著者

加藤 久子

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2007, no.36, pp.61-71, 2007 (Released:2010-05-31)

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Many studies have focused on the autonomous functions of the Catholic Church under the communist regime in Poland in comparison to other countries in former Eastern Europe. The autonomy of the church is sometimes confounded with the resistance or struggle against the communist party, although the church did not necessarily attempt to fight against the party with concerted effort. Obviously, the church is not a monolithic organization; it has to distinguish the general believers that account for most of the Polish from the leaders of the church. This paper examines how believers became involved with “the struggle, ” referring to the concept of the “collective mentality” proposed by George Lefebvre. He explained that some affairs were composed by the people, who gathered even accidentally, but because of their “collective mentality” they are capable to change the character of the activities into social and political affairs without conscious awareness.I will look, for instance, into an affair that occurred during the establishment of a parish church in an industrial estate around the Lenin Steelworks. I analyze what “collective mentality” was underlying, and how had been changed among people. For 12 years, people in this estate had moderately appealed to the party and to the administration to permit them to have their own church for practical reasons i.e. it was inconvenient to go to other churches as they were too far away, and they did not want to participate in a Mass in the snow and rain outdoors. Meanwhile they had come to clearly distinguish between the party and themselves.Generally, the affair has been recorded as a violent confrontation between the party and the church for freedom of faith. However, the believers that joined in the battle on the street said that at the beginning they only wanted to defend and keep their own cross, which they had built as a symbol of their faith. They changed their attitude gradually because of escalation of violence, and the reaction of the authorities; consequently, many of them began to agitate for freedom of faith and other political ideals. In the process of escalation, however, we can observe some accidental factors, for example misunderstandings, miscommunications and so on. After the incident, clergymen suggested that the battle had been a political fight from the beginning and the believers were motivated by political and social reasons.This case demonstrates how Catholics participated in and were involved in the political field. There were some disconnects between the clergymen and the believers; both had their own stories and values. However, we can say that people shared a “collective mentality” through their relationship with others; that is true not only for the communist party, but also for the leaders of the church. And now the shared “collective mentality” is changing in relation with the others: the different generations, some foreign journalists and us-researchers of history.

著者

酒井 明司

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2007, no.36, pp.84-97, 2007 (Released:2010-05-31)

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We can find easily dozens of media and academic articles over the past 1-2 years that foretell and warn of Russia's aggressive foreign policies to her neighbours by means of her energy-exporting power in oil and gas. Many of them are the products of the gas dispute between Russia and Ukraine in the early 2006, which also reminds some authors of Russia's oil cut-off of the Baltic countries in the early 90's. In their arguments they seem to share a common understanding that Russia has firm intentions and aims in her foreign policies—to decelerate, if not to exclude fully, democratization of her FSU neighbours and to extract maximum diplomatic concessions from them and the EU members, concluding that her oil and gas resources are political instruments these purposes.After having a look at each oil/gas pipeline project of Russia, however, we feel this conclusion may not match reality. In this article the current main oil and gas pipeline projects of Russia (to Europe—BTS, Burgas-Alexandropoulis, Nord Stream, and South Stream; and to Asian countries—East Siberia-Pacific Ocean (VSTO) and Altaj) are briefly reviewed, and it is hard to see her aggressive diplomatic intentions in them. The main motive of new pipeline construction by Russia to Europe is to bypass as many transit countries as possible or to avoid transportation bottlenecks. They are of a commercial character rather than a political one, though the current transit countries which may lose their position by newly routed pipelines of Russia fear the theoretical worst that they will be under a full energy supply control by Russia. The construction plans of eastbound pipelines to Asian countries and the Pacific Ocean have a primary task to develop the areas of East Siberia and the Far East of Russia, accompanied by again commercial tactics in avoiding transit countries and a single destination route of the energy export.We have to pay more attention to the fact that Russia's energy export policy is hardly reliable in the world energy market, not because of her politicized aggressive stance to consumers but because it only plays a passive role against what the world market expects to one of the main oil and gas exporters. Though Russia reacts to given conditions like transit countries, she does not seem yet to involve herself into market coordination and adjustment of demand/supply balances in cooperation with other producers and consumers.

著者

笹岡 伸矢

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2007, no.36, pp.98-109, 2007 (Released:2010-05-31)

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Since the 1993 State Duma elections, there had been no ruling party in Russia. Instead many parties, including the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, the “Yabloko, ” liberals, nationalists, and “parties of power, ” had shared seats in the State Duma. But one of the so-called parties of power, United Russia, won an outright victory in the December 2003 elections. Some existing studies attribute the cause of this party's success to the economic performance of President Vladimir Putin's administration. I think we need to examine the accuracy of this view.To this end, in this article, I use statistical methods and analyze cross-regional variations in election results. It would appear that variations in voting patterns of the Russian electorate are clearly manifested by statistical analysis of the relationship between some economic indicators at the regional level and electoral results at the district level. In this article I use multiple regressions. These time dependent variables consist of PR vote shares of the parties of power at the district level in 1999 and 2003, and independent variables consist of inflation, unemployment and growth rates in each region. But there is a problem with the method of analysis. These regressions concern relationships between 89 regions, federal subjects, and 225 electoral districts. In sum, regions and districts can be conceptualized as a hierarchical structure, with districts nested within regions. To solve the problem, I use multilevel modeling, which allows effective study of the relationships between variables observed at different levels in the hierarchical structure.Judging from the results, the analysis, unlike those of previous studies, demonstrates that in 1999 Russian voters evaluated an anti-inflation policy by their government, but in 2003 they expected a future unemployment policy as well as evaluated a promotion of economic growth. These results may oblige reconsideration of the previous studies.

著者

長谷 直哉

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2007, no.36, pp.122-132, 2007 (Released:2010-05-31)

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The birth of “A Just Russia” was a significant event in national and regional elections of 2007. It was taken as a milestone to bring a change to Russian political party system that predominance of “United Russia” continued on. Some researches discussed the possibility of the two-party system that the left faction confronted the right-center, and the other expressed deep concern over the danger that political party system in itself would be strictly operated by administrative power.In recent years, the camp that takes politico-sociological approaches appeared. For example, the group of Richard Rose does not overvalue a temporary change in support variation for Russian political regime. They never concentrate their interests on administration elite's behaviors only. Its analysis clarifies how Russians recognize the political regime. This perspective helps to deepen understandings what kind of role political party play to be expected. In Russia, preference of voters has been quite floating. The voters have been unlikely to ballot on cleavages and positive party support. Does the appearance of new left-center party cause a change for Russian political party system? Russian government began to build ruling party system in rapid political changes. The Presidential office took the leadership to organize“A Just Russia”. However, it is not definite if the interferences in the parties consolidate Russian political party system or not. Because the power of ruling parties deeply depends on the authority of the Federal President, and Russian voter's preference also is based on retrospective voting for President's achievement.In this article, I will analyze “A Just Russia” which attracted keen attention in the result of 2007 elections. This article primarily aims to examine why “A Just Russia” should have been formed, moreover, I presume that the question is likely to be a good scope finding a particularity of Russian political party system. “A Just Russia” is the successor of “Party of Life” under Sergei Mironov; the chairman of the Federal Council. The new party formation was not irrelevant to the support for “Rodina” declining and the reforms of Russian federalism. Although preference of Russian voters shifted into left position since the latter half of 2004, this change in voting behavior was the outcome of retrospective voting against social benefits reform beginning from June 2004.To clarify these, I mainly analyze on the process of the new left-center party formation and the result of regional parliamentary elections performed since the forth election of State Duma.

著者

平手 賢治

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2007, no.36, pp.133-145, 2007 (Released:2010-05-31)

参考文献数

23

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The aim of this article is to clarify the traditional natural law Theory and the systemic Ethics on the “theology of the body” of Karol Józef Wojtyla (John Paul II) .First, after being based on the time situation of rupture of solidarity by the hometown loss (existence loss) in Central Europe, which first had big influence on the ideological background of Wojtyla, the Thomistic Personalism which is the ideological basis of Wojtyla is expressed. Then, I point out that Persona is relational subsistence and, so, the essence of Persona has an other-directedness.Second, if a human being given Persona is created as “an image of God”, ontological structure of the individual of body-soul one has hylomorphic structure, and it will be shown clearly that this individual's ontological structure is a dynamic state which is called the union (unio) to the One based on the order of existence.Third, the outline of the natural law theory based on the ecstatic metaphysics is described. As long as God is imaged in itself, since existence in itself is brought by the ecstatic creation of the highest existence (God), it is oriented to the others so that it may be transcended. That is, because the good is by nature self-diffusive and the diffusive self must be given to the others, creatures are interiorly propelled to communicating that good. (Bonum est diffusivum sui [Pseudo-Dionysius] ) . In the basis of this view, what is called “a law of ecstasy” (Wojtyla) is worked. This law is consists of firm belief that those who love follow and come out of self, in order to find out the existence completed more in the others. Given this metaphysics of bodily ecstasy, the natural law is our participation in the pattern of ecstasy that governs the universe, and created nature's sharing in the ecstatic being of its Creator.Fourth, from the Thomistic viewpoint, after examining critically the body-soul dualism of Descartes=Hobbes, just the loss of God and the idol-worshipizing of reason which come from the body-soul dualism show clearly that they are the nature of violence of liberalism.At last, I discuss the critique of liberalism, that is, the “culture of death” which is described in John Paul II's encyclical “Evangelium Vitae” I point out that just a natural law which takes a Christological form establishes the “culture of life”, and just the politics which accepts the others is just the affirmation of the social “solidarity” symbolized by the blood (of Christ) which flowed out of the body. And a part of the Christoform constitutionalism (relation between Privilege and Democracy) is clarified.

著者

封 安全

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2007, no.36, pp.146-158, 2007 (Released:2010-05-31)

参考文献数

11

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Recent years, Chinese-Russian border trade develops rapidly. This trade is a part of the Chinese-Russian economic and trade cooperation, and it plays a major role in the development of the borderland region of the two countries. There is a general understanding of the meaning of “border trade”, but it still has not an exact definition. The information materials concerning this trade have not been analyzed consistently.In this paper the author clarifies the definition of border trade and its concrete systems, Mutual trade (in Chinese: hu shi mao yi), Small amount trade (in Chinese: bian jing xiao e mao yi), consignment trade and shuttle trade, using the result of interviews and data gathering in the China-Russian borderland region, carried out by the author in the period from July to September 2007. It also examines more closely the dynamics of the borderline trade policy of the two countries. Because the Heilongjiang province accounts for more than 60 percent of all Chinese-Russian borderline trade, the paper analyzes the statistical materials of this province and examines main causes for changes in volumes of border trade. It is demonstrated that the border trade has been largely influenced by the policy of the two states and by the. recent economic booms in two countries.

著者

森岡 真史

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2007, no.36, pp.159-172, 2007 (Released:2010-05-31)

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Just after the February Revolution in 1917 Boris Brutzkus actively participated into the public debate over the agrarian reform. This paper shows how he conceived the task of reform under the newborn democratic government. Although his view on this problem is less known than his famous lecture on Marxist socialist economy in 1920, it deserves attention for its unique perspective placing the peasant farming as a vital element in capitalistic development of the Russian economy. His focus of criticism in this period was Russian Populists (Narodniki) who were at that time in the midst of popularity. He strongly warned that their agitation about the overall land distribution without compensation and redemption would not only lead sweeping economic catastrophe but also seriously endanger the fate of democracy.While Populists see the root of agrarian crisis in the land shortage among peasants, Brutzkus points out that the essence of the land shortage was accumulation of agrarian overpopulation caused by the extremely sluggish pace of Russian economic growth. Because of this, Russian industry could neither absorb the increase of rural population nor provide domestic market for agricultural products. In addition, on the side of villages the communal ownership of land held back the population flow into cities. Thus the solution of agrarian crisis needs also the development of industrial production. In his opinion such a development is possible only under capitalism. Therefore the land reform must be compatible with the general framework of capitalist economy. In this connection Brutzkus emphasizes the importance to preserve Stolypin's legislations with necessary democratic revisions. Referring to the experiences of Western countries, he advocates that the peasant's private ownership of land with the system of well-organized mortgage credit can promote intensification of peasant farming and flow of rural surplus population into cities. Since land is now one of precious assets of people, every peasant who receives land must bear responsibility to the national economy for its adequate utilization through the payment of rent corresponding to the prices of expropriated land. From these considerations Brutzkus urges intellectuals to tell people honestly that land cannot be distributed freely. He believes that the success of land reform depends on peasant's individual initiative and energy and for this end the immense energy of excited people must be transformed into creative force for economic construction.Brutzkus' standpoint was similar with those of Neo-populists (Neonarodniki) in its recognition of peasant farming's vitality and deep concern on the fate of national economy. However, Neo-populists still shared with traditional Populists negative attitude toward capitalism and the private land ownership. Most of Russian liberals were also sympathetic to the socialization of land in a moderate form. These circumstances placed Brutzkus in a quite isolated position. The Populist program was adopted by Bolsheviks and put into execution by communal peasants. In this point the October Revolution was the Populist agrarian revolution. Along with his critique of Marxist socialism, Brutzkus' penetrating criticism against Populism has great historical significance in its deep insight and civil bravery.

著者

金野 雄五

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2006, no.35, pp.72-83, 2006 (Released:2010-05-31)

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The aim of this paper is to examine the current status and future prospects of the regional economic integration among CIS countries.Firstly, the institutional framework of FTA and customs union among CIS countries is reviewed. Several plurilateral agreements towards establishing FTA and customs union were signed by CIS countries, but almost all of them have not been realized. On the other hand, a web of bilateral free trade agreements among CIS members is in effect. These agreements stipulate duty-free trade regime in all goods, while allow for some exemptions. Currently, such exceptional goods are very few in trade among 5 members of EvrAsES (Eurasian Economic Community) excluding Uzbekistan (i.e. Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan), though some NTB (nontariff barriers) remain. Concerning customs union, Russia and Belarus seemed to have succeeded in unifying tariff rates against the third countries in the latter half of 1990's, but some retreats are observed recently.Secondly, we examined two kinds of indices which represent the characteristics of intra-bloc trade. One is TII (Trade Intensity Index) and the other is HDLR (Horizontal Division of Labor Rate) Index. The results are following. Very high TII were observed with intra-CIS trade in 1996 and 2005, but the indices decreased during the period. In contrast, TII with EU and China were not so high, but increased. HDLR indices show the same trends. In many cases, the HDLR indices were higher in intra-CIS trade than in trade with non-CIS countries, but both of the indices decreased in the past decade. These trends of TII and HDLR seem to indicate the efforts toward CIS economic integration have had little effects on the flow of intra-CIS trade.Thirdly, we foresee the future prospects of CIS economic integration in relation to the process of entering WTO (World Trade Organization) . In that process, CIS countries are required to abolish all of the existing NTB, which will also contribute to the progress of FTA in the region. As for a customs union, the influence will be adverse. To sum up, it may be safe to foresee that the CIS economic integration will remain at the stage of FTA for several years in future.

著者

坪井 宏平

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2006, no.35, pp.84-94, 2006 (Released:2010-05-31)

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The Czech Green Party was founded in 1990, but gradually marginalized and forgotten by both the voters and the media. A critical moment appeared when leading activists of environmental movements and former dissidents joined the party after 2002. In the 2006 election the Greens succeeded in getting 6.29 percent of the vote and six seats in the parliament. Clearly, this article aims to examine the party organization, its program and the internal relations of the Czech Greens.The Czech Greens share common features of the New Politics party: electorate profiles and framework party. One feature, however, participatory party organization, is not fully applied to the party. With respect to the program, the Czech Greens have a distinct characteristic. While programmatic orientation of the New Politics is related to some left-wing policies, the program of the Czech Greens shows liberal orientation.Since the party congress 2003 the presidium was dominated by leading activists of environmental movements. Because of their adamant way, sources of discontent accumulated between the party memberships, particularly former dissidents. In the congress 2005 the presidium was replaced by new chairman Martin Bursik and left the party. Under the new administration, the Czech Greens turned toward liberal tendency and aimed at entering government with Civic Democratic Party. Opposing to this course, former dissident Petr Uhl asserted that the Greens should be opposi-tion. Uhl played a fundamentalistic role in contrast with realistic position represented by Bursik.It is impossible to forecast whether the Czech Greens would be maintained in the Czech party system. The Greens, however, could have the advantage of a member of the European Greens.

著者

本田 登

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2006, no.35, pp.95-107, 2006 (Released:2010-05-31)

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The purpose of this paper is to interpret Leonid Lipavskii's “A Dialogue Poem, ” considering his view of the world.Leonid Lipavskii (1904-1941) is a soviet philosopher, who is one of the members of the group “Chinari”, which existed in 1920s' in Leningrad.The form of “A Dialogue Poem” is, as the title says, dialogical. In this poem “choir” insists that people, who have alternation of generations, must live in a daily life. But “One person” denies not only its opinion but also his own corporeity.From Lipavskii's view the world is waving liquid. If a frequency of one wave is different from that of others, then the wave is comprehended as an existence. The emotion of horror appears when the frequency of one's wave is going to synchronize with that of the world, which means a deprivation of an individual.In earlier studies it was thought that Lipavskii considered the emotion of horror as something negative and even disgusting. But in fact Lipavskii himself desires the emotion. One of the reasons is that he thinks a deprivation of an individual as “Nirvana” in Buddhism. The other is that he wants to have a view of the world itself. When one tries to know the true aspect of the world, he must feel horror. For Lipavskii the emotion of horror pays his curiosity.We can read his above-mentioned thought not only in his philosophical texts but also in the poem “A Dialogue Poem.”

著者

ドゥーダ ヘンリク

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2006, no.35, pp.108-119, 2006 (Released:2010-05-31)

参考文献数

36

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The present paper only deals with the Slavic languages that are in use in present-day Poland. There is no arguing that the populations living in the north-east part of Poland (the region of Bialystok) are Belarusians and so they speak the Belarusian language, or that south of this region, along the Polish-Belarusian and Polish-Ukrainian borderline there are villages where people speak (or have been speaking not long before) Ukrainian dialects. South-east of Poland (The Bieszczady Mountains) had been inhabited by the Lemkos until 1949, when they were deported westwards. Linguists classify their speech as belonging to Ukrainian dialects. The Lemkos are divided in their opinion on that matter. Some say they feel to be Ukrainians, and they consider their language a Ukrainian dialect. Others are not ready to recognize their Ukrainian identity, and claim their language has an independent status. Both the Belarusians, Ukrainians and the Lemkos (as well as a small number of non-Slavic Lithuanians in the very north of Poland) live within the Polish language environment, which makes them bilingual.In the remaining part of the country there lives a population speaking a variety of dialects within the Polish language. It is for at least a century that the contentions about the language status of Kashubian has been going on. Kashubian is the speech of the ethnic groups living south of Gdansk. They inhabit the area of about 6 thousand square kilometers. The latest reports show that the Kashubian population equals about 300 thousand. Traditionally, in Poland the speech of the Kashubians is regarded as a dialect of Polish. Various researchers from beyond Poland, and some younger Polish linguists refer to it as the Kashubian language. Lately, a lot has also been said on the growing language separatism between the Silesians.The borderline between what we are ready to name a language or a dialect is unclear, and it seems one has to agree with H. Popowska-Taborska (1998: 87) in saying that the judgement depends on the criteria one prefers. Dixon's (1988: 7) distinction between the political and the linguistic understanding of what is a language, and his proposal to consider those varieties of language—in the linguistic sense of the term—which are mutually comprehendible to be dialects is impressive as regards its simplicity. Unfortunately, in practice it leaves a number of problems unresolved. This paper analyses the linguistic status of the Slavic languages and dialects used within the territory of present-day Poland, drawing upon both linguistic and sociological data.

著者

ヴァシリューク スヴェトラーナ

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2006, no.35, pp.120-135, 2006 (Released:2010-05-31)

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This paper addresses the following questions. What is the essence of “energy politics” in the relations between the Soviet Union and Japan in the 1970s? How did political actors influence the two countries' energy policies? What factors underlined economic complementarity in Japan-Soviet relations during the same period? Finally, what was the significance of bilateral energy cooperation on the overall structure of their relations during this period?This paper analyzes major political trends as well as energy institutional establishments in the two countries during the 1970s, which was marked by the two countries' economic rapprochement and first initiatives for energy collaboration. It underlines the complementarity as well as the linkage between domestic and foreign policies in Japan and the Soviet Union based on case studies of major joint energy-development projects, such as Sakhalin Oil and Gas Development Project as well as the Tyumen Oil Project and Yakutiya Gas Project.Finally, focusing on the late 1970s, the paper considers the two countries' domestic political factors and international developments leading to the downturn in Japanese-Soviet trade relations that had a detrimental effect on bilateral energy cooperation during the same period and beyond. The paper also highlights the impact of the Kuril territorial dispute on the two countries' economic relations, which became the basis of the Japanese policy of “the inseparability of politics and economics” (seikeifukabun) adopted toward the USSR throughout the 1980s. In conclusion, the dynamics of bilateral energy politics and their impact on the overall Japanese-Soviet relations are analyzed.

著者

田口 雅弘

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2006, no.35, pp.136-138, 2006 (Released:2010-05-31)

被引用文献数

1

著者

大中 真

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2005, no.34, pp.168-170, 2005 (Released:2010-05-31)

著者

小山 洋司

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2005, no.34, pp.171-173, 2005 (Released:2010-05-31)

著者

杉本 侃

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2006, no.35, pp.13-23, 2006 (Released:2010-05-31)

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Energy resources such as oil and gas might work as one of diplomatic means and a pipeline which transports oil and gas, as well. There are some such examples in and around the Former Soviet Union in these days as pointed out below.Ukraine shut off a gas-valve, Belarus turned off the tap of the oil pipeline, Azer-baijan stopped oil flow from Baku to Novorossisk, Georgia seems to have decided to depend on Azerbaijan gas instead of Russian. Russia is constructing and planning to lay pipelines without passing a third country, some of oil and gas producing countries in the Caspian region are trying to export their products bypassing Russia and some European states support such an action, some countries are trying to invite transit pipeline construction within their territory. Russia will differentiate gas export prices depending on importers' loyalty to Russia.The above-mentioned are one of evidences for the strategic features of a pipeline, but nonetheless attention must be paid to the following two aspects.1) Profit which a long-term reliable relation brings outweighs a short-lived advantage, gained contrary to principle of reciprocity.2) Use of pipeline for a political purpose might be a peculiar phenomenon in a specific region for specific time duration as almost all cases studied here concern the Former Soviet Union.Conclusion: A pipeline might affect relationships between nations and vice versa. We, men of reason, should live basing on the assumption that a relation among producers, a relation among consumers and a relation between a producer and a consumer must be supplementary and cooperative, not exclusive.

著者

月村 太郎

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2006, no.35, pp.24-33, 2006 (Released:2010-05-31)

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Which countries were considered as comprising “Eastern Europe?” Generally speaking, Poland, East Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria and Albania are regarded as having belonged to Eastern Europe and, without a doubt, the concept of Eastern Europe as one region was grasped most easily in the era of the Cold War. However, even this conclusion is hasty. Yugoslavia never joined the Warsaw Pact and it was only a semi-member of COMECON, while Albania withdrew from the former in 1968 and from the latter in 1962. Even those people who think that “Eastern Europe” really did exist as an entire region are faced with the current dissolution of Eastern Europe because of the EU's eastward expansion.Furthermore, the case of Kosovo illustrates the dissolution of Eastern Europe as one region. Kosovo was an autonomous province of Serbia, but because of human rights violations against the majority Albanian population of Kosovo by the Milosevic regime, from March to June 1999, NATO undertook air strikes not only in Kosovo, but also in Serbia proper. This was a clear example of infringement of Serbia's state sovereignty, both formally and substantively. After the fall of Milosevic, state-building in Kosovo is being undertaken by neither Serbia nor Eastern Europe, but by the international community. On 2 February, Martti Ahtisaari, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General of the United Nations for the future status process of Kosovo, announced his Draft Comprehensive Proposal on the Kosovo Status Settlement. According to the draft, Kosovo can, in practice, obtain independence. Kosovo will be an independent state, although Serbia strongly opposes this. Neither Albanians, Serbs, people in neighboring countries, or even the international community imagine “Eastern Europe” as one region.Nowadays, the EU member states in Eastern Europe are only interested in strengthening their political and economic relations within the EU and in building special relations with their eastern neighbors Russia and Ukraine. The non-EU member states of the region only desire EU membership. Moreover, the term “Eastern Europe” is closely connected with the memory of domination by the USSR. EU enlargement and Soviet connotations of “Eastern Europe, ” which cannot be detached from the term, ensure that Eastern Europe will no longer remain as a distinct region in the future.

著者

青木 國彦

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2006, no.35, pp.34-45, 2006 (Released:2011-01-31)

参考文献数

47

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This paper criticizes Hirschman's interpretation of “the events of the autumn of 1989” that is representative of the popular interpretation. According to the popular interpretation, the process started just by change of the Hungarian west border in May, 1989. Hirschman (1995) has written the same. Using only this framework he studied why and how the Exodus and the reform movement tied up in East Germany in the autumn of 1989. He did not recognize very important historical facts and showed some unsuitable judgments.The central point of the events of the autumn of 1989 in East Germany is the opening of the Berlin Wall, i.e., liberalization of emigration and foreign travel. It was the result of the “Ausreise” (this word means departure, but as an official East German word it refers to emigration) movement that had existed since 1975 and was growing quickly. The most important demands for reform by people who decided to stay in the country in the autumn of 1989 were also liberalization of foreign travel and election. Therefore, the departure movement and the reform movement had different interests as well as a common interest. The history and roles of the departure movement since 1975, which is the most important historical fact, is missing in Hirschman (1995) and in the popular interpretation.The departure movement was not simply an escape movement, but a very strong and aggressive dissident one, because it demanded from the government acceptance of the human right to leave the country, which could not exist without ban on free departure and free foreign travel (isolation of the East German people) . The victory of the movement (the wall opening) brought about a chain collapse of East European communist systems. That suggests the movement was one of the three major movements from the bottom which brought about the system collapse. The others were Polish solidarity and the independence movement in the Baltic States.Hirschman also made other misjudgments. He argued that there were no “voices” in East Germany and that the tie-up of the departure movement and reform groups, such as “new forum” (derived from groups for peace, human rights and environment) arose for the first time in the autumn of 1989, and that Christa Wolff and other in traparty artistic people were the main forces for “voice.” In addition, because he considered the events of the autumn of 1989 separately from the historical context, the events were drawn only as accidental outbreaks.If the events of the autumn of 1989 had been considered in Hirschman's framework, the concept of “voice in pursuit of exit” could have been utilized. Footnote 5 of Hirschman (1995) mentioned the “voice in pursuit of exit” which Scott (1986) discovered as one of the forms of the emancipation of Cuban slaves. Hirschman called it “a mixed, exit-cum-voice strategy.” He should have developed this concept for study in the East German case if he wanted to persist in his model of voice-exit.

著者

岡田 美保

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2006, no.35, pp.60-71, 2006 (Released:2010-05-31)

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How the political leaders can commit themselves over the promises to abolish a specific kind of armament? By which means can they force the domestic actors or stakeholders to change their behavior?The international rules to control arms increasingly require qualified administrative management, and implementation of these rules significantly affect the interests of the domestic organizations or groups such as the military, the arms producers or the local governments and residents. So, compliance can be discussed as a matter of attaining cooperation among these domestic actors.This article examines the key sources of variation in the level of compliance by tracing the political process of the chemical weapons destruction in Russia. The recent three leaders (Mikhail Gorbachev, Boris El'tsin and Vladimir Putin) worked with different external enthusiasm and domestic political energy on the problem. This paper concludes that the most significant and direct source was the deliberate and effective handling by the leader, though the institutional changes also had limited impact on the situation.Compliance was poor, when a large majority of political energy went into bargaining with the local governments over the compensation for accepting the construction of destruction facilities, and when external commitment lacked political decisiveness to proceed against domestic resistance. Compliance was achieved, though with delay, when strong political leadership was exercised over budget allocation and over establishment of effective mechanisms of control over the local governments and the destruction troops. The case deserves serious attention, because it illustrates us that the institutional changes must be followed by strong and effective political leadership.

著者

湯浅 剛

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2005, no.34, pp.37-47, 2005 (Released:2010-05-31)

被引用文献数

1

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Changing framework or institution for people's identification after the collapse of the Soviet Union is one of main issues to understand political order in contemporary Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) . In this context, constructing suitable collective identity is important project for statebuilding process in this region. As long as surveying institutionalization of citizenship in each Central Asian countries, it consisted with relatively wide tolerance for minorities including Russian citizens or natives. On the other hand, through the institutionalization of border control and visa regime, discrimination among citizenships is getting strict. In Central Asia, there is no appropriate conception to construct institutions, in which combinations of several multi-level identities, such as national, state and regional, harmonize interactively. Region-wide level identities in Central Asia have less affected than state-level ones because of their lack of measures to develop their unity. Although several security frameworks (the former Central Asian Cooperation Organization [CACO], Eurasia Economic Community [EurAsES], Shanghai Cooperation Organization, etc.) are reconstructed with their geographical enlargement, they are too vulnerable to establish a regional security identity. Emerging of the cascading framework of EurAsES-ODKB (Collective Security Treaty Organization) would not be a revival of Soviet identity. It covers only eastern side of Caspian Sea as the area of influence, while GUAM countries ignoring the area for the shifting of their interest toward Baltic Sea region. The cascading framework also needs physical and moral support from China inevitably.