著者

下斗米 伸夫

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2017, no.46, pp.5-6, 2017 (Released:2019-02-01)

著者

上垣 彰

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2017, no.46, pp.7-26, 2017 (Released:2019-02-01)

参考文献数

51

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The present study discusses the two problems in Putin’s Russia, namely that of protective trade measures and that of social disparities, both of which have been attracting attention from a lot of researchers and journalists under the circumstance of the Trump phenomenon. Therefore it examines the problems in comparison with the situation of the two problems in the USA under the Trump administration. For the first problem, it argues that Russia is rather faithful to the rule of the game of international system, while the Trump administration has an inclination to destroy it. However, there is a kind of deception in this attitude of Russia because it applies double standards when it treats trade problems with the USA, Western Europe and Japan on the one hand and the problems with the former Soviet states on the other. It emphasizes that Trump’s trade policies would play a role that gives an indulgence to the double standards of Russia. For the second problem, we argue that the residents in Russia are divided into small interest groups as a result of the survival of the “Soviet social system”. What ties together the people there is the patriotism of the citizens surrounded by “enemies”. Also in the United States, a specific income group does not support Trump’s regime, but a wider cross-hierarchical ideology, “anti-intellectualism” supports it. According to our view it is important to pay an attention to the relationship between the hierarchical structure and the patriotism or ideology in order to estimate the sustainability of the both regimes in the future.

著者

本村 眞澄

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2017, no.46, pp.27-41, 2017 (Released:2019-02-01)

被引用文献数

1 1

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The appointment of Mr. Rex Tillerson as the Secretary of the State by Mr. Trump prior to the inauguration of his administration at the end of 2016 was thought a strong message that the No. 1 businessman of USA in the Russian business community is going to manage the USA diplomacy. However, Mr. Michael Flynn, a presidential assistant, was prosecuted for his close contact with the Russian agent, and the “Russia Gate” is under investigation by FBI which is a serious issue for the administration. So, Mr. Tillerson had to correct his political stand to cope with the parliament, since the US diplomatic policy concerning Russia was virtually run by the parliament not by the President. In addition to that, “Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act”, which was drafted by the parliament members and became effective on August 2nd, 2017, provides for further sanction against Russia and at the same time restrains the construction of the Nord Stream 2, a direct gas pipeline from Russia to Germany, for the reason of avoidance of too much concentration of one gas source, i.e. Russia, in the EU market. This issue created a splitting in Europe, since leading EU countries like Germany, France and Austria put a premium of the commercial value and would like to purchase cheap and stable gas from anywhere, while Ukraine and Poland wary about too much reliance on the Russian gas, which sometimes works, they believe, as a political weapon to control the consuming countries. The United States is in the position to check the influence of Russia in the European energy market and has same opinion with Ukraine and Poland. However, this is not all the points of confrontation among European countries. Ukraine and Poland have been enjoying benefits as transit countries of the Russian gas pipelines. The Nord Stream 2 was designed to detour these countries to avoid any disorder of transportation of gas, which means Ukraine and Poland will not be able to receive transit fees. These two countries are superficially warning the risk of too much dependence on Russian gas, but the fact is that their economy depend heavily on the transit fees of gas from Russia and these countries don’t want to lose them.

著者

秋月 準也

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2017, no.46, pp.90-99, 2017 (Released:2019-02-01)

参考文献数

15

被引用文献数

1

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This paper examines Mikhail Bulgakov’s letter to the Soviet government, sent on March 28, 1930, and explores how Bulgakov expressed his purpose, or, rather, his creative creed as a playwright. Bulgakov’s self-orientation, as discerned from the letter, is also discussed. The three major audience members Bulgakov had in mind for this letter were Stalin, Kalinin, Maxim Gorky, which we can deduce from the fact that he had sent a nearly identical letter as a petition to these three in June 1929. The 1930 letter has two aspects: petitionary and artistic. First, Bulgakov protested the banning of his plays “The Days of the Turbins”, “Flight” and “The Crimson Island”, as well as the repeated refusal of his requests for a short trip abroad with his wife to escape a series of critical campaigns against his personality and his work. He asked the Soviet government to immediately grant his request of leaving with his wife, Lubov, or, failing that, to give him a job in the Moscow Art Theatre, to work under the guidance of Stanislavsky and Nemirovich-Danchenko either as an assistant director or an extra or even as a member of the stage crew. Additionally, Bulgakov flatly denied that he was trying to curry favor with the Soviet government by writing a letter full of falsehoods about his plays and thoughts. He declared that he would never create a communist drama or even try to do so, simply because he fully understood that such a drama from his pen would never be a success. He confessed that “The Crimson Island” was a satire of the Glavrepertkom, a Soviet censorship agency, and he called for freedom of the press and the playwright’s imagination in the Soviet Union. Bulgakov severely criticized the censorship system in effect in Soviet Union as a writer in the satiric tradition of Nikolai Gogol and Mikhail Saltykov-Shchedrin, he defended the Russian intelligentsia and claimed that he had tried to portray the intelligentsia as the finest class of society in “The Days of the Turbins” and “Flight” following the tradition of Lev Tolstoy’s “War and Peace”. This letter shows Bulgakov, sometimes directly and sometimes with indirect intent, putting on radical anti-communist plays under his own direction for an audience of the Soviet government, or rather Stalin alone, which obviously increased the risk to his life. This was, however, a bet that partially paid off: on April 18, 1930, Stalin personally telephoned Bulgakov and informed him that the Moscow Art Theatre would accept him onto their staff.

著者

林 由貴

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2017, no.46, pp.100-114, 2017 (Released:2019-02-01)

参考文献数

40

被引用文献数

1

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The main objective of this paper is to analyze the construction process of the historical studies on nationalism of Nicholas Hans, Russian émigré educationist. In general, the scholar’s comparative theory is known in the field of education; however, this article concentrates on Hans’ keen interest in various aspects of ethnic questions, which widely vary between the humanitarian questions of the Enlightenment and the post-colonial problems after the Second World War. It is almost impossible to survey these numerous issues entirely at a time. However, a theoretical outline of Hans will be investigated using archival materials on him. Thus, the analysis will be made in the following order. First, the article interprets the basic term “nationalism” and its academic contexts where it is specially used by Hans. In the draft “Ethnic Questions in Ukraine,” no clear definition of the term is yet adopted. Though Hans obviously questioned the definition mainly after the Second World War, the evolution of the construction process of studies on nationalism should be investigated along with his historical interest in ethnic questions in Russia’s western frontier, where Russians, Ukrainians, Belarussians, Poles, Ruthenians, and other minorities live altogether. Thus, the nationalism in the draft “Russia’s Western Frontier” and in other articles written at the beginning of the Cold War should be interpreted as a creation process of ethnic consciousness on the one hand; a negative usage also exists, which is equivalent to xenophobic movements, on the other. The former definition evaluates the ethnic movements to attain cultural independence and political transition, but the latter chiefly aims criticism at the utterly ignorant attitudes of the imperial bureaucracies towards non-Russian inhabitants. Second, the untapped notes “Ethnic Questions in Ukraine,” which are witness to Hans’ political practice in Odessa and the regional disorders after the October Revolution, are taken into consideration. An on-the-spot inquiry, which Hans personally attempted in Odessa, shows that neither the newly founded ethnic schools nor the Bolshevik ones satisfied regional educational demands. The author focuses on the historical coincidence of Hans’ inquiry with the educational circumstances in Ukraine after the collapse of the Soviet Union, which shows the fact that the exclusiveness of nationalism is rather fictional, and that the genuine nationalist movement, as Hans puts it, is often confused with the former. Finally, the last part contains an analysis of the unpublished draft “Russia’s Western Frontier.” After the failure of its publication, Hans obviously changed his research direction. Whilst the purpose of the work was first defined as a single mission by a Russian émigré scholar to speak of the historical details of ethnic varieties in his motherland, unknown to a European readership, the purpose was corrected after the Second World War to a more universal framework. So-called teamwork in comparative study, an ultimate end of Hans’ theory, enables a wider scope to analyze ethnic questions interculturally.

著者

黒木 英充 小泉 直美 宇山 智彦 小森田 秋夫

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2016, no.45, pp.62-88, 2016 (Released:2018-06-02)

著者

服部 倫卓

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2016, no.45, pp.135-155, 2016 (Released:2018-06-02)

参考文献数

36

被引用文献数

2

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The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) was established in 2015 and so far consists of five nations (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan). One cannot deny that the EAEU has several defects such as too much dominance of Russia among the member states, an imbalanced network of intra-EAEU trade, relatively low importance of intra-EAEU trade for the member states, tendency to postpone market integration of crucial sectors like oil & gas and differences of import tariffs as a result of Kazakhstan’s accession to the WTO.We should, however, evaluate true merits of the EAEU for Russia in the context of its actual political and economic developments, not of the classic economic integration theory. It is noteworthy that the concept of the EAEU was proposed by Vladimir Putin on the eve of 2012 Presidential elections of Russia. Meanwhile Putin, who put ‘modernization’ of Russia on the top of the agenda, pursued innovation and new industrialization of Russian economy. Putin argued that so as to achieve these goals Russia should improve investment climate and enhance investment merits and that the creation of the EAEU was one of the efforts in that direction.Russian automotive industry is an important touchstone in this regard. Manufacturers of passenger cars in Russia used to concentrate on Russian domestic market, paying almost no attention to foreign markets because of high production costs within Russia. The creation of the Customs Union, a predecessor of the EAEU, however, lead to a unification of import tariff on passenger cars among Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, resulting in a rapid expansion of Russia’s new cars exports to the two partner countries, which used to be occupied by used cars. Thus, the EAEU plays a positive role in developing Russian automotive industry, a pivotal sector for new industrialization of Russian economy.It is true that the markets of Belarus and Kazakhstan are not sizable enough for Russian manufactures to secure profitability. Still the EAEU could be instrumental in converting some industrial sectors of Russia more export-oriented and in this sense could contribute to modernization of Russia to a certain extent.

著者

青木 國彦

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2016, no.45, pp.156-169, 2016 (Released:2018-06-02)

参考文献数

75

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This paper studies the significance of Rosa Luxemburg’s famous words “Freedom for people who think differently” in her manuscript “The Russian Revolution” (1918) as a background of the event of January 17, 1988 in East Berlin.On 17 January 1988, a group tried to join the “fighting demonstration in honor of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg” in East Berlin with their own banners. The banners carried Rosa Luxemburg’s words: “Freedom is always the freedom for people who think differently” etc. quoted from her manuscript.The MfS (East German security forces, so-called “Stasi”) arrested more than 100 people on the day. The Stasi named this operation “Troublemakers”. Hundreds, or thousands of people protested against this operation in churches every night. Western media reported the event every day. East German authorities showed some mysterious actions for the control of the event.As for the initiator of the event there have been often misunderstandings since then. There has been a controversy also on the manuscript for a long time.The president of the East German PEN Club H. Kamnitzer (he was also an IM (spy) of the Stasi) contributed an article to the party organ “Neues Deutschland” of January 28, 1988. He emphasized that the group had taken the quotation out of context for their banners and that Rosa Luxemburg canceled these words right before her death (January 15, 1919). This idea is a rehash.For the first time Clara Zetkin’s book (1922) affirmed that Rosa Luxemburg canceled the contents of the manuscript. During the same period, Georg Lukács criticized Rosa Luxemburg theoretically. Since then there has been a heated controversy on the manuscript “The Russian Revolution”.In this paper, after having explained the event briefly, I will show who was the real initiator of the event. Then I will examine the criticism of Rosa Luxemburg by Zetkin and Lukács, and I will show the influences of the event on the fate of East Germany.My main conclusions are as follows: 1) the initiator of the event of January 17, 1988 in East Berlin was not a group of human rights activists, but the applicants for exit from the GDR, especially the working group “GDR Nationality Law”, 2) Rosa Luxemburg did not cancel her theory about and belief in the freedom, 3) Lukács studied Rosa Luxemburg’s theory about the freedom academically and understood it very well, though he attacked her, 4) Rosa Luxemburg thought that “Freedom for people who think differently” was essential not only for the socialist revolution, but also for the social development in general, and 5) the event of January 17, 1988 became the beginning of the last stage of the exit movement.

著者

松浦 光吉

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2016, no.45, pp.170-183, 2016 (Released:2018-06-02)

参考文献数

25

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Since 1992 Poland has enjoyed positive GDP growth for 25 years, including 2009 which was a harsh year due to the global recession. It is also forecasted that its good development will further continue for several coming years. Some economic analysts attribute the important role of EU funds (grants from the EU) and foreign direct investments (FDI) for the successful GDP growth. The GDP ratio of foreign capital is 3.2% and 4.8% for EU funds and for FDI respectively, which is a relatively high ratio totaling 8% of the Polish economy. 20% of EU funds are allocated to Poland, and this makes it the top beneficiary. The inflow of FDI is also the top among Central and Eastern European Countries (11 countries).Despite its long period of successful economic growth, it seems that an economic level (represented by GDP per capita) has not converged with the EU average and has been stagnant in recent years. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that arguments for the Middle-Income Trap in the Polish economy are gradually increasing. That is whether Poland faces the Middle-Income Trap or is already in it.What is the background of the Middle-Income Trap? Here we look at not only the positive side of foreign capital but the negative side as well. The positive side is its function as a powerful engine to drive the Polish economy. The negative side is an unwanted effect causing an excessive dependence on foreign capital, which constrains or at the very least, deteriorates self-sustainable growth, resulting in stagnation of future growth. In order to keep competitiveness needed for continuing growth and to avoid the Middle-Income Trap, it is essential to reform the industrial structure from labor-intensive to capital/knowledge-intensive industry through successive innovation.On February 16, 2016 Polish authorities released the Action plan for responsible development of Poland. It is a remarkable plan, because it officially acknowledged five development traps (The Middle-Income Trap, Lack of balance trap, Average product trap, Demographic trap, and Weak institutions trap), which Poland currently faces. Before the publication of this plan, Polish authorities often appealed for EU funds or FDI, and claimed the acquisition as their diplomatic or political achievement without any mention of possible traps.On June 23, 2016, it was decided that the UK would withdraw from the EU through a referendum, known as Brexit. As the UK’s economic size is the second largest in the EU, there is concern about continued political and economic turbulence for at least a couple of years. And the withdrawal of the UK from the EU will cause a reduction in the EU budget including EU funds, which will be an external shock on Polish economic growth.This paper focuses on the background and development of economic growth and the Middle-Income Trap in Poland.

著者

櫻間 瑛

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2016, no.45, pp.184-187, 2016 (Released:2018-06-02)

参考文献数

3

著者

大串 敦

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2016, no.45, pp.188-190, 2016 (Released:2018-06-02)

参考文献数

3

著者

溝端 佐登史

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2016, no.45, pp.191-194, 2016 (Released:2018-06-02)

著者

木村 崇

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2015, no.44, pp.120-124, 2015 (Released:2017-08-18)

被引用文献数

1 5

著者

中井 遼

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2015, no.44, pp.125-127, 2015 (Released:2017-08-18)

著者

中村 裕

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2015, no.44, pp.128-131, 2015 (Released:2017-08-18)

著者

兵頭 慎治

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2015, no.44, pp.132-134, 2015 (Released:2017-08-18)

著者

蓮見 雄

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2016, no.45, pp.3-4, 2016 (Released:2018-06-02)

著者

蓮見 雄

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2016, no.45, pp.5-31, 2016 (Released:2018-06-02)

参考文献数

78

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In this article, we discuss the correlation between structural change in the world economy and Russian strategy. The transition to market economy in former socialist countries was the process joining the neo-liberalistic world economy. The liberalization of cross-border capital flow accelerated the expansion of capital markets and outsourcing. It stimulated the economic growth in China and other East Asian countries. Russia also enjoyed its benefits increasing oil price. It has caused a power shift from Europe and United States to Asia.But the failure of “circulation of growth”—the financial capitalism driven by USA and EU, the export-led quantitative growth in China, and the growth in Russia depended on natural resources—was revealed after the global economic crisis in 2009.According to the Constellation theory, the Ukraine crisis reflects an unstable hegemonic core of the world economy. In the EU financial institutions were relieved, but the burden is imposed on citizens by the reduced budget. It caused social deficits and anti-EU movements. At the same time, because of developing division of labor between East Asian countries, the East Asia economy is stepping into the way of self-sustained growth.The competition for hegemony of the world economy is intensified by mega-regions. A Eurasian Union alone could not be a very serious challenge to the hegemonic core. However, Russia’s Pivot to the East will strengthen its economic relations with East Asian countries, and might contribute to development of “counterpoints” with the capitalism model different from the neo-liberal one.The world energy market is undergoing a structural change through liberalization, development of renewables, and change of demands from Europe to Asia. Russia, depending on resources, must adapt to changes in the energy market and modernize its economic structure. The eastwards shift of Russia may be a wise choice. Its strategy is an adaptation to the structural change in the world economy, even if it costs enormous money to develop Far East regions in Russia. Closer relations between Russia and Asian countries will secure the energy supply in Asia and support their development. The power shift from the West to the East will be accelerated. From the long-term viewpoints, Russian joining the division of labor in Asia could be a chance of modernizing Russian industry.At the same time, for Russia, being afraid of excessive dependence on China, the cooperation with Japan is more important than ever.

著者

雲 和広

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2016, no.45, pp.32-46, 2016 (Released:2018-06-02)

参考文献数

8

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This paper examined trends in subjective well-being and political situations in Russia, paying special attention to the period of economic stagnation since the introduction of economic sanction after Crimean incidence.It may be unclear whether or not the approval rate of current political bodies in Russia is stable in the long run. Deterioration in macroeconomic situations, however, did not play a critical role in the worsening of political circumstances. Additionally, the decline in economic activity related to sluggish oil prices and economic sanctions seemed to have bottomed out, therefore it is unlikely that the economic or political situations would deteriorate sharply in the short term. In this sense, the years of 2014–2016 may have shown the stability of the political system in Russia.

著者

油本 真理

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2016, no.45, pp.47-61, 2016 (Released:2018-06-02)

参考文献数

29

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This article revisits the beginning of Putin’s third term, which was characterized by the rise of opposition. Here the opposition means “non-systemic opposition,” who placed itself decisive opposition to the regime. One of the most prominent opposition activist was Alexei Navalny. Following the 2011 Duma election, the opposition gained power with the activation of post-election protest movements “For Fair Elections.” Since the protest movements soon declined, many researchers focused more on the regime’s coercive measures towards the opposition. However, it is no less important to ask why the opposition gained power and remained active for a while. This article explores the reason behind the rise of opposition, and reveals how the regime reacted to the opposition’s activities. In answering these questions, this article focuses on the regime’s effort to defend its legitimacy from the opposition’s attacks.The article first explores why the opposition gained power. The answer can be found in the opposition’s active commitment to the politicization of regime legitimacy. Such topics include electoral integrity, distribution of power, corruption and others. The early example of the opposition’s commitment to the legitimacy issue was their initiatives in anti-corruption campaigns. Corruption issue became a trigger for the opposition’s further attack on the regime legitimacy. In addition, it should not be ignored that the opposition’s attack on the regime legitimacy well suited to a populist discourse. The opposition emphasized how the regime contradicts the interests of ordinary people, for example, by committing electoral fraud, contradicting the “rule of law,” or committing illegal enrichment. The regime had difficulty in refuting the opposition’s criticism.Second, the article traces how the regime reacted to the opposition’s attacks. At first, the regime tried to discredit the opposition by mobilizing anti-western rhetoric and strengthening the patriotic mobilization. But the regime’s attempts had limited impact in discrediting the opposition. Then the regime tried to narrow the room for opposition activities by forestalling the opposition’s agenda. The regime actively participated in the anti-corruption campaigns, such as banning the high-ranking officials from possessing bank account abroad, and limiting the maximum amount of money for purchase of cars by officials. The regime’s active commitment to anti-corruption initiative narrowed the room for opposition activities.The analysis on the “era of opposition” reveals the importance of discourse-level struggle over the regime legitimacy. Despite its significant disadvantage against the incumbent elites, the opposition could attack the regime by mobilizing the legitimacy issue. In order to avoid the opposition’s attacks, the regime could adopt limited measures: after a series of attempts, the regime took over the opposition’s agenda and itself began to commit to the legitimacy issue. The experience of Putin’s third term provides us with a useful perspective in predicting the future of Russian politics: once the opposition succeeds in mobilizing the legitimacy issue, it will not be easy for the regime to tackle the opposition’s attacks.