著者

大塚 耕平

出版者

公共選択学会

雑誌

公共選択の研究 (ISSN:02869624)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2010, no.54, pp.55-60, 2010-08-15 (Released:2013-07-31)

参考文献数

5

著者

清成 忠男

出版者

JAPAN PUBLIC CHOICE SOCIETY

雑誌

公共選択の研究 (ISSN:02869624)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2011, no.56, pp.18-18, 2011

著者

ミューラー デニス・C

出版者

JAPAN PUBLIC CHOICE SOCIETY

雑誌

公共選択の研究 (ISSN:02869624)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1986, no.7, pp.5-15, 1986

著者

ゲッツ チャールズ・J

出版者

JAPAN PUBLIC CHOICE SOCIETY

雑誌

公共選択の研究 (ISSN:02869624)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1992, no.20, pp.51-64, 1992

著者

谷口 洋志

出版者

公共選択学会

雑誌

公共選択の研究 (ISSN:02869624)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1987, no.9, pp.46-54, 1987-05-20 (Released:2010-10-14)

参考文献数

18

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In his book The Limits of Liberty, Professor Buchanan argued that the state has two roles, that is, “protective” and “productive” ones, which are derived from the viewpoint of gains-from-trade among individuals. The purpose of this paper is to elucidate the characteristics of his view of the state described in this book and his essays.Professor Buchanan's theory of the state is characterized by (methodological) individualism, contractarianism, constitutionalism, libertarianism, subjectivism and democracy. All these elements are important and closedly linked each other. It should be emphasized, however, that contractarianism and constitutionalism, along with individualism, are specially important elements. And it should be pointed out that his libertarianism substantially means the constitutionalist-contractarian position based on individualism. Indeed, his own peculiar libertarianism distinguishes him from the libertarian anarchists, Hayek, Rawls and others. In this paper, we consider the difference between these modern thinkers and Buchanan in more detail.

著者

曽我 謙悟

出版者

公共選択学会

雑誌

公共選択の研究 (ISSN:02869624)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2005, no.45, pp.106-109, 2005-12-05 (Released:2010-10-14)

著者

金子 太郎

出版者

公共選択学会

雑誌

公共選択の研究 (ISSN:02869624)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1995, no.26, pp.68-78, 1996-01-30 (Released:2010-10-14)

参考文献数

10

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This paper is concerned withN-person Prisoners' Dilemma in which every player has a dominant strategyd (defecting) but if every player uses his dominant strategy the outcome is Pareto-inferior.T. Schelling (1973) brought to attention the minimum size of any coalition that can gain by abstaining fromdin his definition ofN-person Prisoners' Dilemma and called this sizek. And he argued thatkplayers can be better off by abstaining from d, so they will cooperate.M. Taylor (1987) criticized Schelling fo having removed the“dilemma”in the Prisoners' Dilemma and left open the question of whether the sizekinfluences a player's incerrtive to cooperate.Cankinfluence a player's incentive to cooperate?In pure strategykcannot influence a player's incentive. Becausedis a dominant strategy.P. Molander (1992), on the other hand, showed in his theorem that the mixed strategy, consisting of both conditional cooperation influenced bykand unconditional defection, is Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (Maynard Smith (1974) ) in a dynamic model.I show his theorem in a simplified model and make clear the role of Schelling'skin the process of reaching the equilibrium.The results is as follows:(1) Schelling's k influences a player's incentive to cooperate in mixed strategy and to take strategy containing cooperation is rational from the standpoint of payoff maximization.(2) The equilibrium reached by the mixed strategies has robustness in that it resists invasion from other strategies.This can be an answer to the open question that M. Taylor proposed.

著者

黒川 和美

出版者

JAPAN PUBLIC CHOICE SOCIETY

雑誌

公共選択の研究 (ISSN:18846483)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1998, no.30, pp.32-42, 1998

著者

臼木 智昭

出版者

JAPAN PUBLIC CHOICE SOCIETY

雑誌

公共選択の研究 (ISSN:18846483)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1994, no.24, pp.97-108, 1994

著者

山下 耕治

出版者

公共選択学会

雑誌

公共選択の研究 (ISSN:02869624)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2001, no.37, pp.25-33, 2001-12-15 (Released:2010-10-14)

参考文献数

14

著者

細野 助博

出版者

JAPAN PUBLIC CHOICE SOCIETY

雑誌

公共選択の研究 (ISSN:02869624)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2011, no.56, pp.26-26, 2011

著者

黒川 和美

出版者

公共選択学会

雑誌

公共選択の研究 (ISSN:02869624)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2001, no.36, pp.47-58, 2001-07-05 (Released:2010-10-14)

参考文献数

14

著者

田中 清和

出版者

公共選択学会

雑誌

公共選択の研究 (ISSN:02869624)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1982, no.2, pp.25-30, 1982-12-10 (Released:2010-10-14)

参考文献数

13

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This paper deals with the well known Basic Theorems of Welfare Economics from a view of Public Choice. The conventional Pareto Optimality of the Basic Theorems is defined by the only obligatory conditions. The changes from a society with no facultative conditions to that with both facultative and obligatory conditions are considered under the Theorems. But any changes except those from the existing rules and institutions are impossible in the real world. The First Basic Theorem is criticized from Buchanan's approach and the Second One is disapproved by allowing for Tullock's cost of transfers.The extention of the conventional Pareto Optimality concept to the changes of rules and institutions are called as Buchanan Optimality. We consider some charactaristics of Buchanan Optimality and Public Choice approach compared to the conventional Pareto Optimality criterion.

著者

玉村 雅敏

出版者

公共選択学会

雑誌

公共選択の研究 (ISSN:02869624)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1998, no.31, pp.61-72, 1998-12-15 (Released:2010-10-14)

参考文献数

40

著者

土門 晃二

出版者

公共選択学会

雑誌

公共選択の研究 (ISSN:02869624)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1993, no.21, pp.61-69, 1993-05-25 (Released:2010-10-14)

参考文献数

20

著者

西川 雅史

出版者

公共選択学会

雑誌

公共選択の研究 (ISSN:02869624)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2002, no.38, pp.19-30, 2002-07-15 (Released:2010-10-14)

参考文献数

23

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The main purpose of this paper is to scrutinize the Duverger's Law. We especially shed light on (1) Duvergerian convergence process as a mechanism that makes the number of prim candidates converges to the stable value, and (2) whereabouts its stable value goes.In the first section Duverger's law is formalized for applying it to OLS estimation. In the second section, it empirically analyzed it by using single member district (SMD) data of Japan 1996 and 2000. The conclusion can be summarized to the following three points. (I) As long as the number of prime candidate is more than 2, Duvergerian slide down convergence works. However when it was smaller than 2, statistically significant conclusion was not obtained. Therefore, (II) the Duverger's Law in a classic meaning is untenable. In addition, (III) some of results statistically reject the hypothesis assumed that Duvergerian equilibrium is equal to 2 in SMD. According to these results, Duvergerian slide down convergence is tenable while the Duvergerian equilibrium departs from 2.

著者

太田 耕史郎 春日 教測

出版者

公共選択学会

雑誌

公共選択の研究 (ISSN:02869624)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2000, no.35, pp.21-31, 2000-12-15 (Released:2010-10-14)

参考文献数

45

著者

湯之上 英雄

出版者

勁草書房

雑誌

公共選択の研究 (ISSN:02869624)

巻号頁・発行日

no.45, pp.24-44, 2005

著者

村瀬 英彰

出版者

JAPAN PUBLIC CHOICE SOCIETY

雑誌

公共選択の研究 (ISSN:02869624)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2003, no.40, pp.26-34, 2003

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本稿では, 民主主義制度が社会的見て非効率な政策選択をもたらすいわゆる「民主主義の失敗」が生じる新たなメカニズムを提示する.メカニズムの背景にある基本仮定は, 投票者は政策がもたらす経済的利得に最も関心があるという意味において殆ど合理的であるが, ごくわずかに政策それ自体, いいかえればイデオロギーにも選好を有し自らが選好しない政策を支持することにコストを感じるというものである.このとき, 個々の投票者のイデオロギー選好が殆どないに等しい無視しうるものであっても, それが選挙という集計装置を通じると社会全体としての政治的選択に大きな影響を与え, 投票者の政策選択を投票者の効用を大きく下げるという意味で完全に非合理なものとする可能性があることを示す.また, 各投票者の行動が他の投票者の行動に対する予想によって左右されるという投票行動の相互依存関係が生じ, 選挙結果に予見不可能性が持ち込まれることも示す.

著者

貝原 俊民

出版者

JAPAN PUBLIC CHOICE SOCIETY

雑誌

公共選択の研究 (ISSN:02869624)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1999, no.32, pp.6-16, 1999