著者

東田 範子

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

no.46, pp.1-32, 1999

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Since the time of the Russian Empire, Kazak(Qazaq) music had been described as "folk music" by scholars and musicians, and under Soviet rule, it was to be developed to create a part of the Kazak national culture. The author describes the process of the formation of Kazak national music and its systematization in the first half of the Soviet period. To understand the changes in Kazak musical culture in the Soviet period, it is important to survey the course of Russian nationalism in the 19th century; which served as a model for the formation of Kazak national music. In Russia, Iike in other countries on the periphery of Europe, there had been interest in folk culture since the middle of the 18th century; and folk songs and music were transcribed in musical notation and arranged by composers and scholars. So-called Russian nationalist school w as established in the history of European music, and composers did not simply quote Russian folk music in their works with European harmonization. At that time, it became a common practice for composers to publish "collected folk songs" -- a term which was applied to their own arrangements of songs with piano accompaniment. The worth of folk songs was appreciated only when they were given arrangements or harmonization, thus transformed by composers into works of art. Folk music was always subsidiary to "art music" or "universal music" -- i.e., European Classical Music. Another source of material to be transformed into works of art in Russia was the musical traditions of foreign peoples. Their motifs were inlaid in many works by Russian composers, and they evoked not only exotic but also imperialistic and patriotic feelings for Russia. The music of foreign peoples was also considered as "folk music," whether it be their ritual music or court music. On the other hand, Russian folk music was transformed in the process of staging it. In the 1880s, V. V. Andreev "improved" Russian folk musical instruments, giving them frets and adding strings to permit the playing of more "complicated" European works. He made instruments of different sizes and registers, and these were organized into the orchestra of Russian folk musical instruments. This orchestra became instantly popular, and stimulated formation of similar ensembles. The collection of folk music and its publication was of interest not only to musicians but to Russian ethnographers. Ethnographic research institutions formed special commissions for folk music research, which included composers, musicologists, and music critics, as well as ethnographers. They undertook the systematic collection and study of Russian and foreign music, and published the results. Kazak music was also transcribed in this tradition. Beginning in the first half of the 19th century; it was recorded in linear notation. Many of the transcribers of Kazak music were professional or semi-professional musicians or ethnographers well-grounded in music, and some of them did arrangements in the manner of the Russian composers. Meanwhile, Kazaks did not write their own music into notation until 1931. Since they had transmitted tr mheiusical heritage in an entirely oral-aural w ay, the idea of visual recording of music was unfamiliar for them. It is natural that they might have come into contact with Russian music and with European music through the Russians, as a result of their long history as neighbors. A few Kazaks at that time actually read and wrote European notation. But most people simply received the music by ear, not by a European notation system, and they never attempted transcription of Kazak music. Unlike Kazak literature, which was transformed eclectically to meet the demands of the coming new age, such transformation of Kazak music was not possible without transcription. In early Soviet ideology, the culture of the Kazaks was seen not as "national culture," but as "folk culture." Folk culture was to be collected and recorded to educate and enlighten the people. They were expected to gradually adopt "universal culture," supplemented with their own folk elements. In 1920, when the Kirgiz [Kazak] ASSR was established, the government decided to undertake the collection of Kazak folk music as a state project. As the key person responsible for this task, the government appointed A. V. Zataevich, who had come from Russia. Since he once wished to be a professional composer, Zataevich had been interested in Kazak music before his offircial appointment, and he had himself already begun transcription and arrangements of the music. His personal purpose was to create new art music by using the motifs and melodies of Kazak music in his works as was done by the Russian composers whom he admired. Thus the aims of the government and those of Zataevich diverged, but they were basically in agreement on the ultimate purpose of contributing to "universal art music" -- one by educating Kazak people, and the other by trying to bring new possibilities to art music. Another program pursued by the government and Zataevich was the "improvement" of Kazak musical instruments and the organization of ensembles according to the Russian model. Improvement meant increasing the volume of the sound of instruments for performance on stage, increasing the number of frets and strings, and so on. This program was initiated after 1928, and took shape in the 1930s. After the concept of the socialistic realism was formulated in the 1930s, folk culture was required to be "national in the form and socialistic in the content" through "development" in a Soviet socialistic way. In Kazak music, this development was to be realized through professionalization and popularization. Now Kazak musicians had to become "professional" by being educated in public institutions which were opened in rapid succession, and by playing the improved Kazak instruments in orchestras using notation. Education in institutions was conducted only by these "professional" musicians, and the traditional form of Kazak musical culture was designated as amateurism. It was only "professional folk music" that could become "Soviet-Kazak national music." The first institution of higher musical education in Kazak SSR was the Musical-Dramatic Training College, founded in 1932. The government appointed A. Jŭbanov to direct this College. Jŭbanov was the first Kazak that learned European music in Russia (Leningrad), and he was an expert in Kazak musical culture, as well. In the College, he played a leading role in the transcription and arrangement of Kazak music, in the reconstruction of Kazak musical instruments, and in musical education. He and colleagues transcribed a large number of Kazak songs and melodies into staff notation. They were arranged to create "art music", and to provide a repertoire for the Orchestra of Kazak Folk Musical Instruments which was established in 1934. Kazak instruments were "improved" by Russian masters who had previously worked with orchestras and ensembles of Russian folk musical instruments. The Orchestra of Kazak Folk Musical Instruments began to use a notation system for performing arranged European Classical pieces, but there were great difficulties for Kazak musicians both in the polyphonic performance style of the orchestra and in using the linear notation system. In this way, the professionalism of Kazak folk music was developed despite various difficulties. Furthermore, this professionalism was supported by musicological research. Jŭbanov began to write the biographies of past Kazak musicians, and formulated the concept of "the history of Kazak music." The first comprehensive work on the history of Kazak music was written by Jŭbanov, entitled "The Lives and Works of Kazak Composers." This book apparently follows the history of masters of European music in its manner of historical and biographical writing. We see that Jtibanov attempted to show the autonomous and independent worth of Kazak music -- by both denying and allowing the application of European terms to Kazak music. Simultaneously, though, this autonomy of Kazak musical culture was considered as a thing of the past, and in this regard was unlike Soviet-Kazak professional folk music. In this way, Kazak folk music was "developed" into Soviet national music through systematization and institutionalization. As national music was seen to have these indispensable characteristics, traditional forms of Kazak music were relegated to the realm of folk music, which was associated with "simplicity" and "amateurism".

著者

秋月 孝子

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究(Slavic Studies) (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.22, pp.253-270, 1978-03-25

著者

横手 慎二

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究(Slavic Studies) (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.36, pp.47-78, 1989

著者

石 和静

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.46, pp.33-55, 1999

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This paper elucidates the plans for Korea's neutralization by Russia between 1900-1903 and evaluates its connection with Count Witte's Manchurian policy It deals with a series of three attempts to realize Korea's neutrality under the auspices of a "joint guarantee by the Powers," which was invented by the Russian government. In most of the literature reviewed, discussions about Russia's Korean neutralization plans have failed to view them as policies initiated by the government as a whole, and tended to interpret them only as impromptu, unauthoritative proposals by Russian Ministers on the spot. Witte, as the Russian Minister of Finance who had the greatest influence in Russian East Asian affairs, sought to strike separate under-the-table deals with Japan concerning Korea's neutrality. Japan in fact wanted a free hand for itself in the Korean peninsula, however, which seemed to Russia absolutely unacceptable in view of Korea's paramount strategic significance. This study shows that Korea's neutralization was Russia's ultimate goal, and this goal conflicted with lapan's stance on the Korean and Manchurian issues. In the end, these tensions contributed to the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904. The Korean neutralization policy was originated and conducted by Witte. This was due to Witte and his ministry's involvement in all aspects of Russian foreign affairs. Witte's solution to the Korean problem was always connected with the situation in Manchuria, where the Russians wanted to exercise their extraterritorial rights. He brought up the Korean neutralization policy as a temporary means to defend against the lapanese from "getting into Korea" while Russian troops were actively engaged against the Boxer Rebellion in Manchuria. Witte argued that Japan would be handicapped by the expenditures it was making in Korea and that it would be much more susceptible to Russian pressure, especially once the Transsiberian Railroad was completed. All of which would make it easier for Russia to take possession of Korea later, if circumstances required. In other words, Witte was simply searching for a modus vivendi until Russian preparations were complete. Henceforth Russian troops occupied Manchuria on 7 January 1901, Izvolskii, the Russian Minister to Japan, proposed Korea's neutralization under international guarantees, that is, by Japan and Russia, which in substance would divide the Korean peninsula according to each side's sphere of influence. The Japanese government, however, replied that they would not discuss Korea's neutrality until the Russians took steps to move their armies out of Manchuria. By replying through Chinda, the Japanese Minister to St. Petersburg, Japan by- passed lzvolskii who had been entrusted by the Czar with the authority to negotiate the neutralization issue. The two countries' relations continued to be very strained. The "war crisis" of Spring 1901, caused by the conflict and mutual distrust between Russia and lapan on the Manchurian and Korean questions, had a number of consequences. First, it tended to unite Japanese statesmen who had previously been undecided with the proponents of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Second, for Witte, Russia's primary concern was to avoid war with Japan, and the best means for solving the Manchurian problem was to renounce any political intentions in Manchuria and limit Russian interests there to the protection the Chinese Eastern Railway's interest as a private company With regards to Korea, he felt that if lapan demanded the country's annexation, the proper course would be to open the issue to international discussion. Even if Japan seized Korea, Russia should not consider it a casus belli. Following the "war crisis," a second neutrality scheme was attempted by Witte himself. In July 1901, when his ideas were accepted as the basis for a plan for the three-stepped e vacuation of Manchuria with some reservations, he approached the Japanese Minister in St. Petersburg and suggested, unofficially, a conditional arrangement regarding the crucial Korean problem. Russia, he said, would agree to a settlement making Korea a neutral area, but allow Japan the right to supply the Korean government with administrative and fmancial advisers as well as with a chief of police. In return, Iapan would officially recognize Russia's preponderance in Manchuria. Witte's practical proposals would have conceded Japan's demands in Korea with some reservations and normalized relations with China. The main concern of Wiitte's counterpart, however, was Korea, and for Japan it was seen as matter of life and death for Japan to keep Russia out of Korea. Japan could not question the actions of Russia in Manchuria merely on the basis of the London Times revelations of reported Russo-Chinese secret ne gotiations to consolidate Russia's occupation of Manchuria. By tying in the Manchurian question with Korea they hoped to ascertain Russia's intentions. The Russian proposal ended in failure because lapan would not enter into an agreement concerning Korea until the fate of Manchuria was decisively settled. Russia did not take this to mean a breakdown in negotiations. In Decernber 1901, while the question of a military retreat from Manchuria was a heated subject of discussion between Russia and China, Witte suggested more specific neutrality terms in St. Petersburg, in talks with Ito, Iapan's former Premier. It is evident that the Russians accepted the Japanese demands with respect to Korea only with the following qualifications: guarantees to maintain Korea's independence, not to use any part of Korean territory for strategic purposes, and not to hinder Russia's free passage through the Korea Strait. In return, Russia was to be left with a free hand in Manchuria. On the other hand, Ito brought with him an itemized plan setting forth Japan's desire for a free hand in Korea commercially, industrially, militarily and politically, as well as offering a guarantee that the country would not be used for military purposes against Russia. In the end, Russia's final plan was refused by the Japanese government. Japan felt compelled to conclude an alliance with England which would provide it with the guarantees it needed for primacy over Korea rather than negotiate an agreement with Russia which would have hindered it in attaining this goal. The last secret attempt by Russia to achieve Korea's neutrality was the proposal for the "Neutralization of Korea under the joint guarantee of the Three Powers, Russia, Japan, and America." This plan was aborted almost as soon as Russia had begun proposing it, mainly because America had already made a decision not to interfere in a matter being pursued by the Japanese government. At the time lapan questioned Russia's approaches to America. It is evident that with the first scheduled evacuation in Manchuria coming soon, Witte probably considered the plan as a way of placating America and to encouraging them to develop a new understanding regarding Korea. To restrict Russia's activities in Manchuria and in support of the Anglo-Iapanese Alliance, the United States demanded the 'Open Door' policy in China. It should be also noted that the fmal neutralization scheme proposed in September 1902 was a more concrete version of the plan "under the joint guarantee of the Powers" which had been formally proposed in January 1901. The main feature of the negotiations on Korea's neutralization between Russia and Japan was that the Russian proposals were repeatedly rejected by the Japanese, who were always one step ahead of Russia. The pattern of Russia's abortive schemes for Korean neutrality did not change in official discussions on the Manchurian and Korean questions after August 1903, the period of so-called "w ar diplomacy." From the Japanese point of view," the neutralization of Korea" meant the sacrifice of its position on the peninsula. In fact, Japan, not yet viewing itself as a fully independent actor, had the support of England and America behind it. Agreeing to anti-Russian common interests, the Western powers did not stint in their promises of diplomatic support to Japan. It can be surmised that the failure of Russia's schemes to neutralize Korea, aimed at putting lapan's imperialistic ambitions to rest, was a by-product of general trends in power politics in East Asia since the last decades of the nineteenth century.

著者

猪木 正道

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.4, pp.1-17, 1960

著者

鳥山 成人 鳥山 成人 鳥山 成人

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1, pp.25-70, 1957

著者

松里 公孝

出版者

北海道大学スラブ・ユーラシア研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.68, pp.71-105, 2021-09-08

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The military interventions led by the United States and its allies in Iraq (2008), Libya (2011), and Syria (indirectly since 2011), despite their promised purposes, produced failed states and nurseries of jihadism. This dismantled the moral legitimacy of the unipolar world. Bitter lessons procured from the Libyan crisis made Russia and China veto any resolution authorizing the West’s and Gulf States’ possible military intervention in Syria at the UN Security Council. In 2012-2014, Russia’s police and security organs intentionally allowed domestic Islamists to emigrate to Syria to become jihadist fighters for the sake of domestic security on the eve of the Sochi Olympic Games. Fearing their return to Russia and the former Soviet territories after the expected seizure of Damascus by the radical Islamists, President Vladimir Putin decided (perhaps in early August 2015) to conduct air strikes on their military facilities in Syria. The essay critically examines widespread interpretations attributing Russia’s participation in the Syrian War to Putin’s domestic populism, Russian leaders’ desire to protect the Bashar Assad regime, and their attempts to overcome Russia’s diplomatic isolation after its annexation of Crimea. The main purpose of Russia’s military intervention was to change the decision making procedure of the unipolar world. Russia’s Middle East policy was benefited from its developed Middle Eastern studies inherited from the Soviet Union, whereas in the United States “Arabists” have traditionally been alienated from policy-making vis-à-vis the Near East and North Africa. Based on area specialists’ expertise, Russian policy-makers do not primordialize confessional confrontations in the Middle East, which facilitated Russia’s brokering roles between conflicting local parties. Michael Kofman calls Russia’s decision-makings on the Syrian and Middle Eastern problems a lean strategy, which, in my view, well echoed the “hedging diplomacy” pursued by Middle Eastern countries. The collaboration between Russia and the US since the beginning of Russia’s military intervention in Syria in September 2015 could not continue due to US domestic politics in 2016. Instead, the radical Islamists’ evacuation from Aleppo to Idlib was implemented by the collaboration of Russia, Turkey, and Iran. In 2017, this tri-polar collaboration developed into the Astana Process managing de-escalation zones in Idlib, East Ghouta, and North Homs, while the collaboration of the US, Russia, and Jordan in Southern Syria generated the Amman Process to control the South de-escalation zone. In 2018, three de-escalation zones, except for that of Idlib, practically functioned as mechanisms to allow radical Islamists to evacuate from there to Idlib, as a result of which these territories returned to government control. The Russian MFA is skeptical of the Astana Process and is concerned about the practical shelving of Syria’s political transition, determined by the UN Security Council Resolution No. 2254 (December 2015). For the MFA, a “multi-central dualism” privileging the participants in the Yalta-Potsdam Declarations, not just a multipolar world, should follow the declining unipolar world. Thus, dual diplomacies between the Russian MFA and military emerged, which has barely been coordinated by the hyper centralizing presidential authorities.

著者

シュラトフ ヤロスラブ

出版者

北海道大学スラブ・ユーラシア研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.67, pp.59-81, 2020-07-16

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Sakhalin occupies a special place in the history of relations between Russia and Japan. Depending on the times, the island has been a battlefield or a place for cooperation; the rivalry over Sakhalin was often an agenda-setting factor for bilateral relations. The island could be set as a sort of “crossroad,” where Russia and Japan interacted variously; a “mirror,” reflecting the condition of Russo-Japanese contact. The situation over Sakhalin was particularly dynamic in the first half of the twentieth century. The island became the last battlefield in the Russo-Japanese War, and then the final crucial problem at the peace conference. According to the Portsmouth Peace Treaty, Sakhalin was divided between the two empires, which created a precedent of revising the Russo-Japanese borderline with military force?since 1905, it has been changed only by wars. Still, the demarcation of a new border took place in a peaceful atmosphere, symbolizing the cooperative trend in the bilateral relations after the war. The situation seemed to have been resolved. Yet the collapse of the Russian Empire in 1917 rendered Sakhalin the subject of Russo-Japanese bargaining again. Then, with the outbreak of civil war in Russia, Japan took an active part in intervention, deploying the largest contingent of troops to Siberia and the Far East. The center of Sakhalin Oblast, Nikolaevsk, was occupied by Japanese troops in 1918. After the clashes with partisans and annihilation of the Japanese garrison and its inhabitants in 1920 (the “Nikolaevsk Incident”), Japan occupied Northern Sakhalin, making it the hostage of settlement with Russia. After the USSR was established and Soviet-Japanese negotiations launched officially, Sakhalin became the key problem, particularly at the final stage. After reaching a compromise on this issue, the Peking Convention was signed in 1925. A new “Soviet” Russia repossessed Northern Sakhalin, and the USSR was officially acknowledged by Japan, which carved out concession rights for Sakhalin oil and coal, effective until 1944. These events became the subject of attention by many prominent scholars, including John Stephan, Teruyuki Hara, Takashi Murakami, Naoki Amano, etc. However, mostly due to lack of archival sources, the period of 1917-1922 remains insufficiently researched, particularly from the viewpoint of diplomatic history. What place did Sakhalin occupy in the negotiations between Japan and its Russian counter-partners, especially given the enormous dynamics of changes and diversity of political actors involved? This article analyzes the role and evolution of the Sakhalin issue in Russo-Japanese relations after the collapse of the Russian Empire in February 1917 to the establishing of the USSR in late 1922. The author conducts multi-archival research and examines the position of the provisional government, the Kolchak administration, Russian military circles, and local authorities, as well as the Bolsheviks and Soviet officials in Moscow and the Far East, providing analysis of the complicated “mosaic” over Sakhalin in Russo/Soviet relations during the abovementioned period. The article uses various declassified files mostly from Russian archives (AVP RI, AFP RF, RGIA, and RGASPI), as well as materials of the Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Gaimush? Gaik? Shiry?kan) and published documental collections. The issue of Sakhalin appeared on the table of negotiations with Japan soon after the February Revolution. Japan worried about the US involvement in developing the island’s resources, and encouraged the provisional government to exclude American capital and provide the Japanese with prerogatives, but Petrograd was reluctant to do so. The Russian military also took a cautious stance towards Japan, suspecting it of using Russia’s weakening position and expanding its influence over her eastern territories including Sakhalin. After the Bolsheviks took power in November 1917, the situation became more complicated. Amid the collapse of governance and the state system in Russia, Japan actively engaged in the intervention and intensified her attempts to participate in mining at Sakhalin. Yet Kolchak and his administration, which subsequently took control of most of Siberia and the Far East, generally inherited a guarded attitude toward Japan, suspecting her of using Russia’s weakness and seizing key positions in the economy of its eastern territories, including purchase of Northern Sakhalin and obtainment of wide concessional rights. Despite the Japanese bids, the Omsk government eventually decided to employ the “free hands” principal in Sakhalin, denying exclusive rights to the Japanese. Tokyo’s hopes of gaining the privileges in fact turned out to be a false dawn. Ironically, except for Japanese-backed G. Semyonov, it was the Bolshevik government that constantly claimed to acknowledge prerogatives for the Japanese in East Russia. The Soviet officials made the first attempts to reach an agreement with Japan as early as in December 1917, offering privileges in a vast territory including Northern Sakhalin. From the very beginning, the Soviets regarded the island as one of the important tools for negotiations with the Japanese. But Japan did not take it seriously and refused to keep contact with the Soviet government. Being fully occupied with the Civil War, Moscow was unable to deal with Japan, but the situation changed after the fall of Kolchak. While organizing the Far Eastern Republic (DVR) as a buffer state in order to avoid the risk of war with Japan, Chicherin and other Soviet officials claimed sovereignty over Siberia and the Far East and appealed to Tokyo, promising various economic benefits in the region. Moscow’s conciliatory attitude was criticized by the local Bolsheviks who stood for immediate Sovietization and a hard line against Japan, assuming this tactic most effective. One of the examples likely to be successful were the actions of Ya. Tryapitsyn and his group, who could reach agreement with the Japanese troops and gain control over Nikolaevsk, the center of Sakhalin Oblast. Yet, after the Nikolaevsk Incident, which caused the occupation of Northern Sakhalin and rebooting of interventionist actions by Japan, as well as after Merkulov’s coup d’etat, the local Bolsheviks and DVR leaders assumed a much more circumspect position and attempted to provide cessions. On the other hand, Moscow reinforced its influence, gradually pushing away the DVR actors and striving for direct negotiations with Japan. Thinking that time was on her side and implementing a “carrot and stick” attitude, the Soviet government used the so-called American factor or “international pressure,” while continuing to offer to grant concessions, the area of which shrank from the whole of East Siberia to Northern Sakhalin.

著者

百瀬 宏

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.21, pp.217-232, 1976

著者

豊川 浩一

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.39, pp.73-96, 1992

著者

宇山 智彦

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.53, pp.27-59, 2006

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This paper aims to challenge various traditional views of the Russian Empire: that it was a ruthless "Russirier"; that it had a universalistic and hannonious principle for integration; that in its last stage the empire was transforming itself to a nation-state. I try to do so by examining history of two unsuccessful projects of the Russian Empire in Central Asia, that is, Christianization as propagation of a universalistic ideology, and military conscription as a tool of nation building. Debates on Christianization of Central Asians began in the 1860s. The Kazakhs and Kyrgyz were considered to be half-Muslims, unlike Tatars and Uzbeks ("Sarts"), and therefore relatively easy targets for propagation of Orthodoxy. Opponents to Christianization, however, maintained that it could antagonize Muslims (including Kazakhs and Kyrgyz) and cause disorders. In Turkistan, whose Muslim sedentary population was called "fanatic," Governor-General Kaufman practically prohibited missionary activities. He did not object to General Kolpakovskii's support to missionary activities among the Kazakhs, Kyrgyz and Kalmyks in Semirech'e, but the results of proselytism there were meager. Throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, only about one thousand Central Asian natives converted to Orthodoxy. The Tsar's manifesto of religious toleration in April 1905, which conditionally sanctioned conversion from Orthodoxy to other faiths, dealt a final blow to missionaries. Most of the baptized Central Asians went back to Islam and almost no one was newly converted after this. Scenes of the revolt of 1916 in Semirech'e, where rebels killed monks and Russians in arms gathered in church squares, were highly symbolic in the sense that the Orthodox Church, after all, belonged to the Russians, not the native peoples of Central Asia. The second part of the paper examines discussions on military conscription of Central Asians, who were exempted from it as inorodtsy (aliens). One of the arguments for conscription was the necessity of strong cavalry in preparation for possible wars with China and Afghanistan. Officers cited the high quality of Central Asian nomads as horse-riders, and emphasized that military service was a powerful tool of Russification and the best school to teach public order. Again, a major argument against military conscription was the possibility of disturbances. Many officers feared that military service would give the population leaders for possible insurrections. Some also insisted that the conditions of military service radically contradicted the mode of life of nomads who were accustomed to unlimited freedom. Overall, they alleged that Central Asians' "low blagonadezhnost' (trustworthiness) and grazhdanstvennost' (level of civic development)" was a fundamental obstacle to their conscription. Officers evaluated the combat ability of various ethnic groups differently. They generally regarded the sedentary population of Turkistan as cowards and called the Kazakhs excellent horsemen but not necessarily courageous warriors, but were fascinated by the splendid quality of the Turkmen as warriors. This fascination gave birth to the exceptional case of the Turkmen irregular cavalry. After 1905, Russian nationalists increasingly asserted that Russians bore an unjustly heavy burden in defending the empire, and called for drafting inorodtsy. During World War I, the Ministry of War drew up a bill to draft almost all the ethnic groups of the empire, but the Ministry of Interior nixed it. In 1916, the government suddenly decided to mobilize Central Asians not as soldiers but as laborers, which gave rise to a huge revolt. On the whole, discussions of military service by Central Asians (which continued for more than half a century) took the character of a chicken-and-egg problem. Would military service enhance their grazhdanstvennost' and Russify them, or did military service require a sufficiently high level of grazhdanstvennost' and Russification? Eventually, officials who mistrusted inorodtsy always managed to block conscription proposals. Reasons for the failure of the two projects were partly rooted in the Russian bureaucracy. Permission for missionary activities was often given after much delay or was not given at all. The Orthodox Church itself had a hierarchical and bureaucratic structure. By contrast, Muslim mullahs went into the steppe as peddlers and healers without bureaucratic procedures, and could easily adapt themselves to local society. Moreover, officials' grasp of local situations was shaky. They thought that native administration of volosts and villages formed an "impermeable curtain" and hindered them from knowing Muslim life. The most important point of my analyses is the particularistic features or Russian policy. Many officials shared the view that it was desirable to Russify Central Asians, but there was hardly any resolute determination to carry out concrete measures for this purpose. They were interested in passive maintenance of stability rather than active integration and Russification. They did not just differentiate Central Asians from the Russians, but also differentiated nomads from sedentary people, the steppe oblasts from Turkistan. Officials were obsessed with the idea that they had to discuss the pros and cons of a policy measure in relation to every single region or ethnic group. This attitude of alienating (or otherizing) Central Asians and classifying them is what I call particularism. Particularism partly derived from a character inherent to autocratic empires. In such empires, a subjugated country or people pledged allegiance separately to the monarch, and were given peculiar privileges and obligations. But in the second half of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, quasi-academic discourses on ethnic characters added new meanings to particularism. Courageousness, warlikeness, trustworthiness and grazhdanstvennost' were considered to be characters of ethnic groups rather than qualities of individuals. This tendency to attach excessively great importance to ethnic characters was a product of Orientalism and the mind of the colonial state.

著者

豊川 浩一

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.37, pp.177-207, 1990

著者

坂本 清

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.36, pp.79-111, 1989

著者

野村 政修

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.45, pp.305-318, 1998-03-31

著者

醍醐 龍馬

出版者

北海道大学スラブ・ユーラシア研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.68, pp.45-70, 2021-09-08

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In 1875, soon after the sealing of the St. Petersburg Treaty stipulating the exchange of Sakhalin and the Kurill Islands, Japan and Russia agreed on a land lease of Inasa Village in Nagasaki to the Russian navy. This was a juridical confirmation of the Russian Squadron’s long-standing practice of using this locality as its winter base, which would remain intact until the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904. In fact, this agreement brought about stability of the bilateral relationship, serving as a prerequisite for Japan to embark on its subsequent Korean policy. This article attempts to contextualize this particular land lease in the increasingly entangled relationship between Japan and Russia. Nagasaki’s importance as a resort for the Russian navy increased, with its failure to obtain Tsushima as a strategic base under pressure from the British in 1861 and with its pivotal port moving from Nikolaevsk-on-Amur to Vladivostok in 1871. Against this backdrop in 1870 the Russians succeeded in renting a piece of land Hiradogoya for ten years by directly negotiating with the landowners and the Nagasaki administration. Two years later, when Grand Duke Alexei Alexandrovich visited Japan, he found it inconvenient to maintain a naval hospital and dock in Hiradogoya. This led one of his attendants, vice admiral of the navy Constantin Possiet, to propose to the Japanese government the Maruoyama foothills as an alternative for the Russian navy base. The Japanese government in turn rejected this proposal for two reasons. First, the Japanese navy was afraid that the occupation of this strategically important location by the Russian navy would raise security concerns. Second, the increase of places of mixed residence outside the fixed enclaves could threaten Japanese sovereignty. Undaunted, K. V. Struve, the Russian minister in Japan, tried to renegotiate in 1874, arguing that the lease of Maruoyama would have a positive effect on Russo-Japanese relations. However, the Japanese navy was a staunch opponent to this deal; it even purchased the disputed land for an admiralty house in haste so as to forge a fait accompli. Ultimately, the Japanese government was forced to propose an alternative land lease in Inasa in exchange for the old one in the same locality. In 1875, after Struve’s on-the-spot inspection of the proposed site along the coast of Nagasaki Bay, the Russian navy and a local landowner Shiga reached an agreement. The timing was crucial: this was right after the sealing of the St. Petersburg Treaty. While the establishment of a navy base in Inasa in the following year caused anxiety among the Japanese and the British, the Russians began to make efforts to maintain their friendship with Japan in order to keep this base. Together with the Maria Luz case in 1875, where the tsar worked as an arbitrator of the dispute between Japan and Peru, this Inasa controversy was a significant opportunity buttressing an improving bilateral relationship under the St. Petersburg Treaty. While the Russian Squadron’s utilization of Nagasaki as its winter base since the end of the Edo era had been possible thanks to the relatively good relationship between the two countries, the foundation of the Russian squadron’s berth in Inasa immediately following the St. Petersburg Treaty only reinforced the cemented friendship. Renewed in 1886, the land lease in Inasa continued to function until the Russo-Japanese War. Despite some negative reactions particularly from the British, the Meiji government’s recognition of the Russian navy base in Inasa alongside the St. Petersburg Treaty was an important factor in maintaining Russia as Japan’s ally and thereby allowing Japan’s strategic leeway in East Asia.

著者

伊賀上 菜穂

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.49, pp.179-212, 2002

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Какое значение имеет для русских сельских жителей эпоха Советского Союза? Чтобы ответить на этот вопрос, на мой взгляд, важно познать динамику культурных изменений: какие элементы культуры транслировались, а какие нет с дореволюционного общества на постсоветскую жизнь. Для сравнительного анализа я выбрала один из важнейших социальных элементов - «родство». Как источник изучения системы родства у крестьян анализируются свадебные обряды Грязовецкого уезда Вологодской губернии конца XIX - начала XX вв. В данной статье я преследовала цель - представить свадебные обряды как целостный комплекс. Для этого я специально ограничила объект наблюдения до административной единицы «уезд», точнее говоря, до восточной половины Грязовецкого уезда, и анализировала целостный процесс свадебных обрядов как со стороны терминов, так и совершаемых действий. Грязовецкий уезд находился в юго-западной части Вологодской губернии, не очень далеко от губернского центра г. Вологды. Из 7 волостей, выбранных в статье в качестве объекта наблюдения, в 3 волостях численно превосходили бывшие частновладельческие крестьяне, а в остальных - бывшие государственные. Следует еще указать, что одна южная волость отличалась от других давним распространением отходничества. Так как этот уезд был расположен на границе между северной и центральной частью Европейской России, там ярко наблюдались культурные традиции обеих территорий. В частности, в свадебных обрядах можно найти много общих черт как с северной, так и с центральной частями России. Но вместе с тем грязовецкие обряды имеют ряд существенных отличий, например, отсутствует обряд в бане, наблюдается небольшое количество магических элементов (включая и сглаз, и колдовство), развиты разные формы выкупа со стороны жениха. На основе локальных материалов по свадебной обрядности, можно утверждать, что в восточной части Грязовецкого уезда отмечаются 4 субтипа свадебных обрядов. На мой взгляд, деление на субтипы совпадает исключительно с географическим расположением. Я не заметила влияния бывших крестьянских категорий или типа хозяйствования на структуру обрядов. На основе грязовецкой системы терминов родства, которая очень близка к системе современного стандартного (литературного) русского языка, можно сказать, что система родства у грязовецких крестьян носит эго-фокусный (ego-focal) характер, т. е. родственников определяют в зависимости не от общих предков, а от отношения с «эго» билатерально без разницы сторон отца и матери, и даже включаются в «родство» и некровные: свойственники, крестные и приемыши. В анализе свадебных обрядов я обращала особое внимание на рамки упомянутых родственников, характер и время их действий. Однако большое количество обрядовых терминов свадебных чинов и вместе с тем недостаточная информация о выборе конкретного действующего лица для каждого чина не разрешают определить зависимость между каждым действием и действующими лицами. Поэтому я анализировала действующих в обряде лиц двухстепенно, т. е. сначала классифицировала участников по генеалогическим статусам (отец, тетя, зять и т. д.), потом по свадебным чинам (дружка, сваха и т. д.). Результат анализа ценен с точки зрения двух аспектов познания системы родства: «половозрастная система» и «отношения между родственниками и не-родственниками». В грязовецких свадебных обрядах выбор действующего лица для определенного действия не определяется в большинстве своем по генеалогическому статусу. Исключение, естественно, составляют родные родители, родные братья и иногда крестные родители. Зато многие обрядовые роли у родственников разделяются по половозрастной системе. Это особенно касается замужних родственниц (тети, крестная мать и замужние сестры), от которых выбирают исполнительниц свахи, раздачи невестинов даров и т. п. От родственников мужчин отцовского поколения со стороны жениха выбираются главные свадебные чины, тысяцкий, сват и дружка, действия которых во многом совпадают. Что касается парней и девушек, то родственники и не-родственники часто исполняют одну и ту же роль: парни - участники в свадебных поездах, девушки причитают у невесты. В материалах по свадебной обрядности можно найти данные, свидетельствующие о том, что в одной половозрастной группе предпочитают родственников более близкой степени родства: предпочитают, например, родную сестру двоюродной. Но следует указать, что в грязовецких свадебных обрядах не наблюдается предпочтение какойлибо одной стороны родства (отца или матери), а также категорическое следование принципу старшинства и кровных связей. Последние, в частности, отражаются на отсутствии в материалах по свадебным обрядам сведений о дедушках и бабушках и так же на факте предпочтения зятя двоюродному брату как «заместителя» родного брата. Можно сделать вывод о этом, что в том регионе исполнителей свадебных обрядовых ролей выбирают сравнительно свободно, из широкого круга родственников по половозрастной системе. Это доказывает, что свадебные обряды есть событие, подтверждающее и реконструирующее внутренние связи между родственниками. Что касается связей между родственниками и не-родственниками, то участники в свадебных обрядах разделены на три группы: 1. главные свадебные чины, 2. званые гости без специальной роли и помощницы (поварихи), 3. незваные гости. Большинство участников первой группы - родственники, третьей - не-родственники, а во вторую группу включаются обе категории. Анализ материала по данному вопросу позволяет выделить две характерные черты. Во-первых, в этом регионе не развит обычай укреплять отношения с не-родственниками, специально назначенными на важные свадебные чины в знак почтения и уважения. Крестных родителей могут выбрать из не-родственников, но в исследуемом регионе чаще всего выбирают из кровных родственников. Во-вторых, несмотря на вышеуказанное, не-родственники тоже активно участвуют в обрядах как званые гости и даже как незваные. Последние дают общинное согласие на брак, требуя выкупа от гостей даже во время застолья. В грязовецких свадебных обрядах можно наблюдать совмещение предпочтения родственников и выражения уважения к общине, причем без серьезного коммуникативного напряжения двух категорий участников свадебного обряда. Такой «баланс» в достаточной степени объясняется совпадением отношения кровного с соседским. Но у русских крестьян, которые не имеют «систему родства патрилинейного происхождения» (patrilineal descent group), люди с физической кровной связью не всегда считаются родственниками. Таким образом, можно сказать, что свадебные обряды функционируют как процесс, способствующий переключению отношений между людьми с кровной (родственной) связи на просто соседское. Выводится следующее заключение. В исследуемом регионе внутренняя и внешняя форма «родства», функционирующая как вид взаимной помощи, изменяется в зависимости от конкретных отношений между людьми. В такой ситуации свадебные обряды представляют семьям жениха и невесты редкий случай познать и реформировать «свою» рамку родства и его внутренние отношения. Но здесь следует подчеркнуть, возможно такой выборочный характер «родства» появился только после распада бывшей системы взаимной помощи среди родственников, которая была действенна до промышленной революции. В советское время отношения между участниками свадебного обряда подверглись изменениям. На современной свадьбе почти не существует иерархии гостей, нет разницы между старшими родственниками и молодыми друзьями. Незваные уже редко заходят на застолье. Такие изменения стали наблюдаться уже в конце XIX века: половозрастной принцип терял свою символическую и обрядовую основу. Но познавательное понятие родства не изменялось и родство до сих пор продолжает функционировать как система взаимной помощи и поддержки в условиях тяжелой социальной ситуации.

著者

沢田 和彦

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

no.47, pp.327-353, 2000

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.33, pp.118-122, 1986

著者

五十嵐 清

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.7, pp.1-14, 1963

著者

塩川 伸明

出版者

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

雑誌

スラヴ研究 (ISSN:05626579)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.46, pp.155-190, 1999

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Hitherto, Soviet language policy was often interpreted to be aimed at "Russification." Although this viewpoint is not entirely groundless, it is often exaggerated and tends to lead to a one-sided picture. It is true that many non-Russian nationalities in the Soviet Union have been, more or less, linguistically russified. But it cannot be denied that some nationalities, especially those with Union republics, have retained their national languages to a fairly high degree. Thus, it is necessary to investigate the language situation more fully on the basis of empirical data. It is well-known that in the 1920s the Soviet authorities adopted the policy of "korenizatsiia," which meant extending education among nationalities by their own national languages. For the central political leaders, this policy was merely a means for spreading the official policy to the masses. In the localities, however, some activists tried to use this policy for nationalistic purposes. Thus, the meaning of the policy of "korenizatsiia" was ambivalent and the process of its implementation was not consistent. The 1930s saw several policy changes, but the process of the changes was not so straight-forward as was often supposed. First of all, at the beginning of the decade political centralization was greatly enhanced, and as a result some republican leaders were demoted. This personnel change entailed the strengthening of political control over nationalities. It is important, however, not to confuse this political centralization with Russification, for Russian people also suffered severely by the political control, and the old Russian national tradition was not officially glorified, at least until the mid-1930s. The attitude of the Soviet authorities toward old traditions began changing around the mid-1930s. The fervent anti-traditionalism of the early revolutionary days subsided and the queer amalgam of Sovietism and pre-Revolutionary tradition came into being. This situation made it possible for Russian nationalism to creep into the official ideology. This, however, did not necessarily mean that the policy of Russification was established once and for all. Along with Russian nationalism, Ukrainian, Armenian, Uzbek and some other kinds of nationalism also crept into the official ideology, although it is clear that the latter were relatively low-ranked in comparison with Russian nationalism. The Soviet nationality policy after the late 1930s was characterized by its hierarchical nature. At the top of the hierarchy, needless to say, stood Russians. Some relatively large nationalities, such as Ukrainians and Uzbeks which had their own Union republics, came on the second echelon. Then followed the third-ranked nationalities, such as Tatars and Bashkirs, which had Autonomous republics or Autonomous regions, as contrasted with Union republics. At the bottom of the ladder there were minor ethnic groups which were not officially recognized as separate nationalities. The lower an ethnic group was ranked in the hierarchy, the stronger it underwent the tendency of Russification. In contrast, the relatively high-rank ed nationalities maintained their own national languages, with the only exception of Ukrainians and Belarussians who belong to the Eastern Slavic family and are easily russified without administrative pressure. After Stalin died, Khrushcev took an ambivalent nationality policy. On the one hand, he rehabilitated some "punished peoples" who were deported en masse by Stalin and took several decentralizing measures, which enhanced the autonomy of some nationalities. On the other hand, he advocated the all-out construction of full communism and the complete fusion of nationalities under communism. The 1958-59 education reform abolished the principle of compulsory education in native languages and instead introduced the principle of an optional system, which meant that parents could choose which school to send their children to, i.e., to a national- language school or a Russian- language one. Thereafter, education in national languages has continued to decline and some minorities have tended to lose their national languages. It is clear, then, that some of Soviet language policies were explicitly aimed at extending the education of the Russian language among non-Russian nationalities. Among the most prominent were: the 1938 decision to make it compulsory to teach Russian in non-Russian schools; the 1958-59 education reform referred to above; and the more intensified policy of extending the Russian language after the late-1970s. This, however, does not mean that the aim of these policies was the straightforward Russification. As far as the relatively large nationalities were concerned, education in their own nationality language was maintained and Russian was taught as the second language. In this case the official aim was not simple Russification but the spread of bilingualism. As concerns the smaller nationalities, in contrast, the education in their own national language was impossible to enforce, and therefore the Russification progressed through education in Russian. Thus far, we have surveyed the history of the official Soviet language policy. But the effect of the policy is another matter of discussion. In the Soviet Union, especially under Brezhnev, the official policy was often proclaimed only on paper, and the real situation was left far from the state at which the official ideology aimed. It is necessary, therefore, to investigate the real situation on the basis of empirical data. Although the Soviet statistics and sociological research are poor both quantitatively and qualitatively, it is not impossible to examine this situation which differs greatly from the official ideology. Most of the relatively large nationalities, with a few exceptions, have kept their own national languages as mother tongues. Besides, those languages were used quite extensively in education and publishing. As concerns publishing activities in 1985, the number of items published per population was highest in Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, and Georgian. Russian came in at the fifth place and Armenian the sixth. In contrast, Belarusian and Ukrainian came in at the sixteenth and eighteenth, respectively. As for education, Soviet languages were classified into three categories: first, those used extensively both in general and higher education. This category includes not only Russian, but also the three Baltic languages, Georgian and Armenian. The second category , which included the Central Asian languages, Moldovan and Azerbaidzhan, was used widely in general education only. In these national republics higher education was mainly conducted in Russian. Finally, the third category, to which Ukrainian and Belarusian belonged, was scarcely used whether in general or in higher education. Those facts we have examined above clearly indicate that the language situation varies from one nationality to another. What factors, then, explain the variation? We may suppose that at least six factors are related. The first one is the position held by each nationality in the Soviet federal system. As was already noted, the Soviet federal system constituted a unique hierarchy, consisting of Union republics, Autonomous republics, Autonomous regions, Autonomous okruga, and those without national autonomy. This hierarchy was closely related to education policy, and the latter influenced the language situation of each nationality. The second factor is the cultural-ethnic proximity of each nationality to the Russians. In this regard, the two Eastern Slavic nationalities, Ukrainians and Belarusians, are, needless to say, most easily russified. Those nationalities who were converted by the Russians into Orthodox, e.g. Chuvashi, Udmurtians, Mordvins etc., have also been greatly russified. In contrast, the degree of Russification of most Moslem and Turkic nationalities remains generally very low. Thirdly, we have to consider the tradition of literary and scientific works in national languages. The greater tradition a nationality has, the more strongly it tends to cling to its own national languages. The Baltic nationalities and Georgians are clear examples. Fourthly, the degree of urbanization influences the process of Russification. In major cities the language of official administration is usually Russian, and Russification proceeds more intensively than in rural areas. This fact is especially important in the Central Asian republics, where the percentage of rural population remains still high. The fifth factor is the percentage of Russians among the population. Needless to say, in the localities where Russians live in mass, Russification tends to be stronger than other areas. Lastly, we have to consider the degree of diaspora of each nationality. Those nationalities who reside scattered all over the whole Soviet Union tend to be more strongly russified than those who live closely in their home republic. It suffices to mention the contrast between Jews, Tatars, or Armenians, on the one hand, and Georgians and the Baltic nationalities, on the other hand. These six do not exhaust the related factors, but we can surmise that these are among the most important ones. By combining these factors, we can make a typology of the language situation of Soviet nationalities. We hope this typology can serve as a solid stepping stone for further investigation.