著者

川島 真

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.69, no.2, pp.22-32, 2023-04-30 (Released:2023-05-16)

著者

川島 真

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.69, no.3, pp.97-106, 2023-07-31 (Released:2023-08-19)

著者

権 香淑

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.47, no.3, pp.81-105, 2001 (Released:2014-09-15)

著者

崔 智喜

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

pp.as23.a01, (Released:2023-01-17)

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The 1980s was a period when North Korea’s military actions, such as the Rangoon bombing and the bombing of Korean Air Flight 858, drew focus away from Japan-North Korea relations. In terms of North Korea’s foreign policy, it is often contrasted with South Korea’s “Nordpolitik,” which was aimed at improving relations with China and the Soviet Union ahead of the 1988 Seoul Olympics.However, during this period, North Korea did not spare any effort to improve relations with Western countries such as Japan, the United States, or South Korea. Among them, the approach to Japan was remarkable. In 1984, North Korea re-signed a fishing agreement with Japan that had been neglected for two years. In 1985, active personnel exchanges between Japan and North Korea took place, and there were significant moves to improve relations at the political level.North Korea clearly expressed its intention to build political relations, including exchanges with the Liberal Democratic Party and the Japanese government, and tried to address resolvable issues. While the situation in Northeast Asia was exhibiting increasing fluidity, such as China’s reforms, opening-up policies and efforts to improve China-South Korea relations, North Korea had tried to develop not only economic but also political relations with Japan.On the other hand, North Korea expressed its negative attitude regarding the issue of establishing mutual trade offices, fearing that it would lead to cross-approval. It is presumed that this was largely due to concerns over the rapid development of China-South Korea relations. North Korea was reluctant to enter into a South Korea-led cross-approval initiative aimed at linking Japan-North Korea relations with China-South Korea relations, but tried hard to advance bilateral relations by increasing contacts with Japan’s government.It is no exaggeration to say that North Korea, which had been closely watching South Korea expand its exchanges with socialist countries such as China and the Soviet Union, was trying its own “Southern Policy”. North Korea’s efforts to build relations with the Japanese government and the Liberal Democratic Party in response to South Korea’s improved relations with communist countries such as China in the mid-1980s were maintained amid changes in the strategic environment caused by easing U.S.-Soviet tensions. It led to Kanemaru’s visit to North Korea in 1990 and negotiations to normalize diplomatic relations between Japan and North Korea in 1991.

著者

塚瀬 進

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.35, no.4, pp.47-76, 1989 (Released:2014-09-15)

著者

峰 毅

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.52, no.1, pp.19-43, 2006-01-31 (Released:2014-09-30)

参考文献数

105

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The North East Region of China, also known as Manchuria, became the chemical production base of the newly formed socialist China up to the time of the ‘open door’ policy. This chemical production base was originally developed by Japan prior to World War II. Only recently has Japan began to undertake academic research on this region; this hesitation is at least partly a reflection of Japanese attitudes to their invasion of China. However, US researchers had long held a high opinion of the industrial development of this region. Edwin Pauley, the first Westerner to visit Manchuria after the end of World War II, reported in 1946 to US President Truman concerning the Japanese assets in Manchuria, which he evaluated highly, to his surprise, as a war indemnity. Since then many researchers on China have written in the United States about the industrial development of this region as part of China, but not in Japan. However, more recently, researchers have begun to make studies on the industrial development of Japan-era Manchuria. Some remarkable research works have been published, especially concerning the steel and iron industry. Regarding the chemical industry, however, little research work has so far been done. This paper therefore starts with a description of how the Manchurian chemical industry was incubated and developed by Japan.First, this paper outlines the chemical production base developed by Japan in Manchuria. It then describes how Japan needed to develop and construct a chemical production base inManchuria, where natural resources, including coal are abundant, in order to put its economy on to a war footing. The construction of the highly organized industrial production base in Manchuria was only possible with the strong support of the Japanese Army. As a result the industrial structure of Manchuria was highly dependent on heavy industry, including the chemical industry. This paper also analyzes the characteristics of the economy of Manchuria and makes comparisons between the Republic of China and Japan based on GNP/CDP and on some data on three major representative chemical products: sulfuric acid, soda ash and am monia. The analysis shows clearly that the economy of Manchuria was oriented towards the war economy.This paper also analyzes the early days of the newly formed socialist China, when the production base in the North East Region played a key role in the national economy. After the defeat of Japan in 1945, Manchuria was invaded by Soviet soldiers and much of the production facilities were destroyed. Soon after socialist China was formed in 1949, the new government made recovery of the North East Region a top priority. This urgency was caused partly by the Korean War, which broke out in 1950, the year after the formation of socialist China, and partly by the existence of the highly organized modern heavy industry which was indis pensable to the construction of the national economy. Since then this region has contributed a great deal to the development of China’s chemical industry not only as a production base but also as an R&D and technical center. Some examples of the economic heritage of the industry from the days of Manchuria are introduced by referring to the Chinese literature as well as to papers written by the Japanese engineers and technicians who remained in China after World War II in order to help the recovery and reconstruction of China’s economy.

著者

綛谷 智雄

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.48, no.2, pp.106-127, 2002 (Released:2014-09-15)

参考文献数

38

著者

柿崎 一郎

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.55, no.4, pp.20-38, 2009-10-31 (Released:2014-09-15)

参考文献数

20

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This article discusses two private railways built in Thailand in the 1890s and 1900s. It analyzes the attempts of these two lines to develop into urban railways, and explains why they eventuallyfailed to do so.The two private lines discussed are (i) the Paknam Railway, the first railway in Thailand, which opened in 1893 and connected Bangkok to the mouth of the Chao Phraya river at Paknam; and (ii) the Thachin Railway, connecting Bangkok to Thachin (Samut Sakhon), which opened in 1905 and was extended in 1907 to Maeklong (Samut Songkhram) and was thereafter named the Maeklong Railway.Although initially both railways functioned as inter-city lines, by increasing their service frequency they soon began to serve functionally as intra-city or urban lines. The Paknam Railway introduced a motor-tramcar service within the Bangkok urban area in 1908, which was replaced in 1912 by an electric tramcar. A plan in the 1920s to electrify the entire line was discouraged by the government’s opposition to any extension of the concession period. Although the Paknam Railway was eventually electrified, its intra-city service was largely substituted by the newly extended tramline along it. The Maeklong line also began an electric tramcar service along one section to serve the Bangkok urban area, but global depression prevented it from realizing its full potential.The Thai government, having no intention to renew the private railway concessions, instead purchased the lines outright at the end of the concession periods. However, state ownership resulted in little further investment in the lines. The Paknam line suffered in competition with road transport, and soon became a loss-making venture. The Maeklong line, in contrast, which did not suffer from direct road competition, witnessed an increase in traffic volume, but this enhanced its inter-city, rather than its intra-city, functions. Prime Minister Sarit’s policy of ‘beauty’ brought the closure of the Paknam line in 1959. The Maeklong line also faced closure, but only one section was actually abandoned in the 1960s.There are three reasons why these railways failed to become true urban railways. First, the government’s state-oriented railway policy exhibited excessive caution towards foreign investors. Second, the foreign investors that did exist restrained their investments, particularly in the final periods of their concessions, partly in reaction to government policy. Third, the government failed to recognize the potential of these railways to provide urban mass transport. As a result of these reasons, Bangkok failed to maintain urban railways and developed post-war along a path of automobile-dependency, a path that has brought numerous transport and environmental problems in its wake.

著者

伊藤 融

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.53, no.3, pp.43-56, 2007-07-31 (Released:2014-09-30)

参考文献数

35

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In May 1998, India and Pakistan carried out a series of nuclear tests and declared themselves “nuclear powers” — a move that shocked the international community and added a newdimension to the rivalries between these two neighbors. This article will attempt to analyze what led both to this nuclearization and what kind of influence it had on the whole world as well as on the region.From a strategic viewpoint, India had pushed ahead with its nuclear program in order to counter the threat of China, not of Pakistan, whereas Pakistan’s program was aimed at reducing the threat posed by India. That is to say, the power imbalance in the region (China > India > Pakistan) encouraged these two countries to go nuclear. India and Pakistan have faced increased security-related concerns since the collapse of the alliance structure that built up during the Cold War. In addition to these security interests, rising nationalism in the midst of globalization has created a political trend that has encouraged nuclearization.Now, in retrospect, we can ask the question: which side has benefited most from nuclearization?Regionally, Pakistan seems to have seized more advantages militarily and diplomatically, especially regarding the Kashmir issue. Globally, however, nuclearization has helped India to rise in the world: most major powers, including the United States, cannot help regarding and treating India as a global player. In contrast, the international community regards Pakistan with suspicion in the wake of revelations about the “nuclear black market.”In fact, this nuclearization, which drew international concern about the risk of nuclear war, has not only contributed to sustaining the ongoing peace process since 2003, but has also created aninternational environment in which each side stops short of resorting to war even in times of crisis. “Rising India” will also hesitate to draw a sword. Unfortunately, however, it is difficult to conclude that a stable“ nuclear peace” has been established between India and Pakistan considering their geopolitical and strategic characteristics, lack of a relationship of mutual trust, persistent cross-border terrorism, and the fragile state foundations of Pakistan.

著者

岩本 卓也

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.50, no.4, pp.98-102, 2004 (Released:2014-09-15)

著者

井上 一郎

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.64, no.4, pp.22-37, 2018-10-31 (Released:2018-12-05)

参考文献数

44

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It is often pointed out that the status of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been declining in the entire party and government system in China in recent decades. As a result, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been unable to cope with many challenges China faces today. With the progress of the Reform and Opening-Up policy since the early 1980s, pluralization and decentralization are increasingly apparent in making and implementing its foreign policy. And recently, media and public opinion and private sector interests have begun to influence Chinese foreign policy. However, the phenomena of the gradual erosion of foreign ministries’ status as well as the expansion of low politics diplomacy in foreign relations have been observed among other advanced countries. This paper studies how the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has reshaped its organization and changed its role as one of the country’s many complex party-government apparatuses in the era of globalization. Traditionally, the scope and jurisdiction of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been rather narrow as compared with foreign ministries in other countries. The departments focusing on managing international economy, foreign aid, national security, cultural exchange, and intelligence and analysis, which are common in other countries, do not seem to exist. In recruiting young diplomats, there has been strong emphasis on foreign language ability rather than basic knowledge of social sciences such as international relations or economics. Consequently, the reality of traditional Chinese diplomatic practice has leaned too much on bilateral relations. However, the spread of globalization has brought significant structural change to the organization of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. With the apparent shift from regional affairs to functional affairs, several new departments have been established to tackle new global challenges. The impact of globalization has brought the low politics diplomacy dealing with the economics and social affairs to the forefront. Today, multilateral diplomacy is actively practiced. The ministry has been recruiting human resources with more diversified professional backgrounds. As a result, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the globalization era has evolved to become more similar to ministries of foreign affairs of other countries. However, given the rapid change of circumstances both in and outside China caused by globalization combined with the traditionally limited jurisdiction and function of China’s national diplomatic organizations, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has still been unable to fully meet the global challenges that today’s China faces.

著者

伊藤 正子

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.63, no.3, pp.12-29, 2017

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&lt;p&gt;During the Vietnam War from 1965 to 1973, more than 310,000 Korean soldiers were dispatched to Vietnam. The killings of many Vietnamese civilians that occurred during this period are often mentioned in the recent 'anti-Korean sentiment' boom in Japan. This article discusses narratives of the memory of killings in both Korea and Vietnam. At the end of the 20th century in South Korea, what was once a 'bravery story' that killed 'Aka (Communist)' began to be viewed as an event that 'killed civilians'. This difficulty in facing the reality of the home country's negative history resulted in divided public opinion. A Korean NGO, NAWAURI, has attempted to contribute to future peace by apologizing to the Vietnamese people, listening to the people who survived from the killings, and understanding victims' feelings.
&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;On the other hand, in Vietnam, based on the slogan 'Close the past and head towards the future', Vietnamese survivors can only mention the historical recognition of the war in a way that does not affect international relations. This slogan has not only been simply championed by the state but also become a national consciousness, so there is little movement to record war memories of the general people so as to convey them to posterity. The slogan suppresses the honest feelings of survivors of mass killings, who have been forced to live difficult lives.
&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The national history of the Vietnam War, therefore, is a story of the brilliant triumph of the North Vietnamese army, or the National Liberation Front, who fought risking their lives. As a result, memories of mass killings that are unrelated to the victory would inevitably be unrecognized in Vietnamese national history. This means that when the state regulates memories and constitutes it as 'the history of so-and-so country', only favourable events are recorded, and some memories that do not promote nationalism are truncated. Memories of mass killings by the Korean army usually disappear with the death of the survivors, but ironically, the activities of the Korean NGO, which is revealing war memories of survivors in an attempt to ensure future peace, are contributing to the healing of the survivors and also to maintaining diverse war memories that are not subsumed by the state.
</p>

著者

張 兵

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.65, no.3, pp.49-53, 2019-07-31 (Released:2019-09-10)

著者

陳 嵩

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.61, no.2, pp.40-54, 2015-06-30 (Released:2015-07-07)

参考文献数

15

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Conventional arguments regarding the attitude of the Chinese populace toward the 2012 anti-Japanese demonstrations in China speculate on the characteristics and motivations of participants in anti-Japanese protests by observing their participation. By conducting surveys with average citizens at their residences immediately prior to anti-Japanese demonstrations rather than observing actual participants demonstrating on the street, this study sheds light on what regions and what types of people have the strongest inclination to demonstrate.First, it became clear that, prior to the occurrence of anti-Japanese demonstrations in 2012, different regions and income brackets differed in their inclination to demonstrate. On the whole, a trend of strong inclination to demonstrate was observed in the eastern region, where economic development is relatively advanced. Additionally, a strong inclination to demonstrate was observed among low-income individuals overall. A variety of factors increases a person’s inclination to demonstrate. A negative attitude toward Japan and a high level of patriotism are the factors that most increase inclination to demonstrate. Further, dissatisfaction with societal inequality and the belief that China protects freedom of speech are also factors that add to the inclination to demonstrate.

著者

江藤 名保子

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.61, no.4, pp.61-80, 2015-10-31 (Released:2015-11-10)

参考文献数

52

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Chinese nationalism tends to excessively react to some specific problems which oppose to Japan, USA or West European countries in particular. This “anti-West” sentiment of the Chinese society has been regarded as the “trauma” of invasion by the Great Powers. Yet when reviewing Chinese cognition after the national foundation in 1949, there were the times when Chinese nationalism expanded without connecting to the “anti-West” assessment. For example, despite the rise of “patriotism” in the 1980s, Chinese public opinion took a conciliatory attitude to the Western countries, especially to Japan. Similarly, it was observed that while the nationalism kept on surging, Chinese public sentiments towards Japan continuously improved from 2006 to 2010. These phenomena can’t be explained by a simple logic that “the surge of nationalism promotes anti-foreignism.” This paper hypothesizes the contemporary Chinese nationalism as multiple political thought in order to examine the dynamism of its “anti-West” logics. Here, the centripetal force of Chinese official nationalism is extracted as the four elements; national identity, socialism, economic development and notion of great power. Using these factors, this paper discusses the mechanism how Chinese nationalism links to the “anti-West” sentiments. In conclusion, this paper argues that the “anti-West” sentiments is not only an extension of the historical trauma, but it is also promoted by official nationalism. At the same time, however, it is also pointed out two elements of the official nationalism—economic development and notion of great power—functioned to offset the public “anti-West” feelings.

著者

井上 治

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.47, no.4, pp.4-22, 2001 (Released:2014-09-15)

被引用文献数

1

著者

新美 達也

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.60, no.2, pp.69-90, 2015-01-10 (Released:2015-01-27)

参考文献数

29

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This paper discusses Vietnam’s out-migration policy and the current situations of its overseas workers, and the impact of out-migration on the regional development of the regions where the migrants come from. The paper also discusses the prospects for sending nurses and caregivers to Japan from Vietnam, which is about to start at the time of writing this paper.Vietnam dispatched workers mainly to East European countries before 1991 through official channels, based on intergovernmental contracts with these countries. Since 1991, out-migration of workers from Vietnam has been based on contracts between private companies. Out-migration has contributed to the Vietnamese economy and to regional development. In 2013 alone, Vietnam sent about 90,000 workers to Taiwan, Malaysia and Korea. The Vietnamese government has been encouraging out-migration, because it will contribute to reducing poverty, developing regional economies, and fostering international cooperation.Although the total number of overseas Vietnamese workers is far less than those of Filipinos and Indonesians, the number of Vietnamese workers sometimes exceeds those of Filipinos and Indonesians in Taiwan, Korea and Japan. The most important destination in 2013 was Taiwan, which absorbed 40,000 Vietnamese workers, or 45% of all workers that left the country in that year. On the other hand, Korea, which had also been an important destination for overseas Vietnamese workers, stopped the acceptance of the Vietnamese.The incidence of out-migration is high in some particular districts. Nghe An province, which is one of such districts, received US$ 85 million in 2009 as remittances from the 45,000 workers who went abroad from this province. The amount of remittance was equivalent to 50% of the provincial government’s total revenue. The most important destinations for overseas workers from Nghe An province are Taiwan and Malaysia, accounting for 30~40% of all overseas workers from Nghe An. Work experiences in foreign countries, however, did not contribute so much to transferring modern industrial techniques to the workers’ origins, because almost all of the returnees engage in farming after returning home.Based on the economic partnership agreement (EPA) between Japan and Vietnam, the first batch of the candidates for nurses and caregivers from Vietnam will come to Japan in June 2014. These nurses and caregivers come from the same regions where other types of overseas workers come from. Considering the insufficiency of medical staff, especially highly educated nurses, in Vietnam, the out-migration of nurses may have a detrimental impact on the domestic supply of medical services. Besides this, the candidates from Vietnam may not be able to pass the examination necessary to work as qualified nurses in Japan, considering the low rate for Filipino and Indonesian candidates—who came to Japan earlier—to pass the examination.Even with these problems, we can still conclude that out-migration has positive impacts on Vietnamese regional development. The knowledge and experiences acquired by the candidates for nurses and caregivers who are about to start their training in Japan will contribute to the development of medical services in Vietnam.

著者

上野 正弥

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.64, no.1, pp.40-55, 2018-01-31 (Released:2018-03-02)

参考文献数

57

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To control Christians and their religious activities, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) established the Three-Self Patriotic Movement (TSPM) committees in 1954 and required Protestant churches to register with these committees. However, the number of non-registered house churches has been growing rapidly since the end of the Cultural Revolution. During the first decade of the 21st century, new house churches, whose leading members are students and intellectuals, developed in large cities. This paper studies the Chinese government’s response to the development of Protestant churches. The national government has devolved the mandate to develop religious policies to local government in order to address concerns about Protestant churches. Provincial governments have a mandate to establish regulations for religious affairs, and some have established regulations that allow local churches in their jurisdiction to receive donations from Christian organizations abroad. Local governments adopt these policies in order to encourage Protestant churches to supply welfare and public services to the residents instead of the government. In 2001, the CCP central committee decided to build networks of religious affairs management among governments of counties, townships, and villages to post religious affairs staff to a grassroots community. However, local governments have not been willing to build these networks or strengthen the management of Protestant churches for the following reasons. First, local governments want the churches to provide public services. Second, they emphasize economic development rather than religious affairs management in their jurisdictions. Third, they have been ordered to reduce and simplify government organizations by the central government; hence, it is difficult to increase the number of staff members assigned to religious affairs. On the other hand, some local governments and churches registered with TSPM committees have begun to approach individual house churches directly. TSPM churches provide pastoral work, services, and materials for some house churches. The government is trying to apply this approach across the country, but even some pastors of TSPM churches have doubts about this approach because some house churches fundamentally do not want to involve with the government or TSPM churches. Meanwhile, some local governments scout out house churches and order them to dissolve if they have connections with hostile forces abroad. Through these analyses, this paper reveals that the Chinese government has been confronting challenges in implementing policies for church affairs management because each stakeholder has different priorities.

著者

土屋 健治

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.30, no.2, pp.61-70, 1983 (Released:2014-09-15)

著者

森 悠子

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.62, no.1, pp.31-35, 2016-01-31 (Released:2016-02-09)