著者
ブルナ・ルカーシュ
出版者
ロシア・東欧学会
雑誌
ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2020, no.49, pp.52-61, 2020 (Released:2021-06-12)

Czech literature was first recognized in Japan in the 1920s and early 1930s. Among literary works published during this period, which were few in number and mostly second-hand translations from English or German, three books - one play and two novels - require special attention. Karel Čapek’s dystopian play R.U.R., originally written in 1920 and first staged in 1921, was translated into Japanese in 1923 and became the first major work of Czech literature ever introduced in Japan. Just like in other parts of the world, the play attracted attention of both critics and readers. Several other translations were published soon after and the play was also successfully staged in Tsukiji Shōgekijō Theatre in 1925. A few years later, in 1930, Japanese translations of two other essential works of the inter-war period Czech literature were published – Jaroslav Hašek’s acclaimed antimilitarist novel The Good Soldier Švejk and Ivan Olbracht’s socialist novel Anna The Proletarian, a book which is now almost completely forgotten.The main objective of this paper is to explore the relation between the literary concepts adopted and constantly argued by the critics and writers of the Proletarian Literature, predominant literary movement at that time, and the reception/interpretation of foreign literary works, in this case works of Czech literature. Based on the analysis of the newspaper advertisements, book reviews and other related texts this paper shows that the reception was determined by the concepts and notions the Proletarian critics valued and that the leftist literary critics tended to emphasize those elements of these literary works they considered to be conveying the Proletarian ideals. On the other hand, Olbracht’s Anna The Proletarian, a novel praised by its translator Ichiko Kamichika as a must-read for every proletarian woman, was targeted by Japanese censorship for its radical political thoughts and was eventually published with large parts of the text censored.Consequently, this paper concludes that Czech literature introduced and translated in the inter-war period was interpreted in different ways and valued for different reasons than it was originally in Czechoslovakia.
著者
下社 学
出版者
ロシア・東欧学会
雑誌
ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2020, no.49, pp.82-91, 2020 (Released:2021-06-12)
参考文献数
7

In this paper, from the perspective of economic exchange between Japan and Central Asia (Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan), the current situation and challenge, as well as future prospects, will be described through the work of promoting trade and investment.One of the characteristics of economic exchange between Japan and Central Asia is that the forms and fields of business developed by the target countries differ significantly, and one is that the public and private sectors are working together unexpectedly. One can point out that neither Japan nor the target countries can be decisively important economic partners, and as a result, exchanges remain at a low level.The lack of information is at the top of the challenge in developing economic exchanges between Japan and Central Asia. Also the difficulty of logistics, the vulnerable foreign exchange circumstances and the compliance problem are major bottleneck for commercial activities for Japanese companies.Although rosy expectations for future economic exchanges are forbidden, there are several directions for efforts that can contribute to building win-win relationships.
著者
ベルタラニチュ ボシティアン
出版者
ロシア・東欧学会
雑誌
ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2020, no.49, pp.92-105, 2020 (Released:2021-06-12)
参考文献数
31

The present article tracks the evolution of Japan’s engagement with Central Europe after the end of Cold War. More specifically, it looks into the development of V4+Japan partnership within the context of post-Cold War foreign policy of Japan. The main argument revolves around two questions. First, in light of democratic backsliding in Central Europe, the article enquires into the basis of strategic relevancy and rationality behind the V4+Japan partnership. Second, it looks into the potential for future evolution of the relationship in the context of the post-Brexit EU-Japan relationship. The major conclusion rests on the premise that V4+Japan partnership, although weakly institutionalized and asymmetric in nature, retains meaning as long as it remains contingent on the values and principles of the EU-Japan strategic dialogue.
著者
角田 安正
出版者
ロシア・東欧学会
雑誌
ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2019, no.48, pp.55-71, 2019 (Released:2020-05-30)

This paper compares three versions of Nikita Khrushchev’s secret speech: a Russian booklet that was allegedly published in 1959; the official Russian edition, published in Moscow in 1989; and the US Department of State’s version, published in English in 1956. This paper argues that although the booklet of 1959 was a forged imprint, its text cannot be summarily dismissed as false.The official text of Khrushchev’s speech, delivered to the closed session of the 20th congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on February 25, 1956, was published by the party in 1989. A note at the end of the text mentions that it is identical to the original text from March 1, 1956 (not to the text of February 25, 1956).The US Department of State’s version of the speech was printed in the New York Times on June 5, 1956. The text is identified as being a direct or secondary translation of the official text from March 1. Subsequent newspapers reports and research findings from the mid-1990s reveal that the original text had first passed through the hands of the Polish United Workers’ Party before reaching the Israel Security Agency, and finally the United States.By comparing the text of the 1959 booklet, the official 1989 edition, and the US Department of State’s version concurrently, we observe the following:(1) The 1959 edition of Khrushchev’s secret speech is a variant of the original version from March 1, 1956.(2) A number of subtle differences in wording exist between the 1959 edition and the 1989 edition; however, these differences are so minor that they are unnoticeable in the Japanese translation.(3) Despite these differences, the “precision” or “accuracy” of the 1959 edition is only slightly inferior to the version produced by the US Department of State. If the US Department of State’s version differs from the official one by only 5 percent, the 1959 booklet differs from the official version by approximately 7-8 percent.(4) We present the following hypothesis to explain why the 1959 version is less accurate than the version produced by the US Department of State. Both the US Department of State’s version and the 1959 edition were derived from an identical text, which was possibly in Polish. However, while the former has a “parent-child” relationship with its original, the 1959 edition is a secondary derivative, which means that it should be considered a “grandchild” of the Polish text.
著者
宇野 真佑子
出版者
ロシア・東欧学会
雑誌
ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2019, no.48, pp.72-89, 2019 (Released:2020-05-30)
参考文献数
45

This paper aims to analyze the articles relating to the World War II (WWII) published in the weekly Croatian newspaper Danas (Today), a prominent print medium for mass circulation that did not agree with the Croatian Democratic Union’s (HDZ) and the League of Communists of Croatia’s (SKH) understanding of the WWII.Debates about the WWII became heated in former Yugoslavia from the late 1980s, especially in Serbia and Croatia. As discourses regarding the past serve to legitimize the politics of the present, there exists abundant literature focusing on the media coverage, the politics of memory, and the discourse regarding the WWII in the Yugoslav media. However, there is insufficient research investigating the opposition in Croatia that did not share the HDZ’s and the SKH’s interpretations of the WWII. Attending to such opinions expressed on the eve of the fragmentation of Yugoslavia will help the study of the alternative plan of state-building mooted during Croatia’s transitional period.Franjo Tuđman, the HDZ president who also became the president of the Republic of Croatia in 1990, criticized the official history of Yugoslavia promoted by the communists and instead offered a nationalistic interpretation of the WWII, attempting to rehabilitate the wartime regime led by the pro-Nazi Ustasha. Tuđman called for a “national reconciliation” that aimed to accomplish reconciliation between Partisans and Ustasha by claiming that both sections strived to achieve the independence of the Croatian state. Conversely, the articles in Danas criticized both, the official history of the communists and the new nationalistic narrative offered by the HDZ. Nonetheless, Danas partly followed communists’ official version of history, although it also focused on the mass killings committed by the Yugoslav Partisans and denounced the lack of research on Yugoslav historiography. The politics of memory in Croatia, such as a commemoration event in Bleiburg, was also a matter of dispute in articles published in Danas, which criticized the politics of the HDZ as using the past for political purposes just like the communists.This paper demonstrates that the articles published in Danas in 1990 called for reconciliation between the Serbs and Croats instead of a nationalist settlement among the Croats because it was considered to be an unavoidable task when Croatia aimed at the accomplishment of integration into Europe. Danas and the liberal oppositions placed significance on the political and cultural pluralism of Europe, while the HDZ focused on state-building that was based on the notion of a Croatian nation. However, the idea that both the Serbs and Croats should come to terms with the crimes committed during the WWII was unacceptable to the Serbs in Croatia, who eagerly tried to use their past as the basis of the legitimation of their political goals. Eventually, the opposition could not bring about a settlement between the Croats and Serbs in Croatia. Further research is required to ascertain the reason why the claims of the Croatian opposition failed to attain wider support.
著者
神原 ゆうこ
出版者
ロシア・東欧学会
雑誌
ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2018, no.47, pp.65-80, 2018 (Released:2019-10-08)
参考文献数
40

In Central Europe, the Hungarian minority have been forced to become the national minority in some countries following border changes in the region during the twentieth century—in particular, Slovakia, which counted among its population of 5 million people around 450,000 ethnic Hungarians. The Hungarian minority could not be ignored, especially in Slovak politics, and its party participated in the Slovak government from 1998 to 2006. This demonstrated to the world in general and to Western European countries in particular that Slovakia had become a European democratic country that could accept minority politicians in its government. Ethnic Hungarians had been a minority in (Czecho)Slovakia for at least 70 years, but they became significant political actors only after the end of the repressive communist government, which did not recognize their right to be active or speak as an ethnic minority. Democratization and the related idea of supporting political change from the socialist regime helped promote the establishment of minority solidarity.This study investigated the effects and limitation of minority solidarity, as influenced by such democratic values as collective ideas as freedom of expression, civic activity, market economy, Western political orientation, and minority rights and protections. This research adopted an anthological approach based on fieldwork in southern Slovakia, where the Hungarian minority lives as a regional majority. The author conducted interviews with community leaders in the southern Slovak society and observed participants’ events and activities.In late 1980s, the Hungarian minority in Slovakia were able to obtain information directly regarding Hungary, which had reformed its economic and political system earlier. Bolstered by the example of the Hungarian condition, they were able to easily imagine a democratic world, and this drove the Hungarian minority to participate in social movements aimed at changing the regime, not only because they were eager to improve the minority condition but also they had struggled under the less reformed Czechoslovak society. Vaguely proposed democratic values and associated rhetoric attracted more minorities, further establishing minority solidarity. For the Hungarian minority in Slovakia, demands for democratic reforms subsumed ethnic identity, as calls for change and democratic rhetoric were more acceptable to the Slovaks than the protection of minority rights.However, democratic values alone were not enough to sustain minority solidarity for 30 years. Currently, minority politicians and activists continue to secure rights and protections for ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia; however, doing so conversely undermines the effectiveness of democracy as the voice of the people given the diversity of the population. This has led to tensions in the Hungarian minority community between those desirous of ensuring the purity of the ethnic Hungarian community in a multicultural society and those desirous of living peacefully with Slovak neighbors in their daily lives. Adding to this erosion of solidarity among minorities, the recent transformation of Hungarian politics as the ideal goal of the past for ethnic Hungarians will likely move the current minority to consider new types of minority politics.
著者
宮川 真一
出版者
ロシア・東欧学会
雑誌
ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2018, no.47, pp.131-143, 2018 (Released:2019-10-08)
参考文献数
40

In 1949, international peace campaign was formed systematically. The Russian Orthodox Church participated in the international peace movement and played a leading role. In the same year, a column “In Defense of Peace” was newly established in the “Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate”. In the “Peace” column, information on the peace campaign and the Russian Orthodox Church's participation in that movement and the most important documents of the World Peace Council began to be published. However, no specialized research on the peace activities of the Russian Orthodox Church in the 20th century exists in Russia, and this theme has not been reviewed and evaluated academically.In this paper “war and peace” image presented by the Russian Orthodox Church in early postwar years is considered, analyzing the articles published in the “Peace” column in the “Journal”. The followings are observed as features of the “Peace” column. It closely reflects the trend of the peace organizations both inside and outside the Soviet Union, a wide variety of articles are published primarily as editorials, and authors consist mainly of the Orthodox high priests, such as Metropolitan Nikolai. In addition, as character of the “Peace” column, the most articles relate on the Christian Church and the world peace organizations, about half of the articles include direct criticisms directed toward the Western countries and direct praises to Stalin and the Soviet Union.Nikolai was a leader of peace activities in the Russian Orthodox Church. He talked about Christian church. He insisted that the Russian Orthodox Church contributed to peace, and that the Christian world had to cooperate each other. In addition, Nicolai wrote about world peace organizations. He reported favorably the condition of the various peace movements including the World Peace Council and praised Stalin and the Soviet Union. Furthermore, Nikolai preached about international relations. While striving for peace activities such as the award of the International Stalin Peace Prize, he condemned fighting acts of the Western countries including the United States of America in the Korean war.In this way, the “Peace” column is filled with the voice of peace as a Christian. However, the Orthodox Churches are praised in the field of Christian church, the Eastern countries are praised in the field of world peace organizations, and the Western countries are criticized in the field of international relations. The "war and peace" image presented by the Russian Orthodox Church in the early postwar period consists of an image of the Orthodox Church which serves peace, an image of the peace-loving Eastern countries, and a militant image of the Western countries. “Journal” actively discussed peace, but it reflected the intention of the Soviet state under the Cold War of those days.
著者
大崎 巌
出版者
ロシア・東欧学会
雑誌
ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2018, no.47, pp.144-162, 2018 (Released:2019-10-08)
参考文献数
31

Despite a good deal of research in the field, Japanese scholarship still insufficiently understands the Russian perspective on the territorial dispute between Japan and Russia, known as the Northern Territories problem in Japan and the South Kuril Islands Dispute in Russia, which prevents both countries from realizing the full normalization of the relations by signing a peace treaty and moving beyond Cold War era relations.To overcome these inadequacies, this paper suggests the necessity for the use of a new analytic viewpoint that focuses on the political artificiality of contemporary Russian politics on the above territorial dispute. One reason why Japanese scholarship has not been able to fully understand the political function of the South Kuril Islands Dispute in Russian society, may be due to the lack of such studies that analyze this problem on the basis of this analytical viewpoint.The purpose of this paper is to analyze the character and the structure of Russian logic on this dispute, examining the achievements and problems of the previous studies on the matter in Russia.The content of this paper covers the major contributions by Russian experts on the South Kuril Islands Dispute since the last years of the Soviet Union until today and analyses the major development of their position related to Japan. Such analysis discusses the arguments of Russian experts on Japanese studies, such as former soviet journalists, diplomats and scholars, former high officials in the Russian foreign ministry, and scholars at Moscow State Institute of International Relations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (MGIMO), the Center for Japanese Studies at the Institute of Far Eastern Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences and so on, revealing the fundaments of the Russian position, which include the importance of the results of the World War Two, generally known in Russian as the Great Patriotic War continuously seen as a renewed symbol of national identity for rebuilding Russian core values since the collapse of the Soviet Union.The above analysis helps to deepen understanding of the essence of Russian stance in this unresolved territorial dispute and thus the connection and continuity between the Soviet and contemporary Russian approach towards the territorial dispute.The resolution of the Northern Territories problem will assist Japan in evolving out of its “postwar era” and will contribute towards removing remnants of World War II and the Cold War in Northeast Asia. Ultimately, resolution of this problem will make a significant contribution to stabilizing the current situation in the Asia-Pacific Region.
著者
里上 三保子
出版者
ロシア・東欧学会
雑誌
ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2018, no.47, pp.163-179, 2018 (Released:2019-10-08)
参考文献数
53

This paper discusses the issue of German unification costs. After the Unification, German Federal Government facilitated the process of transition from socialist planned economy to social market economy and supported East Germans in their adaptation to the new system. The actions of the government included extensive public transfers from Western to Eastern Germany and these transfers continue until nowadays, thus their accumulated amount is regarded as enormous financial problem. These financial transfers from the German Federal Government are regarded as both one of characteristics and as one of the advantages of the East German transition when compared with other transition countries. Many researchers focused on this public transfer system itself and the breakdown of its expenditures. Previous studies have concluded that these transfer payments increased pressure on the German State Budget and did not always work very efficiently. In particular, expenditures related to social security in the East and other social policies have been criticized because these were often transferred for consumption rather than investment purposes. However, these expenditures supported the lives of Eastern Germans under the turbulent times. In this paper I focus on social costs which have been discussed in the field of transition economics. Social costs include but not limited to the following ones: decline of employment, increase of unemployment, impoverishment, increased inequality, depopulation, decline in fertility rates and so on. Although some of these problems have emerged even in Eastern Germany, they were not recognized as social costs. This paper examines social costs in Eastern Germany and identifies the factors which were accountable for their occurrence. In addition, it explains how these expenditures effectively reduce the escalation of social costs and resulted in many positive outcomes in both Eastern and Western Germany. Finally, I revisit the meaning of unification costs and the effectiveness of social policies.
著者
林 忠行
出版者
ロシア・東欧学会
雑誌
ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2018, no.47, pp.1-16, 2018 (Released:2019-10-08)
参考文献数
33

This paper outlines the movement for an independent Czechoslovak state during the First World War and examines how it was affected by the Russian revolutions of 1917. After the outbreak of the War, only a limited number of Czech and Slovak leaders took up the cause for an independent state, while the majority remained loyal to the Habsburg Monarchy. In 1916, one of the early independence leaders and the first president of Czechoslovakia, T. G. Masaryk, founded the Czechoslovak National Council (CNC) at Paris with the aim of securing the support of the Allied countries. Yet since Allied governments regarded the Habsburg Monarchy as necessary for keeping the balance of power in Europe, they avoided making any commitment to support the CNC and, instead, sought a separate peace with Austria-Hungary. Consequently, the CNC could not achieve any notable results in their negotiations with the Allied governments until April 1918.Just after the outbreak of the War in 1914, Czech and Slovak settlers and emigrants living in Russia joined the war against the Central Powers as a part of the Russian army. The Russian Imperial Governmdent supported Czechs and Slovaks who were loyal to the Russian Empire, but they made no commitment to the independence of the Czechoslovak state. Meanwhile, the Russian state also barred Masaryk, a vocal critic of Czarism, from entering the country. After the March Revolution of 1917, however, Masaryk gained entry to Russia, and he subsequently established his leadership among the Czechs and Slovaks there. He also mobilized newly-freed Czech and Slovak prisoners of war into what later became known as the “Czechoslovak Legion.”In the Bohemian Lands, the Russian March Revolution promoted the rise of radical nationalists who claimed the independence of the Czechoslovak state from Habsburg Monarchy. Between January to July 1918, they gradually expanded their influence in the Czech political circles. Yet they lacked sufficient power to overthrow the Habsburg regime on their own. This situation eventually changed when, in April 1918, the negotiations for a separate peace between the Allied Powers and Austria-Hungary miscarried, and, subsequently, the French government turned to openly support anti-Hapsburg movements including the CNC.After the Bolshevik November Revolution, Soviet Russia and the Central Powers signed the Brest-Litovsk treaty in March 1918. With the eastern front now closed to the Czechoslovak Legion, Masaryk instead decided to transfer his troops to the western front through Vladivostok. On their way to Vladivostok, however, the Legion revolted against the Bolsheviks. This was followed by the Siberian Expedition by the United States and Japan in August. After the outbreak of the rebellion, the CNC was officially recognized by the Allies, and it was regarded as a de facto government by the end of the War. These favorable circumstances led Czechoslovak leaders to declare the independence of the new state and established a new government with exiled leaders at the end of October of 1918.