著者

出 かず子

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究(Slavic Studies) (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.20, pp.11-24, 1975

著者

藤森 信吉

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.47, pp.301-325, 2000

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Ukraine draws attention from the international community because it is positioned between NATO and Russia. In 1999, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland were allowed to join NATO. Ukraine welcomed this accession as it would "strengthen security and stability in the European Continent." It seems that Ukraine has consistently moved closer to West European organizations and Ukraine took advantage of this opportunity to significantly improve its relationship with the West. However, the fact is not as simple as described above. Ukraine once proposed its original security plan and denounced NATO's PfP. Furthermore, Ukraine's economy relies heavily on the Russian market and energy supplies. When Ukraine's economy fails, there will be real danger that Ukraine involuntarily drifts eastward. In this paper, attention will be given to Ukraine's unique security policy regarding NATO-Russian relations. In the first chapter, economic problem under which Ukraine has existed will be discussed. In the second chapter, attention will be given to Ukraine's bridge diplomacy. Taking into account Ukraine's economic constraint and neutral policy, the last chapter will discuss Ukraine's policy towards NATO's expansion. 1. Economic factor plays an important role in Ukraine's security policy since its economy depends on Russia. After Russia launched its price liberalization in January 1992, Ukraine chose to leave the Ruble zone in order to establish its own national economic policy. This policy, called the "New economic plan" ended in failure and brought about hyperinflation, decline of GDP and huge energy debts. Kiev realized that Ukraine could not run its economy without Russia's cheap energy and market. A year later, Ukraine switched its orientation to Russia, but claimed that this integration was limited to the economic area. This economic integration with Russia, or the CIS Economic Union, generated great disputes among the citizens. In the presidential election in 1994, Ukrainian opinion was divided into two: Eastern Ukraine voted for former prime minister and pro-Economic integrationist Kuchma, Western Ukraine voted for then President Kravchuk who acted as a guarantor of Ukrainian statehood. Kuchma won, but after the elections, he launched an economic reform with the IMF and did not choose the integration line with Russia. The reason is straightforward. The IMF provided credit to cover the energy debts. After this decision was made, Ukraine's interest for the CIS Economic Union diminished. Ukraine realized that Russia had no intention of selling its energy at a cheap price. As IMF gives credit, Ukraine's interest in Russia is only to secure market for its products. Even with the economic reform launch in 1994, Ukraine's economy still records minus growth and its dependency on Russia has not been resolved. 2. As in the case of Euro-neutrals, their positive image in international arena comes not from their economic or military power, but from their neutral diplomacy, that is, bridge-diplomacy. Ukraine also tries to carry out this diplomacy. In 1993, Ukraine proposed to create a collective security zone for Central and Eastern Europe. This proposal aimed to create a bridge between Western Europe and Russia that would develop a broad transatlantic security system covering the entire CSCE (now OSCE) region. This proposal has found little support in Central and Eastern states as well as U.S. and Russia because it seemed like an anti-Russian alliance. Furthermore, it could be said that unstable Ukraine lacked its positive international image. This proposal was finally eroded by the PfP, since the PfP aimed to create a bridge between NATO and non-NATO countries. In 1996, Ukraine had the opportunity to propose a nuclear-weapon-free-zone in Central and Eastern Europe which also aimed for a bridge between NATO and Russia. Ukraine connected this proposal with the fact that Ukraine has carried out her commitments to transfer nuclear warheads. However, it appears that Ukraine did not have an intention to institutionalize this proposal. Generally, negative security assurance from nuclear powers is one of the necessary factors to materialize the nuclear-weapon-free-zone. However, there was no security assurance discussion in this proposal. As a matter of fact, this proposal aimed to find a common language with Russia who strongly opposed to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new NATO member states rather than creating a bridge between NATO and Russia. 3. Ukraine has shifted its view of NATO and its security policy. Eastern European countries which wanted to join NATO regarded PfP as the first step to NATO membership. Ukraine also did not oppose NATO's expansion, but claimed this process must be evolutionary, and it was necessary to harmonize with neighboring countries such as Russia and Ukraine. From Ukraine's viewpoint, Ukraine would develop her security through the PfP framework. At this point, Ukraine advocated building pan-European security institutions, especially the OSCE, the main pillar of the new European security architecture. This was similar to the Russian vision. Ukraine saw that NATO would be a promotive but secondary factor for this institution. However, soon Ukraine realized that NATO would expand in the near future. Ukraine changed its view of NATO from a passive to a positive one. Russian Duma and politicians have on several occasions called into question Ukraine's sovereignty over Sevastopol. Furthermore, some Russian government officials implied using economic pressure to boost its integration policy within the CIS. In these circumstances, Ukraine must place NATO as the center of its security policy. Ukraine noticed that NATO was changing from a defense organization to a political-military institute, as well as the guardian of democracy and human rights. This could be the reason why NATO would not harm any other states. Furthermore, idealism regarding the OSCE was replaced by a realistic approach to NATO. At this moment, it was vital for Ukraine to conclude a special relationship with NATO. NATO-Russian document seemed likely to be signed, so if Ukraine could not conclude a document with NATO, Ukraine's future would be determined by this NATO-Russian document. In the negotiation process, Ukraine strongly asked NATO to give security assurance or "associate status." Finally, in the document called "NATO-Ukraine Charter," NATO gave vague security assurance to Ukraine. NATO knows that Russia is strongly against the former Soviet Republics joining NATO. NATO had given Ukraine this document to "keep Ukraine quiet" regarding this problem. This Ukrainian government's pro-NATO orientation could not be explained by domestic factors, such as parliament and regional opinions. 4. Conclusion. Since independence, Ukraine has been caught and limited by economic dependence on Russia. Nevertheless, Ukraine pursued its intention of playing an intermediary role in European security issues. In the Kosovo crisis, Ukraine again showed its intention to intermediate between NATO and Serbia, but this initiative had found little support by both sides and as a result, ended in failure. Under the current international environment, there is little room for Ukraine to implement its bridge-diplomacy. Concerning the above mentioned objective and subjective factors, Ukraine gradually shifted its policy toward NATO. However, NATO's expansion continued regardless Ukraine's concerns. Ukraine demanded more security assurances from NATO, but its proposals were rejected. Every Ukrainian leader has to consider this situation. Ukraine's economic slump continues and Russia does not provide energy by cheap price. On the other hand, keeping a distance from NATO and pursuing its neutral policy have little prospect in the short and medium term. If the above-mentioned international condition continues, then there is no alternative for Ukraine but to maintain the current policy, IMF-oriented, pro-NATO but neutral status.

著者

村上 孝之

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究(Slavic Studies) (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.38, pp.1-16, 1991

著者

志田 恭子

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

no.49, pp.245-268, 2002

著者

百瀬 宏

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究(Slavic Studies) (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.15, pp.143-163, 1971

著者

外川 継男

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究(Slavic Studies) (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.9, pp.43-85, 1965

著者

城野 充

出版者

北海道大学

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.43, pp.167-180, 1996

著者

出 かず子

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究(Slavic Studies) (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.23, pp.53-85, 1979

著者

見附 陽介

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

no.56, pp.63-89[含 英語文要旨], 2009

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In this paper, I examine the meaning of the concepts of "person" and "thing" in M. M. Bakhtin's theory of dialogue. Through this examination, I aim to clarify the similarities and differences between Bakhtin's and C. L. Frank's philosophy based on an ontological concept unique to traditional Russian philosophy, namely, "pan-unity" (всеединство). I begin by presenting a conceptual contrast between dialogue and reification, which play an important role in Bakhtin's seminal work Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics. I demonstrate that this contrast between dialogue and reification derives from the contrast between person and thing. Dialogue, to Bakhtin, is the relationship between "I" and "Thou." We need to consider the other as "Thou" because he/she is not a thing but a person who has his/her "independence," "inner freedom," and "unfinalizability." Bakhtin says that only through dialogue can we properly deal with such characteristics of the other. If we have contact with the other without a dialogical attitude, he/she is reified as a thing that does not speak. He affirms that the main aim of his work is to elucidate the meaning of the artistic form of Dostoevsky's literary works, namely, "polyphony." According to Bakhtin, polyphony emancipates the person from such reification through a dialogical attitude. In this sense, we can infer that Bakhtin's theory of dialogue is based on the contrast between dialogue and reification, which derives from the fundamental contrast between person and thing. In addition, by comparing Bakhtin's concept of reification with A. F. Losev's, I demonstrate that Bakhtin utilized the word "reification" not in the manner of Russian Platonism, wherein it was considered as the incarnation of an "idea," but in the manner of Kantian argument, which ethically differentiated person from thing and criticized the idea of treating a person as a means. Next, I examine S. L. Frank's concepts of person and thing to compare them with Bakhtin's. Frank also developed the idea of "I" and "Thou." Moreover, like Bakhtin, he criticized the idea of treating a person as a thing. In this sense, I think that his philosophy is suitable for a comparison with Bakhtin's theory. However, there is a third category in Frank's argument, which he refers to as "We." This makes his idea of "I" and "Thou" distinct from others' idea. "We" is characterized as a primary state from which "I" and "Thou" are derived through differentiation, namely, as pan-unity. Frank ultimately places these categories in ontological unity under God. I show that in Frank's philosophy, encounter and association with the other as "Thou" is grounded in this ontological concept. On the basis of these theories, we can point out the similarities between Bakhtin's and Frank's philosophy. Both developed the idea of "I" and "Thou" on the basis of the contrast between person and thing. Moreover, it seems that Frank's definition of "We" as a "polycentric system" is similar to Bakhtin's idea of "polyphony." However, there is a decisive difference between them, namely, the ontological premise of the relationship between "I" and "Thou." As stated above, the relationship between "I" and "Thou" is ensured by the ontological concept of "We" as pan-unity in Frank's philosophy. On the other hand, the ontological premise of Bakhtin's dialogue is the idea of "outsideness" (вненаходимость). I conclude that this idea is incompatible with the idea of pan-unity. However, there seems to be a disagreement concerning the interpretation of Bakhtin's idea of outsideness. Some scholars, including me, think that there are some differences between the idea of outsideness and the idea of pan-unity. Therefore, they consider Bakhtin's philosophy to be distinct from traditional Russian philosophy. Others think that there are some similarities or connections between them. Therefore, they consider Bakhtin's philosophy to be influenced by traditional Russian philosophy. By considering the differentiation between "monological outsideness" and "polyphonic (dialogical) outsideness," which was proposed by Bakhtin, I intend to provide a solution for this seeming disagreement. Finally, on the basis of these arguments, I consider not only how Bakhtin's idea of person and thing can be appreciated in comparison with Frank's idea, but also how the idea of outsideness as the ontological premise of Bakhtin's dialogism can be appreciated in comparison with the ontological idea of pan-unity, unique to Russian philosophy.

著者

百瀬 宏

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.27, pp.p81-104, 1981

著者

相沢 直樹

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.45, pp.1-33, 1998-03-31

著者

伊東 孝之

出版者

北海道大学

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.18, pp.117-166, 1973

著者

森下 嘉之

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.59, pp.93-114, 2012-06-15

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Right after WWII, Eastern European countries stood at a crossroads, witnessing, to name but a couple, communization of the state and transfer of millions of ethnic minorities, most notably Germans. Postwar Czechoslovakia was no exception. Czechoslovakia had had three republican periods: the first republic from its independence in 1918 to the collapse in 1938, the second from 1938 to the Nazi occupation in 1939, and the third from 1945 to the beginning of Communist Party rule in 1948. The third republic in particular embraced many alternatives for future social policies, neither capitalistic nor communistic. Focusing on the housing policy from 1945 to 1948, this article aims to elucidate postwar Czechoslovakia's search for the optimum social policies, addressing the difference between the prewar and the postwar period. I also examine the policy of the transfer of the German population and the settlement of Czechs in the Czech border area, as it was against this backdrop that the new housing policy took form. While the last president of the first republic, Eduard Beneš, returned as president of the new Czechoslovakia, the Communist Party was dominant in the government. On the one hand, the new republic resembled its prewar predecessors in terms of parliamentary democracy. On the other hand, undertaking the nationalization of large enterprises, land reform, and a planned economy, the postwar government attempted to differentiate itself from the prewar regime that had resulted in the Nazi's invasion and the collapse of the state. The Communists as the largest group in the government could propose their own postwar reforms disposed not toward Soviet-type socialism, but toward "the Czechoslovakian way" or "the bridge between the East and the West." The highest on the agenda for postwar reconstruction was the housing policy. The postwar government launched a "two-year plan," the first planned economy for the reconstruction of Czechoslovakia. Notably, the government planned to build and supply 125,000 houses from 1947 to 1948. The government and architects worked in tandem to upgrade the poor prewar housing conditions by revising prewar housing laws. On the one hand, socialist parties and architects criticized the prewar liberalist housing market, exhorting the introduction of state control of the market. Some architects were enthusiastic about grand apartment buildings containing small houses as the socialist type of housing of the future. On the other hand, based on the housing law of 1921, the government decided to provide subsidies for family houses with 80 m2 of floor space, instead of 34 m2 as had been stipulated in 1937, with a view toward improving the housing environment. Moreover, the new government adhering to the Czechoslovakian way, neither liberalist nor socialist, even allowed private properties, while some architects influenced by Soviet architecture insisted on the entire socialization of houses and land. It is definitely necessary to contextualize the postwar Czechoslovakian housing policy in the removal of more than 2,000,000 Germans and the settlement of Czech people in the borderland (pohraniči). There, the "settlement office (Osidlovací úřad)" led by the Communist Party played a particularly essential role. The settlement office as well as the national board, which was also ruled by Communists, fulfilled the task of furnishing new Czech settlers with houses that had been expropriated from Germans and Hungarians as well as managing the housing market. The Communist Party had a good reason to expect support from those new settlers who could obtain huge properties, such as houses, thanks to the Communist policy. Despite the abundance of confiscated empty houses, this period did not see the solution to the housing problem, as the condition of these houses remained atrocious. Although the postwar housing policy held an opportunity to realize ideal plans for the future Czechoslovakia, it did not thrive due to the tough reality in the borderland. The policy and the ideal were consigned to oblivion after the establishment of the Communist regime in 1948.

著者

長谷 直哉

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

no.53, pp.267-298, 2006

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After the demise of the Soviet Union, Russia changed from a communist regime to democratic rule. Federalism was chosen to coordinate the center-regional relationship: and Russia was reborn as the "Russian Federation." Recently, various Russian regional researches have been published, since "Rebellion" in the Russian region has often been observed. These provided exhaustive knowledge for Russian regional politics, but few paid attention to the type of relationship that has been built between center (federal government) and region (the components of the Russian Federation). Russia institutionalized the federal political system, which is recognized in most studies on federal political theory. Therefore, we need to explain Russian regional politics from the perspective of federalism, in order to deepen the comprehension of contemporary Russia. The aim of this thesis is to grasp the system of Russian federalism in the framework of comparative federalism. The traditional approaches to federalism are: the constitutional approach, the sociological approach, "the process to integration" approach, and the bargaining approach. While these four approaches provide an explanation that is somewhat effective with respect to federalism, they do not provide a concrete concept for an adequate comparison. Ronald Watts, who is one of the pioneers of comparative federalism, succeeded in resolving the problem of how to combine the multifarious factors of a federal state. He clarified the definition of federalism, and conceptionalized the following six features of a federal political system: 1. Two orders of government each acting directly on their citizens 2. A formal constitutional distribution of legislative and executive authority and allocation of revenue resources between the two orders of government ensuring some areas of genuine autonomy for each order 3. Provision for the designated representation of distinct regional views within the federal policy-making institutions, usually provided by the particular form of the federal second chamber 4. A supreme written constitution not unilaterally amendable and requiring the consent of a significant proportion of the constituent units 5. An umpire (in the form of courts or provision for referendums) to rule on disputes between governments 6. Processes and institutions to facilitate intergovernmental collaboration for those areas where governmental responsibilities are shared or inevitably overlap (Ronald Watts, Comparing Federal Systems, McGill-Queen's University Press, 1999, pp. 6-7) What kind of conclusions can be deduced when analyzing Russian federalism based on Watts's framework? I examined the jurisdiction between governments, the allocation of fiscal power, the functions of the senate, the constitutional amendment procedures, the role of constitutional courts, and the intergovernmental relations in comparison with other federal states. In the field of jurisdiction, the Russian federal government has never had wide-ranging power. However, the constitutional provision (Article 70, f): "the establishment of the fundamentals of federal policy and federal programs in thc spheres of state, economic, ecological, social, cultural and national development of the Russian Federation" can confer a power that can interfere in regional jurisdiction. Various powers are allocated in joint jurisdiction, but consensus building between governments is still unstable. With respect to fiscal matters, revenue resources allocated to the regions are larger than the average allocation in other federal states, but the fiscal gap between regions is very serious in Russia. Now, Putin's reform is pushing to change fiscal federalism. The aim of this reform is to clarify the fiscal responsibility of governments. It is possible that the reform causes regions' fiscal dependence on the federal budget because most regions do not have sufficient fiscal resources. And thus, the Russian Senate (Federal Council) holds an unstable institutional position. The Duma can override the veto of the senate, and the president can also enact law by decree. Since Putin's reform, the influence of the senate on the policy-making process continues to weaken; however, the senate is maintaining its status as the organ of regional representatives. In Russia, it is extremely difficult to amend the constitution, and the rigidity assures federalism. Federal government basically intends to recentralize the Russian Federation. However, the rigidity should protect the principles of federalism. The Russian constitutional court tends to deliver judgments including contents to defend federal jurisdictions. However, the court always tries to remain neutral in political conflicts among other federal, and regional organs. For example, the resolution, which was decided on 18 July 2003, repelled interference in the judiciary by the federal executive branch. Generally, the federal President takes the initiative in intergovernmental relationship construction because the Federal President is able to deal with center-regional problems flexibly through promulgation of the presidential decree. The federal government continues to exert pressure on regional governments, and it is difficult to reorganize regional political regimes. Therefore, stability of the Russian federal political system is inclined to depend on presidential influences. However, this system satisfies Watts's six features: I can confirm that the rigidity of the constitution, the independence of the constitutional courts, and the principle of regional representatives in the senate help to maintain federalism. The Russian federal political system seems to be wavering and is dependent on presidential initiative, but it does have the robustness of a constitutional system. The intergovernmental relations have been repeatedly transformed since 1993, but the principle of federalism has not changed.

著者

長谷 直哉

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.53, pp.267-298, 2006

---

After the demise of the Soviet Union, Russia changed from a communist regime to democratic rule. Federalism was chosen to coordinate the center-regional relationship: and Russia was reborn as the "Russian Federation." Recently, various Russian regional researches have been published, since "Rebellion" in the Russian region has often been observed. These provided exhaustive knowledge for Russian regional politics, but few paid attention to the type of relationship that has been built between center (federal government) and region (the components of the Russian Federation). Russia institutionalized the federal political system, which is recognized in most studies on federal political theory. Therefore, we need to explain Russian regional politics from the perspective of federalism, in order to deepen the comprehension of contemporary Russia. The aim of this thesis is to grasp the system of Russian federalism in the framework of comparative federalism. The traditional approaches to federalism are: the constitutional approach, the sociological approach, "the process to integration" approach, and the bargaining approach. While these four approaches provide an explanation that is somewhat effective with respect to federalism, they do not provide a concrete concept for an adequate comparison. Ronald Watts, who is one of the pioneers of comparative federalism, succeeded in resolving the problem of how to combine the multifarious factors of a federal state. He clarified the definition of federalism, and conceptionalized the following six features of a federal political system: 1. Two orders of government each acting directly on their citizens 2. A formal constitutional distribution of legislative and executive authority and allocation of revenue resources between the two orders of government ensuring some areas of genuine autonomy for each order 3. Provision for the designated representation of distinct regional views within the federal policy-making institutions, usually provided by the particular form of the federal second chamber 4. A supreme written constitution not unilaterally amendable and requiring the consent of a significant proportion of the constituent units 5. An umpire (in the form of courts or provision for referendums) to rule on disputes between governments 6. Processes and institutions to facilitate intergovernmental collaboration for those areas where governmental responsibilities are shared or inevitably overlap (Ronald Watts, Comparing Federal Systems, McGill-Queen's University Press, 1999, pp. 6-7) What kind of conclusions can be deduced when analyzing Russian federalism based on Watts's framework? I examined the jurisdiction between governments, the allocation of fiscal power, the functions of the senate, the constitutional amendment procedures, the role of constitutional courts, and the intergovernmental relations in comparison with other federal states. In the field of jurisdiction, the Russian federal government has never had wide-ranging power. However, the constitutional provision (Article 70, f): "the establishment of the fundamentals of federal policy and federal programs in thc spheres of state, economic, ecological, social, cultural and national development of the Russian Federation" can confer a power that can interfere in regional jurisdiction. Various powers are allocated in joint jurisdiction, but consensus building between governments is still unstable. With respect to fiscal matters, revenue resources allocated to the regions are larger than the average allocation in other federal states, but the fiscal gap between regions is very serious in Russia. Now, Putin's reform is pushing to change fiscal federalism. The aim of this reform is to clarify the fiscal responsibility of governments. It is possible that the reform causes regions' fiscal dependence on the federal budget because most regions do not have sufficient fiscal resources. And thus, the Russian Senate (Federal Council) holds an unstable institutional position. The Duma can override the veto of the senate, and the president can also enact law by decree. Since Putin's reform, the influence of the senate on the policy-making process continues to weaken; however, the senate is maintaining its status as the organ of regional representatives. In Russia, it is extremely difficult to amend the constitution, and the rigidity assures federalism. Federal government basically intends to recentralize the Russian Federation. However, the rigidity should protect the principles of federalism. The Russian constitutional court tends to deliver judgments including contents to defend federal jurisdictions. However, the court always tries to remain neutral in political conflicts among other federal, and regional organs. For example, the resolution, which was decided on 18 July 2003, repelled interference in the judiciary by the federal executive branch. Generally, the federal President takes the initiative in intergovernmental relationship construction because the Federal President is able to deal with center-regional problems flexibly through promulgation of the presidential decree. The federal government continues to exert pressure on regional governments, and it is difficult to reorganize regional political regimes. Therefore, stability of the Russian federal political system is inclined to depend on presidential influences. However, this system satisfies Watts's six features: I can confirm that the rigidity of the constitution, the independence of the constitutional courts, and the principle of regional representatives in the senate help to maintain federalism. The Russian federal political system seems to be wavering and is dependent on presidential initiative, but it does have the robustness of a constitutional system. The intergovernmental relations have been repeatedly transformed since 1993, but the principle of federalism has not changed.

著者

百瀬 宏

出版者

北海道大学

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.20, pp.97-113, 1975

著者

植田 隆子

出版者

北海道大学

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.22, pp.69-103, 1978-03-25

著者

劉 旭

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

no.57, pp.157-177, 2010

著者

大野 成樹

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

no.47, pp.91-115, 2000

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In former studies about Russian banks, analysis from a comprehensive viewpoint has been almost completely ignored. In order to clarify the characteristics of Russian banking activities, an analysis from the viewpoints of bank location, foundation and scale is indispensable. Russian banks have shown some distinguishing characteristics in their activities when viewed by these classifications. To analyze this situation, we have classified Russian banks in this article by their location, foundation and scale. To do this we used the lists of large Russian banks that were periodically published in "Ekonomika i zhizn'" (data as of July 1994, January 1995, January 1996 and January 1997; the list has not been published since 1998) and "Finansovye izvestiia" (data as of January 1996, January 1997 and January 1998). The situation after 1998 was not analyzed because of the lack of information. For an analysis of Russian banking activities by bank foundation, banks were classified into former state banks and non-former state banks. Former state banks include the Savings Bank of Russia, Promstroibank of USSR, Agroprombank of USSR, Zhilsotsbank of USSR (excluding the Foreign Trade Bank of Russia) and the Foreign Trade Bank of Russia. For an analysis of activities by their location, banks were classified into those which were located in Moscow city and Moscow oblast (hereafter referred to as Moscow banks) and those in 11 other economic regions (North, Northwest, Central excluding Moscow city and Moscow oblast, Volga-Vyatka, Central Black-Soil, Volga, North Caucasus, Urals, West Siberia, East Siberia, and Far East; Kaliningrad was excluded because there were no data about it). The banks in these economic regions are referred to below as regional banks. In addition, regression analysis was applied to clarify differences in banking activities by bank foundation and location. Because of the limited data, in the regression banks were classified by foundation into former state banks and non-former state banks, and banks were classified by location into Moscow banks and regional banks. In the analysis by bank scale, data were taken into account for the banks that were ranked as the 50 top banks in the 100 largest bank lists and for 50 banks from the bottom of the lists. Regression was then used to confirm whether or not differences existed in the activities between large banks and medium-sized banks. Before analyzing Russian banks' activities by these classifications, let us survey the trends and changes of their lending and investing activities. Russian banks earned profits under the hyperinflation caused by the liberalization of prices in January 1992, through devaluation of their liabilities and from other sources. Subsequent government tight money policies led to the suppression of inflation and stabilization of the ruble exchange rate. From about 1994, therefore, banks tended to increase loans to other banks, although they still held a large share of hard currency as non-working assets. The banks made profits by raising funds in the call market and lending the money as call loans under a positive yield curve for terms longer than the call money repayment period. Such a profit-making structure collapsed under tight monetary and fiscal policies, however, and some banks fell into default in August 1995. Banks therefore began to place more emphasis on their lending activities to non-bank sectors or to holdings of state securities. Especially after 1995 the amount of outstanding state securities has increased dramatically, because the government was prohibited in 1995 from compensating its budget deficits with Central Bank loans. Because the inflation rate decreased further in 1996-1997, the refinance rate of the Central Bank also was reduced. This resulted in the decline of the yield on state securities. During these years banks tended to increase the amount of loans to non-bank sectors, reducing the proportion of non-working assets. In the following sections we will analyze loans to non-bank sectors, loans to other banks and holdings of state securities. 1. Loans to non-bank sectors. In this section we will analyze the general situation regarding loans to non-bank sectors and the situation of foreign currency-denominated loans to non-bank sectors. (1) General situation of loans to non-bank sectors. First we analyzed the situation by foundation of banks. In the data of "Ekonomika i zhizn'" the share of loans to non-bank sectors in the assets of the former Promstroibank and Agroprombank was high. This was because these banks had strong relationships with their customers, industrial and agricultural companies. In contrast, the share of loans to non-bank sectors in the assets of the former Zhilsotsbank was lower than that of the former Promstroibank and Agroprombank. Banks that originated from the former Zhilsotsbank did not tend to participate in unprofitable government economic programs such as agricultural programs. Activities of these banks were quite different -- some of them gave priority to loans to non-bank sectors, while others gave weight to operations of state securities. The share of loans to non-bank sectors at the Foreign Trade Bank of Russia was much lower than that of banks of other categories. That was because its main activities were to hold its assets in hard currency in foreign banks. The share of loans to non-bank sectors at non-former state banks was lower than that of the former Promstroibank and Agroprombank but higher than that of the former Zhilsotsbank. Let us further analyze the situation of loans to non-bank sectors by the location of banks. In the data of "Ekonomika i zhizn'" the share of loans to non-bank sectors at Moscow banks was much lower than that of regional banks in 1994 and 1995, but in 1996 and 1997 differences between Moscow banks and regional banks became smaller. Furthermore, regression indicates that the share of loans to non-bank sectors at smaller Moscow former state banks tended to be greater in 1994 and 1995. From the viewpoint of the scale of banks, the share of loans to non-bank sectors at larger banks tended to be lower. But in 1996 and 1997 differences between classifications were smaller. In the data of "Finansovye izvestiia" the share of loans to non-bank sectors in the assets of non-former state banks was the highest of all categories by foundation of bank. At the former Promstroibank, Agroprombank and Zhilsotsbank and at the Foreign Trade Bank of Russia, the share was about 20-30%. In the data of "Finansovye izvestiia" the share of loans to non-bank sectors at non-former state banks exceeded that of the former Promstroibank and Agroprombank. This is different from the result of the analysis based on the data of "Ekonomika i zhizn'" and is caused by the difference in the definition of "asset" in the data. This means the share of interest arrears, the inter-office account and other assets in the assets of the former Promstroibank and Agroprombank was larger than the share at non-former-state banks. The share of loans to non-bank sectors at the Savings Bank of Russia was much lower than that of other categories. This was caused by the weakness of the bank's relationship with companies in the Soviet era. In the data of "Finansovye izvestiia" regression shows that larger non-former state banks tended to loan more, whereas differences between Moscow banks and regional banks were weaker. On the other hand, differences between large banks and medium-sized banks became greater as years passed, which is distinguished by the smaller proportion of loans to non-bank sectors at larger banks. (2) Foreign currency loans to non-bank sectors. The data of "Finansovye izvestiia" were used for an analysis of foreign currency loans to non-bank sectors (there were no such data in "Ekonomika i zhizn'"). The data showed that of loans to non-bank sectors, the share of foreign currency loans tended to be larger at the non-former state banks than at the former state banks, but differences by location of banks were weak. Regression shows that the share of foreign currency loans to non-bank sectors denominated at larger non-former state banks tended to be greater. Differences between large banks and medium-sized banks were evident. 2. Loans to other banks. In this paper we defined "loans to other banks" as loans that were included in the category "Loans" on the balance sheet, excluding deposits in correspondent accounts at other banks. Only the data in 1994 and 1995 of "Ekonomika i zhizn'" were consistent with this definition. According to the data the proportion of loans to other banks in the total of all bank loans was high in Central (excluding Moscow city and Moscow oblast) in 1994, and high in Moscow city and Moscow oblast and Urals in 1995. Therefore differences in loans to other banks between Moscow banks and regional banks were not so evident. From the viewpoint of the foundation of banks, the share of loans to other banks at non-former state banks was higher. This was related to the weakness of their relationship with companies when compared with the former Promstroibank and Agroprombank, as well as the lower overall share of loans to non-bank sectors (in the data of "Ekonomika i zhizn'"). Moreover, regression proved that non-former state banks tended to loan to other banks more than former state banks. On the other hand, differences between large banks and medium-sized banks were not observed in the data. 3. Holdings of state securities. Data about holdings of state securities were available in "Finansovye izvestiia." From the viewpoint of the foundation of banks the share of state securities in the assets of the Savings Bank of Russia was far larger than that of other categories, and the share in the assets of the Foreign Trade Bank of Russia was relatively high. Differences between former state banks and non-former state banks were clear. From the viewpoint of location, the share of state securities in the assets of Moscow banks tended to be higher than the share at regional banks. Analysis by regression showed that in 1996 and 1998, differences in holdings of state securities by both foundation and location were clear, and the share of state securities at larger Moscow former state banks tended to be higher. Furthermore, in 1996 and 1998 differences between large banks and medium-sized banks were clear, judged from the higher share of state securities in the assets of large banks than those of medium-sized banks. Conclusion. In many phases of Russian banking activities, differences in characteristics according to the foundation of banks came to the fore. Differences in characteristics by the location of banks were weaker, except for holdings of state securities. Differences based on the scale of banks were outstanding, especially differences in loans to non-bank sectors. Recently differences in the activities between large banks and medium-sized banks have attracted more media attention. On the other hand, differences by foundation of banks in particular have tended to be ignored. Our analysis indicates, however, that viewing bank activity from the standpoint of the foundation of banks is still effective to explain Russian banking activities. Our work may as well be the first step towards understanding the changing activities of Russian banks since the collapse of USSR. The task of analyzing the situation after the crisis of August 1998 remains to be addressed.

著者

林 忠行

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

no.30, pp.p71-94, 1982