著者

神野 慧一郎

出版者

日本イギリス哲学会

雑誌

イギリス哲学研究 (ISSN:03877450)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.29, pp.19-34, 2006-03-20 (Released:2018-03-30)

参考文献数

22

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According to moral sentiment theory, morals cannot be derived from reason. Therefore, if we accept moral sentiment theory, and yet still contend that moral judgments can be cognitive and rational, we have to carry out two tasks. In the first place, we should show that moral judgments based on passions, sentiments, or on something of that kind, can be, as a matter of fact, cognitive, and so have some kind of rationality. Secondly, as many contemporary philosophers still tend to think that emotive meaning is non-cognitive, and so non-rational, we should explain why and how this unfortunate situation has been brought about. In this essay, the author tries to answer the second problem, leaving the first for another occasion. The argument will proceed as follows. The author propounds (1) the process how in the 20th century, many moral philosophers have come to think that moral judgments have no descriptive meaning. And they think that judgments which lack descriptive meaning, cannot be cognitive. The author also attempts to explain (2) how ‘emotion’, during the course of history in the 19th century, has replaced ‘passion’, ‘affection’, ‘sentiment’, etc. These latter feelings, however, not only in moral sentiment theories in the 18th century but also in Aristotle's and Thomas Aquinas' theory, had been considered to be susceptive to reason, and therefore to have some rationality. As for (1), the author depicts the development of ethical theory since G.E. Moore's refutation of ethical naturalism to Stevenson's emotivism. And as for (2), the role William James had played will be emphasized.

著者

川添 美央子

出版者

日本イギリス哲学会

雑誌

イギリス哲学研究 (ISSN:03877450)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.29, pp.35-48, 2006-03-20 (Released:2018-03-30)

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Hobbes regarded the social order as artificial. Though most critics have argued his materialism excludes human productive capacities, this paper tries to show that his notion of nature encompasses metaphysical and epistemological preconditions that enable the mankind to be creative. In his mechanistic conception of philosophy can be found two types of nature: one as the physical world, which consists of matters in motion, and the other as the model science, which is most exemplified in geometry. The former influences our perception of the external world, whereas the latter makes the men capable of forming the civil order. Thus the act of making a commonwealth is made possible and conditioned by the two types of nature.

著者

青木 滋之

出版者

日本イギリス哲学会

雑誌

イギリス哲学研究 (ISSN:03877450)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.29, pp.49-68, 2006-03-20 (Released:2018-03-30)

参考文献数

26

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It is well known among Locke scholars that Locke owed much to Descartes for the development of his thought. However, the nature of the influence has not been specifically explored. This paper argues that though Locke inherited several philosophical terminologies and a sort of dualist thinking from Descartes, he altered them to serve for his philosophical project: the examination of our ideas and knowledge by means of his “historical, plain method.” A case study of our idea of substance and its essence shows that unlike Descartes Locke stayed agnostic about the very essence of body and mind. Thus it can be said that Locke held a property dualism in contrast to Descartes' substance dualism.

著者

冲永 宜司

出版者

日本イギリス哲学会

雑誌

イギリス哲学研究 (ISSN:03877450)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.27, pp.55-69, 2004-03-20 (Released:2018-04-25)

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William James's concept “stream of thought” has mainly two backgrounds to build up its original style. The first is the difference between material state and inner state of vital phenomena, and the second is the impossibility to associate plural ideas without transcendental subject. The first is influenced by an issue in the theory of evolution. That is a question, on which point in evolution the inner state of life has emerged. This is the principal impossibility which is contrary to the emergence of vital phenomena as material body. For this problem James reexamines “mind-stuff theory”, and he approves its one aspect which assumes inner state from the beginning of evolution, but rejects its another aspect which affirms association. The problem of the latter aspect has something to do with the second background. To overcome this problem, James attained to “stream” after examining “several another hypotheses”.

著者

柘植 尚則

出版者

日本イギリス哲学会

雑誌

イギリス哲学研究 (ISSN:03877450)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.27, pp.70-73, 2004-03-20 (Released:2018-04-25)

著者

山本 建郎

出版者

日本イギリス哲学会

雑誌

イギリス哲学研究 (ISSN:03877450)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.28, pp.5-17, 2005-03-20 (Released:2018-03-30)

著者

門 亜樹子

出版者

日本イギリス哲学会

雑誌

イギリス哲学研究 (ISSN:03877450)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.28, pp.33-45, 2005-03-20 (Released:2018-03-30)

参考文献数

29

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For Locke, the problems of economy were closely related with the government. He thought that the economic prosperity of England was realized by ‘ordering’ trade. Trade consisted of two fields; one was manufacture, and the other navigation and commerce. And what rotated ‘the wheel’ of trade was money. It was required that landholder, broker (merchant and moneyed-man), and labor took their own part as a component in the circulation of trade. He did not intend to defend their particular interests, but thought about totally the problem of trade in terms of pursuing the public good.

著者

島内 明文

出版者

日本イギリス哲学会

雑誌

イギリス哲学研究 (ISSN:03877450)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.28, pp.47-62, 2005-03-20 (Released:2018-03-30)

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Both utility and sympathy are the key concepts in Hume's and Smith's theory of justice. Whereas Hume and Smith hold the same view that the rules of justice have utility, their accounts differ in terms of the role of utility and sympathy. In this paper, after the careful analysis of Hume's and Smith's arguments, I would like to propose the following interpretation. Hume explains the evolution of the rules of justice and justifies them based on utility; so sympathy only plays a secondary role in explaining the moral approbation of justice as a virtue. But in Smith's theory it is sympathy that is used to explain the evolution and the enforcement of the rules of justice, and utility plays a part in justification of some kind of punishment and evaluation of laws and social policies.

著者

三原 就平

出版者

日本イギリス哲学会

雑誌

イギリス哲学研究 (ISSN:03877450)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.28, pp.63-78, 2005-03-20 (Released:2018-03-30)

参考文献数

23

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This paper reassesses Locke's theory of ideas with that of Boyle for a background, and argues as follows. Initially, ‘cosmical quality’ is essential for Boyle's corpuscular philosophy, since it manifests radical interactions in the world. Secondly, Locke's theory of qualities in which ideas take a leading part conceals this insight, yet he accepts it. Thirdly, Boyle treats ideas as the principle of the metaphysical and mathematical reasoning in his book about limits of reason. Finally, ideas in Locke are not the principle of the history of matter of fact in the world, and Locke consciously treats these ideas as the principle of the morality.

著者

青木 滋之

出版者

日本イギリス哲学会

雑誌

イギリス哲学研究 (ISSN:03877450)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.26, pp.21-38, 2003-03-20 (Released:2018-04-25)

参考文献数

18

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It has been debated whether Locke holds direct realism or representative theory of perception. This paper examines the key concept, things themselves, to help determine that Locke is really a supporter of representative theory of perception. Yolton's view of things themselves — its emphasis on natural history of the day — is criticized for not adequately dealing with another decisive feature of things themselves — the corpuscular structure of the body. With this latter concept considered, Locke's idea should be seen as immediate object of mind, indicating that things themselves cannot be perceived in a direct way.

著者

福田 名津子

出版者

日本イギリス哲学会

雑誌

イギリス哲学研究 (ISSN:03877450)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.26, pp.39-52, 2003-03-20 (Released:2018-04-25)

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This paper intends to show that Adam Ferguson's moral philosophy has a body of theory, and that it follows the tradition of Scottish Philosophy. The tradition has 3 characteristics: 1. method of observation, 2. introspection, 3. a priori principles. Ferguson insists on the natural historian's method to find the ultimate facts, which are the superior facts that every theory must depend on. As for the moral approbation, he explains it by the law of estimation — the ultimate fact. The law can also be the guiding principle of man's good actions, since this moral approbation is accompanied with simple emotions of admiration or contempt.

著者

鶴田 尚美

出版者

日本イギリス哲学会

雑誌

イギリス哲学研究 (ISSN:03877450)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.26, pp.73-86, 2003-03-20 (Released:2018-04-25)

参考文献数

15

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In this paper, I will focus on Bernard Williams' discussion on reasons for action. He takes a position called ‘internalism’, and claims that a statement ‘A has a reason to φ' is true if and only if there is a sound deliberative route from A's subjective motivational set to A's φ-ing. I will examine the necessary connection between this ‘internal reason statement’ and an agent's motivational state, and show why internal reasons have normative force. Then, I will suggest that statements which Williams calls ‘external reason statement’ can be well interpreted if we take them as a kind of advice or recommendation.

著者

浜下 昌宏

出版者

日本イギリス哲学会

雑誌

イギリス哲学研究 (ISSN:03877450)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.26, pp.87-91, 2003-03-20 (Released:2018-04-25)

著者

泉谷 周三郎

出版者

日本イギリス哲学会

雑誌

イギリス哲学研究 (ISSN:03877450)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.27, pp.5-20, 2004-03-20 (Released:2018-04-25)

著者

佐々木 拓

出版者

日本イギリス哲学会

雑誌

イギリス哲学研究 (ISSN:03877450)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.27, pp.21-37, 2004-03-20 (Released:2018-04-25)

参考文献数

19

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John Locke's argument of free-will problem in his An Essay Concernig Human Understanding has been seen to be sort of problematic. It is “a power to suspend the execution of any of its desires” and determinism of will that form the core of the problem. In this paper, I'm trying to resolve this problem from the libertarian point of view. There are some approaches to interpret Locke as libertarian, but they has further problems in terms of both interpretation and theory themselves. This paper gives further arguments to support their approaches and sets forth coherent interpretation of Locke's theory of freedom.

著者

長尾 伸一

出版者

日本イギリス哲学会

雑誌

イギリス哲学研究 (ISSN:03877450)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.24, pp.63-65, 2001-03-20 (Released:2018-04-25)

著者

神野 慧一郎

出版者

日本イギリス哲学会

雑誌

イギリス哲学研究 (ISSN:03877450)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.25, pp.5-22, 2002-03-20 (Released:2018-04-25)

参考文献数

28

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As every Hume scholar knows, there are two leading interpretations concerning the fundamental position of Hume's philosophy. One views Hume the philosopher as a sceptic, and the other regards Hume's moral theory as naturalistic. And as far as Hume's moral theory is concerned, the latter interpretation is now no doubt dominant. Although by and large I would agree with the naturalistic interpretation of Hume's philosophy, I should think it necessary to clarify the meaning of “naturalism”. For, though moral naturalism tends to be identified with moral realism, I rather doubt whether we can say Hume's moral theory is a kind of moral realism. In addition to this, if moral realism, as the correspondence theory of truth maintains, should imply that a moral proposition corresponds to some state of affairs, then a problem would arise: to what state of affairs does a moral proposition correspond? This is a difficult question to anwser if we accept the dualism of fact and value. Now some recent moral realists have introduced the idea of “supervenience” into moral theory to solve the problem. This idea, I admit, is very attractive, because it seems not only to give us the criterion to decide whether any moral proposition is true or not, but also enables us to avoid confusing moral property with natural quality. S. Blackburn, however, propounded a forceful argument that is fatal to the strategy of introducing the idea of supervenience for the solution of the problem, and contradicts moral realism. If, however, we would accept his argument, what would be the results? In the first place, in order for us still to be justified in talking about the truth of moral propositions, we have to refuse the correspondece theory of truth and make an appeal to the coherence theory (for the pragmatic theory would not be suitable in the present situation). But, then, it may be that we are not allowed to maintain that each moral proposition does correspond to some state of affairs. In that case, to settle the matter, we have to create some logical space of reasons in which moral propositions should be located. And this means that Hume's moral theory cannot be interpreted entirely naturaristically. I would indeed make it m y methodological rule to consider the moral matter from a naturalistic point of view as far as it is possible for us to do so, and treat moral proposition as something that can be true or false. But the rule is only a rule, so it cannot be a principle from which one can deduce anything material. Therefore, the interpretation of Hume as a naturalist can hold true, only if and as far as it would permit this circumstance. So my conclusion is rather an ironical one. The strategy of interpreting Hume's moral theory as a naturalistic one is viable, only if it argues that Hume's moral theory is in some sense not naturalistic. I defend a kind of expressivism.

著者

小林 麻衣子

出版者

日本イギリス哲学会

雑誌

イギリス哲学研究 (ISSN:03877450)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.25, pp.23-38, 2002-03-20 (Released:2018-04-25)

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The political thought of James VI has always been associated witn the divine right of kingship. However, the theory of divine kingship is merely one feature of his thought. James primarily developed his ideas under the influence of political realism that he encounterea in his youth. He then incorporated various elements of religious reformers' views and Renaissance humanism into his thought for the purpose of constructing strong kingship, which could not be threatened by any other entity. In this paper, I examine the historical context that influenced the development of James' thought and the characteristics of his thought—the obedience theory, Renaissance humanism, and political realism.

著者

星野 勉

出版者

日本イギリス哲学会

雑誌

イギリス哲学研究 (ISSN:03877450)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.25, pp.39-54, 2002-03-20 (Released:2018-04-25)

参考文献数

3

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We begin our pursuit of Hobbes's moral theory by considering whether he had a moral theory or not. For so many people have insisted that Hobbes did not have a moral theory, resting on the claim that he was a moral relativist or that he reduced morality to prudence. Then we examine influential modern interpretations, which have portrayed Hobbes's moral theory as either rule-egoism, moral contract theory, divine-command theory (or deontology), or virtue ethics, in order to throw diverse aspects of his moral theory into stark relief and to make clear what it really is. We conclude that his grotesque picture of modern state, ‘Leviathan’, which supports his moral theory, is an expression of his resignation to the impossibility of realizing of moral ideals.

著者

近藤 真史

出版者

日本イギリス哲学会

雑誌

イギリス哲学研究 (ISSN:03877450)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.25, pp.55-68, 2002-03-20 (Released:2018-04-25)

参考文献数

9

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The distinction between real and nominal essences is a very important one in Locke's Essay. With respect to substances, Locke insists that our nominal essences do not coincide with the real essences. The nominal essence is an abstract idea for which a general name stands. But his attitude towards the real essences of substances is very obscure. The problem is whether a real essence relates to a particular or to a sort. In Essay we find “the essences of sorts ... are nothing else but these abstract ideas”. Therefore, as some commentators show, it seems that only particular things have the real essences. In this paper I intend to show that Locke admits the possibility that real essences of substances apply to kinds of particulars.