著者

家永 真幸

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.55, no.3, pp.1-17, 2009

---

The idea that pandas are the "national symbol" of China is no more than a historically invented notion. However, even within international politics today, debates concerning whether or not these animals are "Chinese" have arisen as a political issue through their connection with the so-called "Taiwan problem" or "Tibet problem".<br>How is it that pandas have become embroiled in such political controversy, despite not being regarded as important for international politics from a realist perspective? In answering this question, it might be meaningful to reconsider what factors have made the Chinese state legitimate within international society. Therefore, in this article I have tried to reveal how pandas have become a Chinese national symbol, referring to the official archives of the Republic of China opened on Taipei, Nanjing, Chongqing and Chengdu.<br>The Central Propaganda Department of the Chinese Nationalist Party first presented pandas to the USA as a part of its "propaganda diplomacy" in 1941, when this animal first became a symbol of friendship between the two countries. This paper reveals that the Nationalist regime used this "panda diplomacy" to forge friendly relations with the USA, while at the same time as attempting to show the "civilized" nature of the Chinese state. Before then, the Chinese government had taken little interest in pandas. This paper also points out that such "panda diplomacy" had been initiated between 1928 and 1949 in the following four historical contexts: (i) the rising significance of the south-west region for the Nationalist regime in the War of Resistance Against Japan; (ii) the rising consciousness of sovereignty in China that insisted that natural resources, including pandas, must be controlled by the Chinese themselves; (iii) the adaptation to the idea of animal protection which had become a criterion of civilized countries; (iv) the demand for widespread support from the US people under wartime diplomacy.<br>In conclusion, I would like to stress that the process by which pandas became a national symbol was nothing more than a process involving China's adaptation to international society, in which the handling of these animals had the potential of constituting a factor in China's "external legitimacy". I believe that this situation is still relevant in regards to the legitimacy of the Chinese state in contemporary East Asia.

著者

福岡 正章

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.50, no.3, pp.65-84, 2004 (Released:2014-09-15)

著者

高梨 和紘

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.50, no.2, pp.1-2, 2004

著者

矢内原 勝

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.38, no.2, pp.147-149, 1991 (Released:2014-09-15)

著者

高梨 和紘

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.50, no.2, pp.1-2, 2004 (Released:2014-09-15)

被引用文献数

1

著者

一谷 和郎

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.67, no.4, pp.33-40, 2021-10-31 (Released:2021-11-16)

参考文献数

19

---

This special feature is based on the plenary session of the FY2020 Autumn Conference (November 7, 2020; Online meeting): “Infectious Diseases in Asia: Pandemics in Past and Present.” The theme for the conference was to consider how Asian countries are coping with the pandemic of COVID-19, the crisis for people around the world. What role do governments play for stopping human and economic losses caused by this pandemic? How is society responding to this new situation voluntarily or under the guidance of the government? And what type of state-social relationship is best dealing with this crisis? In this plenary session, these questions were discussed.COVID-19 is spreading rapidly, and the situation of the world is changing day by day. We believe that this is the time when we need to take a step back from current situation and look back on history. Looking back on the past, infectious diseases have had various effects on human history. Even in modern times, pandemics have often put the world in jeopardy, killing a huge number of people. At that time, what policies did the governments use to repair the damage caused by the pandemic? It was also the theme for the conference to review past infectious diseases and the response of the state and society to them, and to consider how the development of the state and society and the sustainable cooperation beyond the state to defeat pandemic can be realized.As this special feature is based on the plenary session of the conference, it consists of articles by three speakers of the plenary session. The paper by Kohei Wakimura discusses the port quarantine of the Red Sea route during the nineteenth century cholera pandemic. At that time, the Red Sea route was a concern as a transmission route for cholera. The paper by Wataru Iijima discusses China’s response to COVID-19 with a focus on the community. The aim of this paper is to deepen the understanding of the Chinese community, which supported the tough measures of lockdown. The paper by Shozo Sakata discusses the characteristics of Vietnam’s politics and society focusing on the information dissemination conducted by the government during COVID-19 pandemic. He argues that the challenge of infectious disease control in Vietnam since the Nguyen Dynasty has been to acquire the knowledge about epidemic diseases from abroad and to inform its people.In the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, we hope that this special feature will serve as a catalyst for comparative research on infectious disease control between each government and society, and for the dialogue between the past and present regarding pandemics.

著者

飯島 典子

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.57, no.2, pp.19-34, 2011

---

Contrary to popular belief, the Cantonese were not always oriented on working overseas as has been presumed in recent studies of overseas Chinese. In fact, the Cantonese were active investors in the mining business in southern China, especially in tungsten mining in Jiangxi province, the southern border of which is adjacent to the northeast of Guangdong. Although archives from the Qing period contain much about the involvement of the Cantonese in tin mining in the east of Guangdong, little has been investigated of their activities afterwards. However, during 1930s in the Republican era, the Guangdong Ministry of Construction started supervising the development of the newly exploited tungsten mining in Jiangxi by controlling tungsten exports. Traditionally, the southern part of Jiangxi came within the economic sphere of Guangdong, and thus the control of tin mining in Jiangxi by the Guangdong authorities was not considered as economic invasion across the provincial border.<br>The Cantonese spread their mining business as far as Yunnan province. In 1910, the completion of Dian-Yue (Yunnang-Viet Nam) railroad promoted the rapid transportation of tin from Yunnan to Hong Kong through Viet Nam. By the time of the Sino–Franco agreement of 1933, the Chinese had won almost total freedom of residency and business in Viet Nam, which stimulated their local business. From the statistical point of view, based on the number of residences of outsiders in Yunnan during the Republican era, there were relatively few Cantonese in Yunnan but the archives show that the Cantonese were economically the most active group in the mining and export of tin, while the Fujianese left almost no trace in the province.

著者

青木 清

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.66, no.4, pp.22-38, 2020-10-31 (Released:2020-11-19)

参考文献数

19

---

In October 2018, the Supreme Court of Korea ordered a Japanese company to pay four Korean men ₩100 million each as compensation for the damages from forced labor during World War II. In the next month, the Supreme Court ordered another Japanese company to provide compensation for the same kind of damages. They are called “Cho-yo-ko [forced laborers] Judgments” in Japan. These judgments have caused the Japanese Government to impose severe diplomatic actions upon Korea, i.e., restrictions of exports from Japan. Thereupon, the Government of Korea has carried out counter diplomatic policies toward Japan. As a result, it is said that the relationship between Japan and Korea has been the worst it has ever been since World War II.This paper deals with the “Cho-yo-ko Judgments,” which have given rise to this situation. In particular, it examines the Supreme Court judgment in October 2018 and the lower judgments on the case in which the defendant was Nippon Steel Co., because this case has often been reported on by the media and was considered one of the most famous in Japan.First, after giving the outline of this case, the paper introduces the judgments of the case that were delivered in Japan. Originally, two Korean men among the above plaintiffs brought a case forth in Japan against Nippon Steel Co. and the Japanese Government, but the case was dismissed. After that, the plaintiffs, in which two other Korean men joined in, brought a case forth in Korea against Nippon Steel Co. Although the trial court and the appellate court decided against the plaintiff on the grounds that the Japanese judgment should be recognized under the Korean Civil Procedure Act, in 2012 the Supreme Court overturned the lower court’s decision and sent the case back to Seoul High Court. The Supreme Court refused to recognize the Japanese judgments because of the order public of Korea and continuously held that the individual claims of the Korean men were not settled by the Agreement on the Settlement of Problems concerning Property and Claims and on Economic Co-operation between Japan and the Republic of Korea. Seoul High Court, which the case was remanded back to, ordered the defendant to pay compensation to plaintiffs in 2013. Finally, the Supreme Court confirmed the High Court judgment in 2018.This paper also deals with Korean judgments. Since there are many legal issues arising in the fields of Public International Law, Private International Law, Constitutional Law, Civil Law, and Commercial Law, it examines some of these legal issues and how the judgments affected the relationship between Japan and Korea.

著者

大島 一二

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.52, no.4, pp.90-94, 2006

著者

橋本 誠浩

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.66, no.3, pp.20-36, 2020-07-31 (Released:2020-09-12)

参考文献数

30

---

Since the introduction of the Reform and Opening-up Policy in 1978, social inequality and instability in Chinese cities have reemerged. Conflicts between individual urban residents, private enterprises, social organizations, and local authorities over wealth and opportunities created by the rapid economic development have intensified. Moreover, frustration among those who failed to benefit from this competition is also on a sharp rise. Social tension, along with social diversity, has made it very difficult for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to maintain social stability in urban China. In order to cope with this situation, which might become a severe risk for the party-state system, the CCP has been trying to reinforce its urban governance through residents’ committees.In the official context, the residents’ committee is a grassroots level autonomous organization, which takes care of daily issues within local communities. Members of residents’ committees are chosen through elections. This election gives the residents’ committee a “democratic” image. However, in reality, it is a sub-administrative organization controlled by the local government. Not only does it provide benefits for urban residents, but it is also in charge of management and surveillance of the urban populous. Therefore, many literatures have concluded that local governments have established a firm control over residents’ committee and through that control the CCP has improved its urban governance.In order to investigate state influence towards residents’ committees, the author conducted fieldwork at a residents’ committee (“J” committee) located in Hangzhou city from 2015 to 2017. One of the objectives of this ethnographical observation was the election process of choosing the new leadership of “J” committee. This paper introduces what the author encountered during that election and elaborates over those findings.All of the members of “J” committee leadership, turned out to be CCP members. They interfered with the election process by mobilizing other party members within the community. Mobilized party members interfered with the election in various ways in order to secure a high voting rate. They did this to gain high evaluation from the local government, which decides the annual budget of “J” committee.What became clear through this ethnographical observation was that “J” committee was indeed manipulating the election in order to gain more resources from the local government. Since the officials of the local government and members of “J” committee were both party members, it could be said that lower level party members were actually maneuvering against their superiors. This incident shows that local governments do not necessarily possess firm control over residents’ committees. Therefore, this paper argues that the theory of “Fragmented Authoritarianism” propounded by Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg might be applicable to the explanation of urban governance in contemporary China.

著者

高橋 伸夫

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.34, no.4, pp.96-133, 1988

著者

任 哲

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.55, no.1, pp.1-18, 2009-01-31 (Released:2014-09-15)

参考文献数

51

被引用文献数

2

---

Since 2002, the central government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has issued numerous policies to suppress the price of real estate across the country. These policies, however, have shown little effectiveness at the local level. Why did the central government fail to suppress these high prices in the real estate sector?Existing interpretations in the literature often put much emphasis on the responsibility of local governments for overheating in the real estate sector. Many studies point out that the financial dependence of local government on the real estate sector is the main reason. However, the conventional interpretations fail to clarify which level of local government should be responsible to the failure of policy implementation.This paper presents two arguments. First, I argue that the financial dependence of grassroots local government on the real estate sector is the major reason for the failure of policy implementation. By analyzing the fiscal revenues of central, local and grassroots government from 2000 to 2004, this paper finds that the proportions of revenue from the real estate sector in local government is higher than in the central government, but lower than in grassroots government. Most taxes from the real estate sector become fiscal revenue of government at the grassroots level but not at the local level. This paper also insists that grassroots level government has no incentive to progress policy, as their fiscal revenues rely more on tax and expenses from the real estate sector, rather than on local and central government.Second, I argue that state-owned companies are the major obstacle to the effectiveness of the policy and the existence of these companies undermines policy implementation initiated by the central government. The real estate companies are divided into three categories for analysis: central government-owned company, local government-owned company and private company. In this paper, I focus on three regions (Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong) and analyze those companies which are ranked in “China’s Real Estate Top 10” project. I demonstrate that half of them are state-owned companies. In the case study of Shanghai, for instance, I find that local government-owned companies play a decisive role in softening the intensity of policy implementation.

著者

安田 淳

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.39, no.1, pp.95-102, 1992

著者

石井 明

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.61, no.1, pp.55-61, 2015-05-24 (Released:2015-06-04)

参考文献数

7

被引用文献数

2

著者

深沢 宏

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.14, no.3, pp.85-100, 1967 (Released:2014-09-15)

著者

川島 真

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.66, no.4, pp.60-67, 2020-10-31 (Released:2020-11-19)

参考文献数

14

---

The main topic of discussion at the 2019 meeting of the Japan Association for Asian Studies (JAAS) was the issue of the movement of “wartime laborers” from the Korean peninsula to Japan proper. Professor Kiyoshi Aoki and Professor Hideki Okuzono gave presentations on this topic, with Professor Tetsuya Yamada, Professor Mie Oba, and the author posing questions and offering comments to the presenters. This paper summarizes the author’s comments and questions at that JAAS meeting, which focused on the importance of considering the connections, commonalities, and differences that exist in how history problems are handled across East Asia.First, China, Korea, and Vietnam were divided during the Cold War, and each one came to rely on the use of history in order to provide it with some form of legitimacy. History problems in this region were often related to how competing factions in these divided polities sought to justify their rule based on the past. On the Korean Peninsula and across the Taiwan Strait, this historical legitimacy was often connected to resistance activities carried out against Japanese aggression and colonial occupation. However, though both Koreas have continued to assert their relative “historical legitimacy” on this basis through the present day, the Republic of China government on Taiwan began shifting its source of “historical legitimacy” from being based on the creation of a unified China to the creation of an autonomous/independent Taiwan in the 1990s.Second, the cases of South Korea-Japan and Taiwan-Japan relations share the fact that the dissolution of the Japanese Empire and the manner in which Korea and Taiwan were subsequently decolonized had a significant impact on the construction of their history problems. In both cases, authoritarian governments negotiated with Japan to conclude peace treaties. Their broader populaces, however, were not allowed to play a significant role in such negotiations. This led to the emergence of critiques of these treaties after their democratization, with the appearance of subsequent calls to revisit the postwar settlements that their authoritarian regimes had reached.Third, democratization in South Korea and the expansion of freedoms in China led to the emergence of new developments in how history problems were handled, with a shift toward a greater focus on individual claims for reparations against Japanese entities. The governments of neighboring countries had abandoned their ability to seek state reparations from Japan as part of the peace treaties they signed in the decades following the end of the war. However, individuals were able to seek private compensation through the Japanese judicial system from the 1980s through the 2000s, which played an important role in the resolution of a number of history problems. In Taiwan, democratization led to “Taiwanization,” creating a historical identity that included aspects of history problems that were different from South Korea’s case. Beginning around 2005, however, the Japanese Supreme Court changed its interpretation of the segment of the 1972 Sino-Japanese Joint Declaration that dealt with reparations, ultimately ruling that private citizens did not have the right to seek compensation from Japanese companies on an individual basis. This marked a significant shift in the role that Japan’s legal system played in resolving history problems.View PDF for the rest of the abstract

著者

丸川 知雄

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.67, no.2, pp.21-37, 2021-04-30 (Released:2021-05-28)

参考文献数

29

---

Studies on Chinese urban societies under the planned economy tend to use the Chinese term “danwei” to depict the self-contained features of urban firms. However, this study proposes to view them as “isolated societies” instead. The purpose of using this term is to shed light on the difference in the degree of isolation between various urban firms under the planned economy. The industrial firms erected under the “Third Front” program were the most isolated from their surroundings among Chinese firms, while those located in traditional industrial cities were less isolated.This study focuses on Shanghai’s “Small Third Front”, which consisted of 81 projects built by the Shanghai Municipal Government in the mountainous region of southern Anhui Province during the late 1960s and 1970s. It produced rocket ranchers and artillery shells for the military under the direction and support of the Shanghai Government. All inputs for production were either transported from Shanghai or supplied by specialized plants in the Small Third Front. Staples for the employees such as grain, meat, tobacco, sugar, and soap were also transported from Shanghai. The Small Third Front was thus isolated from its surrounding rural societies in its production and daily life.The Small Third Front was also isolated in marriage. Most of the employees married some other employee in the Small Third Front or left their spouses in Shanghai. Inter-marriage with the surrounding rural population was rare, because there were wide cultural gaps between the employees who came from Shanghai and the local population. Only 5 percent of married couples were between the employees and local rural residents.However, societal relationship gradually developed between the Small Third Front and local rural residents. Local peasants sold vegetables and eggs to the employees and used the facilities for the Small Third Front’s employees such as clinics, schools, and movie theaters. The Small Third Front provided cement, steel, electricity, water, and even money to the surrounding rural societies to maintain good relationship.The Small Third Front’s plants were transferred from Shanghai to Anhui Provincial Government during 1986 and 1988 and most of the employees that came from Shanghai returned to Shanghai. Tens of thousands of Anhui peasants went to Shanghai later for work, taking advantage of their connections with the former employees of Small Third Front. This fact reveals that the Small Third Front was not absolutely isolated from its surroundings.

著者

山下 康雄

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.3, no.1, pp.12-36, 1956 (Released:2014-09-15)

著者

杉野 明夫

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.8, no.3, pp.67-79, 1961

著者

五十嵐 隆幸

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.66, no.4, pp.1-19, 2020-10-31 (Released:2020-11-19)

参考文献数

92

---

The period when Chiang Ching-kuo served as Premier of the ROC largely overlapped the process of normalization of US-PRC relations. How did the ROC government, which in effect relied on the US to defend “Taiwan” by the Mutual Defense Treaty signed in 1954, attempt to survive the security crisis of de-recognition from the US with the termination of the treaty? Meanwhile, the ROC government, which was leaving the UN and losing support from the international community, had maintained the “Unity of Offensive and Defensive” strategy. How did the ROC government consider about “Retaking the Mainland,” which aimed to restore lost land, as the legitimate China?The leaders of the ROC government and the military were deeply concerned about the trend of US-PRC normalization negotiations and aware of the day to come in the near future. However, hey hardly envisioned a situation in which the ROC would defend “Taiwan” independently after the “Expected de-recognition from the US.” Behind this was estimation of the PLA’s forces remaining at the stage of preventing “Retaking the Mainland.” (from the ROC military). Namely, the leaders of the ROC did not feel anxiety about “Defending Taiwan” on their own because there was no immediate danger in preparation for the PLA’s invasion of Taiwan.The ROC military officers had the realistic belief that conducting “Retaking the Mainland” was difficult, but they also strongly felt that it was their responsibility to accomplish the mission. Nonetheless, meanwhile, “Retaking the Mainland” was essentially the task of some special operations forces. Above all, the ROC government as a whole lacked awareness of achieving “Retaking the Mainland.” For this reason, even if the power struggle that unfolded after Mao’s death was considered a chance for counterattack, it was not possible to complete such task.Premier Chiang Ching-kuo had limitations in leading national defense development. He had virtually full control of the military shortly before taking office as premier, but he was on behalf of the President during Chiang Kai-shek’s life. Until then, he was assumed to have taken leadership in national defense development, as well as political reform and economic construction. Yet, those were to continue the orthodox of the emphasis of “Retaking the Mainland.” Shortly after Chiang Kai-shek’s death, Chiang Ching-kuo showed his vision for military reform, but it was implemented specifically only after he became the President in 1978 and seized control of the military’s supreme power, both in name and in reality.