3 0 0 0 OA 書評
- 著者
- 神野 慧一郎他
- 出版者
- 日本科学哲学会
- 雑誌
- 科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
- 巻号頁・発行日
- vol.31, no.2, pp.109-136, 1998-11-15 (Released:2009-05-29)
2 0 0 0 OA 書評
2 0 0 0 OA 書評
1 0 0 0 OA 書評
1 0 0 0 OA 書評
1 0 0 0 OA 科学における認識と「宇宙」の問題 宇宙論の諸局面
- 著者
- 神野 慧一郎
- 出版者
- 科学基礎論学会
- 雑誌
- 科学基礎論研究 (ISSN:00227668)
- 巻号頁・発行日
- vol.24, no.1, pp.1-7, 1996-12-25 (Released:2009-07-23)
- 参考文献数
- 15
1 0 0 0 OA 書評
1 0 0 0 OA 書評
1 0 0 0 OA なぜエモーティヴな意味は非認知的とされるか ─道徳感情説の擁護─
- 著者
- 神野 慧一郎
- 出版者
- 日本イギリス哲学会
- 雑誌
- イギリス哲学研究 (ISSN:03877450)
- 巻号頁・発行日
- vol.29, pp.19-34, 2006-03-20 (Released:2018-03-30)
- 参考文献数
- 22
According to moral sentiment theory, morals cannot be derived from reason. Therefore, if we accept moral sentiment theory, and yet still contend that moral judgments can be cognitive and rational, we have to carry out two tasks. In the first place, we should show that moral judgments based on passions, sentiments, or on something of that kind, can be, as a matter of fact, cognitive, and so have some kind of rationality. Secondly, as many contemporary philosophers still tend to think that emotive meaning is non-cognitive, and so non-rational, we should explain why and how this unfortunate situation has been brought about. In this essay, the author tries to answer the second problem, leaving the first for another occasion. The argument will proceed as follows. The author propounds (1) the process how in the 20th century, many moral philosophers have come to think that moral judgments have no descriptive meaning. And they think that judgments which lack descriptive meaning, cannot be cognitive. The author also attempts to explain (2) how ‘emotion’, during the course of history in the 19th century, has replaced ‘passion’, ‘affection’, ‘sentiment’, etc. These latter feelings, however, not only in moral sentiment theories in the 18th century but also in Aristotle's and Thomas Aquinas' theory, had been considered to be susceptive to reason, and therefore to have some rationality. As for (1), the author depicts the development of ethical theory since G.E. Moore's refutation of ethical naturalism to Stevenson's emotivism. And as for (2), the role William James had played will be emphasized.
1 0 0 0 OA ヒュームの自然主義
- 著者
- 神野 慧一郎
- 出版者
- 日本イギリス哲学会
- 雑誌
- イギリス哲学研究 (ISSN:03877450)
- 巻号頁・発行日
- vol.25, pp.5-22, 2002-03-20 (Released:2018-04-25)
- 参考文献数
- 28
As every Hume scholar knows, there are two leading interpretations concerning the fundamental position of Hume's philosophy. One views Hume the philosopher as a sceptic, and the other regards Hume's moral theory as naturalistic. And as far as Hume's moral theory is concerned, the latter interpretation is now no doubt dominant. Although by and large I would agree with the naturalistic interpretation of Hume's philosophy, I should think it necessary to clarify the meaning of “naturalism”. For, though moral naturalism tends to be identified with moral realism, I rather doubt whether we can say Hume's moral theory is a kind of moral realism. In addition to this, if moral realism, as the correspondence theory of truth maintains, should imply that a moral proposition corresponds to some state of affairs, then a problem would arise: to what state of affairs does a moral proposition correspond? This is a difficult question to anwser if we accept the dualism of fact and value. Now some recent moral realists have introduced the idea of “supervenience” into moral theory to solve the problem. This idea, I admit, is very attractive, because it seems not only to give us the criterion to decide whether any moral proposition is true or not, but also enables us to avoid confusing moral property with natural quality. S. Blackburn, however, propounded a forceful argument that is fatal to the strategy of introducing the idea of supervenience for the solution of the problem, and contradicts moral realism. If, however, we would accept his argument, what would be the results? In the first place, in order for us still to be justified in talking about the truth of moral propositions, we have to refuse the correspondece theory of truth and make an appeal to the coherence theory (for the pragmatic theory would not be suitable in the present situation). But, then, it may be that we are not allowed to maintain that each moral proposition does correspond to some state of affairs. In that case, to settle the matter, we have to create some logical space of reasons in which moral propositions should be located. And this means that Hume's moral theory cannot be interpreted entirely naturaristically. I would indeed make it m y methodological rule to consider the moral matter from a naturalistic point of view as far as it is possible for us to do so, and treat moral proposition as something that can be true or false. But the rule is only a rule, so it cannot be a principle from which one can deduce anything material. Therefore, the interpretation of Hume as a naturalist can hold true, only if and as far as it would permit this circumstance. So my conclusion is rather an ironical one. The strategy of interpreting Hume's moral theory as a naturalistic one is viable, only if it argues that Hume's moral theory is in some sense not naturalistic. I defend a kind of expressivism.