著者

砂山 幸雄

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.35, no.2, pp.1-48, 1989 (Released:2014-09-15)

著者

横山 宏章

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.41, no.4, pp.111-118, 1995 (Released:2014-09-15)

著者

田中 明彦

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.69, no.1, pp.32-44, 2023-01-31 (Released:2023-02-17)

著者

宇野 重昭

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.6, no.3, pp.1-25, 1960 (Released:2014-09-15)

著者

石塚 迅

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.66, no.3, pp.103-118, 2020-07-31 (Released:2020-09-12)

参考文献数

41

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In this paper, on the 30th anniversary of the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, I reexamined the connection and disconnection between the modern constitutionalism in western Europe and the Chinese constitution (thought and system). The constitutional review was employed as the focal point in this discussion.First, the constitutional review has two meanings: the protection of human rights and the protection of constitutional order. The constitutional review is one of the crucial elements of constitutionalism. Its system and operation are a measure of realization and retention of the constitutionalism.Second, the Chinese constitution enacted in 1982 was based on the bitter experiences of the Cultural Revolution. In order to protect human rights and constitutional order, various discussions were held to decide what kind of constitutional review system was to be established. Furthermore, the Chinese government and CCP rejected the judicial review and chose their own version of constitutional review that is carried out by the People’s Congress.Finally, there is a gulf between the modern constitutionalism in western Europe and the Chinese constitution. The Chinese constitution imposes the duty of upholding and abiding by the constitution not only to the government but also to its citizens. At the same time, it is reluctant to ensure the relativity of individuals’ values. At the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, the Chinese government and CCP criticized the students and intellectuals for joining the protest and openly violating the constitution. This accusation symbolizes the gap between the modern constitutionalism in western Europe and the Chinese constitution.

著者

SIDDIQA Ayesha

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.68, no.4, pp.32-46, 2022-10-31 (Released:2022-11-25)

参考文献数

19

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The post-Cold War had appeared to Frances Fukayama as an age for ascendency of liberal democracy. Indeed, one could observe a change of mood around the world marked by lesser tolerance for military authoritarianism which is why military regimes were seen on a decline. In Pakistan, known for a politically powerful military, it took the generals a bit more than a decade after the end of the Cold War to realize that direct intervention was not welcomed. October 1999 was the last that a general took charge of the state. General Pervez Musharraf’s rule ended in 2008 dovetailing into return of democracy the same year. The change was far more significant—Pakistan’s electoral democracy got anchored as governments were removed through elections rather than use of non-Parliamentary methods. This shift cannot be termed as a transformation but a variation since non-Parliamentary institutional methods were used to not allow prime ministers from completing their terms. Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gillani was removed from office by the higher judiciary in June 2012 followed by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in July 2017, and later Prime Minister Imran Khan in March 2022.The army, which in 1997 lost its power to sack governments through constitutional means in the form of article 58(2)(b) of the 1973 Constitution that was revoked by the then civilian government, used the higher judiciary to keep governments unstable. It was not that after 2008 the army had learned a lesson and was willing to surrender power but that it found a new way to maximize control of state power and resources without undertaking direct intervention. The military shifted from control of government to managing governance. Stability in electoral democracy is a new benchmark. The status-quo will remain and political players will not gain more ground until and unless they build institutional capacity. So, while Fukayama could imagine that all players in Pakistan have accepted liberal democracy as a norm, such acceptance is primarily superficial. The military remains dominant in power politics and civilian forces still subservient. Pakistan, in fact, offers a model of hybrid military rule in which political governments provide cover to military’s de facto control of the state.

著者

周 俊

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.67, no.3, pp.19-36, 2021-07-31 (Released:2021-08-12)

参考文献数

78

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Neibu Cankao (NC) is widely recognized as one of China’s classified internal bulletins, yet little is known about its functions and how it shaped the central-local relations in the country. NC began its publication by the Xinhua News Agency in 1949 as a daily bulletin, documenting sensitive domestic topics which were not suitable for public release, such as riots, cases of corruption, accidents, and outbreaks of infectious disease. Its circulation was limited, with only senior cadres of the CCP being granted access. Despite its similarity with the Soviet bulletin system, NC was a product of the CCP’s own attempt at solving the information dilemma of its dictatorship, and thus served as an important tool for gathering information. It also played a crucial role in the supervision of lower cadres, while at the same time providing the central committee of the CCP—and more importantly, Mao Zedong, with a way to exert influence on policymaking. However, the full realization of its functions faced several challenges. First, the Xinhua journalists responsible for NC were often mistrusted, as most of them were highly educated young people, who lacked revolutionary experience and came from bourgeois families. Second, NC’s independence was hampered by the increasing inferences of local party committees. Though the journalists could criticize local party committees and were backed by Hu Qiaomu (or more precisely—by Mao), in 1953 Liu Shaoqi granted the committees with permission to review NC manuscripts, because he believed them to be more trustworthy. These local interventions put journalists in a very risky position, especially when they disagreed with local authorities or made critical comments on local issues. This led to NC’s becoming a mouthpiece for local party committees, rather than a political tool of the central party committee. Finally, Mao used to constantly send instructions on policymaking to senior cadres via NC, reminding them of what they should focus on. This forced journalists to shift their attention from issues they considered important to what were essentially Mao’s concerns. In sum, NC was stuck between the pressures from both the central and the local committees of the party, which ended up putting it at a constant risk of disfunction. Ultimately, the plight of NC was a reflection of the structural problems in the CCP’s rule.

著者

嶋田 晴行

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.56, no.3, pp.45-58, 2010-07-31 (Released:2014-09-15)

参考文献数

33

被引用文献数

1

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Nine years after the collapse of the Taliban regime, the hope and optimism that the Afghan people held prior to the presidential election in 2004 seem to have declined. The deteriorating security situation has demanded the reconstruction and expansion of the security sector (national army and police) as the top priority. In fact, some measures, such as increasing the number of army and police staff members, have been taken, but the improvement in the quality is at a standstill. Accordingly, the dependence of the security sector of Afghanistan on the NATO-led International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) has been increasing.Even though there has been no distinct change in the fragile fiscal structures, which historically rely greatly on external assistance, a policy of upgrading the facilities, equipment, training, and salary levels in the security sector will create further pressure. Moreover, questions will be raised about the sustainability.In order to achieve successful state-building, restoring security and confidence in the government is crucial. In addition, it is necessary to establish a self-reliant fiscal structure. Nevertheless, things have not progressed well due to the worsening security situation in Afghanistan. However, because of increasing casualities and fiscal pressure, scepticism about assistance to Afghanistan has grown among the countries that have provided considerable inputs to Afghanistan. As a result, the governments of Canada and the Netherlands have announced timelines for withdrawal of their military units. Moreover, even the US declared its intention to start withdrawal of its military presence in the summer of 2011 in exchange for a short-term additional dispatch and further assistance to the Afghan security sector.Such a strengthening of assistance in the Afghan security sector would be a ‘localization’ of the security affairs and an ‘exit strategy’ for foreign stakeholders. However, this strategy cannot be achieved in a short period of time. Eventually, dependency on external resources will continue.Such dependency will result in an unstable situation in Afghanistan because external assistance tends to fluctuate due to political and economic reasons. Therefore, drawing a blueprint for Afghanistan’s future is a difficult task. However, stabilization in Afghanistan will contribute to regional stabilization in the Middle East, Central Asia and South Asia. Appealing to external stakeholders to share the burden and accept long-term involvement with Afghanistan is the key to success in Afghan state-building.

著者

吉岡 英美

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.58, no.4, pp.86-89, 2012-10-31 (Released:2014-02-05)

著者

内藤 耕

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.48, no.1, pp.85-91, 2002 (Released:2014-09-15)

著者

松村 史紀

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.50, no.2, pp.126-137, 2004 (Released:2014-09-15)

著者

高橋 美多

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.55, no.1, pp.40-53, 2009-01-31 (Released:2014-09-15)

参考文献数

24

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This paper discusses the recent transfer of technology to Chinese software firms from Japanese software development businesses. Studies of the Chinese software industry agree that its rapid expansion was promoted by strong domestic economic growth and the support of the Chinese government. The literature, however, overlooks an important point: offshore software development has helped China’s software firms acquire advanced technology.Our interviews revealed that, since the end of the 1990s, certain Chinese software firms have conducted not only coding and testing, but also design through offshore development. These firms had had difficulty in obtaining design skills by themselves. This fact suggests that technology transfer to Chinese software firms through offshore software development is an important factor in the rapid expansion of the industry. Based on this awareness, this paper focuses on the division of work between Japanese firms and Chinese firms and describes how technology transfer to Chinese software firms has occurred.The conclusions are as follows. In the 1990s, Chinese software firms conducted coding and testing on offshore software developed in Japan. However, since the end of the 1990s, some Chinese software firms have not only conducted coding and testing, but also design. Chinese firms have thus acquired design skills through joint development with Japan. This fact means that offshore software development from Japan helped Chinese software firms acquire advanced technology.The significance of this paper is that it focuses on the technological progress of the Chinese software industry from the viewpoint of the international division of work, which has been overlooked in previous studies. The entrusting of design to China is not now being implemented on a large scale, but there is a chance that it might grow in the future. This trend will accelerate technological progress in the Chinese software industry further.

著者

宮川 慎司

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.68, no.2, pp.27-48, 2022-04-30 (Released:2022-05-24)

参考文献数

62

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In the Philippines since the 2000s, the authorities in charge of maintaining local order, such as local governments and the police, have strengthened their crackdown on informality. They have strengthened the claim that informality that deviates from the law is a problem that needs to be solved. However, previous studies on informality in the developing world have argued that authorities do not always exercise strict crackdowns. These studies pointed out that the authorities prioritized the goals they were supposed to fulfill, such as maintaining local order, and that minor deviations were tolerated to achieve these goals efficiently.In explaining the changes in the Philippines in the 2000s, this paper uses the case of electricity theft, which is the use of electricity without paying regular fees. A medium- to long-term analysis was conducted based on newspaper articles from 1986 to 2020 and parliamentary minutes on laws to control electricity theft. The power distribution companies began to crackdown on electricity theft from 1986 on and the percentage of electricity theft was already decreasing in the 2000s. Thus, the incentive for the authorities to participate in the crackdown was considered to be low in the 2000s. However, the authorities began to consider electricity theft as a problem from that period. The factors that led to a change in the authorities’ stance toward informality will be explained by examining this case.A review of the said newspaper articles and parliamentary minutes revealed the following points. From 1986 to 2000, electricity theft had been seen as a problem by the power distribution companies as it was mainly committed by industrial and commercial users and the elite, causing negative effects on economic growth and higher electricity prices. However, since around 2000, electricity theft has been seen as a problem by the authorities because it is mainly committed by the poor and causes damage, such as fires and accidents. The reason the authorities began to see electricity theft as a problem could be attributed to two factors that arose from the economic growth in the late 1990s. Firstly, the use of electricity by the poor has increased and the proportion of electricity theft by them has also increased. Secondly, the middle-income group, who are highly anxious about damage to their bodies and their property, has expanded. Before 2000, electricity theft was considered to be a problem in an economic context, which did not overlap with the objectives of the authorities. However, since the 2000s, electricity theft has been seen as a cause of fires and accidents, and the authorities that aim to maintain local order have an increased need to crack down on electricity theft to achieve their goals. In other words, it can be hypothesized that the situation discussed by previous studies on informality, where strict crackdown is not implemented as long as the goals of the authorities are achieved, has no longer applied in the Philippines since the 2000s.

著者

谷村 真

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.58, no.3, pp.1-20, 2012-07-31 (Released:2014-09-15)

参考文献数

26

被引用文献数

1

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In the Philippines, lack of fiscal discipline has been a major factor behind the nation’s macroeconomic instability. Since the mid-1980s, in particular, expanding fiscal as well as current account deficit has fuelled concerns over external debt sustainability, and has thus made the Philippines dependent on an International Monetary Fund program and Paris Club debt rescheduling.However, the fiscal consolidation policy initiated by President Arroyo’s administration, aimed at restoring macroeconomic stability, has resulted in significant improvements in fiscal balance and a marked decrease in public sector debt. Improvements in the Philippines’ fiscal position have contributed to containing the impact of the global financial crisis on the nation’s economy, while creating fiscal space for stimulus policy measures to counter the global recession.Yet, to date, fiscal consolidation under the Arroyo administration may not have been fully recognized in spite of its significant effect on the economy of the Philippines. Therefore, it is worthwhile analyzing how the Arroyo administration’s fiscal consolidation policy has contributed to improving the fiscal balance and attaining macroeconomic stability, and then proposing policy initiatives that the Aquino administration, which took office in 2010, needs to implement in order to successfully implement the fiscal consolidation policy.Against this backdrop, this paper makes a comprehensive study of the impact of the fiscal consolidation policy under the Arroyo administration and the challenges that remain to be addressed, with reference to past studies on the issue. To this end, this paper firstly examines how progress in fiscal consolidation under the Arroyo administration has contributed to macroeconomic stability and has led to significant improvements in the Philippines’ sovereign creditworthiness. This paper secondly evaluates the administration’s fiscal consolidation initiatives from revenue and expenditure side and points out that the tax reform policy did not bring about the level of increase in tax revenue expected due to a decrease in tax collection efficiency and the failure to enact key bills. Furthermore, this paper outlines that the fiscal deficit widened significantly in 2009 due to the introduction of a stimulus package to cope with the global recession and measures that undermined tax revenue. This paper undertakes a simulation using the debt sustainability analysis framework to quantify the desirable tax revenue needed for further fiscal consolidation and increased capital spending which is necessary for growth enhancement.Based upon the simulation result, this paper finally presents a medium-term scenario with a goal of increasing tax revenue by approximately 2 percentage points of GDP. To achieve this target, this paper emphasizes that the Aquino administration must present, before anything else, a clear roadmap to fiscal consolidation, together with specific policy measures to increase tax revenue, and implement these measures promptly.

著者

入江 啓四郎

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1, no.1, pp.30-51, 1954 (Released:2014-09-15)

著者

菅野 敦志

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.51, no.3, pp.41-59, 2005

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This paper clarifies the significance and implications of Chiang Ching-kuo's 'cultural construction' and his 'Taiwanization' (localization) policy that brought a drastic change in the Kuomintang's cultural policy in postwar Taiwan. <BR>'Cultural construction', launched by Chiang Ching-kuo, is the name that has been given to the last of the twelve major construction projects beginning in 1977, and includes the construction of local cultural centers and the establishment of a Cultural Commission in cabinet. By the construction of cultural centers in every county and major city, this 'cultural construction' is acknowledged as the most important cultural policy in the 1970s, having a strong impact on cultural developments in Taiwan thereafter. <BR>The major findings of this paper are concerned with the implications of Chiang's 'cultural construction' and his intention of promoting a 'Taiwanization' policy, not only in political administration but also in cultural administration. The basis of this discussion will be centered on the following observations. <BR>Firstly, Chiang Ching-kuo's landmark announcement to launch his own cultural policy marked a clear transition from Chiang Kai-shek's policy of the 1960s. <BR>Secondly, the highly symbolic appointment by Chiang Ching-kuo of Ch'en Ch'i-lu, a prominent Taiwanese scholar in the field of Taiwanese aboriginal studies, to the chair of the newly founded Cultural Commission in 1981, represented the first time the KMT was to place a local-oriented personality as the head of the government's national cultural administration. As a result, Ch'en's concern with local culture and the notion of Chinese culture opened up new horizons for the KMT's cultural policy. <BR>Thirdly, Chiang Ching-kuo's policy of cultural localization is evident through the establishment of Taichung's first cultural centre, founded in 1976 by the well-known Taiwanese poet Ch'en Ch'ien-wu. When examining the significance of Chiang's localization policy, we should not neglect the fact that the ideas of a single Taiwanese intellectual became the base upon which Taiwan's cultural policy was formed after 1970. <BR>Fourthly, the establishment of display rooms and museums in local cultural centers, exhibiting notions of the 'tradition' and 'uniqueness' of various local places, presents a good illustration of the enhancement of local history and culture to represent the cultural policy of the new age. Such museums, initially conceived by Ch'en Ch'i-lu, can nowadays be seen everywhere, while the concept itself continues to be strongly promoted by the present government. <BR>Finally, following the 'Local Autonomy Act', enforced in 1999, local cultural centers were gradually reorganized into local cultural bureaux. In short, it can be said that Chiang's cultural centers became a prototype that since the 1990s has provided the basis for the decentralization of cultural policy. Hence, due to the above reasons, it is possible to state that Chiang Ching-kuo's 'cultural construction' was a significant part of his 'Taiwanization' policy, which can be defined clearly as the 'turning point' in the KMT's cultural policy.

著者

朱 海燕

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.62, no.3, pp.69-85, 2016-04-30 (Released:2016-08-24)

参考文献数

42

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This paper discusses how China’s relations with other nations, especially with Soviet Russia had an impact on the Anti-Christian Movement in the year of 1922 in China. The Anti-Christian Movement started with the establishment of the Anti-Christian Student Federation (Fei Chituchiao hsüehsheng t’ungmeng). The main purpose of this federation was to protest against the 11th conference of the World Student Christian Federation (WSCF) at Tsinghua College in Beijing. Previous studies have revealed that the federation was formed by the Socialist Youth Corp in Shanghai. But the debate still continues at the motivation of the federation to start the Anti-Christian Movement. Its relationship with the Great Federation of Anti-Religionists (Fei tsungchiao ta t’ungmeng), another (anti-Christian) federation that had a nationwide influence, has not been fully figured out yet. The present study, examining publications such as newspapers of the time and memoirs, clarifies that: 1) anti-capitalism and anti-Christian thought expressed in the Congress of the Toilers of the Far East and the Congress of the Revolutionist Organizations of the Far East were the significant factors which drove the Chinese communists to the Anti-Christian Movement. Considering the fact that the two congresses were held in Soviet Russia against the Washington Conference, the Anti-Christian Movement in 1922, in a sense, was the manifestation of the conflict between Russian Bolshevism and American Protestantism in China; 2) unlike Anti-Christian Student Federation which was founded on socialist ideology in Shanghai, the Great Federation of Anti-Religionists in Beijing was grounded on the Anti-Religion Thought, which emerged during the time of the May Fourth Movement and the New Culture Movement. It was, however, the communists who took a leading role in the formation of both federations. And they listened to the intention of the leading Socialist Youth Corp in Shanghai; 3) one of the significant factors which contributed to the expansion of the Anti-Christian Movement among students and intellectuals throughout China was the Anti-Religion Thought, which was influenced by an enlightenment thought during the New Culture Movement (Renaissance) among Chinese intellectuals. It may be said that the Anti-Christian Movement was an direct extention of the enlightenment movement started by the New Culture Movement. It became increasingly radicalized, however, as communists began to participate in it with political purposes; 4) the radical anti-capitalistic and anti-Christian thought was finally formulated by the resolusion of the 1st Conference of the Social Youth Corp in Guangzhou in May 1922. Then after the First United Front, the radical thought further spread to the Chinese Nationalist Party (the Kuomintang).

著者

高原 明生

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.68, no.1, pp.61-65, 2022-01-31 (Released:2022-02-05)

参考文献数

4

著者

磯部 靖

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.68, no.1, pp.15-17, 2022-01-31 (Released:2022-02-05)

著者

高 暁彦

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.68, no.1, pp.1-14, 2022-01-31 (Released:2022-02-05)

参考文献数

53

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In November 1949, with communists heading southward, Kuomintang’s control over southwest China quickly collapsed. What the communists were about to face was a highly militarized society with countless self-defense forces of villages and clans. Though showing their support towards communists initially, most self-defense forces openly revolted once the grain procurement program started.In the spring of 1950, Guizhou, one of the provinces of southwestern China, had become ungovernable, leaving communist work-team members brutally slaughtered and newly established people’s governments ravaged. Official accounts of pacification actions in this region involves peace-preserving action of militia, a locally active military forces of rural proletariat freed by land reform.Arguing Chinese Communist Party’s approach to handle popular unrests during the formative years of the People’s Republic of China was fragmented between central and local level. This article traces the continuity both of personnel composition and activities of local militia units. Utilizing newly available county-level archival resources from Guizhou, the following two questions are to be put under scrutinization. The author first compares central and local level cadres’ different approaches to popular unrest. Central level cadres, by repeatedly issuing urgent orders to their subordinate, demanded not only swift recovery of social order but also complete demilitarization of society. Under these orders, the People’s Liberation Army units and party activists were organized into work-teams and sent into villages where “bandits” were still active. Threatened with “rectification” if demands are not met within certain short period of time by their superior, local cadres decided to legitimize local self-defense forces’ existence, some of which were previously deemed as “bandits”, and utilize their presence to restore order. Self-defense forces thus rebranded first as “people’s armed forces (人民武装)” in 1951 and later the same year as “militia (民兵)”.The author further analyzes the activities of the new militia members. Rioting and looting were rampant during 1951, and in some cases, militia members were overtly hostile towards the local government. To extend its control over the militia, “People’s Armed Forces Departments (人民武装部)”, with its reach into every county under CCP’s control, were set up by the PLA. Active military cadres were sent into PAFDs as directors, and militia captains were gathered at PLA’s compound, politically screened and trained.In general, this article shows CCP’s experience of “internal pacification”, termed by Anthony Giddens. Screening and training secured PLA’s control over local militia units, and institutional expansion, as it is seen from the creation of PAFDs nation-wide, provides the infrastructure for state’s surveillance of the contentious society.