)

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This paper describes the development of Trust Companies in Japan, focusing on the characteristics of their capital, executive staffs and management philosophy.Trust companies were incorporated under the Trust Business Act of 1923. Most of those trust companies were established and capitalized by a Zaibatsu, a large bank or major provincial banks, and were managed by the executives sent from the mother bank, following the example of their mother. The fact that the trust companies had the function of taking charge of trusters' property, however, gave characteristic feature to their management philosophy.The trust companies grew up as one of the long term financial institutions, comparable to banks and life insurance companies.

著者

川辺 信雄

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.9, no.3, pp.18-51, 1974-06-25 (Released:2009-10-19)

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It is said that in the United States the modern big business came into being and continued to grow through the addition, combination, and integration of specialized functions and units. Especially, in 1880-1900 the urban and national markets grew as the result of the rapid development of railways. And it became the main goal of many enterprises to actualize mass sales to these large markets. In order to attain this goal, rational and efficient marketing system were necessary.There appear the following problems concerning the marketing functions held by manufacturers and retailers : (1) why and how manufacturers and retailers integrated marketing functions, (2) what role has the integration of marketing functions played, (3) why existing middlemen could not keep their position, (4) what kinds of struggles have appeared among retailers, manufacturers and middlemen. The objective of the author is to investigate these problems from the viewpoint of marketing strategy and corporate growth of the companies which deal in consumer goods.In the last half of the 19th century, some of the manufacturers began to integrate marketing functions aggressively because of the inadequacy of existing wholesaler network for their products. They were of two types. Firstly, there were the producers of relatively complex durable goods like sewing machines. Secondly there were the producers of perishable goods such as meat packers. Moreover, as the dense market grew, manufacturers of products like oil and rubber who had no difficulties in their marketing, found it convenient and efficient to integrate some of the marketing functions.There also appeared modern mass retailers such as department stores, mail order houses, and chain stores. These mass retailers developed through the addition of product lines and stores. Besides, one of the common strategies of them was mass sales with low prices, and they integrated backward or wholesale functions.On the contrary, there were some industries in which middlemen continued to play important roles till the beginning of the 20th century, because of the nature of the commodities and the competitive conditions. Among these, there were manufacturers of groceries, drugs, hardware, etc. Even in these industries, however, after mass retailers began to become national chains and to buy directly from manufacturers, and advertising by producers developed, the power of the middlemen was correspondingly weakened. At the same time, mass retailers began to show their countervailing power against large manufacturers by rationalizing their activities through the integration of the marketing functions. Thus, by the end of the 1910's the old marketing systems disappeared and new ones have been formed.

著者

チャールズ ウィルソン

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.9, no.3, pp.52-54, 1974-06-25 (Released:2009-10-19)

著者

アルフレッド チャンドラー二世

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.9, no.3, pp.55-57, 1974-06-25 (Released:2009-10-19)

著者

藤津 清治

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.9, no.1, pp.5-33, 1974-07-25 (Released:2009-10-19)

著者

小野 二郎

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.9, no.1, pp.33-35, 1974-07-25 (Released:2009-10-19)

著者

野口 祐

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.9, no.1, pp.36-55, 1974-07-25 (Released:2009-10-19)

著者

間 宏

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.9, no.1, pp.55-59, 1974-07-25 (Released:2009-10-19)

著者

橘 博

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.9, no.1, pp.60-77, 1974-07-25 (Released:2009-10-19)

著者

田杉 競

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.9, no.1, pp.77-80, 1974-07-25 (Released:2009-10-19)

著者

下川 浩一

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.9, no.1, pp.81-106, 1974-07-25 (Released:2009-10-19)

著者

土屋 守章

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.9, no.1, pp.106-109, 1974-07-25 (Released:2009-10-19)

著者

小倉 栄一郎

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.9, no.1, pp.110-131, 1974-07-25 (Released:2009-10-19)

著者

小島 男佐夫

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.9, no.1, pp.131-132, 1974-07-25 (Released:2009-10-19)

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.9, no.1, pp.133-138, 1974-07-25 (Released:2009-10-19)

著者

大東 英祐

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.8, no.2, pp.26-58, 1973-02-25 (Released:2009-10-14)

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In 1925, with the intention of joining hands in marketing of synthetic gasoline, B. A. S. F. began to approach Jersey Standard. Though Jersey held a different view on immediate commercial value of coal hydrogenation process, Jersey appreciated its great potential and decided to buy the patent right of this process.The purpose of this paper is to analyze the inter-action of these two companies with the aid of the theory of bargaining. Whole process can be divided into several stages. The further the negociation proceeded, the more subjects were taken up for discussion. As time passed by, each party percieved the other party's aims more accurately.In those days, new petro-chemical industry were emerging between chemi cal and oil industry. Having rather limited interests in this new fields, Jersey admitted the prefered position of I. G. Farben in chemical industry. And at last, they concluded a series of contracts which contained many provisions for co-operation in braod commercial and technical fields.

著者

楊 天溢

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.8, no.2, pp.59-92, 1973-02-25 (Released:2009-10-14)

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In any economic system not in a state of complete stagnation, there must be somebody exercising the abilities to see new economic possibilities, the foresight to develop them, and the courage to take the necessary risks-the talents of the entrepreneur. Mao Tse-tung has always emphasized the importance of entreneurship. This is often obscured for the Western reader only by the fact that in the West people think of entrepreneurship as a characteristic of free market economies, and they do not even attempt to study entrepreneurship in socialist countries.Mao's entrepreneur, however, is not the individual per se, but the collective, or more precisely individuals operating in collective economies. In many examples of good Maoist-type enterprises, there is almost always one named individual, or a small group of individuals, who have taken the initiative in a new development, worked out the idea, embraced the effective forethought, and persuaded the collective to adopt it. The aim is not of course the maximization of individual profit, but the maximization of collective production. These are the qualities of the heroic leaders of the Taching Oilfield, the Tachai Production Brigade, and of a thousand other economic enterprises, industrial and agricultural, which have been presented as models of Maoist organization.Mao sees the education of peasants as the fundamental problem of the Chinese economy, and considers that economic growth as well as revolution must depend on the masses of the people and on everybody going into action, not depending on a few people issuing orders. Therefore, his strategy of developent is to bring peasants and local initiative more into play and, under the unified planning of the central government, let the localities do more. Given the one basic assumption that China's problems can only be radically solved by collective enterprise, there leaves no doubt that entrepreneurship within the collective organization is the keystone of Mao's hopes of rapid development, and a major object of educating peasants, sons into modern producers. Surely, maximizing these qualities within that system is one of Mao's greatest and most constant preocupation in the economic field.