- メルロ=ポンティ研究 (ISSN:18845479)
- vol.20, pp.16-27, 2016-09-10 (Released:2017-01-23)
“Feminist phenomenology”, which is now becoming an established discipline, provides a profound analysis on gender – gendered corporeality among other things. It sheds light on women’s bodily experiences (such as breasted body, menstruation, and pregnancy), which have been overlooked by conventional phenomenology so far. Moreover it brings into question how adequate and sound the methodological framework of phenomenology and the concepts used in it are. Due to the far-reaching implications, however, feminist phenomenology has raised questions. In this paper, I will try to address myself to some of the questions, which are crucial for further development of feminist phenomenology.1) How adequate the description of feminist phenomenology is? If a description of “female corporeality” it gives were not applied to all women, could it be right to call the corporeality at issue female corporeality?2) What kind of theory of body can serve as a useful starting point for feminist phenomenology?3) Would it be possible for feminist phenomenology to deal with “masculine” corporeality?In what follows, I will deal with the first question by referring to some relevant thoughts of I. M. Young, with the second by introducing Levinas’ theory of body, which I believe reveals some flaws of that of Merleau-Ponty and with the third by not confusing “masculine” corporeality with gender neutral one and contrasting “masculine” corporeality with “female corporeality” in an appropriate way.