著者

大塚 淳

出版者

京都大学哲学論叢刊行会

雑誌

哲学論叢 (ISSN:0914143X)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.35, pp.106-117, 2008

著者

池田 真治 伊藤 遼 久木田 水生

出版者

京都大学哲学論叢刊行会

雑誌

哲学論叢 (ISSN:0914143X)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.38, no.別冊, pp.S49-S60, 2011

著者

西條 玲奈

出版者

京都大学哲学論叢刊行会

雑誌

哲学論叢 (ISSN:0914143X)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.41, pp.59-70, 2014-11

著者

久米 暁

出版者

京都大学哲学論叢刊行会

雑誌

哲学論叢 (ISSN:0914143X)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.39, pp.27-45, 2012

著者

佐々木 崇

出版者

京都大学哲学論叢刊行会

雑誌

哲学論叢 (ISSN:0914143X)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.36, pp.56-67, 2009

著者

西條 玲奈

出版者

京都大学哲学論叢刊行会

雑誌

哲学論叢 (ISSN:0914143X)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.38, no.別冊, pp.S73-S84, 2011

著者

WITTIG Joshua

出版者

京都大学哲学論叢刊行会

雑誌

哲学論叢 (ISSN:0914143X)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.36, pp.180-182, 2009

著者

山口 尚

出版者

京都大学哲学論叢刊行会

雑誌

哲学論叢 (ISSN:0914143X)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.35, pp.94-95, 2008

著者

佐金 武

出版者

京都大学哲学論叢刊行会

雑誌

哲学論叢 (ISSN:0914143X)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.35, pp.82-93, 2008

著者

佐々木 尽

出版者

京都大学哲学論叢刊行会

雑誌

哲学論叢 (ISSN:0914143X)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.42, pp.S1-S12, 2015

著者

三木 那由他

出版者

京都大学哲学論叢刊行会

雑誌

哲学論叢 (ISSN:0914143X)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.36, pp.68-79, 2009

著者

小草 泰

出版者

京都大学哲学論叢刊行会

雑誌

哲学論叢 (ISSN:0914143X)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.34, pp.73-83, 2007

著者

池田 真治

出版者

京都大学哲学論叢刊行会

雑誌

哲学論叢 (ISSN:0914143X)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.31, pp.37-51, 2004-09-01

著者

池田 真治

出版者

京都大学哲学論叢刊行会

雑誌

哲学論叢 (ISSN:0914143X)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.33, pp.138-149, 2006

著者

三木 那由他

出版者

京都大学哲学論叢刊行会

雑誌

哲学論叢 (ISSN:0914143X)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.39, pp.86-97, 2012

著者

佐金 武

出版者

京都大学哲学論叢刊行会

雑誌

哲学論叢 (ISSN:0914143X)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.32, pp.94-101, 2005-09-01

著者

大西 琢朗

出版者

京都大学哲学論叢刊行会

雑誌

哲学論叢 (ISSN:0914143X)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.33, pp.43-54, 2006

---

"In Grundlagen, Frege claims that (cardinal) numbers are objects existing on their own. But his realistic view about numbers faces an epistemological problem. For Frege, while numbers are objective entities, they can’t be given to us in standard ways (perception, intuition or representation). Numbers are abstract objects. It is natural then to ask: why would Frege adopt such a problematic ontology of numbers? And, how can we say for certain that there are indeed such abstract objects? This paper tackles these two questions. For the former, I give a characterization of his conception of numbers in terms of his logicist project and the insights underlying it, and show that for Frege numbers must be ‘logical objects’. To establish existence of numbers as logical objects, Frege in Grundlagen attempts to define them contextually by using so-called Hume’s Principle. I examine his argument, thereby attempting to provide an answer to the second question. Though a conclusive justification for his attempt can’t be given in this paper, a concept in Frege’s philosophy is proposed in order to better understand his argument. If developed, I am of the opinion that it might be possible for his ontology of numbers to be come less unproblematic and more substantial. Frege’s discussion on numbers contains compelling insights and arguments. It is my hope that some of these are revealed through this exposition."

著者

藤川 直也

出版者

京都大学哲学論叢刊行会

雑誌

哲学論叢 (ISSN:0914143X)

巻号頁・発行日

no.35, pp.177-188, 2008

著者

久米 暁

出版者

京都大学哲学論叢刊行会

雑誌

哲学論叢 (ISSN:0914143X)

巻号頁・発行日

no.39, pp.27-45, 2012

著者

佐金 武

出版者

京都大学哲学論叢刊行会

雑誌

哲学論叢 (ISSN:0914143X)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.33, pp.67-78, 2006

---

"David Chalmers claims that the nature of consciousness as a subjective quality constitutes an independent subject area and that its existence cannot be reduced to anything else. In particular, reductive explanations to physical theories as well as functionalism about mental states are hopeless for this purpose (perhaps they assume the existence of the conscious mind, in that failing to explain what we seek to understand about its very nature). His argument for mind-body dualism, which is supposed to sustain the claim above, proceeds as follows: 1) what is conceivable is possible; 2) There is at least one conceivable world where one’s physical duplicate has no consciousness, which is called a zombie-world; therefore, 3) the zombie-world is possible; 4) if it is possible, then physicalism or materialism is false; therefore, 5) physicalism is false. The central concern of this essay is to critically examine Premises 1) and 2). Concerning Premise 1), which I shall call the “Conceivability-Possibility Thesis,” some precedent arguments based on similar theses can be found throughout the history of western philosophy (e.g. the Cartesian argument for mind-body dualism and Hume’s denial of the reality of causality), and many contemporary philosophers discuss their validity and force (e.g. van Cleve, 1983 & Yablo, 1993). It should be noted, however, that Chalmers uniquely defends the thesis, as seen in his developed theory known as “epistemic two-dimensionalism,” and I shall begin with its survey (Section 2 and 3). Through this examination, it will be realized that 1) and 2) are not independent premises, and that 1) can never be established as a general rule applicable to all cases until conceivability of the zombie-world is shown to be a priori. I shall argue that no such a priori reasoning for non-existence of consciousness is incomplete (Section 4). (Note also that if this is correct, the zombie case, pace Chalmers, will fall under the “twilight zone” in his terminology and even be in danger of becoming a counter-example to his Conceivability-Possibility Thesis. It therefore should be admitted either that conceivability of the unconscious mind is incomplete, or that the thesis that is expected to encompass something that is merely, or only allegedly conceivable, cannot be maintained. In effect, the zombie argument will turn out to be undone. Following this, responses to six possible objections will be set forth (Section 5)."