著者
中村 信隆
出版者
日本哲学会
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2018, no.69, pp.215-229, 2018-04-01 (Released:2018-08-01)
参考文献数
19

Many philosophers suspect that the emotion of shame cannot play a significant role in morality because shame is the reaction to others’ contempt and therefore, a heteronomous emotion. This paper aims to defend the view that shame is a morally significant emotion by focusing on one form of reproach —“shame on you.” We employ this reproach, for example, with a President who establishes discriminatory policies or a scientist who falsifies data in his academic paper and in these cases, we assume this reproach is morally important. Therefore, what does “shame on you” imply? How can it be morally justified? Moreover, what are its characteristics? In this paper, I answer these questions by clarifying the notions of shame and self-respect. The paper proceeds as follows. First, I resolve the issue of autonomy and heteronomy in the emotion of shame based on Gabriele Taylor’s observation that shame contains two elements — a self-directed adverse judgment and a notion of an audience. I argue that the adverse judgment is always rendered autonomously, but the audience can be either autonomous or heteronomous; essentially, agents feel shame either in their own eyes or in the eyes of others. Second, I explain the meaning of “shame on you” and demonstrate the moral validity of this reproach by referring to the nature and classification of self-respect. Finally, I examine the distinctive significance of “shame on you.” Examining the different characteristics of shame and guilt, I argue that this form of reproach involves more a comprehensive assessment of the agent than other forms of reproach that concern, for example, the violations of moral rules.
著者
中村 信隆
出版者
日本倫理学会
雑誌
倫理学年報 (ISSN:24344699)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.66, pp.173, 2019 (Released:2019-04-16)

The purpose of this paper is to consider the moral responsibility for actions from ignorance. For example, a man may behave violently toward women because he mistakenly believes that men are morally superior to women and are, therefore, permitted to treat women as instruments of man’s will. If we assume that such a man acts from a kind of ignorance, how can we hold him responsible for his action? To consider this problem, I look at the Strawsonian theory of moral responsibility and the concept of insult as an object of resentment. According to Peter Frederick Strawson’s famous lecture “Freedom and Resentment,” responsibility can be understood in the context of “reactive attitudes,” such as resentment. Focusing on insult as an object of resentment, Jeffrie Murphy and Jean Hampton argue that we resent injuries done to us because such injuries involve insulting messages about our dignity or moral status. The wrongdoer is saying, “I can use you for my purposes and you are not worth better treatment”; in these circumstances, resentment is the defensive reactive emotion against an action involving such an insult. Based on these ideas, we propose the following hypothesis: a person, who injures someone but mistakenly believes that his action is permitted and acts from ignorance, can be held responsible for his action if the victim appropriately feels resentment toward his action, as it involved an insulting message about the victim’s moral status. To validate this hypothesis, I will begin by critically reviewing previous studies on the moral responsibility for actions from ignorance. Following this discussion, I will explain the distinctive character of the insulting action from ignorance about someone’s moral status. Finally, I will demonstrate that an insulting action from ignorance about the victim’s moral status inevitably causes resentment by attacking the victim’s self-respect, and that ignorance never excuses the wrongdoer from their responsibility.
著者
中村 信隆
出版者
Japanese Association for the Contemporary and Applied Philosophy (JACAP)
雑誌
Contemporary and Applied Philosophy (ISSN:18834329)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.10, pp.1-22, 2018-07-23

The purpose of this paper is to morally justify the death penalty according to the "expressive theory of retribution, " which has been developed by Jean Hampton. She tries to justify retributive punishment on the basis of the expressive or communicative role of punishment, arguing that retributive punishment can express and reaffirm victims' worth or dignity and their equality with offenders, which were negated by the offenders' actions. In this paper, I try to apply the expressive theory of retribution to the issue of death penalty. The problem is that it is unclear whether the death penalty is compatible with the human dignity of offenders. The first purpose of retributive punishment is to express victims' dignity, but retributive punishment must also not degrade offenders' dignity, because both victims and offenders equally have dignity. How then can imposing the death penalty on murderers be consistent with respect for their dignity? To consider this problem, I take up two questions. The first question is whether the death penalty shows implicit disregard for the human dignity of unrepentant offenders by precluding the possibility of their resipiscence as the development of their own moral character. On this question I advocate the death penalty by arguing that it does not degrade offenders' dignity as long as we provide them the opportunity of resipiscence by allowing them sufficient time between sentencing and execution. The second question is whether any method of execution is not intrinsically degrading to offenders' dignity. On this question, I argue that some methods of execution are not intrinsically degrading to offenders' dignity, and even if those methods are accused of cruelty, cruelty is in itself irrelevant for the justification of the death penalty in the expressive theory of retribution.