著者

八谷 まち子

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2005, no.142, pp.79-94,L11, 2005-08-29 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

42

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The Brussels European Council in December 2004 finally concluded to start the accession negotiations with Turkey on October 3, 2005. Turkey submitted its accession application in 1987 preceding all of the ten new member states of the year 2004. Why has it taken so long for Turkey? What is the basic agenda for Turkey to realize its EU membership? To find answers to these questions, the concept of “focal point” might be useful.Thomas Schelling introduced the concept of “focal point” that [most bargaining situations ultimately involve some range of possible outcomes within which each party would rather make a concession than fail to reach agreement at all. … Any potential outcome is one that either party could have improved by insisting, yet each knows that the other would rather concede than do without agreement. … These reflexive expectations somehow converge on a single point at which each expects the other not to expect to be expected to retreat.] Garett and Weingast elaborate the concept by referring to the “mutual recognition” introduced in a decision of “the Cassis de Dijon” by the European Court of Justice in 1979, and embedded in the European Single Act as a legal system for the single market project. That is, when a natural focal point does not exist, an institution may propose a constructed focal point for an enhancement of expectation towards a possible agreement of a negotiation.In the light of the above understanding of a focal point, there may have been, at least, two potential focal points between Turkey and the EU: the Copenhagen Criteria and the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). The former was set out unilaterally by the EU as the conditionalities for the EU membership, therefore, the Copenhagen Criteria was meant to be a constructed focal point. But it was originally set out to facilitate and control the accession of the former socialist countries which were making efforts to transform their national regimes, while Turkey with its established nationalist idea and regime had tremendous difficulties in renovating the systems in accordance with the EU criteria. The constructed focal point, unlike the former socialist countries, failed to work automatically in Turkey, but started to function with an additional impetus of the promise to give a starting date of negotiation. Turkish domestic situation required an extra motivation for a constructed focal point to be useful.The latter seemed to have had more chance to become a natural focal point, but Turkey stuck to its national interest particularly with the view to sustaining its de-facto governing influence over Cyprus. Greece, securing the interest of Cyprus, also insisted on the national interest. Under such circumstances, there was no place for the “reciprocal expectations” to develop in order to identify a focal point. Thus, a potentially existed natural focal point was unable to function.It should be expected for the EU to set a focal point in view with the Turkish membership including a solution to the divided Cyprus. What may be critical for identifying a focal point is not the problems such as a mass movement of labour, or huge financial aids to suppress the EU budget, often sited by Turkish antagonists. But whether the EU would be able to convince the European citizens of the significance of the Turkish membership, and to the same importance, whether Turkey would be able to internalize the Copenhagen Criteria that would inevitably transform the principles that Turkey has been standing on since its foundation in 1923..

著者

五月女 律子

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2005, no.142, pp.63-78,L10, 2005-08-29 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

53

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Among the member states of the European Union (EU), Sweden is one of the most EU-skeptic countries. Opinion polls have shown strong skepticism of the Swedes since Sweden's accession to the EU in 1995. This article examines anti-EU and EU-skepticism in Sweden and tries to investigate reasons why many Swedes are skeptical about the EU.The first part of this article discuses Sweden's change of support rating for the EU and Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), presenting data from opinion polls. The Swedes strongly favored EU membership in 1991, and although their support declined after 1992, it increased again during 1994. After Sweden's entry into the EU, the Union's popularity immediately slumped and a majority of the Swedes became anti-EU. Then support for the EU gradually increased and supporters of the membership outnumbered its opponents in late 2001. Support for EMU has fluctuated since 1997, and by 2004, half of the population opposed the introduction of the “euro” to Sweden.The second part of this article examines the anti-EU/EU-skeptic faction, and investigates its activities and assertions in the campaign of referendum on Sweden's EU membership in 1994 and the European Parliament elections in 1995 and 1999. The anti-EU camp consisted of the Left Party and the Green Party (anti-EU parties), some trade unions, and members of the Social Democrats and the Center Party. The lack of transparency in EU decision-making is their prime issue. Slightly more than half of the electorate voted “yes” to Sweden's EU membership in the referendum and Sweden became an EU member state in 1995. In European Parliament elections, voter turnout was fairly low and anti-EU parties, the Left and Green Parties, gained higher vote percentages compared to national elections.The third part of this article analyses Sweden's referendum on the euro in 2003 and the European Parliament election in 2004. The anti-euro camp opposed further transfer of Sweden's policy-making power to the EU. A majority of the Swedes voted “no” to the adoption of the euro, effective from 2006. An EU-and Federo-skeptic political organization, Junilistan (The June List), which was established for the European Parliament election, became the third largest political party in Sweden's European Parliament delegation, though voter turnout was the lowest of any nation-wide Swedish election in over 80 years.In Sweden, the rise of anti-EU sentiments spawned anti-EU and EU-skeptical groups. These groups would seek to reform the EU. Many Swedes are not satisfied with the democracy, openness, transparency, social policy and environmental policy of the EU.

著者

鈴木 陽一

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2001, no.126, pp.132-149,L16, 2001-02-23 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

62

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The aim of this article is to rethink why the twin nation of Malaysia and Singapore, emerged. Malaysia is a nation that the Malay-Muslims dominate, Singapore is a nation the Chinese make its core part, but both have strong transnational linkages in Maritime Southeast Asia and the global economy. This article reviews the emergence, focusing on transformation of collaborative relationship between the British government, the Federal government (Malaya, later Malaysia) and Singapore government, which made the formal and the informal British Empire in Southeast Asia.Malaysia and Singapore emerged at the end of Empire. What moved the Metropole and the local collaborators to make Greater Malaysia —Malaysia including Singapore— was an impulse to restructure the British Empire. Against communism in Southeast Asia, they tried to build a new united nation, which would become a new imperial collaborator. However the attempt to embed the conventional collaborator in a new federation led to conflicts among them. The Federal government and the Singapore government both had similar industrialization plans which competed with each other. However, Britain paid little attention to the old collaborators such as Singaporean, because they put more importance in the stability of a new junior partner. Therefore, Singaporean could do nothing but leave the Federation, and without the non-Muslim Singaporeans, Malaysia became more and more Malay-Muslim- oriented. The old Empire fell and a new order emerged. After the failure of Greater Malaysia, the British lost their will and power to maintain their Empire. The new rising power, the United States, did not make an empire, unlike the former imperial powers. She encouraged an anti-communism regionalism, and tried to organize people into a global economy. The Southeast Asians accepted the new power and became local collaborators of the imperialism without empireNationalism played little role in the formation of two nations. Rather, the Federal government and Singapore government worked for their preservation of imperial privileges as imperial collaborators. They worked for the colonial grand design for the reorganization of Empire. Singapore left the Federation to defend its economic autonomy rather than their multiethnic policy. The divided Southeast Asians decided to live as different nations in the new order supported by the new power, to utilize regionalism and globalism.Decolonization saw its peak in 1960s. In many cases, empires advanced to decolonize with collaboration between the metroples and the local collaborators. Therefore, it was not necessarily accompanied by nation-building. The collaborators conflicted with each other. Irresponsible imperialists renounced their burden, and invented a situation of so-called quasi-states. those left engaged in nation-building and globalization, which sometimes contradict.

著者

深川 美奈

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2000, no.125, pp.79-95,L12, 2000-10-13 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

70

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John J. McCloy, the U. S. High Commissioner for Germany, wrote to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles when Konrad Adenauer won the election of parliament in 1953: “We cannot in my judgment, lift our hand and influence from the internal German developments. The roots of sound parliamentary behavior are not deeply enough embedded in German soil for us to take a different position. This is a great step forward domestically but German nationalism and its demoniac counterparts have not been completely exorcised.” Why did he point out that German society was not yet democratized after more than five years of defeat? This paper deals with the formation of democratization policy of American military Government and its successor, the American High Commission. It focuses on the period from defeat of Germany (May 1945) to June 1952 in which American democratization program ended at the local level. I pay attention to the formation and development of denazification policy by both the American Military Government and German and re-education (re-orientation) program by Kreis Resident Officer of Land commission. In this paper, I divide the period into four parts according to its peculiarities. I examine how American policies developed and why these policies failed finally. American Military Government carried out denazification and re-education on purpose to democratize German society. How and where did Americans locate democratization policy after a switch in economic recovery policy in 1947?Denazification in the American zone was carried out with initial severity. In applying the rough-and-ready procedure to Germans, the consequences have been more than ordinarily severe. Proof of this action can be seen in the dismissal not only of those whose removal was required by the directive but also of those in whose case discretion was allowed. Since the influence of Nazism was rather stronger than American authority had predicted, American officials realized that denazification could not be accomplished without German help.German law, entitled “For Liberation from National Socialism and Militarism, ” which was enacted on March 5, 1946, classified ideological offenders in terms of past guilt and future danger and tried to assess penalties proportionate to the guilt and danger. But the number of cases to be handled by judicial machinery was amounting to the great majority of the adult population that the process of rectification was slow as the complications accumulated. Germans were not satisfied with prohibition and restriction of employment.Though process of denazification was promoted by amnesties and amended law, staffs of local authority on denazification could not deal with the cases of major offenders. As a result, the ex-Nazi forces which succeeded in rehabilitation were much more than those who were politically purged.It was estimated that denazification policy ended in failure or was not completely carried out. However, the matter was not so simple for the democratization in postwar west Germany. Although denazification was not completely carried out as a whole, it contributed to change in the German top leadership in the postwar era. American army authority appointed the persons on the “White List, ” who were anti-Nazi or non-Nazi, and could be pro-American to the post of leadership after the examination of denazification. They proceeded to democratization with collaboration with the American Military Government. Hence, antidemocratic power could not be strong when the Federal Republic of Germany was establised.Nevertheless, denazification of the middle class was not fully carried out. Since the influence of Nazism mostly penetrated into the middle class, it was impossible to eliminate the influence completely by denazification.

著者

川村 陶子

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2000, no.125, pp.180-196,L21, 2000-10-13 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

49

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The official concepts of foreign cultural policy in the Federal Republic of Germany, formalized in three policy papers issued in the 1970s, preempt the philosophy of cultural activities in the interdependent and globalized world of the late 1990s. In the three papers, the German government does not actively constitute a “national culture” through presenting publicly authorized cultural elements to people in foreign countries, but it rather promotes transnational relations by encouraging free activities by various social actors across national borders.The formalization of these uniquely “liberal ” concepts —or, the “reform” of foreign cultural policy— resulted from multiple factors at different levels of the policy process concurring during the period from the late 1960s to the early 1970s. Although students of German politics might be tempted to regard the “reform” as a variable dependent upon general political change such as the formation of the social-liberal coalition and Willy Brandt's new Ostpolitik, the reality of policymaking and the content of policy papers, such as the key idea “enlarged concept of culture”, cannot be explained by such a parsimonious model.By tracing the history of the policy process, especially the development of the philosophy of cultural relations itself, one can recognize two factors which were of vital importance for the formalization of new concepts: the changing identity of policymakers, which lay at the base of the very formation of the Brandt government, and the reform initiative within the policy process taken by Ralf Dahrendorf, then the Parliamentary State Secretary of the Foreign Office. On the one hand, the quest for a new “FRG-identity” in the transition period of postwar international relations, which also meant the quest for a new Federal Repubulic open toward the world and contributing to international cooperation, was embodied in the “enlargement of the concept of culture” in the new philosophy. On the other hand, Dahrendorf influenced the making of the policy papers not only in the sense that he took the first step in the “reform” process of the Foreign Office, but also that the opposition party in the Bundestag felt obliged by this popular sociologist to organize a parliamentary inquiry committee for foreign cultural policy, which would produce a thorough report supporting the core of liberal ideas proposed by Dahrendorf himself.Although Dahrendorf left the Foreign Office within 10 months, he played a decisive role in the formalization of new concepts because Dahrendorf, with his progressive liberal theory and distinguished career in the Anglo-American social scientific field, personified the new identity and reform-mindedness of FRG-policymakers at that time. The fact that he could not stay in office for a long time indicates that the genuine Reformeuphorie was transient, but the timing for his initiative was good enough to get the “reform” started. The new concepts of the official FRG-cultural relations are not the byproduct of Brandt's new Ostpolitik, but, through the personality of Dahrendorf, rather reflects the Zeitgeist of the time, which sought for democracy and open-minded transnational cooperation in a changing world.

著者

倉科 一希

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2003, no.134, pp.42-55,L9, 2003-11-29 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

67

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This article discusses the development of the Junktim between East-West disarmament/arms control negotiations and German reunification and the changes in American policies regarding the Junktim under the presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower. It argues that the United States government at that time changed the Junktim in order to make current disarmament negotiations with the Soviet Union possible. At the same time, the Eisenhower administration did not enforce the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) to abandon the latter's objection to the issues relating to European security and to accept the US policy changes in these matters.The Junktim was established as a US policy and as a common Western policy in 1955-56. The Eisenhower administration had inherited a policy of the Junktim from the previous administration. Discussions about US disarmament/arms control policies before and after the Geneva four-power summit meeting in July 1955 reconfirmed this policy with the support of all major members of the administration, including Harold E. Stassen, Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament. The major Western allies had agreed to a Junktim between European security and German reunification before the Geneva summit meeting, but the British, the French and the West Germans soon found themselves divided regarding the definition of this Junktim. US efforts to close the gap among Europeans led to agree another Junktim between German reunification and arms reduction by stages as an allied position in May 1956.The Eisenhower administration tried to change the Junktim in order to widen the range of discussions with the Soviets. First, Stassen tried to define the first stage of an arms reduction proposal which would be implemented without progress toward German reunification. After Stassen's failure in 1957 and departure in the next year, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles opened a way to negotiate a nuclear test ban treaty with the Soviets and the British without discussing German reunification. After a Soviet ultimatum on Berlin in November 1958, President Eisenhower and the newly appointed Secretary of State, Christian A. Herter, connected nuclear test ban negotiations with Berlin negotiations in order to improve prospects of the latter.These US efforts upset Bonn, but Washington did not totally neglect Bonn's concerns. First, Washington modified the Junktim but did not abandon its principle. Second, Bonn's objection against accepting European security measures without progress toward reunification was recognized by the Eisenhower administration.Washington's effort to modify the Junktim indicates its willingness to negotiate with the Soviets and its desire not to destroy the alliance with the FRG. This study shows the second half of the 1950s as a dynamic period of the Cold War and gives a hint that can explain the developments in the following decades.

著者

三尾 真琴

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1999, no.121, pp.140-156,L15, 1999-05-21 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

70

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The purpose of this paper is to portray two different aspects of Hizbullah: that of a radical armed organization-some scholars refer to it as a typical “terrorist” organization, and as a “social welfare party, ” especially for Shiite communities. In addition, through the study of relations between the Hizbullah and other actors, this paper tries to point out its effects on Lebanese society and on politics of the Middle East.Hizbullah was born in 1982 when Israel invaded Lebanon. It is not always clear by what process it was established and organized. It is estimated, however, that Hizbullah is composed of several independent sects leaded by a collective “Ulama, ” like Iran. At present, members of Hizbullah are around 15, 000 and it has come to share influence on the Shiite population with Amal.The basic goals and strategies of the Hizbullah are 1) establishment of a Lebanese Islamic state modeled on Iran, 2) Liberation of south Lebanon (a “security zone” occupied by Israel), 3) struggle against Israel and support for the establishment of a Palestine state, 4) the abolishment of “confessionalism, ” which refers to fixed rights and political power given to each religious sect, 5) support for Shiite communities. In order to complete these objectives, and especially in order to liberate south Lebanon and fight against Israel, Hizbullah took Western foreigners hostage and performed “suicide” bombings against buildings such as the embassy or military compounds of Western powers in Lebanon in the 1980s.Since 1992, however, Hizbullah carried out a big change in accordance with the realities of the Lebanese political system and became one of the political parties representative of Shiite communities. Because Hizbullah took great care of agriculture, infrastructure, school education, social welfare in Shiite residences, which the Lebanese government has been ignoring so far, it gained support in Shiite communities and took twelve seats in the Lebanese parliament in 1992.It is true that Hizbullah is increasing its political power in Lebanese society. However, the situation surrounding Hizbullah is quite complicated. For example, most of Hizbullah's budget still depends on Iran, and much of the freedom given to Hizbullah is only allowed by Syria. Furthermore, the relation between the Hizbullah and Christian sects, a domestic matter, has remained strained and dangerous. Therefore, this paper concludes that we need to study Hizbullah from the point of view of political relations in the Middle East, and at same time from that of religious balance in Lebanon.

著者

土佐 弘之

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1995, no.110, pp.195-198, 1995-10-21 (Released:2010-09-01)

著者

斎藤 正寿

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1996, no.113, pp.199-201, 1996-12-30 (Released:2010-09-01)

著者

石田 勇治

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1991, no.96, pp.51-68,L9, 1991-03-30 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

82

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The election of an avowed monarchist, seventy-seven-years old Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg as the president of the Weimar Republic in April 1925 symbolizes the remarkable continuity in political attitude of the Germans from the time of empire to the republic. Many of them were uncritically attached to the old “Kaiserreich”.In spite of the total defeat and the revolution 1918-19 the aims and roles of imperial German policy in the outbreak of the World War had not yet been clarified. Every government during the Weimar period blocked full disclosure of the empire's war aims and engaged in a political cover up.It was the Independent Socialist Kurt Eisner, head of the revolutionary government in Munich, who released special reports in November 1918 showing the responsibility of the German Empire for the beginning of the World War. Eisner wished to discredit the old regime and persisted in purging the representatives of the “Kaiserreich”.Threatened by Eisner's revelation the foreign ministry insisted that such a free debate about the war guilt question would make the peace negotiations unfavorable to Germany. The new foreign minister Urlich Graf von Brockdorff-Rantzau decided to take the lead and refute any charges that Germany had made preparations for the war in 1914 and was responsible for it. He was determined to exonerate the imperial German policy.After the acceptance of the Versailles Treaty in June 1919 the foreign ministry planned an antiwar-guilt campaign. With the purpose of revising the treaty the foreign ministry mobilized the Germans beyond all classes and parties and lead a national movement (“Volksbewegung”) against the Allies' verdict on Germany's war guilt. A War Guilt Section (“Schuldreferat”) was established in the ministry which should direct research and discussion about this question at home and abroad in favour of German foreign policy.The purpose of this paper is firstly to describe how the war guilt question was dealt with in the German foreign ministry at the first stage of the Weimar Republic. It will show the process how the antiwar-guilt campaign was formed and developed.The second purpose is to analyze the meaning of this campaign for the Weimar political culture. Its influence on the radical-right thoughts and movements such as Nazism will be also discussed.

著者

クラインシュミット ハラルド 仙石 学

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1991, no.96, pp.69-84,L10, 1991-03-30 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

67

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The article seeks to demonstrate the wide range influence of the principles of cultural nation-building in Weimar Germany. Cultural nation-building is understood as a set of administrative measures designed to build a ‘nation’ in Germany, held to be ‘split and torn’ by class struggles and pressures from abroad, by means of the cultural traditions as manifested in classical literature and art. These principles were laid down in the Weimar Constitution of 1919 (dealt with in section 2); and they were supported by the professional organizations of lower middle class artisans (section 3), the Social Democrat based popular education movement (section 4), and various intellectuals (section 5).Hence, while it has always been known that nation-building was an issue argued for by the right, it becomes clear that the issue received wide support also in the center and the moderate left. Therefore, the conclusion seems safe that the isolationist tendencies in Weimar Germany (as forming the basis for Nation Socialism) resulted from a general current in political life.

著者

田嶋 信雄

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1996, no.112, pp.189-191, 1996-05-18 (Released:2010-09-01)

著者

鹿島 正裕

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1996, no.113, pp.135-151,L15, 1996-12-30 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

56

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The third Arab-Israeli war of 1967 quickly ended in an overwhelming victory for Israel, in what is called the “Six-day war” by her. At that time, the Arab countries claimed that the United States had participated in the war on the Israeli side, and severed diplomatic relationship with her. Because the U. S. -Egyptian relationship had already been bad before the war, and the Israeli aerial attack was far more efficient than Egyptians had expected, they suspected U. S. -Israeli complicity. In fact, the Johnson administration had repeatedly warned Israel not to initiate hostility, while trying to organize an international fleet to deter Egypt from the use of force. The Arab side, however, continued to maintain that the United States had encouraged Israel to attack Egypt in order to weaken the revolutionary Nasser regime. The then unofficial spokesman of Nasser, Mohamed Heikal, still does so in his recent thick book “1967 al-Infijal (outbreak)” (Cairo, 1990), which is based on declassified documents of the United States and Egypt.According to him, when Egypt demanded the United Nations Emergency Force (which had been stationed in Sinai Peninsular since the 1956 Suez War) to leave from the Israeli border area, United Nations Under-Secretary Ralph Bunche, an American, advised Secretary-General U Thant not to accept partial withdrawal, thus provoking Egypt to demand total withdrawal and to occupy Sharm el-Sheikh and then close the Strait of Tiran for Israel. It was an American plot to give Israel a casus belli. After that the United States warned Egypt, in cooperation with the Soviet Union, not to initiate hostility while hinting to Israel that she would not, unlike on the occasion of the Suez War, support any United Nations move to sanction Israel if she attacked Egypt.On the American side, serious studies based on declassified documents as well as interviews with then policy-makers have been accumulated, some of which expressly try to refute the Egyptian accusations. I have studied and compared these books and articles, checked many of the documents and interviewed some people myself, and concluded that it is not that the United States “unleashed” Israel to attack Egypt, but that the Nasser regime itself let, through a series of miscalculations, the Egyptian military provoke Israel into war. However, Israeli decision-makers were wise enough not to attack Arab forces prematurely—they gave time to the U. S. and Britain to try to organize the international fleet. When the Johnson administration found the efforts rather fruitless, it was in fact inclined to let Israel help herself. In this sense the United States was involved in the political process leading to the outbreak of the war.

著者

三輪 芳明

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1996, no.112, pp.158-174,L17, 1996-05-18 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

53

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The purpose of this paper is to to examine the prospects for Finnish security policy in the foreseeable future by following the arguments on security alternatives after the application of EC (EU) membership in March 1992.The end of the Cold War forced Finland to reconsider the premises of her neutral policy. The confrontation of two blocks, in which Finland found room to pursue neutral policy, ceased to exist, and the withdrawal of former Soviet's forces from East Eupopean countries increased the strategic importance of Nordic area Pondering these changes, Finland decided to apply for EC (EU) membership, and determined that the core of the neutral policy is military non-alignment and a credible, independent defence. As for the relationship of these policies to the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) of EU, Finland takes a interpretation that observer status of WEU is compatible with the amended neutrality, as WEU is a crisis management organization. The purpose of the applicastion was to ensure its security in a changed situation by participating actively in the formation of the new security order of Europe.Toward the application to EC membership, some advocates of EC membership began to insist on the necessity to establish an institutional relationship with NATO, some maintaineded even the possibility of joining it. These arguments on NATO membership calmed down in the autumn of 1993, when the positive attitudes of Russia toward NATO turned to negative. While the major concern of Russia has been directed to the East European countries, it was highly probable that any attempt to approach NATO would strain the relationship with Russia owing to the Finnish position as a neighbouring country of Russia as well as the increased strategic importance of Nordic area In November, the then president Mauno Koivisto, made it clear that Finland would continue to pursue the neutral policy as any imminent and concrete menace against Finland was foreseeable. What was important for Finnish security was, according to the president, indirect security obtained through EU membership.The main issue for the Finnish security policy in the foreseeable future is whether the amended neutrality functions in the changed situation or not. It depends on how the EU and Russia estimate this policy. From the viewpoint of stability of Nordic area this policy could be in the interest of both. For Russia, this is a much better alternative than of Finland seeks to join WEU, whose membership could lead to the membership of NATO. For the EU whose border has come to touch with Russia, to maintain the stability is a matter of essential interest. One way to make this policy function more effectively in a way to serve for the EU and Russia may be to search for a possibility to cooperate with Sweden, as she is also a new EU member state and pursues neutrarity. Through this cooperation, neutrarity could be incorporated in CFSP as an institutionaized element.Another main issue is the validity of the concept of indirect security in the longer term. In case imminent and concrete menace emerges, would the EU membership be enough to ensure security, or should Finland consider joining NATO? If the latter's case is not excluded, this concept remains to be a transitional one. This problem of NATO membership is, however, premature. It depends ultimately on the advantages gained by NATO membership. But the function of NATO in the new security order of Europe is still unclear, especially in the context of nucler deterrence. The essential points, when Finland considers membership, are the reliability of the nuclear deterrence and the repercussion to be caused by joining NATO; among other things, endangerment of the regional stability of Nordic area.

著者

萩原 宜之

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1987, no.84, pp.136-152,L14, 1987-02-20 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

21

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Malaysia is a typical plural society which is composed of three different ethnic groups; the Malays, Chinese and Indians. The Malays are called “Bumiputra” as the indigenous people of Malaya. They observed the Islamic religion and have inherited the Sultanate system. The Chinese and Indians were brought as immigrant laborers under the British colonial administration of Malaya. They observed Buddism and Hinduism, respectively. Beside these racial and religious differences, there developed a different division of labor in the economy, which was led by the British divide and rule colonial policy. The Malays were mainly paddy and rubber small holders, the Chinese were tin miners, rubber estate owners, traders and merchants and the Indians were mainly rubber eatate laborers. This division of labor has resulted in the income disparity among the three ethnic groups. The Chinese were ranked as the higher income group compared to the Indians and Malays. And, this economic disparity among the three ethnic groups become the main political issues after the independence of Malaya in 1957.The independent Government led by the Alliance Party of Malaya, which was composed of the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA), and Malayan Indian Congress (MIC), has launched the rural development policy for the Malay farmers to increase their incomes, through land development and double-cropping of rice. But, as for the industrial development, the Government has allowed a free hand to the private sector, mainly Chinese enterprises and foreign investment. This laissez fair economic policy of the Government did not succeed in dissolving the economic disparities among the three ethnic groups. And, dissatisfaction toward the Alliance Government reached a crucial point in the May 13th (1959) racial riot at Kuala Lumpur. This tragedy happened after the May 10th election, where the UMNO and MCA lost their seats and the opposition parties-the Democratic Action Party (DAP) and the Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (GRM)-increased their seats and the DAP suported Chinese and the UMNO suported Malays were crushed at Kuala Lampur.This racial riot was controlled by the Government, led by the Vice-Premier Tun Razak. He has launched a New Economic Policy (NEP) to eradicate poverty and eliminate racial economic disparities. The point of this NEP policy is to create a Malay commercial and industrial sector by mobilizing Government development expenditures. After fifteen years implementation of this policy, there has emerged Malay commercial and industrial groups who were supported by the UMNO-led government and public corporations. But, the many Malay farmers were still poor as before, and discontent with the NEP policy among the Chinese has grown, year by year. And, there has been grass-root Islamic fundamentalism in the Malay rural areas. Also, the discontent of the Chinese, who moved to the support of DAP, is shown in their increased seats at the recent election of August, 1986. Thus, the outcome of the NEP policy was to produce a so-called small number of Malay state-capitalists, and dissatisfaction with this policy is growing not only among the Chinese, but also among the Malay farmers.This artide is an attempt to describe political and economic changes under the NEP policy, based on an analysis of ethnic differences, class divisions and ideological conflicts in Malaysia.

著者

土屋 健治

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1983, no.74, pp.117-133,L12, 1983-08-31 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

48

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The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that language is a very important part of political processes, that ‘physical’ processes go along with the manipulation of language, and that political conflicts or integration between different cultures or language systems may, on many occasions, be seen as the processes in which one language or culture ‘destroys, ’ or more modestly, takes over other languages or cultures.Indonesia is one of the world's largest dual-language states. While people in Indonesia commonly share the Indonesian language (bahasa Indonesia) as the national language, almost all Indonesians have their own ethnic languages as their native tongues and use them in everyday life. The Javanese language is the commonest of the ethnic languages in terms of the population. The major characteristic of the Javanese language is that it has two major levels in terms of ‘respectability’: one is the language of krama and the other is the language of ngoko. The language of krama, which has been highly developed through Indonesian history, is a ‘honorific’ language and is used by lower status people to higher status people. The language of ngoko is a ‘commoners’ language and is used among close friends and by higher status people to lower status people. When a person uses ngoko and the other person uses krama, then there exists a ‘dominance-conformity’ relationship between them.In this paper, we briefly describe the major characteristics, origins, and historical developments of these languages. Then, the “Mbah Suro” affair in 1967 is detailed. The affair is well known as one of the most salient resistance movements against the central government in Jakarta. One of the characteristics of the “Mbah Suro” affair is that it is a culturally based resistance movement. The event was widely publicized by the Jakartan government, whose objective was naturally to justify its action, and the newspapers reported the affair in detail. Next, the analysis focuses on how this event was reported in terms of the languages used in order to show the functions of the different languages in the political arena.Mbah Suro, who was a religious and cultural leader in a local area, used the language of ngoko to his followers, which shows that he is their legitimate leader. However, after Mbah Suro was killed by the physical forces of the central governmnent, the event was reported in such a way that the central government official talked to Mbah Suro using the langiage of ngoko and Mubah Suro replied in krama. This shows the central government demonstrated that legitimacy was on its side and that Mbah Suro “knelt down” to the central government. This psychological and cultural persuasion by the central government was only possible by the use of the Javanese language which maintains a distinction between ‘vulgar’ and ‘honorific’ versions. And, the Javanese language was used when the newspapers reported the event, even though the newspapers usually use the Indonesian language (which does not have such a distinction).

著者

白石 隆

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1987, no.84, pp.27-43,L7, 1987-02-20 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

16

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In the age of the United Nations, the state derives the meaning of its existence from the imagined nation, from the fiction that the executives of the modern state are a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole nation. From this, constitutional democratic thinking draws one conclusion: the key to legitimacy is the mandate of the nation/people, represented through fair and free elections; governmental performance in managing the common affairs of the nation is important, but it is translated into legitimavy only through elections. “Authoritarianism and development” thinking draws another: the legitimacy of a regime and hence regime stability ultimately depend on governmental performance in carrying out the common affairs of the nation, that is, national independence, unity, order and welfare. It is not the mandate of the nation/people represented through elections, but governmental performance itself that is the key to legitimacy. The ruling elite are those who know what the national goals are. The Important thing is to do the job. Legitimacy will come if the job is done well.Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines adopted this “authoritarianism and development” strategy for nation-building in the 1960s and 1970s with different results. Thailand and Indonesia have been successful in the task of state-building and are now trying to cope with the task of expanding political participation in different ways. In Thailand the bureaucratic polity has become a thing of the past and the search for a new form of “power-sharing” is now under way. In Indonesia, in contrast, the bureaucratic polity has been consolidated and the integratin of social forces in the regime is being attempted through functional representation. Only in the Philippines Marcos' “revolution from the center” and “democratic revolution” proved to be a dismal failure. But the argument Marcos made proved to be valid. It was indeed a “reoriented political authority” that initiated the “democratic revolution.”

著者

村井 吉敬

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1984, no.77, pp.89-109,L8, 1984-09-29 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

58

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The short history of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) has the reputation of being a case of “successful” regional co-operation in Southeast Asia in spite of a pessimistic prospect in its initial stage. However its “success” of solidarity was attained simply as a result of external pressures, namely the American defeat in Indochina and the regional tension arising from the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea. Except for this kind of regional “solidarity” mainly arising out of common fear of the Soviet “threat”, it might be said that ASEAN could not bring about solid results.This article aims to discuss the difficulties not only of regional integration in Southeast Asia but also of national integration in each country. Indonesia, a major member country of ASEAN, is characterized by its ethnic, religious and historical diversity. This nation also has a center and periphery in terms of social class and locality. This structure of center-periphery is analyzed mainly from the standpoint of one Indonesian local society; Sunda (West Java) World. The national integration of Indonesia from above after independence sometimes brought a process of depriviation of local identity and the oppression of the locality and local people.After the establishment of ASEAN it might be possible to say that authoritarian repressive integration through, “development” has been legitimized on the grounds of strengthening “regional co-operation” or fostering “regional peace.” But, at the same time, when we look at this integration process from the perspective of the vast majority of people, it is hard to say that the situation of their life, safety and justice has been much improved.It might be concluded that ASEAN is now functioning as a kind of sub-metropole of the world capitalistic system when we consider ASEAN's economic and sometimes military dependence upon the U. S., Japan and the EC. Nevertheless we should seek the common interest of Southeast Asian people from the standpoint of their peripheral situation in the world.

著者

土屋 健治

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1987, no.84, pp.80-94,L10, 1987-02-20 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

22

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This article is a preliminary attempt to discuss the cultural environment of Java from the end of the nineteenth to the beginning of the twentieth century through the medium of the growing market in a new type of “mestizo culture.” Since around the middle of the nineteenth century the colonial cities in Java like Batavia, Bandung and Surabaya had been growing dramatically, and concomitantly there was increased social communication among different social groups: the Dutch, Eurasians, and elites of Chinese and ‘native’ societies.“Mestizo culture, ” typically expressed in the pictures of “the Beautiful Indies, ” the kroncong melodies, new types of drama like the “Komedie Stambul” (the “Comedy of Stambul”), new types of popular novels like “nyai's stories, ” and films made by the colonial Dutch, incorporating each of these cultural elements to some extent, was distinctive. It was also important in creating cultural integration and in nation-building in Indonesia, in the sense that: 1) it continued to grow as a mass-culture at the “grass-roots” level, and therefore contributed to the spread of the Malay (Indonesian) language throughout society; 2) it was enjoyable and acceptable to all of the social groups in the colonial cities; and 3) it became more and more a “national” culture as nationalist movements burgeoned from the turn of the century.

著者

鈴木 董

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1983, no.73, pp.44-63,L9, 1983-05-25 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

69

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I.The Cyprus problem was one of the important international conflicts in the Middle East in the 1960s and 1970s. It was essentially an ethnic conflict between the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots, which developed into an international conflict. It was one of the fierce outbreaks of ethnic conflicts which are characteristic of the contemporary Middle East.II.In the modern age, the Western impact destroyed the traditional world system implying a self-sufficient Middle Eastern Islamic World and in the following process of “modernization”, the nature of its basic political units, the structure of identity and the style of co-existence among the ethnic groups, changed greatly.Before the coming of the Western impact, the Middle East was one of the relatively self-sufficient traditional world systems. In the Middle Eastern Islamic World, the idea of the unity of the Islamic World prevailed. There were, in fact, political units called “dawla.” Notwithstanding, the identity of the Middle Eastern peoples who belonged to dawlas was not based on ascription to political units but on religion.The various ethnic groups, which were the components of the mosaic-like societies in the Middle East, formed communities according to religions. And there existed a traditional style of co-existence among them. This traditional style of co-existence in the Middle Eastern Islamic world was not based on the principle of the equality of each ethnic group, but on the principle of the supremacy of the Muslims over the non-Muslims.Non-Muslims were thus second class citizens in Islamic political society. Notwithstanding, considering the limited range of political participation and the structure of the identity of the people of the time, the traditional Middle Eastern style of co-existence, which was institutionalized as a “dhimmi” institution in the classical period and completed in the form of a “millet” institution in the Ottoman Empire, functioned rather well in the complicated mosaic-like societies of the Middle East. Only under the influence of modern nationalism did it begin to dissolve and ethnic conflicts begin to surface. The Cyprus problem is one of these ethnic conflicts of the modern Midddle East.III.Because of its strategic position, Cyprus was occupied by one nation after another. The ethnic composition of Cypriot society also became complicated. When the Ottomans conquered Cyprus in 1571, the largest ethnic group was the Greeks together with some other minor ethnic groups. After the Ottoman conquest, the Turkish soldiers and peasants emmigrated and became at least the second large ethnic group. The millet system, the Ottoman form of the traditional Middle Eastern style of co-existence, was applied to these ethnic groups. The millet system functioned and the fierce outbreak of ethnic conflicts were rarely seen.The beginning of ethnic conflicts came with the impact of the West. Especially, the rise of nationalism and the independence of Greece affected the situation in Cyprus. And the idea of enosis, namely the reunion of Cyprus with Greece, emerged in Greece. Greek nationalism gradually penetrated Cyprus. Because of the rise of the nationalism of non-Muslim subjects, there was an attempt to reform the principle of inequality between Muslims and non-Muslims. In this period, the traditional style of co-existence of ethnic groups was also changing. However, the relationship of co-existence among ethnic groups continued.IV.At the end of this period, in 1878, Cyprus came under British rule. Under British rule, the nationalism of the Greek ethnic group and the Turkish ethnic group developed. The separated educational system of each ethnic group under British rule contributed much to this development. The development of the nationalism of the Greek Cypriots oriented to enosis was especially outstanding. Because of