著者

細川 隆雄

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ソ連・東欧学会年報 (ISSN:03867226)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1988, no.17, pp.95-107, 1988

被引用文献数

1

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2008, no.37, pp.i-xiii, 2008 (Released:2010-05-31)

著者

長谷川 雄之

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 : ロシア・東欧学会年報 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

no.43, pp.69-88, 2014

著者

浜 由樹子

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2022, no.51, pp.41-56, 2022 (Released:2023-04-21)

参考文献数

32

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Russia’s ideology concerning the invasion of Ukraine mainly comprises five components: the criticism of the “West,” historical unity of the East Slavs, self-portrait as a great multi-national/multi-religious nation, staging of the “Great Patriotic War” redux, and traditional gender and religious norms. Based on the three presidential speeches that officially explained the “special military operation” (February 21, February 24, and September 30), this study examines the origins and development of the five components of the Putinesque ideological construction, which is characterized by its haphazardness. The main body of the alleged motivation of the “operation” is the security threat posed by the “West.” In this context, Russia repeatedly criticized the double standard of the “West” as well as its neo-colonialism. More broadly, the September 30 speech expanded the accusation into a criticism of the so-called liberal international order, implying that Russia recognizes the cleavage between the “North” and the Global South and is attempting to use it as a wedge issue. The idea that the East Slavs were originally single “narod” long before the modern notion of “nation-state” emerged from Western Europe was popular in the imperial period and continues to affect parts of the contemporary Russian society. With Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn as an intellectual reference point, it was revived in post-Soviet Russia and developed with the “Russkii mir” ideology. The present administration recycled it as a justification of Russia-Ukraine “historical unity.” Despite emphasizing its Slavic element, Russia still holds a multi-national nature. Its self-portrait as a huge multi-national/multi-religious state grew along with its Eurasian identity. In the 1990s, the newly born Russia rediscovered the legacy of classic Eurasianism. Since then, groups of diplomats and practitioners, as well as influential public intellectuals such as Aleksandr Panarin, have contributed to its spread in the political circle. Given the present situation of an increasing number of ethnic minorities being sent to the frontlines in Ukraine, it is essential for the Putin administration to emphasize its pride of the multi-national identity. On one hand, President Putin severely criticized the Soviet nationalities policy. On the other hand, the administration devoted much energy to choreographing the redux of the Second World War. The historical memory and family story of the “Great Patriotic War” is a valuable asset shared by the Russian society, which can unite the nation and create a patriotic atmosphere. Moreover, a considerable number of political elites maintain continuity with the Soviet period―it is no wonder the administration attempts to appeal to the Soviet nostalgia. The final ideological element comprises the traditional values of gender and religion. Since its third term, Putin administration has adopted it both as a tool to obtain support from the conservatives as well as the Orthodox Church and as an outreach strategy abroad. With anti-liberalism as the core based on strong antagonism toward the “West,” which behaves as “the winner of Cold War,” these ideological branches have been bound together in an eclectic manner. As a result, the current ideological production contains contradictions and seems complex at first glance.

著者

ベリャコワ・エレーナ

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2022, no.51, pp.57-75, 2022 (Released:2023-04-21)

参考文献数

29

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This paper seeks to explore the perception of learning, including the factors which contributed to the spread of self-learning and collaborative learning in the Association of Russian Interpreters in Japan. The research is based on the oral history interviews of three pioneer Russian language interpreters who have taken part in the activity of the Association of Russian Interpreters since the 1980s. The paper briefly outlines the background of pioneer Russian language interpreters in Post-World War II Japan. Tokunaga Harumi, who was one of the founders of the Association of Russian Interpreters in Japan, highlighted the importance of sharing knowledge and continuous learning, and his beliefs significantly influenced Russian language interpreters’ attitudes towards learning. Next follows a description on how the three interviewed interpreters acquired necessary competence through interpreting and translation work, and it focuses attention on the fact that all of them emphasized the role of background knowledge. The paper highlights the importance of extralinguistic knowledge, including worldly knowledge and the country-specific knowledge suggesting the future possibilities of interpreter training within area studies. By analyzing the narratives, this study also demonstrates how the socio-political situation, i.e., the ups and downs in demand for interpreters at that time, was one of the factors which led to the collaboration of the interpreters. Characteristics of interpreter demand, such as the need to work in different spheres, have influenced not only the contents of interpreters’ learning but also the style of learning. This in turn fostered the spread of collaborative learning in the community of practice which enabled the interpreters in this study to exchange their experiences.

著者

古宮 路子

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2015, no.44, pp.56-69, 2015

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<p>Yury Olesha completed <i>Envy</i>, his first novel, after repeated trial and error in terms of the form of narrative. The novel consists of two parts, with a change in the narrator from Nikolai Kavalerov, the hero, in the first part to the author in the second. However, it is not clear why Olesha changed the form of narrative and the narrator in the second part of <i>Envy</i>. Upon inspection of the book's previous drafts, it becomes apparent that Olesha tried various forms of narrative in the process of writing. This study attempts to clarify the reason of change in the form of narrative in the published version, judging from the reason of change in the form of narrative in the drafts. </p><p>From multiple types of drafts, this study picked up three groups of drafts that were written in the three different stages of writing. The fragmental chapter "Useless Things" can be regarded as the first stage, in which the hero is not Kavalerov but Ivan Babichev, one of the main characters in the final draft. In "Useless Things," Olesha introduces Zvezdarov as a narrator and gradually gives him a personality as powerful as that of Ivan Babichev. As a result, the former becomes as important as the latter. </p><p>However, it seems that Olesha still wanted to present Ivan Babichev as the hero. Therefore, in the second stage, Olesha moves from Zvezdarov to Kavalerov as a neutral narrator to recount Ivan Babichev's story. Nevertheless, Kavalerov is also gradually given a powerful personality, becoming as important as Ivan Babichev. </p><p>This may account for Olesha making Kavalerov the hero in the third stage. Instead of Kavalerov, the author begins to use Kavalerov's neighbor as the narrator. The notable feature of this stage is the relationships of pairs: Kavalerov/Ivan and Kavalerov/his neighbor. Although Olesha ultimately shifted the focus from Ivan Babichev to Kavalerov as a hero in the novel, it appears that he continued to believe the former to be more suitable for the role. Thus, in this stage, Olesha adorns Kavalerov with many features characteristic of Ivan in the previous stage. At the same time, Olesha now found Kavalerov's personality suited to that of a narrator. Therefore, the author initially made the narrator, Kavalerov's neighbor, a literary mirror of Kavalerov, as a hero. However, in the end, the author presents Kavalerov with characteristics separate from Ivan, abandons the use of the neighbor as a narrator, and makes Kavalerov both the hero and the narrator. This decision was adopted in the final version as well. </p><p>The reason for change in the form of narrative and the narrator in the second part of <i>Envy</i> is revealed in the relationship between the hero and the narrator in the earlier drafts. In the second part of the published version, Ivan Babichev's monologue is of great significance. In other words, Ivan Babichev becomes as important as the hero. As we saw above, Olesha knew that Kavalerov was not a suitable narrator for Ivan's story. Perhaps this is why Olesha abandoned the use of Kavalerov as the narrator in the second part of the novel. In <i>Envy</i>, the problem of who is the narrator of the story is as important as the problem of who is the hero of the story.</p>

著者

雲 和広

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.50, pp.42-58, 2021 (Released:2022-06-11)

参考文献数

17

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This paper uses micro-data to show differences in normative attitudes towards the division of labor in households between former socialist countries and OECD countries. The results reveal a gap between the OECD countries and the former socialist countries in general. Among the latter, Russia tends to be more accepting traditional norms than the OECD countries, and the trend is stable.The phenomenon of the positive correlation between female labor participation rate and total fertility rate in developed countries has long attracted attention in demography from the viewpoint that "work-family harmony" can have a positive impact on fertility. In the data examined, we extract (1) a clear negative correlation between fertility and the attitude of "accepting" the traditional norms of division of labor between men and women in the household, and (2) an clear negative correlation between fertility and the weak division of labor between men and women in the household. In this respect, the widespread acceptance of the traditional domestic norms of division of labor in the former socialist countries, where the social division of labor was considered to be the most advanced under the socialist regime, is striking.Looking at Russia, the picture emerges that there is no clear correlation between age group and education level and the traditional division of labor. Note that comparing highly educated women's group across different time points is not an appropriate approach, since the data cover a period of about 20 years and the heterogeneity of respondents classified as the same group on the basis of educational level increases over time. However, it could be interpreted as casting a shadow on possible future prospects, such as whether the rise in educational attainment contributes to the achievement of gender equality.

著者

佐藤 圭史

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.50, pp.72-87, 2021 (Released:2022-06-11)

参考文献数

50

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Since the last month of 2016, after the assumption of the self-proclaimed presidency of Vadim Krasnoselsky, Pridnestrovskaya Moldavskaya Respublika (PMR, Transnistria) has implemented full-fledged “State Program of Patriotic Education in PMR” and its legal-administrative decisions concerned, in addition to pro-Kremlin patriotic policy. It is worthy to note that the political outcomes were abided on the 5-year State Program of Patriotic Education of Citizens of Russian Federation and have obvious similarities to patriotic educational programs which were introduced in Luhansk, Donetsk, Crimea, and other areas.The patriotic policy in PMR was officially launched at the establishment of self-proclaimed independence in September 1990 in the aim of promoting national solidarity among inhabitants as “Pridnestrovians,” which was essentially created along the Soviet national line. In contrast to the policy, however, the PMR Patriotic Program and subsequent related decisions after 2016 more focused on national awareness as “Russo-Pridnestrovians” which had inherited an indivisible historical legacy from Russian civilization. To recognize internal-external PMR policy and geopolitical relation between PMR and Russia, this paper deals with “State Program of Patriotic Education in PMR” and its related political decisions for the purpose of fostering patriotic awareness among “Pridnestrovian” youth. Eye-grabbing patriotism and patriotic movements followed Soviet nostalgia by retired veterans and elderly people are not main objects of this paper; rather, inconspicuous state-planned patriotic activities through school regular education, cultural festivals, academic-cultural exchange based on the state program are focal themes. The theory of “everyday patriotism,” which is penetrated in daily life without discomfort among subjects, leads to understanding this political phenomenon.From that perspective, Russian authority tends to control specific territory through cultural-social associations, NGOs, thinktanks or any other “non-political” organized bodies. In PMR, a patriotic youth organization “Unarimia” and a thinktank “Dnester-Prut Information Analytic Center”, a Pridnestrovian branch of RISI, had been activated under official support by the PMR state patriotic programs. This paper also focuses on the process and content of the state patriotic program and the effect and result of their patriotic activities toward “Pridnestrovian” children and youth by above mentioned organizations.

著者

⽮⼝ 啓朗

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.50, pp.88-103, 2021 (Released:2022-06-11)

参考文献数

78

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Why did Russia abandon the Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi, which was Russo-Turkish alliance, and accept the Straits Convention, which was signed by 5 powers on 13 July 1841? Previous studies have cited three reasons for this: (1) Russia’s weakened influence over the Ottoman Empire, (2) Russian Foreign Minister Nesselrode’s orientation toward the Concert of Europe, and (3) France’s isolation. However, how did Russia evaluate the ability of its alliance partner? Using a commitment problem as an analytical framework, this study will clarify the security problems which Russia perceived in the Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi and how it attempted to rectify them through the Straits Convention.In the first half of the 19th century, Russia, seeking to keep the Ottoman Empire vulnerable, gave military support to the Empire, which was reeling from the First Egyptian-Turkish War. After being approached by the Ottomans for an alliance, Russia signed the Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi with the aim of expanding its influence over the Ottoman Empire and prohibiting the passage of foreign warships through the Dardanelles. However, this treaty not only caused a fierce opposition from Britain, which Russia had not expected, but also threatened the security of the Black Sea coastal region, which she had hoped.What did Russian policymakers think of these security threats? First, the Russian Military Officers questioned the Ottoman Empire’s military capabilities and believed that they would have to occupy the Bosphorus and Dardanelles in the event of a war with Britain, regardless of the intentions of their allied partner. Nesselrode also saw the Ottoman Empire as incapable of resisting British and French pressure and recognized that the conflict with Britain posed a serious threat to Russia’s security environment. And when the Second Egyptian-Turkish War broke out, Russia began to fear that it would be drawn into a war with Britain in the Straits region.In this situation, Russia tried to defuse the situation by participating in the conference of the five European powers. Russia approached Great Britain to abrogate the Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi and conclude a new agreement that would prohibit the passage of warships through the Bosporus and Dardanelles. Russia believed that a new agreement, based on the Concert of Europe, would be more credible in its commitment to prohibit the passage of warships through both straits than the Russo—Turkish bilateral alliance. Although it was also Russia’s goal to isolate France at the London Conference, Russia believed that its commitment to the ban on passage through the Straits could be maintained with the agreement of the four powers, regardless of France’s consent. It can be said that the abrogation of Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi was the result of seeking a more reliable guarantee to replace the Ottoman Empire, which was uncertain about its commitment to the Dardanelles blockade, besides easing tensions with Britain.

著者

堀⽥ 主

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.50, pp.104-125, 2021 (Released:2022-06-11)

参考文献数

74

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This article explores the pivotal but largely unwatched 1985–1986 Soviet diplomacy over the Stockholm Conference, also known as the Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE), in terms of its broader domestic and international contexts. It explains why and how the Soviet Union made concessions to Western proposals in the Stockholm negotiations after Gorbachev took office. Regarding the most contentious issue of the on-site inspection, the following three people — the new General Secretary, the Foreign Minister with no diplomatic experience, and the diplomat on the ground — collaborated to create the unprecedented Soviet decision. The long-held Soviet secrecy collapsed because the triangle stifled both the conservative KGB’s and military’s opposition. The Stockholm agreement, reached after two and a half years of negotiations, was the first multilateral East–West security accord since the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and the first arms control agreement involving the two superpowers since SALT II in 1979. It is also remarkable that its success was one of the first achievements for Soviet diplomacy in the ambitious Gorbachev period. However, the real significance of the conference lies in Soviet concessions in areas previously deemed unacceptable. The Kremlin, which had long adhered to secrecy, accepted the West’s proposal for on-site inspections. This paper is organised into four main parts. The first chapter deals with the end of the Gromyko era after Gorbachev’s advent. From the beginning, the new leader had a vision of improving international relations but no concrete plan. Meanwhile, the old-fashioned Foreign Minister, who had long dominated Soviet diplomacy, showed continuity in foreign policy from the pre-Gorbachev period. The second chapter analyses the period immediately following Eduard Shevardnadze’s appointment as Foreign Minister. Shevardnadze, who had no diplomatic experience, strengthened the bottom-up mechanism of actively incorporating his colleagues’ views. The increased discretion of negotiators on the ground significantly impacted the future of Stockholm. The third chapter focuses on the discordance between the words and deeds in Soviet diplomacy following Gorbachev’s spectacular declaration in January 1986. While the leader actively announced new initiatives, actual Soviet diplomacy did not profoundly change course. This chapter also stresses that the Chernobyl nuclear incident was not the decisive impetus for reaching the Stockholm agreement. Finally, the fourth chapter describes the confrontation between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the General Staff. The quiet war behind the Kremlin walls brought complex improvisation into the Soviet decision-making process and negotiation stance.

著者

栗原 克⼰

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.50, pp.126-147, 2021 (Released:2022-06-11)

参考文献数

30

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One of the pathologies of modern democracy is the crisis of representation (parliamentarism).As a countermeasure against the dysfunction of representative democracy, ways to improve it have been argued in each country.One of them is the vocational representation system.This is a way to have the economic and social interests of a complex and diverse society represented in politics, and the idea is to form a representative system from vocational organizations rather than from region or interest.Although this vocational representation system has diminished its influence in terms of its effectiveness after the war, it has not lost its meaning as an institutional theory.The “Civic Chamber” of the Russian Federation discussed in this paper, which started its activities in 2006, was created to deal with the dysfunction of the parliament, and the way it was structured is reminiscent of the vocational representation system, but is it similar to the vocational representation system?This paper aims to gain a perspective for evaluating this Civic Chamber of Russia by looking at the characteristics of its representative system, after tracing the amendments made to the law regulating this institution after its enactment.As a premise for it, the author examined the process leading up to the establishment of the Civic Chamber, and then introduced the process of enacting the law that regulated this institution.Then, based on the enacted law, the outline of the Civic Chamber was examined for its purpose, authority, composition and organization method, and commentators’ evaluation of this law was introduced.The law governing the Civic Chamber enacted in 2005 has been revised many times since then, and this paper considered the revisions that have brought about major changes.The following points were examined in order to gain a perspective to evaluate the Civic Chamber.a. Is the Civic Chamber based on a representation system from social organizations?b. Is it dependent on organizations?c. Is it an advisory body?d. Is it a democratic system?e. Why are its components from organizations limited to social organizations and non-profit organizations?From these points of view, it is necessary to pay attention to the trends of the Civic Chamber, including the verification of the effectiveness of the examination of legislative bills, etc. and the status of activities, and the following can be pointed out as the characteristics of this new institution.The Civic Chamber in Russia was institutionalized by the Putin administration in response to the need for a system that complements political representation by incorporating social elements with the aim of restoring confidence in politics and social integration. In addition, it can be regarded as an attempt to create a representative of society that is neither a vocational representative having the aspect of representating interests nor a group representative as seen in the early Soviet elections, and in terms of making a system that relies on diverse organizations, it can be seen as a form of “associative democracy” as advocated by Paul Hirst. However, if it is likened to P. Hirst’s claim, it is “associative democracy from above”.

著者

越野 剛

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.50, pp.148-151, 2021 (Released:2022-06-11)

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.50, pp.157-158, 2021 (Released:2022-06-11)

著者

⻑島 徹

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2020, no.49, pp.106-125, 2020 (Released:2021-06-12)

参考文献数

20

著者

山脇 大

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2020, no.49, pp.126-143, 2020 (Released:2021-06-12)

参考文献数

41

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Climate change has been recognised as an important policy issue that affects nature and socio-economic systems of all continents and oceans over the last few decades. In order to achieve the ambitious goal of ‘keeping a global temperature rise to less than 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels’ by the Paris Agreement agreed at COP 21 in 2015, formulation and implementation of climate change policies, especially mitigation ones to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions have been recently advanced all over the world.Russia, as one of the largest energy-resource rich countries and GHG emitters, has been also in the process of modernisation towards a low-carbon society, especially after the occurrence of global financial crisis in 2008-2009. Under this circumstance, the formulation and implementation of climate change policies have recently begun in earnest in Russia through its signature on and ratification of the Paris Agreement effective in 2016. These policies in Russia, however, often end in failure.In this context, this present paper firstly clarifies the current situation of climate change and its causes such as GHG and air pollutants emissions in Russia, followed by the critical consideration of previous studies on this global thematic issue. By revisiting the formulation and implementation process of Russian climate change policies with a special focus on its multi-stakeholders, this paper tries to explain why these policies are not materialised in Russia, that is, factors influencing on its policy failure.Throughout a series of analysis, it becomes clear in this paper that Russian environmental administration has been weakened whilst the government spending with environmental purposes on a downward trend in Russia after starting market transition in the 1990s. This paper also derives that institutional arrangements in the governmental committees enable Russian oil and gas companies to do lobbying for reflecting their interests on relevant policies. Besides, it becomes unveiled that residents and civil society organisations (CSOs), as one of representative protesters demanding policy reforms through social movements, have an insignificant influence on climate change policies in the case of Russia.This paper then concludes that these factors are crucial propositions given to Russian climate change policies to materialise its transition towards a low-carbon society as well as big challenges to be overcome for its future sustainable growth.

著者

有⽥ 耕平

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2020, no.49, pp.167-181, 2020 (Released:2021-06-12)

参考文献数

30

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In the 1920s, Mikhail Mikhailovich Zoshchenko wrote about 600 satirical short stories. Many of these satirical works depict the old-fashioned bourgeois culture in pre-revolutionary Russia.One of the aspects of this bourgeois culture, which Zoshchenko picks up and criticizes in his short stories, is theatricality. In this paper, I describe how Zoshchenko defines theatricality and analyze his criticism of theatricality.The theatricality which I elaborate in chapter 1, can be found in Zoshchenko’s storytelling, which is called “skaz”. This is a Russian oral form of narrative. In memoirs, the contemporaries often pointed out how the actors read aloud Zoshchenko’s works with theatrical tone and gesture. A single storyteller, who performs in skaz controls the whole story and plays all characters himself. Therefore, he can reproduce his story with his own theatricality and contrasts it with the excessive pre-revolutionary theatricality of the characters. I discuss the theatrical technique of skaz and Zoshchenko’s critique on the pre-revolutionary theatricality.In the second chapter, I analyze the theatricality of Soviet theater. In 1920s, Russian avant-garde was very influential art movement. Theater-directors abandoned old conventions and expand their artistic world. In this chapter, I examine three works of Zoshchenko that criticized Russian avant-garde, especially, theatricality of Nikolai Evreinov.In the third chapter, I analyze cultural ideology in theater. In Russia, theatrical culture of the 19th century followed a certain etiquette. Zoshchenko’s protagonists always enter the theater without proper costumes and little money. The characters quarrel over theatrical manners and are thrown outside. This conflict reveals the nature of Russian theatricality, which removes uncultured people from the theater and rejects Russians on basis of their social-cultural background.In the fourth chapter, I examine “The Elecrician”, which is Zoshchenko’s most remarkable in terms of dealing with his criticism of theatricality. In this work he succeeds to put all elements of theatricality together and clarify the mechanism of theatricality. Later he revised The Electrician and changed the end of the story in order to avoid his critique on theatricality. From then on he stopped incorporating critique on theatricality in his works.In the fifth chapter, I examine five works of Zoshchenko which deal with electrification in the Soviet Union. By comparing the various editions of these works, including The Elecrician, the high number of revisions that Zoshchenko conducted himself becomes obvious. I addition, I demonstrate that the problems concerning the enlightment of Soviet electification are similar to the problems of theatricality that I elaborated in the second chapter. Zoshchenko tried to unite people with different cultural backgrounds into one collective under the reign of Stalin. Finally, Zoshchenko draws the ideal image of the electrified communal apartment in his work “Last story” In this story, a pre-revolutionary woman changes her mind and transforms into an honorable Soviet citizen. This story shows that Zoshchenko’s criticism of theatricality disappeared because people of different cultural background were united in the electrified communal apartment, which represented the future of the Soviet Union.

著者

⼭添 博史

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2020, no.49, pp.182-185, 2020 (Released:2021-06-12)

著者

宇野 真佑⼦

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2020, no.49, pp.186, 2020 (Released:2021-06-12)

著者

斎藤 慶⼦

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2020, no.49, pp.1-25, 2020 (Released:2021-06-12)

参考文献数

75

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This paper examines the content of and some difficulties which arose in Bolshoi ballet cultural exchange programmes offered by the Soviet government. These programs were offered to a number of countries; I have focused on the countries of Japan, France, the United Kingdom and the USA in the first part of my paper. These four countries were where the most ambitious productions of the Bolshoi company were held in the latter half of the 1950’s. In the second half of my paper I focus specifically and in more detail on the cultural exchanges between Japan and the USSR. The Bolshoi ballet played a significant role in exchanges between the former Soviet union and the rest of the world, as it was symbolic of the USSR’s diplomatic relations. I limited the timespan for the investigation from 1953 to 1964, when Nikita Khrushchev strategically increased dispatches of cultural organizations to the world trying to expand Soviet influence during the Cold War period.In the mid to late 1950’s, the Soviet ballet tours to France (1954), the United Kingdom (1956) and the USA (1959) were lead by the respective governments on the basis of mutual exchanges. However the Japanese government wanted to avoid such exchanges because they were afraid of the ideological impact of communism on the people and more were interested in economic growth than in cultural diplomacy. Despite this, private organizations in Japan hungered for such cultural exchanges in the arts and sciences, and had an active say in who came from the USSR. The 1957 Bolshoi ballet tour to Japan was also organized by a private impresario and it was received with wild enthusiasm by the Japanese people. The Japanese government granted visas to some applicants but not others; it depended on the political sway of the organizations involved. Sadly sending Japanese advocates to the USSR would involve high costs so the numbers sent there were much less than those who came to Japan. In other countries the exchanges were much more balanced but political relationships with the USSR did cause interruption to the programmes. This would suggest that the success of cultural exchanges depends more on politics than content.In the 1960’s the Japanese-Soviet political relationship deteriorated because of the new Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan (1960), the restart of nuclear tests by the USSR, the Northern Territories dispute, the break up of the relationships between the Japanese and Soviet communist parties concerned with the Partial Test Ban Treaty and so on. However Soviet Russia kept sending high caliber representatives to Japan in similar numbers to before. Some of the Japanese organizations involved dropped out of the exchanges, while others joined. This happened due to changing public feeling towards the USSR, shifts in political relations, and changing relations between the organizations and respective governments. It was in this atmosphere that the Soviet government counted on ballet to maintain diplomatic ties with Japan. The Kirov Ballet’s Japan tour (1961), and the joint concerts of the Tchaikovsky Memorial Tokyo Ballet School with Soviet famous dancers (1961 and 1963) helped to set the notion that Russia led the world in ballet. The Soviet government was convinced of the effectiveness of the ballet in demonstrating the strength of Soviet culture without fear of rivalry from other countries, and expanded the exchanges within this field.

著者

⼩野 亮介

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2020, no.49, pp.26-51, 2020 (Released:2021-06-12)

参考文献数

122

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This paper focuses on the 1918–1921 Japanese military mission to Central Asia, stationed in Urumchi, Ili (Gulja), Tarbagatay and Kashgar. Japanese General Staffs dispatched several officers to Xinjiang to support the Siberia Intervention. This paper reviews the mission’s activities and concerns on intelligence, economic interests and propaganda, especially those of the so-called ‘Japanese consul in Gulja’, Captain Nagamine.The Japanese mission had a keen interest in the developments of the Russian Civil War in the Semirech’e and Semipalatinsk Oblasts. In Ili, Nagamine built relationships with the White Russian consul, leaders of nomads and others. Japanese officers reported activities of White Russian Cossacks in detail. Meanwhile, the Governor Yang Zengxin, was suspicious about possible conspiracies among members of the Japanese mission, Russian consuls and the Cossacks. Yang reported to Beijing that Japanese officers had attempted to bring the Japanese army to Xinjiang on the pretext of a joint defence and to interfere in Ili by letting the Cossacks advance into Bolshevik’s Vernyi, which would pass through Xinjiang’s territory. In addition, a report from Kashgar hinted that the Japanese army supported the anti-Soviet guerrilla Basmachis in the Fergana Valley. In early 1920, the Cossacks were defeated by the Red Army and fled to Xinjiang. Nagamine witnessed the disarmament of Commander Annenkov, with whom the Japanese in Urumchi seemed to have maintained a relationship even after Nagamine’s departure from Ili.The Japanese mission also attempted to promote economic interests in Xinjiang. According to Etherton, the British consul-general in Kashgar, Japanese products flowed into Xinjiang in 1919, and Japan was considered a possible rival of Britain over the Xinjiang market. The Japanese mission tried to open a consulate in Xinjiang. In Urumchi, the Japanese entered into talks with ‘Russian’ merchants—who were in fact Muslim Turks—where they discussed Japanese naturalisation and Japanese protection. However, the talks failed. Despite his suspicion, Yang also relied on the Japanese for economic development. He consulted Major Narita in Urumchi about a large loan to construct a light railway and drill for oil. However, this offer was cancelled by order of Beijing. The Japanese General Staffs and Ministry of Foreign Affairs coldly refused Narita’s proposal.Moreover, the Japanese mission engaged in propaganda towards Muslim Turks for some obscure agenda related to Pan-Asianism, Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism. According to Etherton, the Japanese avoided any direct support or propaganda towards the Turks. Later, Nagamine stirred up accusations that Britain would occupy southern Xinjiang. He also had a relationship with Tatar Pan-Turkist, an ex-officer of the military organisation ‘Harbi Shura’. Kaneko and Otaki, stationed in Urumchi, frequently visited Ottoman activist Ahmet Kemal İlkul in jail, who had been sent to Xinjiang from Constantinople in 1914 and engaged in educational and Pan-Turkic activities. Thus, it was rather natural for the Japanese to pay attention to İlkul.Although not successful or long-lasting, the activities of the Japanese military mission to Xinjiang illustrate Japan’s interests in post-1917 Central Asia. Military intelligence about the Cossacks was their main object, but at the same time, they developed economic and propaganda interests that targeted Central Asian Turks, including Tatars. Certainly, such activities raised concerns with Yang and Etherton. In short, the Japanese mission to Xinjiang was one of the examples in which Japan tried to carve out a role in the Great Game of the early 20th century.