著者
鈴木 董
出版者
JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1987, no.86, pp.39-53,L7, 1987-10-24 (Released:2010-09-01)
参考文献数
37

Recently, in Asian and African societies, ethnic conflicts have begun to become more serious. In the Western societies, the ethnic resurgence has been going on. The ethnicity problem has become one of the most crucial issues in the research field of international politics.The ethnicity problem was regarded mostly as a transitional problem in the process of nation-state building and exected to be solved at the end of that process. However, in many cases, the ethnicity problems became more serious actually as the process of nation-state building was going on.The ethnicity problem is the problem of integration and co-existence of ethnic groups. Here, in order to reconsider the ethnic problem, we'll try to analyze the historical and cultural backgrounds of the system of co-existence and integration of ethnic groups and its dissolution, using the case of the Middle East, especially that of the Ottoman Empire and her successor states.The Ottoman society was a typical example of the Middle Eastern societies, which were composed of various ethnic groups. There existed a unique system of integration and co-existence.In the Ottoman society, the identity of the members of the society was mainly based on religion. National or racial consciousness was a secondery factor. Various ethnic groups were grouped according to their religions. The Ottoman system of integration and co-existence was essentially the system of integration and coexistence among religious groups, not national or racial groups.There were two essential categories of group, Muslims and Non-Muslims. Non-Muslims were categoried in several sub-groups. Each group co-existed each other with each own duties and pribiledges. This traditional system of integration and co-existence was not based on the principle of equality, but on that of inequality. Muslims were the essential citizens of the political community. Non-Muslism were the secondery citizens who were merely tolerated to exist. Nonetheless this system functioned rather well during the period when the traditional type of political apathy prevailed in the society.This situation began to change under the influence of the West in the late eighteenth century. At first, Non-Muslim peoples in Balkan began to be politically active under the Western influence. They began to try to build their own “nation-state” of ethnically homogenious composition, instead of seeking for equality in a multinational empire. The Ottomans attempted to transform an Islamic empire into a multinational empire in Western type during the nineteenth century. However this attempt failed. Then Muslims themselves fell under the influence of the Western nationalism from the late nineteenth century. Turkish nationalism, Arab nationalism, and so on began to evolve. After the dissolution of the Ottoman empire, there emerged “nation-states” of Muslim peoples. The traditional system of integration and co-existence totally collusped. The ideal of a nation-state which was ethnically homogenious prevailed.However the ethnic compositions of these societies remained heterogenious. Moreover each ethnic group began to evolve their own nationalism. The new style of integration and co-existence of ethnic groups with new orientation has not yet been established. This situation is one of the important factors in the violent outbursts of the ethnic conflicts in the area.
著者
高橋 和夫
出版者
JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1987, no.86, pp.68-82,L9, 1987-10-24 (Released:2010-09-01)
参考文献数
56

Calling the Kurds a minority is a misnomer, for they constitute the overwhelming majority in Kurdistan. Their tragedy is that the borders of five countries crisscross Kurdistan making them a minority in all of these states, namely, Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Syria and the Soviet Union.From the nineteenth century onwards, the Kurds have been struggling for autonomy in the process of which they have tasted moments of exhilaration as well as despair. Shortly after the Second World War, in January 1946, the Kurds in Iran proclaimed the establishment of the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad in Iranian Kurdistan only to see its demise before the year was out. Later, the focus of their struggle shifted to Iraqi-Kurdistan. The charismatic leader, Mullah Mustafa Barzani, led a series of heroic struggles against Baghdad before, during and well after the Second World War. After his final defeat in 1975, Kurdistan experienced an uneasy period of peace.The revolution in Iran, however, opened up the opportunity for the Kurds to assert their autonomy for the third time since the end of the Second World War. Taking advantage of a brief decline in the authority of the central government, the Iranian Kurds began to demand autonomy. But the revolutionary government has not complied, for it is apprehensive about the possibility of other minorities following suit, which it fears could lead to Iran's dismemberment. Ever since 1979 a civil war has been fought in Kurdistan.The start of the all-out war between Iraq and Iran strengthened the Kurdish resolve for autonomy, for Iraq openly supported the Iranian Kurds. Iran countered by aiding the Iraqi-Kurds against Baghdad. As the fortunes of war shifted on the southern front from Iraq to Iran, so did the situation in the north. By the summer of 1983, after regaining control over its part of Kurdistan, Tehran, aided by the Iraqi Kurds, sent its army into Iraqi Kurdistan.With the concentration of the Iraqi forces on the southern and central fronts, and with the support of both Iran and Syria, the Iraqi-Kurds have steadily expanded their control over substantial parts of Iraqi-Kurdistan. They are already in a position to threaten the pipe-lines and the highway that run through Kurdistan, linking Turkey and Iraq. They also provide sanctuary for the Turkish Kurds who in 1984 started a wide spread guerilla campaign against targets inside Turkey. Thus, Kurdish agitation has spilled over into Turkey. Ankara retaliated first by bombing targets inside Iraq and later increasingly by sending troops across the border into Iraq, straining its relations with Iran and Syria. Also Turkey's intervention in Iraqi Kurdistan has fueled speculation that Turkey might occupy Iraqi-Kurdistan, should the Ba'athist regime in Baghdad show signs of imminent collapse. It seems that under the darkening shadow of the Gulf War, “the third wave” of the Kurdish struggle for autonmy has been building up momentum towards an explosive climax over the fate of Iraqi Kurdistan.
著者
岩島 久夫
出版者
JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1979, no.63, pp.38-54,L2, 1979-10-15 (Released:2010-09-01)
参考文献数
34

The Swedish defense policy is based on the concept of “Total Defense, ” which consists of military, economic, civil and psychological defense in order to maintain its unique standing of “neutrality in war” and “non-alignment in peace time.” Sweden has been often well accepted as an ideal country of “armed neutrality, ” producing most of the weapons in its home land.However, the Swedish people have been forced to drive themselves on an austere road of streamlining its defense system since the Parliament decided to reduce as half as the strength of its armed forces in ten years, June 1972. The latest five-year defense plan 1977/78-81/82 fiscal year has also the same goal as the 1972 decision in principle though a promise was made to increase the annual budget somewhat for defense.This paper intends to analize realistically the meaning of “Total Defense, ” and the way how Sweden is making effort to “rationalize” the defense system, reducing the number as well as adopting new approaches, e. g. “high-low mix, ” the application of advanced technology, “calculated risk, ” etc. The author hopes that the other side of unique Swedish defense posture, which is intended in this paper, be reflected on the Japanese way of thinking about national security problems. The author believes that the Swedish “model” is full of useful suggestions for reorienting the Japanese defense posture toward more logical and rational line.
著者
丸山 直起
出版者
JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1976, no.55, pp.1-26,L1, 1976-07-20 (Released:2010-09-01)
参考文献数
99

The fourth round of the Arab-Israeli War was started on 6 October 1973 by the Arabs. Before the War, the Arabs deliberately prepared their military build-up. Israeli intelligence noted these preparations along the ceasefire lines. But the military elite misinterpreted the intentions of the Arab leaders, believing that the Arabs would never renew the fighting because of their poor military capabilities and the opposing Israeli superiority in the military balance. Should the Arabs intend to surprise Israel, Israeli early-warning systems would founction, a standing army would hold the enemy forces, and the rapid mobilization would be carried out.In the early morning of 6 October, the decisive information that the war would break out that evening reached the military elite. Chief of Staff Elazar took the necessary steps immediately. He met the Defence Minister and proposed a pre-emptive strike and general mobilization of reserves. The political elite, such as the Prime Minister, Defence Minister and Vice Prime Minister, however, turned down the former proposal, but concerning the latter one they authorized Gen. Elazar to mobilize 100, 000 men. These two decisions were based on a political consideration. The factors which induced the political elite to adopt these decisions were mainly their image of the external environment and the political decision-making system itself. The Israeli political elite had viewed their environment as follows: (1) regionally, Israeli military supremacy and the maintenance of the ceasefire in the border areas ruled out any possibility of warfare; but (2) globally, her political position in the international area was symbolized by her isolation. Especially in 1973, two dramatic incidents, the downing of a Libyan airplane by Israeli warplanes in February and the hijacking of an Iraqi jet liner in August, deepened the isolation. In the latter case, the US Government condemned the Israeli action. The decisions not to pre-empt and not to call up all the reserves are explained by Israel's deteriorating pnlitical environment. Moreover there was no machinery in the decision-making organization to check the evaluations presented by the military intelligence.
著者
高松 基之
出版者
JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1982, no.70, pp.120-138,L8, 1982-05-22 (Released:2010-09-01)
参考文献数
70

The purpose of this paper is to describe how President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles reacted to the Arab-Israeli conflicts and the Suez Crisis of 1956 with the extensive use of the newly opened materials, such as Eisenhower Diary and Dulles Telephone Calls Transcripts in the Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas. In particular, this paper attempts to elucidate the following points: First, the U. S. withdrawal from the Aswan project was not Dulles' “spur of the moment” decision, but the result of American efforts to isolate Egypt from other Arab countries. Second, Eisenhower and Dulles had unsuccessfully sought far quick solution of the Suez crisis without any clear courses of action. Third, the U. S. attitude in the Suez crisis had been influenced by the policy makers' optimism that Britain and France might not resort to military force.
著者
鈴木 董
出版者
JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1981, no.69, pp.93-107,L5, 1981-10-28 (Released:2010-09-01)
参考文献数
58

In the traditional image of international system in the Islamic Middle East, the world was divided into two conflicting worlds, the World of Islam (dar al-Islam) and the World of War (dar al-harb). The perpetual state of war between these two worlds should continue till the whole world came into the control of Muslims. In the World of Islam, there should be only one political body, an Islamic universal state. Accordingly there was no room for the international relations among Muslims. International relations could exist only between the two conflicting worlds. These relations could not be reciprocal but unilateral. This proto-image of the Islamic international system had been accepted through centuries even after the circumstances had changed so greatly.On the eve of the rise of the West, the Ottoman Empire was ruling over the Islamic Middle Eastern World as an Islamic universal empire. The Ottomans accepted the proto-image of Islamic international system. Only in the eighteenth century when the Western Impact began to threaten the Ottomans, the traditional Islamic international system began to transform in its reality and in its image. Modern western international system destroyed the traditional Islamic system little by little. Western nationalism undermined the traditional basis of identity of the members of the empire. The national awaking and national liberation movements of the Balkans drived the Ottomans themselves to seek for new basis of identity and new world order in order to keep thier empire. However the change of tide could not be halted.The Ottoman Empire as an Islamic universal empire dessolved. In the ruin of the universal empire there emerged a group of nation states. The Islamic Middle Eastern World as a self-consistent entity lost its consistency and was incorporated into the modren international system as its sub-system or an area.
著者
坂本 是忠
出版者
JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1963, no.21, pp.84-96,L6, 1963-04-25 (Released:2010-09-01)
参考文献数
21

The new constitution of the Mongolian People's Republic of 1960 declared that it was a socialist country. It needed 40 years to construct its socialism, being a nomadic country, without even one line of railroad nor one modern factory before the revolution. The history of this 40 years can be devided into two parts, the first part (1921-1940) which aimed at anti-feudalistic achievement means confiscation of feudal tenures, and anti-religious movement. The second part (1940-) which aimed at construction of socialism means construction of modern industry, collectivization of the nomadic economy and diffusion of agriculture which they had not known. Therefore it was necessary for them to apply the first (1948-52) and second (1953-57) 5 years plans and first 3 years plan to achieve fundamentally the construction of socialism.But this socialization was succeeded not by their own capital accumulation but by economic aid of other socialist countries. Especially, Mongolia could not have possibly achieved its socialization without Russian aid which was the biggest given to it. It finally completed collectivization of its nomadic society in 1959 after several failures. This was the most difficult task of the socialization. But the fact that number of livestock has not yet reached the number of the pre-war time might be the sign which indicates that collectivization obstructed the people's will for production. Mongolia is a socialist country, the economy of which depends mostly on agricultural processing and collective stock farming. This socialism only means that there is no private ownership of means of production, and productivity is on a very low level. The third 5 years plan which is now operating is planned for developing the agricultural industry by three times of its present capacity and for increasing cultivated land by three times of the present area. Russian aid also plays a great role in it.