著者

左右田 直規

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.53, no.4, pp.91-96, 2007

著者

池端 雪浦

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.14, no.3, pp.31-55, 1967 (Released:2014-09-15)

著者

向山 寛夫

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.8, no.4, pp.37-49, 1961 (Released:2014-09-15)

著者

小山 三郎

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.33, no.3.4, pp.18-49, 1987 (Released:2014-09-15)

著者

池上 貞一

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.26, no.2, pp.1-27, 1979 (Released:2014-09-15)

著者

川村 晃一

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.55, no.1, pp.105-109, 2009-01-31 (Released:2014-09-15)

著者

毛里 和子

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.55, no.2, pp.70-84, 2009

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In contrast to the image of a "moving China" outlined by the four previous papers, this article inquires into the possibility of a "stable China". The argument is that we can identify some elements of stubborn continuity behind the fast-changing façade of contemporary China. One such example is the <i>hukou zhidu </i>system (the system of residency permits) which has survived all the reforms of the past thirty years. Is there any useful model in conceptualizing these two seemingly contradictory aspects of contemporary China? The article offers four possible models, and suggests that the China-is-China model is the more promising.

著者

五十嵐 誠一

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.48, no.4, pp.52-72, 2002 (Released:2014-09-15)

著者

稲田 正次

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2, no.2, pp.108-112, 1955

著者

荒 哲

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.64, no.3, pp.33-59, 2018

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<p>This study is intended to answer the following questions: what caused some of the Filipino masses to collaborate with the Japanese?; and why did their collaboration for the Japanese bring about severe violence? </p><p>Over seventy years or so since the end of the Asia-Pacific War in Asia, numerous academic works have been discussing so far the subject matters on the Japanese Occupation of the Philippines. However, only a few of them have discussed the issues of the collaboration with the perspectives from "below." Even though there have been published numerous studies on the Filipino popular history, very few historians have examined the nature of collaborationism transpired in the local setting of the Philippines with such perspectives. </p><p>This paper aims to shed light on rampant severe violence frequently happened among the masses or locals in Leyte Island of the Philippines, one of the rural areas of the country, during the Japanese occupation, that have not yet been thoroughly examined in Philippine historiography. Applying theoretical frameworks of Ranajit Guha (2007) dealing with the historical study on the mass movement in India, this study tries to clarify the characteristics of the mass violence by focusing on the actuations of a number of actors, most of whom belonged to low middle class including some local governmental officials (municipal mayors, treasurers, or chieftains of small villages in the province), local small merchants or landless peasants with a scant educational background. These kind of people tended to be treated as minor actors in "periphery" in the Philippine society when describing the history of the Japanese occupation of the Philippines. Some of them were said to be involved in severe violence during the time of their organizing some paramilitary groups for the Japanese such as the Home Guard in Ormoc or Jutai in Abuyog. Being minor one in Philippine historiography, the significance of mass violence have had been ignored, and these violent incidents were considered nothing but black side of patriotic movements against the Japanese initiated by the anti-Japanese guerrilla groups. Therefore, their involvement in the local history have been forgotten on the minds of locals and local historians as well. </p><p>Discussing several cases presented in this paper, the author tries to posit that such minor actors in "periphery" of the Philippine society tried to delineate themselves in the elite-dominated society like Leyte Province by collaborating with the Japanese. Unfortunately, their activities were too sporadic to unite other minor elements toward the unified movement as the Sakdal Movement or Hukbalahap Movement in Luzon Island did during that time. </p>

著者

入江 啓四郎

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1, no.1, pp.30-51, 1954

著者

間 永次郎

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.58, no.4, pp.37-49, 2012-10-31 (Released:2014-02-05)

被引用文献数

1

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In 1915, Mohandas K. Gandhi (1869–1948) returned to India after his eight-year-long satyāgraha (non-violent struggle) in South Africa. As he initiated satyāgraha in India for the first time, he soon realized that the idea of ‘non-violence’ was misunderstood among his fellow countrymen; it was considered a practice followed by cowards and the weak. In order to eliminate this misconception, Gandhi argued that non-violence was by no means practiced by cowards but by manly and courageous Indian kṣatriyo (warriors). Having highlighted Gandhi’s muscular discourse on satyāgraha, Erikson (1969) termed the concept ‘militant non-violence’.This muscular and militant interpretation of Gandhi’s non-violence significantly influenced later Gandhian scholarship.Contrary to established views, in this paper I show that towards the end of his life Gandhi developed a new interpretation of non-violence that was neither muscular nor cowardly but based on his unique ideas on vyaktitva (personality). In order to demonstrate this, I examine Gandhi’s concept of brahmacarya (sexual celibacy) in relation to his political discourse on non-violence. Gandhi first took a vow of brahmacarya in 1906 during his sojourn in South Africa. During this period, his ideas of brahmacarya were rigorously austere and puritanical. However, after the late1920s, his views on brahmacarya gradually changed. More often than not, Gandhi stayed physically close to his female entourage not only in his āśram but also in public areas. At the end of his life, he even started to sleep naked with naked women under a banner of ‘the experiment’ with brahmacarya. Although this experiment caused controversy all over India, it has never been seriously examined philosophically in past scholarly works.Using original diaries written in Gujarati by Manubhen, a core participant of ‘the experiment’, I reveal three fundamental philosophical features of ‘the experiment’ in relation to tantra sādhanā.(1) Gandhi tried to become sthitaprajña, a man whose wisdom is never affected by organoleptic impulse. (2) Gandhi tried to realize his inner strī (woman) so that he could gain hidden śakti (spiritual power) that was thought to be essential in bringing permanent peace to communal conflict. (3) Through the yogic practice of vīryanigraha (semen retention), Gandhi aimed to realize his inner napuṃsaktva (impotecy) and become ūrdhvaretā (a man whose semen is sublimated) in which male and female sexual boundaries are transcended. This last experiment pointed toward Gandhi’s spiritual project of swarāj in the deepest sense—namely an epistemological emancipation from colonial domination.

著者

李 東俊

出版者

アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.55, no.4, pp.1-19, 2009-10

著者

真保 潤一郎

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.11, no.2, pp.98-105, 1964 (Released:2014-09-15)

著者

Sonoda Shigeto

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.60, no.3, pp.3-15, 2015-03-31 (Released:2015-04-13)

参考文献数

11

著者

麻田 雅文

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.61, no.1, pp.5-23, 2015-05-24 (Released:2015-06-04)

参考文献数

41

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On February 14, 1950, during Mao Zedong’s visit to Moscow, China and the Soviet Union signed the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance. The USSR agreed to transfer all Soviet rights and property connected with the Chinese Changchun Railway (hereinafter, CCR) to China. In addition, The Russians agreed to transfer the CCR gratis to China by the end of 1952, to withdraw Soviet forces from Port Arthur and transfer facilities there to China after conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan, or not later than the end of 1952.After Stalin’s death in 1953, Mao in 1958, stated, “We wanted the CCR but he [Stalin] wouldn’t return it. However, one can pull the meat out of the tiger’s mouth after all.” What was the meaning of Mao’s ‘tiger – meat’ metaphor?In brief, Stalin wanted the management of the CCR to be under Soviet control for as long as possible and was hesitant to negotiate its return in 1949. Mao on the other hand, wanted the rights for CCR’s joint operation since its creation.Despite these issues, the Chinese were successful in securing the return of the CCR in December 1952. There were two reasons for their success. First, the business conditions of the CCR were not favorable for Russia. The Soviet manager of the CCR, Kovalev, reported this problem to Stalin in January 1950, a month before the signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty. According to him, the CCR was a burden to the national economy of the USSR. It is logical to surmise that Stalin accepted his opinion when agreeing to return the CCR in 1950.The second reason concerned the bargaining of the railway construction between China and the USSR. In August and September of 1952, a PRC delegation led by Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai visited Moscow for negotiations with Kremlin leaders. In the negotiations, Zhou accepted Stalin’s demand to construct a railway between Mongolia and the North of China using Chinese laborers. The railway provided a direct link to Beijing for Russians. While Zhou was agreeable during the negotiations, the Chinese were disappointed with the agreement. The Chinese had wanted to construct the Lanzhou–Xinjiang railway; however, Zhou delayed its construction at Stalin’s request.Finally, China and the USSR agreed to transfer the CCR in 1952. The returning ceremony of the CCR at the end of 1952 in Harbin became a symbolic event for the Soviet-Chinese alliance in the 1950s.

著者

HUNG Tzu-Chieh

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.63, no.3, pp.1-11, 2017-07-31 (Released:2017-09-05)

参考文献数

15

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During Kuomintang’s (KMT) administration from 2008 to 2016, China’s influence in Taiwan expanded enormously through increasing mutual communication and exchanges between the two countries, thus giving China leverage to install its proxy agent framework to achieve its political interests. This paper argues that by using Taiwanese elites, China advanced its political agenda, and strengthened its proxy agent framework during this process. China has implanted a softer strategy in connecting with proxy agents. The paper first discusses China’s goals and strategy of further communication and cooperation with Taiwan to elucidate the foundation upon which proxy agent frameworks have been implemented. Next, specific cases of proxy agents providing different degrees of evidence are examined. The cases discussed include the Want Want China Times Group and other business tycoons, Taipei Whampoa Military Academy Alumni Association, the True Enlightenment Education Foundation, and certain Taiwanese political elites. These cases focus on the characteristics of these people’s and entities’ relationships with China that helped China influence or acquire interests in Taiwan. Finally, the paper illustrates the relationship among China, its proxy agents and the Taiwanese as well as the impact of proxy agents. The paper concludes that China’s proxy agent framework is an ecology system of interest that involves quid pro quo. Fieldwork indicates that economic attraction, subsidies and Chinese identity are the major strategies used to attract proxy agents. Although certain cases concerning the connections between China and Taiwan groups and individuals remain unverified, a coincident win-win situation between China and certain Taiwan groups and individuals are revealed periodically. China’s large market and its promise of economic rewards have indeed influenced the actions of Taiwanese elites. China is buying “the hearts and minds” not of the general Taiwanese but of Taiwanese elites, who may serve as proxy agents. After Tsai yin-wen won the presidential election in 2016, China has continued to increase its number of proxy agents to influence Taiwan. It is thus very likely that the number of Taiwanese who devote themselves to the proxy agents “industry” will increase.

著者

ウィニッチャクーン トンチャイ

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.66, no.2, pp.52-55, 2020-04-30 (Released:2020-06-09)

参考文献数

13

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タイでは2006年と14年にクーデターがあり、民主主義は明らかに後退している。しかし19年3月に行われた選挙の結果を見ると、タイ人の半数近くは非民主主義的な政治指導者を支持しているように見える。彼らは、民主主義を支持しないだけでなく、民主主義を恐れている。本稿では、タイで民主主義を恐れているのはどのような人たちで、なぜ彼らは民主主義を恐れるのかについて考察する。1992年以降のタイの民主主義は、王党派民主主義(royalist democracy)であった。議会制民主主義の形態をとってはいたものの、重要な政策決定や人事について、王党派のエリートたちがインフォーマルながら非常に大きな影響力を行使していた。この王党派民主主義は、1960年代から80年代の軍事政権下の経済成長によって所得を向上させたバンコクの中間層からも支持された。本稿では、彼らのことを「旧来の都市中間層」と呼ぶ。これに対し、1990年代以降の経済成長の過程で徐々に生活水準と教育水準が向上し、政治に対する関心を高め、地方分権や経済成長の成果のより公平な分配を求めるようになった地方在住の人たちのことを本稿では「新興中間層」と呼ぶ。地方の新興中間層の多くは、官僚組織よりも、議会政治家の方が自分たちの声に耳を傾けてくれ、経済成長の成果の地方への分配に積極的であると感じた。地方の新興中間層の強い支持を受けたタクシンが2001年と05年の選挙で圧勝すると、王党派民主主義の支持者たちは、この新しいタイプの民主主義に脅威を感じるようになった。数の上では不利な王党派民主主義の支持者たちは、タイの国民の多くは依然として教育水準が低く、議会政治家はあまりに腐敗しているため、一人一票原則に基づく議会制民主主義はタイの現状にも伝統文化にもそぐわないと主張するようになった。グローバリゼーションが進む中、タイが国益を損なうことなく、独立を守り、繁栄を続けるためには、軍と王室が支持する「賢人」に国政をまかせる「タイ式民主主義」が必要だと彼らは考える。2006年と2014年のクーデターは、そのような「タイ式民主主義」を復活させるために行われたものである。「タイ式民主主義」を支持するタイのエリート層と旧来の中間層は、グローバリゼーションがタイ経済にもたらした恩恵を享受してきてはいるが、1997年の金融危機で苦い経験をしたこともあって、新自由主義に対して、不安と脅威も感じている。彼らは、タイ経済がグローバル化する過程で、地方の新興中間層が政治的発言力を強めたことに恐怖を抱いてもいる。グローバリゼーションは、タイのエリート層と旧来の中間層を民主主義恐怖症に陥らせる一方で、民主化を求める地方の新興中間層の潜在的政治力を高めてもいるのである。タイにおける近年の民主主義の後退が一時的なものであることを願うが、近年の民主主義の後退の過程で、タイでは民主主義を支えるべき制度が大きく傷ついており、民主主義が健全に育つにはかなりの時間がかかるかもしれない。深まってしまった社会的亀裂はすぐには癒えそうにない。王室と共存関係にある軍による政治支配は、外見だけは民主主義の装いをして今後もしばらくは続くかもしれない。しかし王室と軍との共存関係が今後どれくらい続くかを現時点で判断することは難しい。

著者

菅野 敦志

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.51, no.3, pp.41-59, 2005-07-31 (Released:2014-09-30)

参考文献数

46

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This paper clarifies the significance and implications of Chiang Ching-kuo’s ‘cultural construction’ and his ‘Taiwanization’ (localization) policy that brought a drastic change in the Kuomintang’s cultural policy in postwar Taiwan. ‘Cultural construction’, launched by Chiang Ching-kuo, is the name that has been given to the last of the twelve major construction projects beginning in 1977, and includes the construction of local cultural centers and the establishment of a Cultural Commission in cabinet. By the construction of cultural centers in every county and major city, this ‘cultural construction’ is acknowledged as the most important cultural policy in the 1970s, having a strong impact on cultural developments in Taiwan thereafter. The major findings of this paper are concerned with the implications of Chiang’s ‘cultural construction’ and his intention of promoting a ‘Taiwanization’ policy, not only in political administration but also in cultural administration. The basis of this discussion will be centered on the following observations. Firstly, Chiang Ching-kuo’s landmark announcement to launch his own cultural policy marked a clear transition from Chiang Kai-shek’s policy of the 1960s. Secondly, the highly symbolic appointment by Chiang Ching-kuo of Ch’en Ch’i-lu, a prominent Taiwanese scholar in the field of Taiwanese aboriginal studies, to the chair of the newly founded Cultural Commission in 1981, represented the first time the KMT was to place a local-oriented personality as the head of the government’s national cultural administration. As a result, Ch’en’s concern with local culture and the notion of Chinese culture opened up new horizons for the KMT’s cultural policy. Thirdly, Chiang Ching-kuo’s policy of cultural localization is evident through the establishment of Taichung’s first cultural centre, founded in 1976 by the well-known Taiwanese poet Ch’en Ch’ien-wu. When examining the significance of Chiang’s localization policy, we should not neglect the fact that the ideas of a single Taiwanese intellectual became the base upon which Taiwan’s cultural policy was formed after 1970. Fourthly, the establishment of display rooms and museums in local cultural centers, exhibiting notions of the ‘tradition’ and ‘uniqueness’ of various local places, presents a good illustration of the enhancement of local history and culture to represent the cultural policy of the new age. Such museums, initially conceived by Ch’en Ch’i-lu, can nowadays be seen everywhere, while the concept itself continues to be strongly promoted by the present government. Finally, following the ‘Local Autonomy Act’, enforced in 1999, local cultural centers were gradually reorganized into local cultural bureaux. In short, it can be said that Chiang’s cultural centers became a prototype that since the 1990s has provided the basis for the decentralization of cultural policy. Hence, due to the above reasons, it is possible to state that Chiang Ching-kuo’s ‘cultural construction’ was a significant part of his ‘Taiwanization’ policy, which can be defined clearly as the ‘turning point’ in the KMT’s cultural policy.

著者

梅村 卓

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.54, no.1, pp.3-21, 2008-01-31 (Released:2014-09-15)

参考文献数

31

被引用文献数

1

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Studies of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have not so far included much investigation of the Party’s media strategy. The radio broadcasts of the Chinese Nationalist Party have been the subject of much study, but there is little corresponding research about the CCP. This paper therefore examines the operating conditions of CCP broadcasting during the Anti-Japanese War and the Civil War, and defines its characteristics in comparison with the radio broadcasts of other countries.In 1940, when the CCP started broadcasting, radio was the latest media. Radio, unlike printed media, can communicate with anyone, irrespective of literacy, and does not need to be physically delivered. These characteristics were very important for China, because most of the population were illiterate, and with no transport infrastructure it was very difficult to reach some regions—especially key CCP territories in remote mountainous lands such as the Shanganning district. For these reasons the CCP gave a great deal of thought to radio.At this time, as in Nazi Germany, the Japanese empire and the United States, radio as a propaganda tool played a major role in promoting national unity. When information was blockaded by the Nationalist Party and the Civil War, the CCP used radio for intelligence and psychological warfare. The main radio programs provided internal party communication and external propaganda to the enemy (black propaganda). The CCP noticed that there had been hostilities between Jiang Jie Shi and various regional armies. These armies surrendered, and in addition asked to surrender to the CCP. Historical material suggests that these discussions were made based on strategic considerations. Although it cannot be claimed that these propaganda programs aimed at the Nationalist Party turned the tide of the Civil War completely, once the tide of war turned against the Nationalist Party, the CCP broadcasts greatly influenced the Nationalist Party’s officers and men as they fought their last-ditch battles. Although the Nationalist army was better equipped than the CCP army, the Nationalist army soon collapsed.The CCP did not consider the general public to be their audience, because radio receivers were not widely available and standard Chinese had not spread. Most importantly, however, the CCP was not at the stage of considering national unity, because it had not yet come into power. Ironically, most of the people who met the requirements for listening to the radio were the Nationalist Party’s army and the residents of Nationalist-controlled areas. Other countries used radio to establish a system of total war, but the CCP did not follow this approach. The CCP mainly used radio as a tool for military activity.