著者

平川 均

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.47, no.1, pp.76-79, 2001 (Released:2014-09-15)

著者

八塚 正晃

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.60, no.1, pp.37-55, 2014-10-15 (Released:2014-10-25)

参考文献数

58

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Official Chinese Communist Party history simply indicates that Deng Xiaoping launched the open-door policy in 1978, largely discounting international factors, such as China’s joining the United Nations and China-U.S. reconciliation. With regards to the pre-1978 era, most studies focused on inter-Politburo politics, because during the Cultural Revolution power struggles often occurred among the leadership. According to the literature, the political situation after the death of Lin Biao is described as the struggle between Zhou Enlai, who aimed at economic reconstruction, and the radicals such as the “Gang of Four,” but they were under the almost complete dominance of Mao Zedong. Previous studies describe how Zhou’s economic policy was at the mercy of politics, and do not analyze his intention and policy. This article reconsiders the conception and limitation of the open-door policy which was launched as a part of Zhou’s policy, considering the importance of the changing international circumstances through analyzing a project designed to import large industrial plants from Western countries. This project was called the “4-3” development strategy, because its total projected cost was US$4.3 billion.Closer examination reveals that the industrial development strategy underlying the open-door policy was formed gradually in the early 1970s, in association with the change in the leadership’s perception towards new international circumstances. Until then, the Chinese leadership had pursued the construction of “the third front” as a preparation for war, which was a massive construction of defense and heavy industries in inland China. However, the change in the international situation in the early 1970s reduced the necessity of preparing for a war. Zhou Enlai and the bureaucrats therefore proceeded with the “4-3” development strategy as a part of a new national strategy, which included the reorganization of the bureaucracy to support the open-door policy and the shift of investment from military industry to agriculture and light industry and from inland to coastal areas. They implemented these policies through modifications of the 4th Five Year Plan.However, there was a conflict between the open-door policy and Mao’s revolutionary diplomatic strategies, despite Mao’s support for the former. The conflict came to the surface as the U.S.-Soviet détente emerged, and the pursuit of the opening was hampered. However, the open-door policy was gradually transformed into a comprehensive industrial policy. As a result, Hua Guofeng and Deng Xiaoping were able to launch a systematic open-door policy soon after Mao’s death.

著者

清水 展

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.59, no.3.4, pp.54-66, 2014-09-15 (Released:2014-09-26)

参考文献数

8

出版者

アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.52, no.2, pp.1-47, 2006-04

著者

大矢根 聡

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.69, no.3, pp.18-34, 2023-07-31 (Released:2023-08-19)

参考文献数

70

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Since 1988, Myanmar been subject to conflicting movements aimed at democratization and the suppression thereof, exemplified most recently by the military coup d’état of 2021. This paper considers this topic in relation to the broader international structure, in which countries such as the United States, China, and the ASEAN nations have engaged in various forms of democratization and the suppression of the same in Myanmar, giving rise to complex regional and inter­national politics.Theoretical research on international relations has provided an excellent analysis of this international structure. In addition, area studies have produced a wealth of findings on the domestic politics and external actions of various countries; however, it can be challenging to conduct an analysis that combines theoretical research and area studies, as the two disciplines diverge considerably. This study integrates and considers findings from both disciplines as described below.Based on theoretical research, this study identifies the characteristics of the international structure described above after the Cold War and since the latter half of the 2010s. It then confirms how that international structure has been correlated with movements to democratize Myanmar and the involvement of various countries therein. Furthermore, this study examines whether area studies may provide alternative arguments or supplement and revise the findings of theoretical research. Through this process, it may be possible to explain Myanmar’s political disturbances and the involvement of various countries as a fitting combination of international structures and domestic circumstances.The results of this analysis will illustrate, for example, that while Myanmar pursued democratization with support from the United States and the EU in the context of international structures following the Cold War, the military of Myanmar retained its authoritarian grip and built its own hybrid regime. In addition, given the international antagonism between the United States and China, and the distance maintained by ASEAN nations from both countries, it will be explained how these countries are reducing their involvement in Myanmar as political chaos continues following the coup. This study also clarifies how ASEAN functions as a buffer between the inter­national structure and Asian countries.

著者

内田 直作

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.4, no.3, pp.102-132, 1958 (Released:2014-09-15)

著者

LIAN Yi-Zheng

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.68, no.4, pp.47-62, 2022-10-31 (Released:2022-11-25)

参考文献数

27

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The Hong Kong democracy movement began with the Sino-UK Joint Declaration of 1984 on the future of the city after 1997. Among other things, the declaration defined for Hong Kong citizens a limited democracy to be put in place at some unspecified point in the post-1997 period. The scheme promised one-person-one-vote to elect all legislators and the chief executive, which sounded fine until one read the fine print. Described in broad terms with lots of discretionary power for Beijing to maneuver, the scheme reserved the privilege to introduce bills for the chief executive only. Elections for the latter would involve only a small number of candidates hand-picked by Beijing, rubber-stamped by a small electoral committee whose membership system was structured in strong favor of the government. Yet moving towards even this limited democracy proved to be a total failure. For all the 25 years after 1997, the government gave not one inch, even though the movement had impressive records of regularly turning out gigantic crowds—up to some 20% of the city’s population for a four-to-six-hour protest event, drawing from a 60% pro-democracy majority among the Hong Kong people. A major problem of this failure lay in the movement itself, which almost since its inception had adopted and held fast to the strategy of pressure politics, while basically remaining within the system as “loyal opposition”. That strategy involved garnering public opinion based on sheer supporter turnout in strictly peaceful, open and legal protests to force the government to grant concessions. That was a strategy that may well work in already democratic countries or even in non-democratic ones which had weak ruling classes. But in the case of the post-1997 Hong Kong, for the government—a highly capable one now backed by a strong, totalitarian government in Beijing, such pressure politics backed by public opinion no matter how strong could simply be ignored if the government still practiced some restraint. And when it had no more patience for those restraints, the whole movement could be wiped out in a short time, as actually happened after the proclamation of the National Security Law in 2020. The movement developed alternative strategies and approaches after the Umbrella Movement of 2014, but even though it gained incredible strength in the run-up to the explosive events of 2019, it was already too late.

著者

高橋 伸夫

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.34, no.4, pp.96-133, 1988 (Released:2014-09-15)

著者

奥薗 秀樹

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.66, no.4, pp.39-59, 2020-10-31 (Released:2020-11-19)

参考文献数

82

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How should today’s Japan-ROK relations be interpreted which is said the worst in their history? This paper discusses the logic of Moon Jae-in administration from the perspectives of its “justification” and “orthodoxy/legitimacy.”Under the constraints of the nation’s division and the Cold War, ROK successfully maintained the “justification” of politics as a result of its democratization that took place immediately after the economic development. However, this “justification” was maintained with the lack of political “orthodoxy/legitimacy,” the dilemma of which was inevitably brought to the surface after the end of the Cold War and the democratization.It was brought to the surface with the movement of going back their history in a way of trying to secure the “orthodoxy/legitimacy” of their politics by liquidating remnants of “pro-Japanese,” the collaborators with the Japanese colonial government. It was Moon Jae-in administration that played the central role of such movement, the administration that was born as a result of the “Candle Revolution,” which led president Park Geun-hye to her impeachment and dismiss.President Moon Jae-in took it as his mission to establish the “orthodoxy/legitimacy” and to bring ROK back to the state of what the nation needs to be like, by eradicating deeply-rooted evils and wiping out “the pro-Japanese conservatives with vested interests.”After the liberation, those “pro-Japanese” collaborators were supposed to be condemned, but they were instead protected under the Cold War and turned into a power of pro-Japanese conservatives with vested interests, as the mainstream of the politics and society, by colluding with the authoritarian governments for the sake of anti-communism and economic development. The true liberation and decolonization process, according to the logic, become complete only when successfully having eradicated those pro-Japanese and replaced the mainstream in order to secure the “orthodoxy/legitimacy,” which has been long absent and undiscussed.Such movement grew into the denial of “ROK lead by conservatives,” taking place with the eradication of the deeply-rooted evils. It was not necessarily targeted at Japan but inevitably involved the issues of comfort women and forced labor as diplomatic problems, which was crucial for Moon Jae-in administration because it stands on the denial of Park Geun-hye. For Moon Jae-in, Japan-ROK normalization of diplomatic relations in 1965 lacked both “justification” and “orthodoxy/legitimacy,” which was nothing but the deeply-rooted evil.If the eradication of pro-Japanese conservatives is expanded to the denial of ROK by conservatives, and furthermore, if Japan-ROK normalization of diplomatic relations is treated as deeply-rooted evils, it could lead to a political situation that will deny the Japan-ROK relations over the past half century and will call for a drastic reconstruction of the relations from the very beginning.

著者

伊豆山 真理

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.69, no.3, pp.84-96, 2023-07-31 (Released:2023-08-19)

参考文献数

38

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Myanmar’s coup in 2021 surfaced India’s long-time challenge of democracy assistance in Myanmar. Resurgent debate on democratic value versus geopolitical interest as guiding principle for Myanmar policy has its origin in 1988 transition. India sided with Aung San Suu Kyi and other democratic leaders but turned to “two track policy” around 1993. Since then, phased engagement with military government evolved while uneasily searching for new format of democracy assistance.China’s expanding influence in Myanmar is often cited as India’s main geopolitical interest. However, India’s interest has been shifting over time, so it is too simplistic to see China factor as constantly dominant. This paper traces changes in weight and format of India’s democracy assistance. It focuses on geopolitical interest pertaining to land border, firstly necessity of border control and consequent importance of cooperation from Myanmar’s military regime, and secondly, land connectivity which Myanmar provides as gateway to ASEAN.Myanmar’s place in India’s “Look East” and later “Act East” is quite interesting. India's vision for its Northeastern area development was tied to its neighbor. Connecting Northeast to ASEAN through Myanmar was the key to its Look East policy. Thus, engaging military government of Myanmar became legitimate as a part of ASEAN connectivity. India’s diplomacy under Prime Minister Manmohan Singh emphasized democratic value than ever as India started to identify itself as rising “democracy.” The feature of India’s democracy assistance debate then was that democratic transition was presented as the mean for economic development. Also, democracy assistance was thought to be best done through building institution.Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced “Act East” policy at East Asia Summit held in Nay Pyi Taw in 2014. Under the Act East, India prioritized Bangladesh and Myanmar as recipients of capacity building. We can observe that India set to compete with China at this stage. Capacity building is a convenient policy tool which includes building education centers such as IIT and transferring submarine to Myanmar navy. India also supplied Covid-19 vaccine to Myanmar as humanitarian assistance.Regarding democratic value versus geopolitical interest, the real test for India is Rohingya crisis. Refugee and migrant in the Northeast is problematic as it has ramifications on citizenship issue. India changed its tolerant policy in 2017 and defined Rohingya as “illegal migrants.” Instead of extending asylum in India, India provided humanitarian assistance to Rohingya in Bangladesh as well as in Rakhine state.

著者

田中 康友

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.45, no.1, pp.29-60, 1999 (Released:2014-09-15)

著者

川島 真

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.63, no.1, pp.98-103, 2017-01-31 (Released:2017-03-24)

参考文献数

12

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For China, H.K., Macau and Taiwan, discussed here, are not part of provincials/autonomous administrative divisions, but are special administrative regions. Articles in this feature, discuss new political trends in this specific region. In these three regions, we can find some similar phenomena and different situations. The first point is about national security and freedom/democracy. Chinese government strengthens the thread of cyber attack, and importance of national secret intelligences and social security. Such discourses lead the new regulations and acts to manage and sustain democracy, freedom, and constitutionalism, especially in Hong Kong. Facing with these new policy, Hong Kong people have so much negative behavior that they insist on deciding matters on Hong Kong by people there. However, such a situation is not found in Macau society where some matured social network is developed. And Taiwan’s case is also different from Hong Kong’s case, if the national government manages and sustains the democracy or constitutionalism, people would be against it by some activities like Sun Flowers movement, and express their opinions toward the administration by the vote at the elections. The second point is about social diversities and splits. As economic growth and democratization in these regions, both social diversities and splits are created so seriously among generations, genders, and between urban and rural areas. Such social diversities and splits influences the political activities, like Sun Flower movement in Taiwan and umbrella movement in H.K.. These movements had proposed strong objections to the government, but the activist couldn’t unify these movements and institutionalize them into a political power. On Taiwanese presidential and member of parliament election in 2016, most of Sun Flower activists vote for the DPP candidate on presidential election, but those were partly scattered on the member of parliament election. So it’s so difficult to find the great common divisor among small segments of the society, and the definition of “democracy” and “constitutionalism” in these societies. The final point is about Chinese stance to such phenomena in this region. As Hong Kong’s case, Chinese governments kept its authority to make interpretation on the situation and to decide the Yes or No on the problems, especially in Hong Kong and Macau. People in Hong Kong cannot decide their situation at present and in the future, in the contrast to people in Taiwan, where they can decide their future by themselves.

著者

阿古 智子

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.48, no.2, pp.9-29, 2002 (Released:2014-09-15)

著者

原 不二夫

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.38, no.1, pp.79-94, 1991 (Released:2014-09-15)

著者

田嶋 淳子

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.57, no.4, pp.70-74, 2011-10-31 (Released:2014-09-15)

著者

水上 祐二

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.53, no.1, pp.66-78, 2007-01-31 (Released:2014-09-30)

参考文献数

23

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The major cities in Southeast Asia have been greatly affected by the phenomenon of overurbanization, a result of rapid industrialization stemming from a surge in foreign direct investment starting in the 1980s. Despite an increase in labor demand in the modern industrial sector, the labor market in these Asian cities still continues to involve finding employment in an informal sector of small and independent businesses.The urban informal sector (UIS) has traditionally been interpreted as that part of the labor force not employed in the modern industrial sector. The existence of the UIS has been explained by external factors such as rural–urban labor migration. Citing the example of Thai stall keepers, this paper in contrast ascribes the continued existence of the UIS to internal factors including socio-economic conditions such as income.The paper’s author independently conducted an interview survey of stall keepers at five locations in Bangkok (Victory Monument, Pratunam, Wongwian Yai, Huai Khwang, andRamkhamhaeng) between August and September 2003. The survey sample consisted of a total of 115 individuals.According to this survey, the main characteristics of these stall keepers were that many were native to the city, and the younger generation in their 20s had a relatively high level of education.The average income of stall keepers was about 16,000 baht per month: this is higher than both the private average wage for Bangkok (9,500 baht) and the average income for Bangkok(10,000 baht). Analysis of the income distribution of stall keepers indicates a mixture of lowerincome earners (making less than 8,000 baht/month) and higher-income earners (making over30,000 baht/month).Factors determining the income of stall keepers were also analyzed. Income was not correlated with length of time in business, age, business hours, and amount of investment. The onlycorrelation in these data was between income and level of education.This analysis indicates that: (1) stall keepers have a relatively level of high income, and the ability to earn such a high income is a factor that perpetuates the UIS; and (2) stall keepers’ incomes are correlated to their level of education. Being able to earn a high income through ability facilitated by education is a reason why even highly educated people become stall keepers.This is a factor for individuals finding employment in the UIS regardless of whether the level of education in Thailand rises or the trend to obtaining higher academic credentials progresses.

著者

白石 愛子

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.22, no.1, pp.59-92, 1975 (Released:2014-09-15)

著者

大畑 篤四郎

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.15, no.1, pp.55-70, 1968 (Released:2014-09-15)

著者

平川 幸子

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.54, no.1, pp.95-99, 2008-01-31 (Released:2014-09-15)

著者

石井 明

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.64, no.3, pp.60-63, 2018-07-31 (Released:2018-08-28)