著者

小林 良彰 平野 浩 谷口 将紀 山田 真裕 名取 良太 飯田 健 尾野 嘉邦 マッケルウェイン ケネス 松林 哲也 築山 宏樹

出版者

慶應義塾大学

雑誌

特別推進研究

巻号頁・発行日

2012

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本研究では、18回(全国調査14回、自治体調査3回、国際比較調査1 回)にわたって実施し、下記の新たな知見を得た。(1)投票行動研究から民主主義研究への進化(2)日米韓における代議制民主主義の分析を通した比較政治学 (3)日本の地方自治体レベルにおける代議制民主主義の分析 (4)政治意識の形成と変容の解明(5)マルチメソッド比較による新しい調査方法の確立 (6)政治関連データベースの構築。これらを通して、海外の研究機関から申し入れを受け、代議制民主主義に関する国際共同研究拠点を構築した。

著者

築山 宏樹

出版者

日本政治学会

雑誌

年報政治学 (ISSN:05494192)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.66, no.1, pp.1_283-1_305, 2015 (Released:2018-06-10)

参考文献数

53

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This study investigates the effect of legislator behaviors on electoral outcome using the panel data of 47 prefectural assembly elections in Japan from 1975 to 2007. In particular, we focus on two legislator strategies to influence public policy under the institution of the Japanese local government: party control of the local governor through electoral support and bill introduction on their own. Theoretically, legislator behaviors would affect electoral fortune, whereas electoral forecast would affect legislator strategies. To address such an endogeneity problem, we adopt the Arellano–Bond estimator for dynamic panel data. The results controlling the endogeneity indicate that parties increase their electoral margins when affiliating with the governor and that the number of bills introduced by parties has no effect on their electoral margins. Furthermore, we discuss that the difference of the effectiveness between the two legislator strategies is caused by the institutional feature of the Japanese local government, where the governor dominates the policy-making process.

著者

築山 宏樹

出版者

日本政治学会

雑誌

年報政治学 (ISSN:05494192)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.65, no.2, pp.2_185-2_210, 2014 (Released:2018-02-01)

参考文献数

31

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In Japan, local legislators often seem inactive and redundant. In fact, they introduce much fewer bills than local governors. However, why don't these local legislators devote themselves to legislative activities, especially introduction of bills?   Using the panel data of 47 Japanese prefectural assemblies from 1967 to 2006, this study investigates the determinants of bill introduction by local legislators. We mainly focus on the effect of political institutions: executive-legislative relations, parliamentary rules, and central-local relations via the party system. The results of Poisson and a negative binominal regression model with unconditional fixed effects show that parliamentary factions tend to introduce more bills in following situations: while opposing the governor, when the factions are large enough to introduce bills on their own, and when they don't have a close connection with the central government via the party system. These results imply that the institutional restrictions of local legislatures cause their legislators to be inactive in introducing bills.

著者

築山 宏樹

出版者

後藤・安田記念東京都市研究所

雑誌

都市問題 (ISSN:03873382)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.110, no.7, pp.15-22, 2019-07