著者

吉井 昌彦

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2012, no.41, pp.121-123, 2012 (Released:2014-05-27)

著者

立石 洋子

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2011, no.40, pp.50-64, 2011 (Released:2013-05-31)

参考文献数

44

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The paper discusses the controversies on the history of non-Russian peoples in the USSR among the Soviet Marxist historians in the 1920s to early 1930s. The development of early Marxist historical science in the USSR was closely related with the policies of the party. The party leaders distinguished the nationalism of the oppressing nations from that of the oppressed nations, and considered “great power chauvinism,” or Russian nationalism, the main danger. Accordingly, the study of all the peoples in the USSR and the improvement of their cultural level became an important task for scholars, including historians. At the first convention of the All-Union Society of Marxist Historians in December 1928 to January 1929, the study of the history of the peoples in the USSR was declared as the main task of Soviet historians. For the first time, the historians faced the problem of how to interpret the history of non-Russian peoples from the Marxist perspective. One main arguing theme was the evaluation of the Russian rule over the non-Russian peoples. Another main problem was the tendency of “the great power chauvinism” of the Russian Marxist historians; this issue was raised by Ukrainian Marxist historians, including M. Iavorskii. They criticized some Russian Marxist historians for underestimating the Ukrainian elements in the history of the revolutionary movement in Ukraine and for not acknowledging the independent features of the cultural, social, and economic history of Ukraine. However, M. Pokrovskii, the most authoritative Russian Marxist historian, did not accept the criticism, and thus, the historians never reached a consensus. In contrast, the problems that became serious themes in the Stalin period, such as the evaluation of the Khan who led the rebellion of non-Russian peoples against Russia, or the evaluation of the “Holy war” by the Muslim population against Russian rule, were given less attention by the historians. At the end of 1929, when “the cultural revolution” began, not only did the non-Marxist intellectuals receive criticism, but the debate among the Marxist historians became strained. In Ukraine, the criticism against Ukrainian nationalism caused mass political oppression, and the most famous non-Marxist historian, M. Khlshevskii, and Marxist historian, M. Iavorskii, were both arrested. The class factor was put forward in the historical interpretation and this change was reflected also in the study of non-Russian history. The leaders of rebellions against Russia in nineteenth-century Kazakhstan and the North Caucasus and of the rebellion against Poland in seventeenth-century Ukraine came to be evaluated as repressors of the masses, and their dissatisfaction against the ruling classes was considered to be a driving force of these rebellions. In the Stalin period, historians tried to reevaluate the tradition and the leaders of each people and again faced the problem of the harmonization of the class elements and the national character of each people. This problem remained unsolved from the 1920s. Thus, in the discussion of the early Soviet period, we can see the roots of the fierce discussion among the historians and politicians of the Stalin period.

著者

堀江 典生

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2011, no.40, pp.65-78, 2011 (Released:2013-05-31)

参考文献数

22

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This study examines the extent of job structure reorganization in Russian enterprises with an emphasis on path dependency on Soviet-type job classification. Human resources is an organizational source of competitive advantage. HRM (human resource management), introduced to Russia by Western countries, is presumed to help Russian enterprises reform their management, but its practical application is difficult for most Russian enterprises that are used to the “Russian Classification of Workers and Employees Occupations and Wage Grades,” regulated by state and inherited from the Soviet era, in their personal management and wage system. Most researchers have focused on cultural diversity in introducing Western HRM to Russian enterprises, but have not paid attention to the job design within these enterprises. We conducted an in-depth interview of a company’s human resources managers to understand the organizational structure of the HRM department and their recent development of HRM practices. We also conducted a large-scale interview survey of executives from more than 430 Russian companies to obtain their view of their HRM practice. The company we visited for the in-depth interview was a former state enterprise with a long history from the Soviet era. The organizational structure designed for the human resources management department lacks the function of conducting job analysis, and thus the main tasks of the department remain the same as those during the Soviet era. They insist that the wage system of this company has changed from the old regime, but these changes concern merely flexibility of wage rates, not job redesign. In addition, using a large-scale interview survey, we examined their dependency on the job classification inherited from the Soviet era, the frequency with which they conduct job analysis, their dependency on the wage system inherited from the Soviet era, and the extent of job enlargement. Our findings indicate that most enterprises still employ the “Russian Classification of Workers and Employees Occupations and Wage Grades” and do not have their own job design. The wage system also heavily depends on the wage grades regulated by the Russian government. They frequently conduct job analyses, but we suggest this has not been conducted for the purpose of job redesign. The executives believe that their jobs have enlarged, but they have enlarged without job redesign. Therefore, we conclude that Russian enterprises have not developed their newly introduced Western HRM in their course of management reform, and most still employ the rigid job classification and wage system inherited from the Soviet regime to manage their employees. But these companies still have survived economic crises and their factory workers have kept working in each job module classified by the state. Human resource management in Russia has not been substituted by western human resource management. It has evolved from the Soviet-type HRM to a Russian HRM with the introduction of some western HRM practices.

著者

山添 博史

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2011, no.40, pp.79-90, 2011 (Released:2013-05-31)

参考文献数

46

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The aim of this article is to provide an analysis of the nature of Russia’s security issues with China by focusing on two areas. Firstly, the study will see examples from Russia’s bilateral security relationship with China. Secondly, the analysis will subsequently provide an overview of the countries’ wider global interests. Resultantly, the article hopes to show that there exists no governing principle per se in Moscow’s relationship with Beijing but rather a cautious case-by-case approach. Reconciliation over border demarcation, an issue that spilled over into the actual conflict in 1969, has been critical in assuaging security relations between Moscow and Beijing. In their settlements of 1997 and 2004, both China and Russia made significant concessions on this issue despite fierce opposition within each country. This negotiation process was combined with the development of their relationship from reconciliation towards “strategic partnership.” However, Moscow’s efforts were driven by a longstanding desire to remove unstable elements on the border rather than an actual aspiration for greater security cooperation. Furthermore, Russian arms sales to China were a significant factor in their relationship and did reinforce China’s modern military capabilities especially towards the sea. However, arms trade has declined since 2007, largely due to the changing interests of Russian manufacturers and the Chinese equipment program. An export of RD-93 engines to China was suspended following the claim from a military industry executive that such components would be used in the construction of FC-1 fighters, a major export competitor to Russia’s own MiG-29. A dichotomy therefore exists in Russia between those seeking export income and those who wish to keep Chinese military capability below their own. Interestingly, Russian exports to India, a potential rival to China, are not so constrained. The first joint military exercise between China and Russia called “Peace Mission 2005” involved thousands of troops and was partly driven by a desire to show power and solidarity. Yet recent military exercises correspond to each country’s practical needs. In the “Peace Mission 2010” joint exercise, China for example focused on long-range flight capabilities. Russia meanwhile devotes more time and resources to joint exercises with former Soviet partners within the Collective Security Treaty Organization than it does with China. Finally, China and Russia share resistance to Western humanitarian intervention and pressure for democracy yet both countries found it hard to coordinate their opposition efforts in the 1990s due to varying interests. In the late 2000s each of Russia and China increasingly conducted independent foreign policies, confident in their increased international influence. But whilst common interests make both countries take similar approaches, coordination between them remains scant. In conclusion, the progress of each security issue depends on practical situations related to it rather than an overarching concept between Beijing and Moscow, such as that which used to determine relations during the Cold War. Whilst both share common non-interventionist policies, these are more often sought independently rather than cooperatively. In essence, a deeply embedded fear of China makes Russian bilateral policy cautious, eager not to turn China into a security concern.

著者

兵頭 慎治

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2011, no.40, pp.91-93, 2011 (Released:2013-05-31)

著者

油本 真理

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2011, no.40, pp.94-97, 2011 (Released:2013-05-31)

著者

藤嶋 亮

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2012, no.41, pp.3-18, 2012 (Released:2014-05-27)

参考文献数

37

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Fierce and continuous political battles broke out in Romania immediately after its accession to the European Union (EU) in 2007, with President Traian Băsescu’s leadership style as the main issue. Băsescu declared that he would be an activist president, a “player-president,” who would advance his own political agenda, control the parliamentary majority, and actively shape policy. He fulfilled this vision to some extent and won the re-election; however, the Romanian Constitution stipulates the role of president as a mediator and obliges him/her to adopt a nonpartisan stance. Moreover, since the late nineties, semi-presidential systems in Central and Eastern Europe (except the former USSR) have tended to be more parliamentarian, shifting supreme executive power from the president to prime minister. Thus, Băsescu’s presidency poses the difficult and interesting question for scholars: Why and how might President Băsescu behave as a “player-president”? To answer this question we must analyze the resources for presidential leadership in the semi-presidential context. Here we can identify three factors of particular importance: the president’s constitutional power; partisan power, focusing on the nature of the parliamentary majority and relationship between the president and majority; and the president’s popularity. The present study describes and analyzes the successes and failures of Băsescu’s initiatives during the period between December 2004 and August 2012 from the perspective of these three factors. Specifically, we focus on the following three situations in which the president’s action became a serious issue: “government formation,” “intraexecutive conflict,” and “referendum.” To examine specific constellations of political resources available for each actor, especially the president, we take the constitutional text as our starting point. The Constitution’s ambiguity allowed the president to expand his formal institutional capacity. For example, according to the Constitution, the Romanian President must consult with the parties in Parliament when nominating the prime minister. However, Băsescu always declared that he would nominate a member as the prime minister from the party or alliance that supported him before he officially consulted other parties in Parliament, and he continued holding initiatives to choose the prime minister. Here, two other factors played an important role. Băsescu was the recognized leader of the parliamentary majority, especially between December 2008 (when his party, the PDL (former PD) became the top party in the general election) and spring 2012 (when the governing coalition collapsed). Furthermore, the president maintained high popularity until the economic crisis worsened and his PDL government introduced austerity measures in spring 2010. His partisan power and popularity enhanced Băsescu’s constitutional power, making him a president with considerable material power. In addition, the president is the only office holder who is popularly elected nationwide. Therefore, winning the post gave him additional leverage, especially immediately after winning the elections. In this context, the threat to dissolve Parliament, which is very difficult according to the constitutional provisions, could be a bargaining chip for him. At the same time, the lack of party discipline and cohesiveness expanded the president’s room for maneuvering. However, Băsescu’s actions to avoid “cohabitation” (sharing power) as much as possible caused political polarization and led to the suspension of the President by the Parliament twice.

著者

湯浅 剛

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2012, no.41, pp.19-27, 2012 (Released:2014-05-27)

参考文献数

23

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The institution of the presidency in post-Soviet Central Asian countries is static, aside from the turmoil in Kyrgyzstan. The same person has held the post for a long time and is authorized by legislative procedures, such as referendums, to prolong his presidential term. In Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, there has been no change in the government since independence. However, presidential leadership in these two countries is a variable for understanding the mechanism of authoritarian regimes in the region. In this essay, the author argues several topics for research on governance in Central Asia, that have been insufficiently covered by previous works. First, trends of political transition in the region are better understood through analysis of leadership in competitive authoritarianism. Quoting Robert C. Tucker, the author identifies two types of presidents in Central Asia: “Event-making” leaders and “eventful” ones. Second, referring to Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way’s work, the author takes the position that leadership is less important than international and domestic structural variables such as leverage and linkage from the West (Europe and the United States). The author discusses the case of Kazakhstan to argue that state organizations and the ruling party have been strengthened in order to support presidential leadership. Other Central Asian countries are also developing the personalization of political power using these institutions for governance.

著者

中村 健史

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2008, no.37, pp.69-81, 2008 (Released:2010-05-31)

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In June 2008, Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter Bosnia) signed the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU. The signing of SAA, however, does not mean reconciliation among nationalist parties who had started the war came to an end successfully. Instead these parties are still dominant in political sphere of Bosnia. On the other hand, as Bosnia comes closer to the EU, Bosnia will inevitably need to express ownership, that is, to have will and capability to tackle reform agenda necessary to join the EU. Although the term‘ownership’ can be used in the context of politics, civil society and business, ownership in this article limits its scope to political one. The main agenda of ownership is, thus, capability to cooperate, discuss and come to an agreement among politicians of Bosnia.Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) installed in Bosnia the Office of the High Representative (OHR) as a representative of international community. OHR is responsible of supervising civilian aspects of peace implementation with extremely huge authority. In addition, DPA provided Bosnia with consociational democracy. As is shown in this article, Bosnia lacks cooperation among political elites, in other words, ownership. Recently OHR has been moving from regulation with coercive power to that of EU integration requirements. Therefore, this article tries to figure out current situation and future prospect of ethnic division in Bosnia, taking police reform as a case. At first, Bosnian state structure set by DPA is analyzed from consociational democracy perspective. Secondly, it clarifies international community's approach towards Bosnian ethnic division. Thirdly, the extent to which Bosnia politicians showed the sense of ownership and international community's influence on it are examined.

著者

本田 登

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2008, no.37, pp.82-93, 2008 (Released:2010-05-31)

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The aim of this paper is to interpret Daniil Kharms' poem “Khnyu”, by analyzing its mysterious eponymous central character. Kharms wrote four poems in which this character appears; among these works “Khnyu” is the most important. In this poem a town, which lives according to conventional logic, is seen in opposition to water. The plot is that Khnyu leaves a forest, which is filled with images of life and liquid, enters the town, and takes control of its water. If its water is controlled by Khnyu, this is a threat to the town, for water is the opposite of logic. Another feature of the poem is that a literary group called OBERIU, which Kharms once belonged to, also appears in it. This group is on the same side as Water, for its members also try to deny the accustomed rule of “reasoning about meanings” Additionally, in the poem when OBERIU has the power to transform people into trees; they lose their ability to use conventional logic and come to belong to the forest which Khnyu comes from.In creating the character Khnyu, Kharms was thinking of the ancient Egyptian God Khnum, the God of creation who can cause floods in the River Nile so as to make plants flourish. At this stage in his career, Kharms was insisting that we could grasp “things-in-themselves” by depriving them of any conventional meaning, grasping only their bare existence. From Kharms' point of view this amounted to the creation of the World. There is a similarity between this thought and the attribute of the god Khnum, and Kharms invented the character Khnyu in order to symbolize this thought in the poem. In the end, however, Khnyu could not completely deny conventional logic, but one of the other characters, her companion, supported her policy. Kharms, in writing this poem, might have been thinking about his own fate. Shortly before the poem “Khnyu” was written, OBERIU had been banned; Kharms, however, believed in himself and never gave up writing.

著者

黛 秋津

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2008, no.37, pp.94-105, 2008 (Released:2010-05-31)

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Undoubtedly, the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union played an important role in modern Balkan history. In international politics, the treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji (1774) is considered as one of the most significant points for Russian advancement into the Balkans. This article outlines the significance of this treaty by analysing its background and stipulations.After the Ottoman Empire lost its predominance over the West European countries and Russia at the end of the seventeenth century, the Ottoman Empire, Russia, the Habsburg Empire and the newly emerging Prussia coexisted in the first half of the following century and these four countries gradually strengthened their ties. In this situation, Russia attempted to expand its influence into the Balkans. However, at that time the Ottoman control over the Balkans was still so firm that such attempts were unsuccessful.This situation, however, changed when the Russo-Ottoman war broke out in 1768. In this war, the Russian troops defeated the Ottoman troops at most fronts including Greece and the Danubian principalities. As Russia's victory continued, the orthodox subjects in the Balkans began to expect Russian protection. Consequently, the Habsburg Empire and Prussia sensed an impending crisis due to the expansion of the Russian influence into the Balkans, and they began to intervene in this war as mediators. In the peace negotiations, although Russia occupied most of the territory of Wallachia and Moldavia, it was obliged to return both countries to the Ottoman Empire because of immense pressure from both the mediators. Nevertheless, Russia attempted to maintain its influence on the Danubian principalities and to obtain some clues for its advancement into the Balkans in the future. In 1774, Russia and the Ottoman Empire signed a peace agreement at Kuchuk Kainardji.Then, we analyse the contents of this treaty. We consider that there were three articles that enabled Russian advancement into the Balkans. Firstly, Article 16 stipulates Ottoman protection for the local subjects in Wallachia and Moldavia and in this article Russia obtained a voice concerning the affairs of both principalities. This right allowed Russia to officially involve itself in the issues pertaining to the Danubian principalities, and these two countries provided the base for Russia's further advancement into the Balkans. Secondly, some researchers have conjectured that owing to this treaty, Russia obtained the right to protect the orthodox Christian subjects in the Ottoman Empire; however, this is not true. Article 7 states that the orthodox Christian subjects in the Ottoman Empire must be protected by the Porte and not by Russia. The above-mentioned misunderstanding was caused due to Russia's exaggerated insistence on the eve of the Crimean War that in this treaty, it had obtained the right to protect the orthodox Ottoman subjects. However, it is true that this treaty was indirectly the beginning for Russia's insistence. Thirdly, Article 11, which stipulates the activities of merchants, provides Russia the right to open consulates anywhere within the territory of the Ottoman Empire. Using this right, Russia opened consulates and vice-consulates in the Danubian principalities in the 1780s, followed by those in the other Balkan areas in the nineteenth century. These consulates played an important role in Russian advancement into the Balkans by collecting information, maintaining contact with local leaders, ecclesiastics and other local influential men.Thus, this treaty was of great significance for Russian advancement into the Balkans.

著者

劉 旭

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2008, no.37, pp.106-119, 2008 (Released:2010-05-31)

参考文献数

10

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Environmental problems accompanying oil development in Russia has attracted a great deal of attention in recent years especially in the field of construction of oil and gas pipeline. These problems have a considerable impact on the advance of oil and gas projects, a good example of which is the issue of Trans Sakhalin Pipeline in 2006, bringing, as a result, an essential change to the structure of the operator company. This paper focuses on the essence and the solution of environmental problems with oil and gas development in Russia, analyzing the construction of the ESPO pipeline.In Russia, a series of laws have been issued and many administrative agencies have been set up to cope with environmental problems. The Federal Environmental, Industrial and Nuclear Supervision Service (Rostehnadzor) and the Federal Supervisory Natural Resources Management Service (Rosprirodnadzor) are taking charge of the environmental expertise of oil and gas projects including the construction of the ESPO pipeline as representatives of the federal government.The construction of the ESPO pipeline is planned to be carried out by two phases. ESPO-1 is under construction and divided into four sections, while ESPO-2 is in designing process. Environmental problems occurred in both ESPO-1 and ESPO-2, including the construction method past Lena River and the design of the route passing Khabarovsk and Primorsky Krai. There are four groups of actors participating in resolving these problems: environmental administrative agencies, pipeline operator company, local governments and social environmental organizations.Four conclusions are derived from the analysis on the environmental problems of the construction of the ESPO pipeline. Firstly, because oil and gas development and pipeline construction is going on in underdeveloped areas under the harsh natural conditions, many environmental problems do and will occur in the construction of the ESPO pipeline Secondly, the social consensus on environmental problems has not been achieved yet and the resolution of these problems, therefore, are still depending upon confrontation of political powers of different actor groups. Thirdly, a distribution of authority between environmental administrative agencies has not been explicitly defined. Fourthly, attracting international interest to the ESPO construction is a promising method to promote adequate resolution of environmental problems.

著者

中村 裕

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2008, no.37, pp.120-122, 2008 (Released:2010-05-31)

著者

伊東 克弥

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2007, no.36, pp.173-182, 2007 (Released:2010-05-31)

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The purpose of this note is to examine the impact of oil price changes on the Russian economy: to what extent does oil price shock influence its gross domestic product (GDP) and the price level? Another goal of this note is to examine the effect of monetary policy. In order to identify the impacts, a vector autoregressive (VAR) model is employed. The time span covered by the series is from the first quarter of 1997 to the third quarter of 2007. Our findings are as follows: when UOP rises 1 per cent, RGDP grows 0.3 per cent. At the same time, the shock leads to a negative 0.4 per cent increase in CPI. The important point to note is the asymmetry of the CPI. It seems reasonable to suppose that this reflects the successful economic policy.

著者

中西 健

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2007, no.36, pp.183-193, 2007 (Released:2010-05-31)

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This is to analyze politicians' exploitation of the North-South rift in Kyrgyzstan from the so called “Tulip Revolution” which ousted President Akaev in March 2005, to the first Parliamentary election based on a proportional system which was conducted in December 2007.Concerning the analysis of contemporary Kyrgyzstani politics, some researchers emphasize the North and South rivalry. On the other hand, others insist that the Kyrgyz politicians ally and separate amorphously, regardless of the North and South factor.Since President Bakiev has held power, facing the mass rallies against him, he succeeded in grasping control of the Parliament through the first Parliamentary election on the basis of proportional representation.This author analyzes the course of the consolidation of power by President Bakiev and the exploitation of the regional and tribal factors. Alliances and ruptures among politicians were observed regardless of the North and South factor, but this factor plays an important role in the politics of Kyrgyzstan. The results of the analysis of the Parliamentary election are as follows:1) Political division seperated by North and South2) Recognition of rift between North and South in the election poll3) Imbalance between the political forces in North and South4) Unification in North and South as a result of regional and tribal factors rather than policyThis analysis concludes that Kyrgyz politicians exploit both regional and tribal factors which are then employed in strategies for consolidation in an attempt to divide their opponents.

著者

柳原 剛司

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2007, no.36, pp.197-205, 2007 (Released:2010-05-31)

参考文献数

5

著者

斎藤 元秀

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2008, no.37, pp.3-16, 2008 (Released:2010-05-31)

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As Russia seeks a resurgence of power under the tandem leadership of Putin and Medvedev, its foreign policy reflects both internal and external influences, especially US and Chinese factors. The objectives of this paper are three-fold. The first is to illustrate key features of the Putin-Medvedev foreign policy, including a review of Richard Sakwa's remarks on Putin's “new realism.” The second is to trace how Russia's foreign policy has evolved in relation to the United States, Europe, Central Asia, China and Japan. The third is to assess Russia's diplomacy under the tandem leadership of Putin and Medvedev.As to the external factors, the US factor plays a central role in the formulation of Russian foreign policy. Moscow tends to weigh the probable responses of Washington as it pursues its global foreign policy goals. Russia's policy towards an expanding Europe, including the eastward expansion of NATO, is no exception. Russia's policy towards the Asia-Pacific region, as well as in Central Asia, is increasingly influenced by the Chinese factor. In this regard, Moscow tries to maintain relations with Beijng on a good-neighborly basis, while trying to keep a rising China in check, making use of a combination of the Japanese, Indian, and US cards.According to Dmitry Trenin of the Moscow Carnegie Center, Russia saw itself as the Pluto of a Western solar system in the aftermath of the disintegration of the USSR. Now, however, it has begun to create its own Moscow-centered system. Although Russia has not been successful in this attempt, the foreign policy of the Putin-Medvedev regime has resulted in several achievements: (1) the prevention of the early entry of Georgia and the Ukraine into NATO; (2) the alienation between Washington and its allies in the Old Europe; (3) the demonstration of a resurgent Russia in the Southern Caucasus through the realization of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia from Georgia;(4) the closure of the US Manas Airbase in Kirgiz.Currently, Russia is facing significant challenges in dealing with the global economic crisis, ignited in the US. In this case, Russia appears to be attempting to mend fences with the US, while seeking, at the same time, to reduce US influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia. The US and China factors, together with domestic concerns, are likely to continue to drive Russia's foreign policy under the tandem leadership of Putin and Medvedev.

著者

浜 由樹子

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2008, no.37, pp.17-31, 2008 (Released:2010-05-31)

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During the interwar period, several thinkers and politicians intellectually challenged the so-called “Western state system”—an international order comprising nation-states. Some of the ideas, such as Coudenhove-Kalergi's “Pan-Europe” or Aristide Briand's “the United States of Europe” bore fruit later on in the form of regional integration. Other ideas failed or simply vanished into oblivion.In this paper, I examined and reevaluated Russia's Eurasianism as one of those challenging ideas that advocated the significance of a “region” to overcome the antagonism derived from the nation-state system.Eurasianism, which emerged among Russian émigrés in the 1920s, is usually regarded as a variation of Slavophiles in Russian intellectual history. However, on the basis of Eurasianists' various descriptions of contemporary international relations, one can elicit their critical view toward the nation-state system. As is often said, the concept of a nation-state which originated in Western Europe presumed national homogeneity within a particular territory. However, many other parts of the world such as Russia are actually multinational regions. According to Eurasianism, Europeanization (nation-building modeled on Europe) leads to the destruction of the inherent diversity in the region. Therefore, they attached considerable importance to Russia's national and cultural diversity. Moreover, this is the reason why they named Russia as “Eurasia”: Russia's vast region had served as a place of exchange between Europe and Asia through its history. They believed that, as a result, it fostered a multicultural character. In their viewpoint, “Europe” meant homogeneity and “Eurasia” meant diversity in contrast.With this notion as a background and focusing on the ideas during the interwar period, it can be stated that there are many similarities between Eurasianism, Pan-Europeanism, and even Asianism in Japan. Regardless of the differences in the context, they all emerged as a criticism to the concept of a nation-state and to modern international relations.Of course, Eurasianism was different from Pan-Europeanism in some respects. For example, mentioning a map (an appendix of the book Pan-Europe), one Eurasianist criticized that Coudenhove-Kalergi's “Pan-Europe” was an expression of colonialism, because his “Pan-Europe” included colonies in Asia and Africa. Another Eurasianist pointed out the practical difficulties in European integration. In short, Pan-Europeanism reflected the interest of victorious European states after World War I.With regard to the criticism of the modern nation-state, the Soviet Union also appeared as a challenger. Eurasianism held a positive opinion on the federalism which could be a suitable governing system for the multinational region. However, on the other hand, they found internationalism and the rule by the Communist Party to be equally dubious.During the 1990s, immediately after the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, we witnessed Eurasinism being revived in Russia. It was certainly the consequence of an “identity crisis”; however, at the same time, a reexamination of the regional concepts was a simultaneous phenomenon worldwide. “Eurasia” as well as “Europe” and “Asia” were reconsidered under the new circumstances that arose in the transitional period.

著者

本村 真澄

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2008, no.37, pp.32-41, 2008 (Released:2010-05-31)

参考文献数

8

被引用文献数

1 1

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The nature of pipelines is to form a “natural monopoly” due to the huge investment required and its superiority through taking precedence against late comers. Russia, the second largest oil producer in the world, has a history of constructing oil exporting networks to ports on the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea as well as an inland pipeline system to Eastern Europe named “Druzhba”. Russia has also made a plan to construct several new pipelines. That is not only to cope with future oil demand but to expand its transport capacities to access future oil markets. Among Russia's planned new pipelines there is a new oil supply system from East Siberia to the Pacific Ocean (ESPO) to access new markets in Northeast Asia. Russia is also the largest gas producing country in the world, which confronts competition of gas suppliers set by Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan for the market of China and the South Europe respectively, on the other hand Russia made China a gas-market competitor against the traditional European market, which allowed Russia to win a series of long-term sales and purchase agreements from European gas distributors. As the gas demand soars, Russia may notch a stronger position against both East and West due to its magnitude and flexibility of deliveries.

著者

吉田 進

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2007, no.36, pp.30-47, 2007 (Released:2010-05-31)

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In this paper, firstly, I have shed light on Russia's economic revival, and the rise in the standard of living of the general public, the political stability and the energy diplomacy, etc., which it has brought about.In particular, I have expounded in detail on the “Federal Target Program for the Economic and Social Development of the Far East and Zabaikal Region”—the development program for the Russian Far East and East Siberia, with their profound relationships with the Northeast Asian region—and the redevelopment in Vladivostok for the 2012 APEC summit.Then I have touched upon the perception of Russia as seen from East Asia, a comparison of the economies of each of the countries concerned, and the trends for trade vis-à-vis Russia for the countries of Northeast Asia. Additionally I have analyzed the history of economic interchange between Russia and the nations of Northeast Asia, the current state of affairs and problem areas.Next I have covered the mutual interdependence of Russia and the Northeast Asian region for the following; mutual cooperation through international organizations cooperating internationally, such as, the Greater Tumen Initiative Consultative Commission, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and the six-party talks on the DPRK's problems, plus the cooperative relationships in the areas of energy, environmental protection, transportation corridors, investment and trade, and finance.Within such a format I have comprehensively discussed the economic relationships between Russia and Northeast Asia, and have endeavored to illuminate the future path of the Northeast Asia Economic Subregion.This is a lecture of 20 October 2007, with additions and amendments.