著者

久木田 水生

出版者

京都大学哲学論叢刊行会

雑誌

哲学論叢 (ISSN:0914143X)

巻号頁・発行日

no.27, pp.62-73, 2000

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There are some difficulties in the notion of sets, in particular, infinite sets. Among the most serious difficulties is the question about how we can make a general statement about an infinite set. Because there are infinitely many members, we can not do it by checking all the members of it. Carnap distinguished two kinds of generalities, one of which is what he called 'numerical generality', and the other 'specific generality'. The former is a property which all the members of a set actually have in common, while the latter is one which can be deduced logically from some general property of a set. He contended that a general property of an infinite set must be specific generality. So, he concluded, the general statement about an infinite set is nothing but a statement logically deduced from some statement which is already known to be true for the set. It is immediately clear that his explanation is not sufficient, for it is difficult to determine what property is specifically general. Moreover, since specific generality is something deduced from another generality, there must be, in the first place, at least one generality known to us which is neither numerical nor specific. Another question will arise. How can we know a set to be infinite. Illustrating this, I refer to three examples. They are infinite sets given by Dedekind, Zermelo, and Peano. I show that they have a common structure, namely the structure of recursiveness. We can construe these sets as sets of objects which are produced by an endless and recursive procedure. It is this recursive and endless procedure that enable us to reach the notion of infinity. These things considered, I conclude that as regards infinite sets, there is a generality which I shall call 'conventional generality' given by rules. And this means that infinite sets are artificial, consequently not real objects, in some sense.

著者

伊藤 遼 太田 紘史 大西 琢朗 海田 大輔 久木田 水生 堀 沙織 三木 那由他 山口 尚

出版者

京都大学哲学論叢刊行会

雑誌

哲学論叢 (ISSN:0914143X)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.38, pp.S129-S159, 2011

著者

西條 玲奈

出版者

京都大学哲学論叢刊行会

雑誌

哲学論叢 (ISSN:0914143X)

巻号頁・発行日

no.41, pp.59-70, 2014-11

著者

山本 興志隆

出版者

京都大学哲学論叢刊行会

雑誌

哲学論叢 (ISSN:0914143X)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.19, pp.59-71, 1992-09-01

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Seit Sein und Zeit oder früher als das, hat Heidegger immer schon sowohl die Frage nach der Sprache wie auch die Seinsfrage für sein Kardinalproblem gehalten. „Die Sprache ist das Haus des Seins, " sagt Heidegger. Dieser bekannte Satz deutet uns den wesentlichen Zusammenhang zwischen den beiden Sachen an. Wie, dann, kann man den eigentlichen Sinn, den der Satz besagt, recht verstehen und den Zusammenhang, der zwischen Sein und Sprache waltet, erklären ? In welchen Sinnen kann man sagen, daß das Sein und die Sprache zusammengehören? In diesem Aufsatz handelt es sich um die verborgene Zusammengehörigkeit von den beiden Sachen, um den oben erwähnten Fragen zu antworten. Bei der Erklärung müssen wir Heideggers Begriff von „logos" d.h. von der „Rede" betrachten, denn er sagt, daß der logos etwas (das Seiende) sehen lasse. Und wir müssen auch seinen Wahrheitsbegriff bewahren. Denn die Wahrheit ist der Ring, der das Sein und die Sprache zusammenbindet. Sozusagen haben die Wahrheit des Seins und die Sprache als die Metapher dieselbe Struktur. Der Kern der Struktur ist die Zusammangehörigkeit von dem Entborgenen und dem Verborgenen, oder von der Entbergung und der Verbergung. Wir werden die grundsätzliche Unmöglichkeit von der Seinsfrage in der mannigfaltigen Zusammengehörigkeit finden. Und die Unmögligkeit ist der Grund von der Seinsvergessenheit der abendländischen Metaphysik.

著者

山田 貴裕

出版者

京都大学哲学論叢刊行会

雑誌

哲学論叢 (ISSN:0914143X)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.37, no.別冊, pp.S49-S60, 2010

著者

三谷 尚澄

出版者

京都大学哲学論叢刊行会

雑誌

哲学論叢 (ISSN:0914143X)

巻号頁・発行日

no.32, pp.36-47, 2005

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Kant's ethical thought has always been criticized for its rigoristic aspects. Bernard Williams's well-known "one thought too many" or "the righteous absurdity" argument can be counted as a contemporary variation of these unsympathetic attitudes toward Kant. Williams objects that Kantian conception of "impartiality" or "universal morality" alienates our commitments to the personal ideals or the deep attachments which we feel to our important others. The principal aim of this paper is to vindicate Kantian conception of autonomy from Williams's accusation. The fundamental thesis of this paper can be summarized as follows : (1) Following Gerald Dworkin's idea, it is pointed out that the concept of "autonomy" should be distinguished from that of "freedom". The latter refers to the situation that an agent is not restricted to behave as he wishes to at certain time and place, or, at a local level, while the former demands that the agent's life-plan should not be interfered with at a global level. The concept of autonomy requires that an agent should be allowed to be the author of his own life, in the sense that he could create his way of living according to his own planning. That is, for an agent to be autonomous, he should be allowed to pursue his own significant purposes, or, the purposes of his own valuing. (2) The structure of "freedom to the purposes of one's own valuing" can be interpreted to overlap with the structure of Kantian obligation, or, the theory of Kantian self-legislation. For, in order for an object of choice to be valuable, it has to be willed as an end of one's acting, or, has to be recognized as a normative object worth realizing, which implies that the value of object is conferred via the process of self-legislation, or, via the process of an agent's willing an object. In this sense, autonomous willing is functioning as a process of value construction. (3) From above, it can be inferred that values would cease to exist if we refused to accept the concept of autonomy as an inherent structure of our normative experience. We have no choice but to admit autonomy if we are to make any sense of our value experience. In this sense, autonomy need not be regarded as the source of alienation. Rather, it should be conceived as a necessary condition of our agency, that is, the central and inevitable structure of value from which all other values arise.

著者

加藤 恵介

出版者

京都大学哲学論叢刊行会

雑誌

哲学論叢 (ISSN:0914143X)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.12, pp.55-74, 1985-07-01

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Heidegger versuchte in der Vorlesung "Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie" den Sinn von Sein überhaupt aus der Struktur der Zeitlichkeit des Daseins, die er in "Sein und Zeit" geklärt hatte, herauszustellen. In dieser Vorlesung kann man das zweideutige Verhältnis Heideggers zur traditionellen Dichotomie deutlich sehen. In der vorliegenden Arbeit sollte versucht werden, diese Zweideutigkeit zu erhellen.

著者

加藤 恵介

出版者

京都大学哲学論叢刊行会

雑誌

哲学論叢 (ISSN:0914143X)

巻号頁・発行日

no.12, pp.55-74, 1985-07-01

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Heidegger versuchte in der Vorlesung "Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie" den Sinn von Sein überhaupt aus der Struktur der Zeitlichkeit des Daseins, die er in "Sein und Zeit" geklärt hatte, herauszustellen. In dieser Vorlesung kann man das zweideutige Verhältnis Heideggers zur traditionellen Dichotomie deutlich sehen. In der vorliegenden Arbeit sollte versucht werden, diese Zweideutigkeit zu erhellen.

著者

松田 克進

出版者

京都大学哲学論叢刊行会

雑誌

哲学論叢 (ISSN:0914143X)

巻号頁・発行日

no.45, pp.1-15, 2018

著者

小林 武史

出版者

京都大学哲学論叢刊行会

雑誌

哲学論叢 (ISSN:0914143X)

巻号頁・発行日

no.46, pp.57-69, 2019

著者

林 拓也

出版者

京都大学哲学論叢刊行会

雑誌

哲学論叢 (ISSN:0914143X)

巻号頁・発行日

no.45, pp.R1-R4, 2018

著者

三木 那由他

出版者

京都大学哲学論叢刊行会

雑誌

哲学論叢 (ISSN:0914143X)

巻号頁・発行日

no.36, pp.68-79, 2009

著者

三木 那由他

出版者

京都大学哲学論叢刊行会

雑誌

哲学論叢 (ISSN:0914143X)

巻号頁・発行日

no.39, pp.86-97, 2012

著者

伊藤 邦武

出版者

京都大学哲学論叢刊行会

雑誌

哲学論叢 (ISSN:0914143X)

巻号頁・発行日

no.5, pp.1-9, 1978-08-01

著者

大川 祐矢

出版者

京都大学哲学論叢刊行会

雑誌

哲学論叢 (ISSN:0914143X)

巻号頁・発行日

no.38, pp.109-120, 2011

著者

橋本 康二

出版者

京都大学哲学論叢刊行会

雑誌

哲学論叢 (ISSN:0914143X)

巻号頁・発行日

no.19, pp.p84-95, 1992

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Alfred Tarski says that his definition of truth is in harmony with the postulates of physicalism. What Tarski means by 'physicalism, ' however, has not been understood well. In this paper the author tries to make it clear what Tarski's physicalism in semantics is. First, the author examines Hartry Field's well-known article 'Tarski's Theory of Truth, ' in which he contends that although Tarski's philosophical purpose in the theory of truth is to pursue physicalism, Tarski fails to do so. There Field suggests his understanding of physicalism as the basis of his contention. According to Field, physicalistic semantics ought to explain the causal connection between language and (extralinguistic) reality. Such an explanation demanded by Field is something which one may naturally expect from physicalistic semantics. But the problem is : Is it also what Tarski demands of physicalistic semantics ? Second, in order to solve the problem, the author investigates Tarski's two methods of introducing the concept of truth, namely, the method of definition and the axiomatic method. Tarski regards the former as physicalistic, the latter non-physicalistic. When this distinction is made, whether or not a method can explain the causal connection between language and reality is not used as the criterion by Tarski. According to Tarski, that a method does not contain any special theories of truth is the criterion for the method to be physicalistic. Accordingly, the axiomatic method is judged non-physicalistic because it characterizes the properties of the concept of truth by its own special axioms. From the physicalistic point of view, the concept of truth does not need to be explained at all, but only to be defined. This is Tarski's physicalistic theory of truth. Therefore the author concludes that Field's physicalism is not the same as Tarski's and that Tarski succeeds in pursuing his own version of physicalism.

著者

佐金 武

出版者

京都大学哲学論叢刊行会

雑誌

哲学論叢 (ISSN:0914143X)

巻号頁・発行日

no.33, pp.67-78, 2006

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"David Chalmers claims that the nature of consciousness as a subjective quality constitutes an independent subject area and that its existence cannot be reduced to anything else. In particular, reductive explanations to physical theories as well as functionalism about mental states are hopeless for this purpose (perhaps they assume the existence of the conscious mind, in that failing to explain what we seek to understand about its very nature). His argument for mind-body dualism, which is supposed to sustain the claim above, proceeds as follows: 1) what is conceivable is possible; 2) There is at least one conceivable world where one's physical duplicate has no consciousness, which is called a zombie-world; therefore, 3) the zombie-world is possible; 4) if it is possible, then physicalism or materialism is false; therefore, 5) physicalism is false. The central concern of this essay is to critically examine Premises 1) and 2). Concerning Premise 1), which I shall call the "Conceivability-Possibility Thesis," some precedent arguments based on similar theses can be found throughout the history of western philosophy (e.g. the Cartesian argument for mind-body dualism and Hume's denial of the reality of causality), and many contemporary philosophers discuss their validity and force (e.g. van Cleve, 1983 & Yablo, 1993). It should be noted, however, that Chalmers uniquely defends the thesis, as seen in his developed theory known as "epistemic two-dimensionalism," and I shall begin with its survey (Section 2 and 3). Through this examination, it will be realized that 1) and 2) are not independent premises, and that 1) can never be established as a general rule applicable to all cases until conceivability of the zombie-world is shown to be a priori. I shall argue that no such a priori reasoning for non-existence of consciousness is incomplete (Section 4). (Note also that if this is correct, the zombie case, pace Chalmers, will fall under the "twilight zone" in his terminology and even be in danger of becoming a counter-example to his Conceivability-Possibility Thesis. It therefore should be admitted either that conceivability of the unconscious mind is incomplete, or that the thesis that is expected to encompass something that is merely, or only allegedly conceivable, cannot be maintained. In effect, the zombie argument will turn out to be undone. Following this, responses to six possible objections will be set forth (Section 5)."

著者

小草 泰

出版者

京都大学哲学論叢刊行会

雑誌

哲学論叢 (ISSN:0914143X)

巻号頁・発行日

no.34, pp.73-83, 2007

著者

加地 仁保子

出版者

京都大学哲学論叢刊行会

雑誌

哲学論叢 (ISSN:0914143X)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.36, pp.116-127, 2009

著者

牧野 広義

出版者

京都大学哲学論叢刊行会

雑誌

哲学論叢 (ISSN:0914143X)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.3, pp.67-81, 1976-04-01