著者

木村 汎

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.43, pp.156-159, 2014 (Released:2016-09-09)

著者

光吉 淑江

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2005, no.34, pp.133-145, 2005 (Released:2010-05-31)

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This article examines how Soviet maternalist policies were implemented in Western Ukraine, a newly acquired Soviet territory in the wake of the Second World War. While the 1944 Soviet Family Code, especially the campaign for “Mothers with Many Children, ” has often been seen as the culmination of the Stalinist pronatalist policies-virtually encouraging extramarital affairs in order to produce children-, its meaning, perception, and methods of implementation were not uniform even in the authoritarian Soviet society. A close examination of the archival documents on the newly created women's departments in the Western Ukrainian party committees reveals that the “Mothers with Many Children” campaign and other state maternal supports served to justify otherwise extremely unpopular Soviet policies in the region. The essentialized gender role of “mother” was a rare measure of Sovietization that did not require special skills, training, or political education, and therefore would not have caused much resistance, bloodshed, or even hesitation. The Western Ukrainian women often quickly learnt how to exercise their new rights in defence of their lives in order to survive the difficult postwar material situation, thus becoming important, if not active, agents in the establishment of the Soviet regime in the region.

著者

小崎 晃義

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2002, no.31, pp.107-122, 2002 (Released:2010-05-31)

参考文献数

20

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It is well acknowledged that Russian Federation's radical economic transition policy, the so-called ‘shock therapy’, caused deep economic depression. In the early 1990's Russia suffered a catastrophic decline in GDP, industrial production, and living standards, which was accompanied by an acute expansion of income disparity and mass involuntary unemployment.The shock therapy, however, caused a greater damage in the social aspects of Russian people. The magnitude of this shock is graver than the phrase ‘painful change’ suggests, which was an expression often used by Russian political leaders. All aspects of society have been affected, including the health care and condition of the population. Above all, the most significant consequence is the rapid decline in number of population and life expectancy, caused by sharp rise of mortality during the early 1990's.What is the main reason for the significant number of premature deaths in Russia for this period? It is generally believed that there are three possible hypotheses: decline in living standard, degeneration of health care system and destruction of the environment. All these hypotheses seem to be plausible. However, it is also clear that there is some evidence to disprove each one of them.This article tries to find the most plausible cause to explain the rapid rise of mortality in Russia during the early 1990's and to reveal the social background of this phenomenon.Many factors appear to be operating simultaneously, including economic and social instability, high rates of tobacco and alcohol consumption, depression, and deterioration of the health care system. Nevertheless, ‘adaptation syndrome’ from the physical and psychological stresses of shock therapy is the most important cause.

著者

久保 慶一

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2002, no.31, pp.73-90, 2002 (Released:2010-05-31)

参考文献数

37

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In the Dayton Agreement, the engagement of the international community in Bosnia was originally supposed to last only for a year and to come to a close after the elections in 1996, turning over the responsibilities to the new governments. In reality, however, the international community has been continuing, or even intensifying its engagement after the general elections. Why has the international community continued its engagement? As an answer to this question, the present article points out that the elections and the establishment of new governments have not resulted in the autonomous political stability in Bosnia, but actually lead to the political instability. The present paper attempts to demonstrate it by examining the Bosnian case from two viewpoints: (1) stateness problem, and (2) problems with the institutionalization of ethnic power-sharing.The stateness problem occurs when “there are profound differences about the territorial boundaries of the political community's state and profound differences as to who has the right of citizenship in that state.” As Linz and Stepan pointed out, democracy is impossible until the stateness problem is resolved. In Bosnian case, the stateness problem occurred in 1991-1992 when Muslims and Croats wanted the independence of Bosnia, while Serbs opposed it and attempted to secede from Bosnia in order to join the Third Yugoslavia. Even though the Dayton Agreement achieved a compromise, it was far from the resolution of the stateness problem. The differences of the conceptions of the state persisted even after the Dayton Agreement, especially between Bosniaks and Serbs. This is one reason why the elections have not lead to the political stability in Bosnia, since the ethnic parties continued to be elected to the public offices, and they kept putting the stateness problem on the political agenda.Another reason why the elections have not lead to the political stability is related to the institutionalization of the ethnic power-sharing in Bosnia. In Bosnia, the political system based on the consociational model was introduced by the Dayton Agreement, acknowledging the three ethnic groups as “constituent nations” and introducing equal representation and mutual veto system of these nations. However, the introduction of a consociational type of ethnic power-sharing has not lead to the political stability in Bosnia, firstly because it has led to the ineffectiveness of the political system, and secondly because it has given centrifugal incentives to the politicians, inducing them to act as a representative of their respective ethnic group and to take a tough stance against representatives of other ethnic groups.These are two reasons why the elections have not lead to the autonomous political stability in Bosnia. This is why the international community has been continuing its engagement: it has been necessary to secure a minimum stability for Bosnia. In order for Bosnia to achieve the autonomous political stability, the two problems pointed out in the present article must be resolved. It remains to be seen whether - and how -the resolution of these two problems would be possible.

著者

亀山 郁夫

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2001, no.30, pp.40-54, 2001 (Released:2010-05-31)

参考文献数

29

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This paper aims to trace the descent of ‘enthusiasm’ in the twentieth century Russian cultural history as well as understand the Totalitarianism under the Stalinist authority and its consequences in the late twentieth century. In doing so, we started by categorizing the concept of ‘enthusiasm’ into the ‘earth-grounded type’ and the ‘authority-oriented type’.The mainstream symbolist movement in the early twentieth century Russian culture obtained an eschatological tendency under the influence of Sorov'yov's school. Later, Ivanov opened up a way to the Primitivist movement by recognizing the role of ‘symbol’ within the Dionysian integration. Such is an example of the ‘grounded’ type of enthusiasm.Nourishing on such enthusiasm, the Russian avant-garde art movement blossomed. After the Russian revolution, the Russian avant-garde art, through artist such as Mayakovsky and Meierhold, realised the enthusiasm in both directions. On the other hand, there were artists such as Eisenstein who attempted to integrate to the Stalinist authority by deploying an anthoropological imagination, even though tending towards the ‘earth-grounded’ enthusiasm.The era of the ‘Thaw’ was also the era in which the spirit of integration (sobornost') originated in the Russian Orthodox tradition flourished. But since Stalin's death the centripetal force of enthusiasm was lost. The process of anti-Stalinism failed to realise the regression towards world history, and caused the new era of closure called ‘the post-Utopean era’. The characteristic of ‘informal culture’ which existed between the ‘Thaw’ and the Breshnev era is understood as the movement attempting to overcome the Stalinist influence through intense sophistication of the concept of ‘distance’.Even though the Soviet socialist declined through the influence of high-tech revolution in the Western Europe, the recent Postmodernists devise Russian history with the concept of ‘emptiness (pustota) ’, identifying Russia as the state of simulation without reference. Such Postmodernists attempt to harmonize with the Totalitarianism, but at the same time seek for a way to overcome Stalinism as they skillfully attempt to secretly innovate the rigid dichotomous framework.

著者

松里 公孝

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧学会年報 (ISSN:21854645)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2000, no.29, pp.49-71, 2000 (Released:2010-10-27)

参考文献数

30

被引用文献数

1 1

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Kuchma's “cassette tape scandal” in 2000-2001 exemplified the patrimonial phenomena that has become prevalent in post-communist Ukrainian politics. However, this patrimonial tendency has not been combined with classic authoritarianism but machine politics (or ‘caciquismo’), in which election votes play a decisive role in intra-elite struggles for power. As a rule, caciquismo is based on independent meso-elites which function as mobilizers of votes and also as political brokers between localities and the center. Ukraine is not an exception, although in this country the meso-elites independence is masked by a constitutional unitarism and an appointment system of regional and ‘raion’ chief executives. Therefore, we need to pay attention to patrimony building at the regional level, which provides a social basis for strong regional electoral machines. I sampled four regions which contributed to Kuchma's victory in the 1999 presidential elections : Odesa, Transcarpathia, Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk. Remarkably, despite previously sympathizing with the opposition, the electorate in these regions changed their political inclinations in the few years leading up to the 1999 elections. Along with the common tendency of electoral machines being based on the regional patrimony, a contrast was found with the extent to which this machine/patrimony had been legalized. This is the problem of regional party building. The development of a regional party system is determined by two factors :(1) intra-elite competition and,(2) interactions between party system levels. Regarding the latter, if infra-regional issues are converted into national political issues in a region, we can say that the interactions between party system levels have been activated. In 1994-98, Odesa Region experienced harsh infra-elite competition between its governor and Odesa mayor, but even in 1998 this conflict remained infra-regional (Kyiv only intervened sporadically). Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk politics were forcibly nationalized in 1996 and after 1997 respectively, since the top leaders of these regions became rivals for Kyiv politicians (Donetsk governor Shcherban versus the then prime minister Lazarenko ; and the Dnipropetrovsk Soviet chair Lazarenko versus President Kuchma). Nevertheless, Kyiv could not divide these regions' elites. In Transcarpathia conflicts between the governor and the mayor of the regional capital Uzhhorod became nationalized in 1997-98 because the governor allied with the Medvedchuk faction of the Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (United), a typical legalized clan organization from Kyiv. In other words, only in Transcarpathia were the two conditions fully met and thus a formal party system was able to develop.

著者

上野 俊彦

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧学会年報 (ISSN:21854645)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2000, no.29, pp.1-11, 2000 (Released:2010-05-31)

参考文献数

52

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The author analyzes President Putin's career in the first chapter of this paper. The analysis shows that President Putin has two different backgrounds. One of them - that he was with the Soviet intelligence organ, KGB - is well known. The other is that he used to be part of the economic bureaucracy of St. Petersburg. These two disparate backgrounds are a sign ficant part of Putin's identity. Indeed, most of the executives in the President's office, as well as the Cabinet members andplenipotentiary representatives of federative regionsthat President Putin appointed, have careers similar to Putin's. This is a defining characteristic of the Putin administration.Furthermore, the author points out that one of the important features of Putin's political style is that he manipulates political, national and traditional symbols or images. One example is that at the time of the presidential election he emphasized his image of“a powerful leader”along the lines of Peter the Great, Alexander I, Stalin, and so on. Even after his inauguration as President this manipulation of symbols has continued. For example, he has enacted laws concerning the national flag, the national anthem and the national crest, which are legacies not only of the tradition of Imperial Russia but also of the Soviet Union. With such symbols, President Putin evokes nationalistic and patriotic enthusiasm among people and he has succeeded in mobilizing the support of the people.In the second chapter of the paper, President Putin's regional policy based on a revival of“a powerful state”is discussed. His regional policy is, in short, the strengthening of centralization or the vertical administrative system within the federal state. He demands that local legislation conform to the federal constitution and laws. Moreover, he has changed the procedures for forming the Upper House and has begun to weaken the authority of the Upper House. He has also tried to reduce the governors' authority. Moreover, plenipotentiary representatives of federative regionshave been sent out in order to strengthen central control over regions. President Putin is seeking to build a“strong Russia”through these regional policies.

著者

宮川 真一

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧学会年報 (ISSN:21854645)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1999, no.28, pp.92-99, 1999 (Released:2010-05-31)

参考文献数

67

著者

角田 安正

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧学会年報 (ISSN:21854645)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1998, no.27, pp.1-10, 1998 (Released:2010-05-31)

参考文献数

37

著者

阿部 軍治

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧学会年報 (ISSN:21854645)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1995, no.24, pp.103-110, 1995 (Released:2010-05-31)

参考文献数

9

著者

福住 誠

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧学会年報 (ISSN:21854645)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1994, no.23, pp.92-98, 1994 (Released:2010-05-31)

参考文献数

50

著者

鈴木 肇

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧学会年報 (ISSN:21854645)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1993, no.22, pp.60-67, 1993 (Released:2010-05-31)

参考文献数

14

著者

丹羽 春喜

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ソ連・東欧学会年報 (ISSN:03867226)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1989, no.18, pp.9-19, 1989 (Released:2010-05-31)

参考文献数

20

著者

前⽥ しほ

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.50, pp.21-41, 2021 (Released:2022-06-11)

参考文献数

47

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This paper discusses female allegorical statues, that is, Motherland and the Lamenting Mother, as Soviet monuments and memorials about the German-Soviet War of the Second World War. In general, we do not meet female citizens in public monuments because modern nations purge women from public spaces to private areas, that is, family spaces. Instead of individual women, they use images of allegorical women, for example, the Archaic goddess Nike/Victoria as a symbol of an imagined community and Marianne in the French Republic.In Soviet war monumental/memorial space, we meet such a symbolic gender structure: Red Army soldiers and allegorical females. In this case, we consider the Archaic goddess featured in Motherland and the Lamenting Mother statue. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, in the process of restructuring war memorial spaces, newborn nations have removed male statues, for example, Lenin, revolutionists, politicians, generals, academicians, artists, and Red Army soldiers, which commemorate great Soviet hegemony. In contrast, female allegory stays in public spaces even today because female unindividual statues are an empty medium that can introject any concept.It was found from the result of fieldwork in the former Soviet Union that Motherland, which has occupied a position as national symbol in the Russian Federation, has lost power to unite nation and people. In fact, the Motherland statue had not been built in Estonia, Lithuania, Azerbaijan, or Central Asia. Regarding Latvia, Moldova, Belarus, and Georgia, we meet small-size variants. On the other hand, Lamenting Mother statues, who mourn for the war dead, have been raised in the whole country, even today. Local communities find space to share the pain of loss of relations and friends, homes, property, and life, in memorials in the shape of the Lamenting Mother, who is similar to the Holy Mother.We are here concerned with the implications of social and cultural context of these two female allegories. In the first chapter, we focus on the period of Khrushchev. Stalin had oppressed all war memory and, after his death, people began to narrate personal experiences about war and build memorials for the dead in burial places. We cannot find a clear distinction in early female allegory statues. The 20th anniversary of the Victory, that is, the year 1965, brought a fundamental change in war memorial-commemoration spaces. In those days, Nike-type statues were raised as national symbols to unite the nation and people, such as The Motherland Calls at the top of Mamai Hill to commemorate the Battle of Stalingrad. In the second and third chapters, we illustrate distribution, location, size, shape of Motherland and Lamenting Mother statues in detail. Next, in the fourth chapter, we classify Lamenting Mother statues according to type of icons of the Holy Mother: Eleusa, Pieta, Our Lady of Sorrows, and Orans. We consider that the cult of the “Lamenting Mother” is based on the faith of the Holy Mother. Next, we surmise that early Christianity had united the faith of the Holy Mother with the cult of local great mothers in the course of Christian religion in Europe. Similarly, Islam assimilated local great mothers in Central Asia. It is possible that Soviet people, including Muslims, had a basis for accepting the Soviet secularized Holy Mother. And, finally, we examine threat factors inherent in the Lamenting Mother-type statue.

著者

中地 美枝

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.50, pp.1-20, 2021 (Released:2022-06-11)

参考文献数

34

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This article introduces to Japanese readers an analysis of the Soviet Union’s postwar pronatalist policy and its effects on gender and society as published in Mie Nakachi, Replacing the Dead: The Politics of Reproduction in the Postwar Soviet Union (Oxford University Press, 2021). In particular, it highlights the evolution of the 1944 Family Law’s formulation and implementation, explaining how the introduction of this policy eventually led to the world’s first legalization of abortion based on the recognition of women’s right to abortion in a country where no feminist movements were allowed.On July 8, 1944 the Soviet government promulgated the new family law. This was in response to the unprecedented scale of demographic crisis the Soviet Union faced after WWII: the loss of 27 million people and an extremely skewed sex imbalance. Millions of women had lost their past partners or future mates in the war. In order to recover from this crisis at an accelerated pace, N. S. Khrushchev, the leader in Ukraine during the war, drafted a pronatalist proposal and sent it to Moscow, where after multiple revisions it became the postwar family law.One of the most significant and questionable features of Khrushchev’s brainchild was the encouragement of the birth of out-of-wedlock children. In order to achieve this goal, the law encompassed several fundamental changes, such as making only registered marriage legal, denying out-of-wedlock children the right to be registered under their fathers’ names, and releasing fathers from legal and financial responsibilities for their out-of-wedlock children. In consequence, women’s standing in gender relations suffered. Moreover, equality between children born in marriage and those born out-of-wedlock, established after the 1917 Revolution, would disappear.Eleven years later, in 1955, the Soviet government re-legalized abortion. Does this mean that the pronatalist policy had ended? If so, did Soviet demography recover from the war, thanks to the postwar pronatalist policy of 1944? Or was this reform a part of the broader de-Stalinization process?This article discusses the policy’s effects on demography, gender relations, and family and argues that the most important context for the reversal of the Stalinist criminalization of abortion in 1936 was not the death of Stalin in 1953, but the ongoing criticism of postwar pronatalist policy coming from Soviet professionals, particularly doctors, female party members, and women, a drumroll that had already begun in the late 1940s. Mariia D. Kovrigina, the first and last female All-Union Health Minister, promoted the idea of women’s right to abortion, which became the core of re-legalization. However, this historic development was muted due to the special, typically Soviet, circumstances of this process. In this way, this article points out possibilities as well as limitations for the reproductive rights movement under state socialism.

著者

永綱 憲悟

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2016, no.45, pp.89-102, 2016 (Released:2018-06-02)

参考文献数

21

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On February 19, 2013, Russian President Vladimir Putin expressed that it would be worth considering “unified Russian history textbooks” that show “respect to all pages of our past.” This announcement has been interpreted as patriotic propaganda or an attempt at re-writing the past to justify authoritarianism in the present. To be sure, we cannot overlook the clear intensification of patriotism under the Putin regime. Also, we cannot deny that Russian citizens’ protests against election fraud during 2011–12 led to Putin’s countermeasures, such as the creation of quasi-social historical organizations, advocacy for unified textbooks, and so on. These measures are clear examples of Putin’s historical politics, by which he means to use history arbitrarily for political purposes.However, it is quite misleading to say that Putin has successfully ordered the history textbooks rewritten to strengthen his own rule. In fact, we see three types of undercurrent concerning the policy on unified history textbooks. First, a group of young politicians with patriotic views advocated the unification of textbooks in response to neighboring countries’ historical politics. Cultural Minister Vladimir Medinsky is a typical example of this group. Second, academic historians such as Aleksandr Chubaryan, director of the Institute of World History, sought to build a basic consensus on historical outlook among historians and people within Russia. Third, there were some liberal groups who opposed any kind of forced textbook unification by the government.Putin monitored these undercurrents, adapting his historical politics as necessary, and avoided dire conflicts between the government and any of these groups. In the end, the “historical-cultural standard” was created, which every textbook must follow. The standard, however, is very general and loose. Therefore, two history textbooks with somewhat different viewpoints were authorized by the education ministry.One characteristic of Putin’s method of governance is the adoption of halfway solutions to disputed issues. They often fail to solve conflicts between groups, and sometimes even preserve them. In this sense, conflicts over historical politics, including those regarding history textbooks, will continue in the future.

著者

保坂 三四郎

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2016, no.45, pp.119-134, 2016 (Released:2018-06-02)

参考文献数

26

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Are there any experts who successfully predicted how the Ukrainian crisis would unfold after the Euromaidan revolution? On the one hand, the “Russian spring” project obviously failed: Vladimir Putin’s call for consolidating “Novorussia” did not catch the hearts of people beyond the limited part of Donbass. For example, after the launch of anti-terrorist operations in spring 2014, even such a Russified eastern city as Dnipropetrovsk turned blue-and-yellow, full with volunteer citizens supporting the government forces, thereby exhibiting the rise of Ukrainian patriotism. However, that was not the end of the story. During the national parliament elections in October, 2014 in the same Dnipropetrovsk Oblast the Opposition Bloc consisting of former Party-of-Regions members that did not endorse the Euromaidan surpassed the president’s party, Petro Poroshenko Bloc. Other eastern regions such as Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia mirrored Dnipropetrovsk in their electoral behavior. These snapshot observations speak for themselves: the social and political dynamics in Ukraine is much more complicated than is routinely described with the popular “east-west divide” discourse.Quantitative research on the mass attitudes in Ukraine often opts for versatile “regions” to explain the social and political cleavages. Most of them, however, treat regions as proxy for historical and cultural attributes common to localities, ignoring the heterogeneous distribution of personal historical memories in a given geographical space. This study tests the explanatory power of individual acceptance of national history in shaping the attitudes toward the Euromaidan, utilizing ordered logit model on nationwide survey data collected from December 2014 to January 2015.The author ran principal component analysis on the responses to the seven major historical events in Ukraine, and identified anti-Ukraine historical component, which denies the Ukrainian Insurgent Army as well as the collapse of the USSR and the country’s independence. In the ordered logit estimation with these principal component scores, the effect of the regional factor was mediated by historical memory in all eastern regions including Donbass, Sloboda, Lower Dniepr and Black Sea. However, explanatory power of the regional variable persists in Podolia and Left bank. This finding suggests the further need for studying interaction terms between historical memory and regions.Furthermore, two-stage least square estimation with instrumental variable was conducted to verify the effect of historical memory on the attitudes to the Euromaidan, which rejected the above hypothesis at a five-percent significance level. This implies that causal arrows run reciprocally between these two variables.The analysis also discovered the carriers of ambivalent “hybrid” memory, who miss the Soviet Union but welcome the independence simultaneously. These findings provide valuable insights into the amorphous nature of the eastern regions that embrace multilayered historical memories, and highlight key challenges for post-Maidan national (re)integration.

著者

寺谷 弘壬

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧学会年報 (ISSN:21854645)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1993, no.22, pp.27-38, 1993 (Released:2010-05-31)

参考文献数

33

著者

小森 宏美

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2018, no.47, pp.54-64, 2018 (Released:2019-10-08)

参考文献数

21

被引用文献数

1

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This article takes the viewpoint of historical comparison to offer a reassessment of Estonia’s nationalization. Estonia has experienced several regime changes in its history and has faced the challenges of nation-building with every alternation. The independence of 1918 and the re-independence of 1991 are especially explored in this article with regard to nationalization, which includes the institutionalization of national cultural autonomy and citizenship policy.In general, national cultural autonomy is considered the means of guaranteeing its minorities the right to self-rule with respect to cultural affairs. Estonia’s independence manifest of February 1918 promised this right to the country’s minorities who included Germans, Russians, Swedes, and Jews. The enactment of the law on cultural autonomy in 1925 accorded Germans and Jews the right of self-rule with respect to cultural affairs in the interwar period. The right of cultural autonomy was also on the agenda during the period of perestroika and the related law was adopted in 1993.According to Brubaker’s definition, Estonia is a coercive nationalizer as well as an active pluralist, pursuing the nationalization as its primal goal along with the official recognition of national minorities. Extant literature explores this intricate situation using discussions on triadic or quadratic nexus, but the question why Estonians took the pluralist approach into consideration when it was still not clear whether their state would be established must be addressed. In this sense, the author of this article would argue that it is worth paying more attention to the continuity maintained with regard to the previous regime.While interwar Estonia’s cultural autonomy functioned rather successfully as a system, the current law is regarded to be completely symbolic. The emblematic nature of the current law emanates primarily from two causes. First, the number of Russians holding Estonian citizenship was quite limited immediately after Estonia’s re-independence. Therefore, most Russians were not entitled to use the associated right. Second, the Estonia’s school system uses the Russian language as its medium of education, which harked to the Soviet period. Hence, Russians as minority did not need to demand the right of education in their mother tongue; at least until the school reforms were instituted. Thus, cultural autonomy was not the priority for Russians.Almost 30 years after the re-independence, Russian politicians who are quite active in the field of Estonian politics compete to postulate discrete forms of nationalization in Estonia and propose varied means of social integration. As more Russians obtain Estonian citizenship, culturally and politically plural approaches to nationalization become increasingly necessary.

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧学会年報 (ISSN:21854645)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1993, no.22, pp.89-105, 1993 (Released:2010-05-31)