著者

魚住 洋一

出版者

Japanese Association for the Contemporary and Applied Philosophy (JACAP)

雑誌

Contemporary and Applied Philosophy (ISSN:18834329)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1, pp.13-30, 2009-11-10

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一九六〇年代後半から、英米においてセックスについての哲学的議論がはじまった。議論されたのは、売買春やレイプ、ポルノグラフィなどだが、それらを問題にするには、「性的」とは一体どういうことかが明らかにされねばならなかった。私はこの論文で、性的行為や性的欲望を巡る初期の議論、とりわけ、ネーゲルやソロモンが行なった「現象学的記述」とゴールドマンやソーブルが行なった「概念分析」の双方の議論を辿りながら、それらの有効性と限界性を見極めようとした。ネーゲルは、サルトルを手掛かりに、二人が互いに相手の興奮を感じて自分もさらに興奮を昂ぶらせていくという「相互人格的認知」を性的行為の規範的なありかたと考え、そうした相互性を欠いた行為を性的倒錯と見做そうとした。しかし、特定の性的行為のありかたの現象学的記述から性的行為の「規範」を短絡的に導き出してしまうところに、彼の問題点があったと思われる。性的行為を感情を伝達する一種のボディ・ランゲージと見做すコミュニケーション・モデルを提唱したソロモンも、彼の立場を受け継ぐ哲学者だが、彼の主張にも、感情を伝達する手段は他にもあるではないかといった多くの問題点がある。ところで、ゴールドマンは、性的欲望を他者との身体接触の快楽を求める欲望と定義する。彼がこうした定義を行なったのは、生殖、愛の表現、コミュニケーション、相互人格的認知などの目的を設定し、セックスをそれらの目的のための手段とする考えを批判するためである。他方ソーブルは、ゴールドマンの定義では、他者との身体接触を求めないマスターベーションが性的行為ではなくなってしまうと指摘し、性的欲望とは一定の快感を求める欲望であると一層単純化して定義するが、今度は性的と見做しうる感覚を特定することが困難になる。彼はそのことを認めつつ、哲学はそれを解明できずその問題を経験的諸学科に委ねなければならないと語る。しかも彼によれば、諸個人が性的な快感をどのように求めるようになるかは、彼/彼女の社会的条件によって異なるのである。これらのことから考えると、現象学的記述も概念分析もともに問題点を含み、性的欲望とは何かとの問いに答えることができるのは、結局は、社会構築主義ではないかというのが私の結論である。From the late 1960s, philosophical discussions on sex opened up in Britain and the U.S. The topics of the discussions were prostitution, rape, pornography and so on, but in order to deal with these problems, the question of "what is 'sexual' ?" must first be clarified. I, in this essay, reviewed the early discussions involving sexual activity and sexual desire, particularly the "phenomenological description" Nagel and Solomon gave and the argument of "conceptual analysis" that Goldman and Soble presented, intending to identify their effectiveness and limits. Nagel used Sartre's argument as a stepping-stone and considered "mutual interpersonal awareness," in which two people "sense" each other's sexual arousal and build up their arousals even more, as the norm of sexual activity, and thus defined sexual activity that lacks such reciprocity as sexual perversion. However, I consider the problem in his argument to be in the simplicity in drawing the "norm" of sexual activity from the phenomenological description of a certain sexual activity. Solomon, who proposed the communication model that regards sexual activity as a type of body language that communicates various feelings, is a philosopher who also built upon Sartre's and Nagel's foundations, and his argument also carries many problems such as the possibility of there being other means to convey feelings. On the other hand, Goldman defines sexual desire as the desire for the pleasure of physical contact with another person. His definition served as a criticism of the idea that sex is a means for purposes such as reproduction, expression of love, communication, and interpersonal awareness. Soble points out that Goldman's definition excludes masturbation, which does not require physical contact with other individuals, from sexual activity, and thus presents his further simplified definition of sexual desire as the desire for certain pleasurable sensations. However, then it becomes difficult to identify the sensations that can be defined as sexual. Soble acknowledges the problem and states that this problem is beyond the scope of philosophical analysis and should be in the hands of empirical disciplines. In addition, according to Soble, how an individual comes to seek for sexual pleasurable sensations varies with his or her social conditions. Considering the above, both the phenomenological description and conceptual analysis contain flaws, and my conclusion is that only social constructionism can solve the question of what sexual desire is.

著者

魚住 洋一

出版者

Japanese Association for the Contemporary and Applied Philosophy (JACAP)

雑誌

Contemporary and Applied Philosophy (ISSN:18834329)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1, pp.13-30, 2009-11-10

---

一九六〇年代後半から、英米においてセックスについての哲学的議論がはじまった。議論されたのは、売買春やレイプ、ポルノグラフィなどだが、それらを問題にするには、「性的」とは一体どういうことかが明らかにされねばならなかった。私はこの論文で、性的行為や性的欲望を巡る初期の議論、とりわけ、ネーゲルやソロモンが行なった「現象学的記述」とゴールドマンやソーブルが行なった「概念分析」の双方の議論を辿りながら、それらの有効性と限界性を見極めようとした。ネーゲルは、サルトルを手掛かりに、二人が互いに相手の興奮を感じて自分もさらに興奮を昂ぶらせていくという「相互人格的認知」を性的行為の規範的なありかたと考え、そうした相互性を欠いた行為を性的倒錯と見做そうとした。しかし、特定の性的行為のありかたの現象学的記述から性的行為の「規範」を短絡的に導き出してしまうところに、彼の問題点があったと思われる。性的行為を感情を伝達する一種のボディ・ランゲージと見做すコミュニケーション・モデルを提唱したソロモンも、彼の立場を受け継ぐ哲学者だが、彼の主張にも、感情を伝達する手段は他にもあるではないかといった多くの問題点がある。ところで、ゴールドマンは、性的欲望を他者との身体接触の快楽を求める欲望と定義する。彼がこうした定義を行なったのは、生殖、愛の表現、コミュニケーション、相互人格的認知などの目的を設定し、セックスをそれらの目的のための手段とする考えを批判するためである。他方ソーブルは、ゴールドマンの定義では、他者との身体接触を求めないマスターベーションが性的行為ではなくなってしまうと指摘し、性的欲望とは一定の快感を求める欲望であると一層単純化して定義するが、今度は性的と見做しうる感覚を特定することが困難になる。彼はそのことを認めつつ、哲学はそれを解明できずその問題を経験的諸学科に委ねなければならないと語る。しかも彼によれば、諸個人が性的な快感をどのように求めるようになるかは、彼/彼女の社会的条件によって異なるのである。これらのことから考えると、現象学的記述も概念分析もともに問題点を含み、性的欲望とは何かとの問いに答えることができるのは、結局は、社会構築主義ではないかというのが私の結論である。

著者

井保 和也

出版者

Japanese Association for the Contemporary and Applied Philosophy (JACAP)

雑誌

Contemporary and Applied Philosophy (ISSN:18834329)

巻号頁・発行日

no.11, pp.1-22, 2020-01-31

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Suppose Ann, who is a colleague of Beth, was thirty minutes late for an important meeting. And suppose, on the next day, Beth was also ten minutes late for her appointment with Ann, and Ann blamed Beth for that. If you had been in the position of Beth then, you would have said, "You are hypocritical. Who are you to blame me for that?" This is because you have a widely shared intuition that some agent R has the standing to blame some other agent S for doing some wrong action φ only if R is not hypocritical with respect to φ. In philosophy of blame, this is called nonhypocrisy condition. My aim in this paper is to explain why nonhypocrisy condition seems to be plausible. (Note that I don't mean to justify it.) This paper is divided into four sections. In section 1, I explain the nature of blame briefly. In section 2, I strictly define hypocrisy that is involved in nonhypocrisy condition. In section 3, first, I see three important features of hypocritical blame, referring to Fritz and Miller. Next, I survey and criticize three theories of hypocritical blame that have been offered so far: inconsistency theory, equality-violating theory, and right-forfeiting theory. I think all of them have a defect respectively. The first one and the second one cannot properly explain one of the three important features of hypocritical blame. And, in order to support the third one, we have to bite bullets. In section 4, I offer a new theory of the nature of blame, looking-down theory, according to which, in many cases, when we blame others, we look down on them in some aretaic aspect. I conclude that we should appeal to this nature of blame to successfully explain why nonhypocrisy condition seems to be plausible.

著者

川谷 茂樹

出版者

Japanese Association for the Contemporary and Applied Philosophy (JACAP)

雑誌

Contemporary and Applied Philosophy (ISSN:18834329)

巻号頁・発行日

no.4, pp.65-78, 2012-11-26

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The aim of this paper is to reconsider the relation between victory or defeat in a contest or a game of sport and athletic superiority of the participants and to make clear the implication that the former decides the latter. In his noted essay related to the same topic, Nicholas Dixon regards victory or winning as "an operational definition" of athletic superiority of an athlete or a team. Our examination of his argument clarifies the point that it would bring about a kind of skepticism with respect to any decision of athletic superiority by winning of contest. This kind of skepticism results in the failure to decide that any winner is superior and its practical effect to our ordinary concept of sport would obviously be very destructive. If we are to avoid such kind of skepticism and such conclusion, then we must think that the particular contest of sport creatively decides athletic superiority of an athlete or a team. Athletic superiority of an athlete or a team wouldn't exist preceding a contest or independently of it as such, but be generated through it for the first time. When victory or defeat in a contest is determined legitimately or according to the rules of the game, therefore, we must admit that athletic superiority of the participants in it could be decided legitimately as well, that is, "the winner is superior". The ethos of sport, in other words, the intrinsic goal of sport can be thought as "the decision of athletic superiority in terms of victory or defeat" and it could have the four different following decisions, though partially implicitly: 1/the decision that it is precisely through victory or defeat of a contest that athletic superiority of the participants could be decided, 2/the decision how victory and defeat of a game are to be decided (the decision of the rules of the game), 3/the determination of winning and losing in terms of the rules, 4/the decision which player or team is superior.

著者

高田 敦史

出版者

Japanese Association for the Contemporary and Applied Philosophy (JACAP)

雑誌

Contemporary and Applied Philosophy (ISSN:18834329)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.6, pp.16-36, 2015-03-01

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本稿は2014年度第6回応用哲学会における発表「図像的フィクショナルキャラクターの問題」に基づいている。The subject I focus on is ctional pictorial characters. Fictional pictorial characters are characters that appear in comics, animations, and illustrations of novels, who are presented by pictures and have ctional properties in stories. This paper examines the relation between ctional characters and pictures as media. I explore the problem of aesthetic judgments of ctional pictorial characters. I argue that ctive pictures are often indeterminate in terms of gurative properties (properties related to appearance such as shapes, colors, and textures). This means that we cannot know many of the gurative properties of ctional characters. We don't know exactly what ctional characters look like, even if we have pictures of them. In the case of deformations, caricatures, and omissions of bodily parts, pictures are implicitly non- committal about many gurative properties. I offer two arguments to defend this idea. First, it is meta ctional to describe in works some of the contents of pictures, such as huge eyes or the omission of noses. Secondly, if pictures of characters were always determinate of all gurative properties, according to the plausible analysis of pictorial realism, every ctive picture must be realistic, and this is quite implausible. On the other hand, it is possible to make aesthetic judgments of the ctional charac- ters portrayed in pictures. We say that characters are pretty or that they look friendly or horrifying. As aesthetic judgments require knowledge of the subject's gurative properties, this leads to inconsistency. In order to make aesthetic judgments about ctional charac- ters, we must know exactly what they look like. However, pictures of characters are often indeterminate. I resolve this inconsistency by arguing that pictures have two kinds of content: pictorial content and separation content (seeing-in content). The former is the indeterminate content that pictures really depict and the later is the determinate content that it is permissible to see. In ction, separation content is involved in aesthetic judgments. I analyze how pictures represent ctional characters in a complex way.

著者

呉羽 真

出版者

Japanese Association for the Contemporary and Applied Philosophy (JACAP)

雑誌

Contemporary and Applied Philosophy (ISSN:18834329)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.11, pp.58-76, 2020-03-26

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In this paper, I address social and ethical issues concerning telepresence technologies. New communication media such as smartphones, video-conferencing systems, and tele-operated communication robots bring forth novel modes of communication and alter the way human relationships are established and maintained. It is sometimes said that these technologies realize "social telepresence, " or being together with distant others. However, some theorists, such as Dreyfus and Turkle, argue that these media degrade the quality of our communication practices and impoverish our human relationships and social lives. These theorists stress instead the importance of non-mediated, face-to-face conversation. An aim of the present paper is to examine these critics' arguments against telepresence technologies and to show that they fail: their arguments, I will argue, are based on simplistic and false assumptions on the effect of communication media and are not supported by empirical evidence currently available. Thus, there turns out to be little basis for the claim that telepresence technologies have harmful effects on human relationships, though it is true that these technologies are sometimes used in inappropriate and ethically problematic ways. Another aim of this paper is to offer an explanation why such usage is problematic. Citing an actual case of inappropriate use of telepresence technologies, I will argue that what make it problematic is not certain intrinsic features of these technologies themselves, but "metamessages" the act of choosing them as communication media bears in certain situations. Thus, I will stress, we should pay critical attention to cultural contexts in which communication media are used and which partly determine how they are used.

著者

永守 伸年

出版者

Japanese Association for the Contemporary and Applied Philosophy (JACAP)

雑誌

Contemporary and Applied Philosophy

巻号頁・発行日

vol.3, pp.28-45, 2012-02-01

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There has been increased emphasis on self-determination for people with disabilities since the Supporting Independence of Disabled People came into operation. As is generally known, the concept of self-determination has become a key part of Disability Studies. This concept allows people with disabilities—who were bound by the idea of economical or physical independence for many years—to see the possibility of autonomy, and led to the formulation of new welfare policies. On the other hand, Disability Studies distinctly reveals the bound of self-determination, which is the possibility of the exclusion of people with the most significant disabilities from the grouping of autonomous subjects. That is, we are faced with the question—does self-determination apply to people with the most significant disabilities, especially those with mental disabilities? This study attempts to answer this question by examining the relationship between autonomy and rationality. Firstly, to show the features of self-determination for people with disabilities, the Independent-living model is surveyed. Secondly, it is argued that this model is based on the premise of rationality, and that this premise necessarily suppresses people with the most significant disabilities. Finally, to avoid this suppression, the idea of "principled autonomy" is claimed. Principled autonomy, an alternative to "individual autonomy," which the Independent-living model depends on, can convert the relationship between autonomy and rationality.

著者

笠木 雅史

出版者

Japanese Association for the Contemporary and Applied Philosophy (JACAP)

雑誌

Contemporary and Applied Philosophy (ISSN:18834329)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.7, pp.20-65, 2015-09-29

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Experimental philosophy is a new growing field whose core consists in applying the methods of experimental psychology to pre-theoretical intuitions regarding philosophical cases. Traditional philosophy uses such intuitions as evidence for or against a philosophical theory. A camp of experimental philosophy, experimental restrictionism, has it that the results of experimental philosophy undermine this methodology of traditional philosophy. This paper goes as follows. Section 1 briefly introduces three camps of experimental philosophy and describes the methodology of traditional philosophy. Section 2 gives a survey of various views on philosophical intuitions, i.e., the kind of intuitions that are supposed to play an evidential role in traditional philosophy. Section 3 sees several experimental results on which experimental restrictionism bases its attack on the methodology of traditional philosophy. Then, Section 4 summarizes the current debate between the proponents of experimental restrictionism and the defenders of traditional philosophy. Section 5 turns to my own defense of traditional philosophy, arguing for the possibility of collaboration between experimental and traditional philosophy.

著者

中村 信隆

出版者

Japanese Association for the Contemporary and Applied Philosophy (JACAP)

雑誌

Contemporary and Applied Philosophy (ISSN:18834329)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.10, pp.1-22, 2018-07-23

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The purpose of this paper is to morally justify the death penalty according to the "expressive theory of retribution, " which has been developed by Jean Hampton. She tries to justify retributive punishment on the basis of the expressive or communicative role of punishment, arguing that retributive punishment can express and reaffirm victims' worth or dignity and their equality with offenders, which were negated by the offenders' actions. In this paper, I try to apply the expressive theory of retribution to the issue of death penalty. The problem is that it is unclear whether the death penalty is compatible with the human dignity of offenders. The first purpose of retributive punishment is to express victims' dignity, but retributive punishment must also not degrade offenders' dignity, because both victims and offenders equally have dignity. How then can imposing the death penalty on murderers be consistent with respect for their dignity? To consider this problem, I take up two questions. The first question is whether the death penalty shows implicit disregard for the human dignity of unrepentant offenders by precluding the possibility of their resipiscence as the development of their own moral character. On this question I advocate the death penalty by arguing that it does not degrade offenders' dignity as long as we provide them the opportunity of resipiscence by allowing them sufficient time between sentencing and execution. The second question is whether any method of execution is not intrinsically degrading to offenders' dignity. On this question, I argue that some methods of execution are not intrinsically degrading to offenders' dignity, and even if those methods are accused of cruelty, cruelty is in itself irrelevant for the justification of the death penalty in the expressive theory of retribution.

著者

三木 那由他

出版者

Japanese Association for the Contemporary and Applied Philosophy (JACAP)

雑誌

Contemporary and Applied Philosophy (ISSN:18834329)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.9, pp.33-65, 2017-07-31

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掲載日: 2017.7.31

著者

川谷 茂樹

出版者

Japanese Association for the Contemporary and Applied Philosophy (JACAP)

雑誌

Contemporary and Applied Philosophy

巻号頁・発行日

vol.4, pp.65-78, 2012-11-26

---

The aim of this paper is to reconsider the relation between victory or defeat in a contest or a game of sport and athletic superiority of the participants and to make clear the implication that the former decides the latter. In his noted essay related to the same topic, Nicholas Dixon regards victory or winning as "an operational definition" of athletic superiority of an athlete or a team. Our examination of his argument clarifies the point that it would bring about a kind of skepticism with respect to any decision of athletic superiority by winning of contest. This kind of skepticism results in the failure to decide that any winner is superior and its practical effect to our ordinary concept of sport would obviously be very destructive. If we are to avoid such kind of skepticism and such conclusion, then we must think that the particular contest of sport creatively decides athletic superiority of an athlete or a team. Athletic superiority of an athlete or a team wouldn't exist preceding a contest or independently of it as such, but be generated through it for the first time. When victory or defeat in a contest is determined legitimately or according to the rules of the game, therefore, we must admit that athletic superiority of the participants in it could be decided legitimately as well, that is, "the winner is superior". The ethos of sport, in other words, the intrinsic goal of sport can be thought as "the decision of athletic superiority in terms of victory or defeat" and it could have the four different following decisions, though partially implicitly: 1/the decision that it is precisely through victory or defeat of a contest that athletic superiority of the participants could be decided, 2/the decision how victory and defeat of a game are to be decided (the decision of the rules of the game), 3/the determination of winning and losing in terms of the rules, 4/the decision which player or team is superior.

著者

西村 正秀 岩月 拓 神崎 宣次 小山 虎 渡辺 一弘

出版者

Japanese Association for the Contemporary and Applied Philosophy (JACAP)

雑誌

Contemporary and Applied Philosophy (ISSN:18834329)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1, pp.1001-1041, 2009-11-12

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This essay surveys some issues in the applied philosophy in the English speaking world. In September 2008, Japanese Association for the Contemporary and Applied Philosophy (JACAP) was established. An issue of this association is how to characterize applied philosophy. In the existing journals such as Journal of Applied Philosophy (JAP) and International Journal of Applied Philosophy (IJAP), the term "applied philosophy" has been used as another name of applied ethics. JACAP, however, wants to mean something more general than mere applied ethics by this term. The aim of this essay is to provide a preliminary work for this new "applied philosophy," by surveying what issues the existing "applied philosophy" in the English speaking world has handled so far. This essay consists of two parts. The first part picks up four topics of applied ethics that have recently appeared as special issues in JAP. To be concrete, these topics are "workfare," "disenfranchising felons," "moralism" and "the ethics of war." This survey gives us a sense of what issues are currently discussed in the existing journal of applied philosophy. The second part surveys a couple of issues that can be seen as different from those of mere applied ethics. The surveyed issues are "the philosophy of economics," "philosophical counseling," "deception in social science research," and "social epistemology and information science." They are taken not only from JAP but also from other resources such as Social Epistemology. Some of these issues—for instance, philosophical counseling and social epistemology and information science—are suggestive in that they show several ways for developing applied philosophy that is not restricted within the field of moral and political philosophy