著者

吉武 純夫

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典學研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.37, pp.23-33, 1989-03-15

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It has often been said that if Ajax is manifesting his decision not to kill himself in his third speech, we have to assume that Ajax is lying But this is not true Ajax can at the same time be sincere throughout the third speech After abandoning suicide at the beginning of the third speech, Ajax comes to understand, first at 666 f and then at 677, what will be the result of his longer life, if he purges his "defilements", escapes the anger of Athena and buries his sword to hide it, he will come actually to obey the gods and honor the Atreidae, learning discipline Now these thoughts of Ajax make him realize the fact that reconciliation with fatal enemies will be inevitable if he continues to live A close examination of 666 f and 677 leads to such an interpretation of the third speech And if we are right in this interpretation, there is no question as to how and why Ajax, behind the stage, decided again to kill himself after the third speech, for the first speech has shown how dominant is the hatred for the Atreidae in the mind of Ajax Though gentle enough to abandon suicide in response to his wife's entreaty, he is so obstinate in his hatred as to refuse reconciliation with his enemies at the cost of his own life Ajax' hatred, shown in the play as an element always leading him to ruin, is continued by his wife and brother after his death And again, at the end of the play, dead Ajax' hatred is mentioned as an important dramatic motif Thus the play is unified by Ajax' hatred However, it is always presented in contrast to other mental elements the sense of honour and humanity It follows that Sophocles gave a dynamism (rather than a pathos) of the mind of Ajax to the traditional monotonous image of hateful Ajax

著者

今道 友信

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典學研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.19, pp.1-15, 1971-03-31

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By quoting several Greek philosophers, the author tries to distinguish the judgement from the description. According to his opinion, the description is nothing other than the task of the eye and its act is the objective exactitude. The judgement is on the contrary the personal decision concerning internal responsibility, and its act is the truth. Many thinkers utilize their objective description about the external world for their judgement. But Plato concentrates on the judgement. Because his theory goes on the level of logos, which is the correlative of the reason, and not on the dimension of pragma, which is the object of the sense. His theory of ideas is not the inductive reference from sense-data, but from this theory as principle the lot of true propositions are deduced. (Interpretation of Phaidon) The subject of thinking in Plato is neither the sense nor the reason of human beings. The human reason does love the true thinking which is the business of God. The act of the human reason is to become the horizon for the thinking of God. Periagoge tes psyches (conversio animae) to the Being-itself is the principle for the homoiosis toi theoi. Because the service for God (latreia tou theou) is the most important task for us, we must know what God thinks and we must do as we know. This is the reason why the thought and deed can be one in Platonic system. (Interpretation of Apologia and Politeia)

著者

國原 吉之助

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典學研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.3, pp.171-173, 1955-05-10

著者

大牟田 章

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典學研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.8, pp.104-107, 1960-03-29

著者

永井 滋郎

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典學研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.15, pp.52-62, 1967-03-23

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It is the object of the present article to analyze and understand the characteristics of peace consciousness of Polybius who lived in the Hellenistic age of chronic wars and wrote a world history in the true sense. We can see in his book, especially in IV. 31. 3-8 and IV. 74. 3, what kind of attitude he took toward the problem of peace. There he wrote as follows: "That war is a terrible thing I agree, but it is not so terrible that we should submit to anything in order to avoid it. ......Peace indeed, with justice and honour is the fairest and most profitable of possessions, but when joined with baseness and disgraceful cowardice, nothing is more infamous and hurtful." Thus, Polybius insisted that liberty and justice were indispensable conditions for peace. We can also recognize the same idea of connecting peace with liberty and justice in many other Greek politicians and historians such as Thucydides. The Greek thought of peace, however, was metamorphosed gradually by historical conditions in the development of the ancient world. Thucydides advocated the war for justice and took a rather aggressive attitude against other city-states such as Sparta, putting stress on Athenian hegemony, although he admitted that peace was naturally desirable. His conception of peace could never depart far from the narrow idea of ομονοια within a πολι&b.sigmav;. The Greek idea of peace was widened by Isocrates to Panhellenistic homonoia, but he had a strong antagonism against Barbaroi. In the historical development of peace theory, the Hellenistic age played a very important role, giving birth to the cosmopolitan pacifism. This kind of pacifism, however, could not become a historical force to attain world peace, because it had a tendency to escape from reality. Though Polybius was influenced by Stoicism he was able to reach a sort of realistic pacifism and wanted to cooperate with Rome, cherishing the idea of a united and organic world consisting of the cultural Hellas and the political Rome, where the common freedom of Hellas should be fundamentally respected. Moreover, he evaluated highly the value of unions of city-states such as the Achaean league. He had not merely a Stoic, philosophic and abstract idea of cosmopolitanism, but a positive, ego-involving and realistic attitude of international cooperation. Thus, the freedom of Hellas as a condition of peace was connected by him with a kind of internationalism and with a Hellenistic idea of one organic world founded on the principle of equality among races and nations. In this sense, we may recognize that Polybius was indeed a pioneer of realistic pacifism, that is of internationalism, though of course in an ancient pattern, which has its limitations for us. It was regrettable after all that the ancient world could not develop this kind of pacifism, but had to seek for a key to solve its problems in Pax Romana and eventually in Pax Dei.

著者

松原 俊文

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典學研究 (ISSN:04479114)

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vol.51, pp.78-93, 2003-03-20

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Diodorus' accounts of the Sicilian Slave Wars have been a source ofcontroversies This paper deals with two particular problems among them the blaming of C Gracchus' equestrian jury in the aetiology of the First War, a notorious anachronism that has vexed scholarship since Mommsen, and the accusation against 'Italian' landowners as having encouraged the highway robbery by their slaves, but whose presence in any large number on Sicilian soil at this period is not much attested by other evidence Some scholars maintain that these passages go back to Posidonius, whose contribution, to whatever extent, as a source to the Diodoran narrative of the First War is beyond doubt I shall below present some likeliest routes for the transmission of the information that has caused these problems 1) Roman Sources The ubiquitous criticisms of Roman magistrates in the narrative smack of narrow partisan hostility within the ruling oligarchy, and it has been suggested that our difficulties result from Posidonius' use of a Roman source coloured by conservative pique against the knights Among Posidonius' Panaetian connexions the most important was P Rutilius Rufus, whose semi-autobiographical history in Greek was certainly one of Posidonius' sources, and whose sorry experience at the repetundae trial in 92 might well suggest a Rutilian origin of the troublesome passages Yet evidence reveals Rutilius' attentiveness to the niceties of law, and his work, like other Republican memoirs, was written primarily for his own political apologia Thus I doubt that this Roman Stoic dared jeopardise the whole credibility of his apologia by a trifling distortion of the history of the extortion court Furthermore, if we allow for an interpreter, Posidonius' potential Roman sources need not be restricted to works written in Greek The annals of Fannius, if the historian is to be identified with C Fannius M f, yet another disciple of Panaetius and the anti-Gracchan consul in 122, are a strong possibility Another candidate would be Sempronius Asellio, who, like Rutilius and Posidonius, belonged to the same Polybian school of history and whose kinsman Diodorus alone in ancient traditions praises for his governorship of Sicily immediately after the Second War 2) Posidonius' Narrative Pattern Many scholars have perceived a structural and thematic parallelism between the accounts of the two wars One school of thought further stretches this deductive tendency of Posidonius the Philosopher-Historian into a strictly formulated 'narrative pattern', claiming that the philosopher, for want of information, retrojected the conditions in Sicily around the time of the Second War, or those in Southern Italy at the time of the Spartacus War, to the island of the 130s, and that in this process he 'reduplicated' an equestrian/Italian involvement in the First War Yet in my view the whole idea of a narrative pattern stands on far too many unattested premises, and hence to attribute our particular problems to this nebulous paradigm risks circularity In fact the similarities between the two Diodoran accounts are no more striking than the obvious differences This fact suggests that the author had fairly detailed knowledge of each war, thus rendering it unlikely that he, simply out of horror vacui, made up part of the account of one war on the analogy of another 3) Local Sources These details include 'folkloric' anecdotes, which all concern Sicehot Greeks, and without doubt go back to the same community But how did they find their way into the current text? Posidonius' famous trip to the West may have included an investigative sojourn in Sicily, but Diodorus himself was a Sicilian, born in a town only a few tens of miles away from the epicentres of both wars within thirty years after the Second War Thus he would have been as well placed as Posidonius to draw on locals for first-hand information The fact that in Bk 11 Diodorus added his own digression on the sanctuary of the Palici, with a cross-reference to the Second War, shows that he had at least some local knowledge of this war Thus the censure against the equestrian jury and the 'Italian' landowners may also have been transmitted through the same intermediary, echoing provincial indignation among Diodorus' contemporaries, if not of the historian himself whose critical views of the Romans and the Italians are known from other examples, over the activities of the equestrian businessmen and Rome's laissez-faire policy The past Quellenkritik has variously attempted to explain these problems, but the desperate dearth of external control precludes any definitive conclusion Yet internal evidence points to two distinctive groups of ultimate informants, Roman and Sicilian The passages in question could derive from either of them If the former is the case, I suggest Posidonius transmitting a non-Rutilian, alternative source If the latter, however, it could have been any provincial Siceliot, Diodorus included, who had garbled part of the picture of the First War

著者

南雲 泰輔

出版者

日本西洋古典学会 ; 1953-

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

no.62, pp.91-102, 2014

著者

南雲 泰輔

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.62, pp.91-102, 2014

著者

高橋 久一郎

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典學研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.37, pp.45-55, 1989-03-15

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Many scholars emphasize the importance of prohairesis in Aristotle's Ethics as a key concept in explaining human action However, its precise nature remains obscure In this paper I will attempt to explicate Aristotle's answer to a fundamental question concerning prohairesis-viz "How should we individuate prohaireton?", and then locate it in the practical syllogism This task is of importance, since we cannot understand Aristotle's views on action as energeia without understanding his conception of action as chosen for its own sake As a preliminary, in section I I defend and develop constituent-innterpretation of ta pros to telos A clue to the solution of this dispute is the fact that the bodily movement performed pros to telos must be an action in itself It must be telos in a sense, otherwise the relation of telos and ta pros to telos would be external Aristotle may be a consequentialist in a broad sense, but not a utilitarian (As a corollary of this point I suggest that we cannot use description of bodily movement as a tool of action mdividuation ) In section II I propose my interpretation of prohairesis by examining Cooper's excellent explanation of deliberation My contentions are as follows 1)We cannot accept his assertion that to kath' hekaston means not the individual, but the atomon eidos We do not deliberate on individuals, as Aristotle says, but use recognition of individuals as premisses of deliberation 2) We should admit that the deliberation ends at prohairesis to perform an act of some suitably specific type Prohairesis is not mere desire, but a unity of desire and belief, which is caused, via deliberation, by having a wish and some appropriate beliefs as to circumstances, but it is not an action We identify (future) action as such not by rinding a uniquely applicable description, but by specifying its type Future action cannot be referred to. 3) We must think that the conclusion of the practical syllogism is an action It seems to me that Cooper's and Mele's argument are not convincing 4) Prohaireton is the major premiss of the practical syllogism Aristotle's examples of the major premisses, however, are not always prohaireton Some of them do not fully specify the types of action to be performed 5) Therefore we must distinguish between the practical syllogism, conceived as including deliberative process, and the so-called "practical" syllogism, which has only two premisses As for human action, the latter is the last step leading to action, and in animal movement it is the only step In section III I criticize and modify Nussbaum's anankastic model of so-called practical syllogism 1) As Nussbaum says, misfire of action is explained either by not wanting G or by not believing it necessary to do A But the hypothetical necessity of A-ing is not relevant to the necessity for action, since if an agent does not want G, he will never do A, even if he believes it necessary for G We should take a parallel with the theoretical syllogism more seriously If one does not believe in premisses because of their falsity, one will not assert (phanai) the conclusion, even if one recognizes it as validly reasoned An action is performed only when both premisses are actualized, as akrates illustrates it negatively Aristotle's contention in asserting the necessity of action lies in the rejection of the third element, e g will, to explain action 2) As to a chosen act, the anankastic model should be modified As argued above, prohairesis is a unity of desire and belief Nonetheless, it is not an action, but a desire I suggest the following modification pN [{wanting G & believing (A for G)} and (believing now & here to A)→acting A] Akrates has both premisses, but he does not use his major premiss he does not stay in prohairesis (Elsewhere I argued for this unorthodox interpretation of akrasia) My arguments in this paper are rather sketchy and need elaboration Nevertheless, I should say that the present paper has taken a step in the right direction toward understanding action as enevgeia

著者

岩田 靖夫

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典學研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.8, pp.136-139, 1960-03-29

著者

平山 晃司

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典學研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.49, pp.86-97, 2001-03-05

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There has long been a controversy among scholars about how pharmakoi, or ancient Greek human scapegoats, were treated at the end of the ritual, namely, whether they were killed or not The disagreement among modern scholars has been caused by that among ancient writers some state that the pharmakoi were put to death, while others indicate their being driven out of the community But it makes little difference whether they were slam or expelled Greater significance is to be attached to the fact that some of those scholiasts and lexicographers who refer to the pharmakos ritual assert that stoning was performed in it Of the two sources for the pharmakos ritual at Abdera the scholiast on Ovid(Ibts 467)states that in that city the scapegoat was killed with stones every year, whereas the commentator on a Callimachus line (fr 90 Pfeiffer) asserts that he was stoned until he was driven over the borders There is a similar discrepancy between the two sources for the purificatory ritual at Massalia while Servius states that the ritual was performed as often as the citizens were suffering from pestilence and that it culminated in mere casting out of the scapegoat, according to 'Lactantius Placidus' the ritual was held annually and at the end of it the scapegoat was led out of the city beyond its boundaries and then was stoned to death What caused these discrepancies? As for the latter case, one could surmise that for some reason Servius and 'Lactantius' both misconstrued the following circumstances in Massalia in very ancient times, whenever they suffered from pestilence, they would kill a scapegoat with stones so as to save their own lives, this practice was gradually established as an annually performed ritual for averting pestilence, and subsequently the final treatment of the scapegoat changed into banishment from the city, possibly accompanied by a ceremonial stoning Such may be the case also with Abdera and the scholiast on Ibis may have made a mistake similar to that of 'Lactantius' The following two sources provide some support for this view (1) According to Helladius, the pharmakos ritual held at Athens has its origin in the unlawful death of Androgeos and the ensuing pestilential disease this suggests that the Athenians purified their city with scapegoats to survive the plague What was the ultimate fate of the original pharmakoi ? An account of Plutarch (Mor 297b-c) and an episode in Philostratus (VA 4 10)enable one to conjecture that they were stoned to death And we are informed by Harpocration that the Athenians would expel two pharmakoi during the festival of Thargelia Thus the same process of change as is supposed for Massalia (and perhaps for Abdera) can be detected here (2) According to Ister, as cited by Harpocration, a man named Pharmakos stole the sacred bowls of Apollo and was stoned to death, and at the Thargelia (of an unknown Ionian city) certain things were performed in imitation of this event Very probably the principal thing performed during the rite was a ceremonial stoning (or pelting with harmless objects such as, for example, squill bulbs) accompanying the expulsion of the pharmakos Here too the above-mentioned process can be well perceived From the materials shown above it may be inferred that in very ancient times in some Greek cities, on the occasion of crises such as plague or famine or drought, to purify the city they would stone to death either the perpetrator of a sacrilegious act which was regarded as the cause of the disaster, or scapegoat(s), if it was of unknown origin Such a practice was gradually established as an annual event with the purpose of averting calamity, and subsequently the expulsion of scapegoat (s) from the community became the essential element of the ritual and stoning changed into a symbolical, ceremonial act performed in casting out the scapegoat (s)

著者

原 正幸

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典學研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.26, pp.145-147, 1978-03-23

著者

山本 建郎

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典學研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.51, pp.20-30, 2003-03-20

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As is well known, in the Respublica III Plato remarks many kinds of harmoniai, among which he selects the Dorian and the Phrygian as fitting subject matter for education of the young The aim of this paper is firstly to find out the real nature of Dorian and other harmoniai The detailed structures are shown in the additional paragraph of Aristides Quintihanus (Arq)' De Musica I ch 9 as old-fashioned harmoniai, according to which we can guess that Plato's Dorian is akin to the form of disjunction of two tetrachords, the standard style of a scale of an octave On the other hand the rationalized styles of harmoniai as the species of an octave are also described in Arq (I ch 8) These structures correspond to the modes of Western Medieval and Renaissance music Historically speaking the standard schema of an octave has developed through Terpander's improvement Terpander's schema has been guessed to be conjunction of tetrachords added the tonos uppermost But this schema shows the Mixolydian octave instead of the Dorian To be Dorian the schema must be the form of disjunction As an evidence of the disjunct octave we can take up Nicomachus' description of Philolaus' scale in the Enchilidion ch 9 This passage is opposed to the description of Pythagoras' scale (Ench ch 5), which is an improvement of the old-fashioned conjunct scale Compared to Nicomachus' passages we can conclude that Terpander's schema must have been the disjunct schema devoid of the trite Terpander arranged the old-fashioned Dorian which had appeared much earlier into the rationalized schema of the disjunct octave Contrary to the Dorian the other old-fashioned harmoniai are supposed to come into existence respectively These traces could be seen in Plutarch's description (mainly on the Mixolydian) So the rationalized style of harmoniai which form the species of an octave should have come into existence somewhat later They might have been constructed artificially about BC430 when Eratocles (an inventor of the circularity of a scale) and Damon were both in their akme Plato's so called Dorianism is supposed to be a reaction against the overflowing of ethos of his age But Plato was not a theorist of harmonics, so he was unable to make an actual reformation It was Aristoxenus (Arx ) who reformed the musical situation by replacing the species with tonoi (pitch) Each tonos is also the same fragment as the species of an octave, but there is a central note, the mese, around which all of the other notes move As the mese works as a central note, many kinds of ethos in the species of an octave disappear, and the scale is reduced to the Dorian The system of tonos presupposes the Great Perfect System (GPS), two octaves system which has the mese as a central note Usually GPS wasconjectured to be arranged about at the middle of the 4^<th> century BC and succeeded by Arx , but I assert as a conclusion that it was invented by Arx constructing the system of tonos

著者

久保 正彰

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典學研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.28, pp.150-156, 1980-03-26

著者

岩崎 良三

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典學研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.5, pp.109-118, 1957-03-30

著者

松平 千秋

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典學研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.16, pp.1-12, 1968-03-30

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In the Aeschylean "Persae", Xerxes is contrasted, in a most simplified way, to Darius, his father. He is a fool, or at least a very thoughtless young man, who, by his reckless attempt to subdue Greece, has endangered the safety of the kingdom, which his predecessors, with Darius at their head, had laborously built up, guided by laudable foresight. The same person, as described by Herodotus in his Histories, can, however, hardly be done away with so easily. That Xerxes was endowed with royal dignity as well as lordly generosity, is well illustrated by episodes in the Histories: he is not inferior to his predecessor in this respect. What separates him from Darius, is the lack of firm mind and resolute will, while these are the very characteristics that principally made out the greatness of Cyrus and Darius. Xerxes was, unlike Cambyses who had a born inclination to insanity, a man of perfect normality. But the two shared the same fate to be heirs to their great predecessors, Xerxes to Darius, Cambyses to Cyrus. Both of them painfully felt their obligations to cope with their predecessors or even to surpass them in merits. However, they lacked the firmness of mind, which was most essential to actualize this ideal; hence their frustration. The way Herodotus presents us Xerxes in VII 187, with description of his physical characteristics, is most impressive and dramatic too, reminding us of the scene in the τειχοσκοπια, where Agamemnon is shown to Priamus by Helen. The lordly figure of the Great King, with his immense host behind him, is really that of a tragic hero, who proudly stands on the summit of happiness, not knowing what fate awaits him at the next moment. Does then Xerxes in fact deserve the name of a tragic hero? Perhaps in the modern, sentimental sense of the word, but surely not in its true sense. The present writer believes that Herodotus was well aware of it. In that he nevertheless dared to stage Xerxes as a tragic hero, one might discover some ironical implications of the author. It is indeed a typical tragic situation that Xerses is placed in. But it seems as if the main concern of the author lies not so much in the fate of Xerxes as in his character itself. Tradition assigns Sophocles, among the tragic poets, the nearest place to our author. It is a pity, however, that no record has been preserved concerning the contact which might have existed between Herodotus and Euripides.

著者

和田 利博

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典學研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.53, pp.114-124, 2005-03-08

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In Democritean atomism, all atomic motion is forced by blows of other atoms On the contrary, Aristotle demanded an explanation for why, if there was no natural motion for atoms, there was any motion for them at all In response to this criticism, Epicurus introduced the downward fall of atoms by their own weight as a natural motion for them But if all atoms only fall downwards at equal speed, why is there any collision amongst them at all ? This is just why the atomic swerve was introduced as another natural motion for atoms in Epicurean cosmology Now, according to Cicero, Epicurus introduced the atomic swerve to avoid a necessary motion by atom's own weight that he himself has introduced with the intention of improving upon Democritean atomism However, the fear arising from this necessity is that if all atoms were only to fall downwards, since there would be no collision amongst them, no compound body would be formed On the other hand, Diogenes of Oenoanda represents the atomic swerve in Epicurean atomism as counterevidence to a necessary motion by collisions amongst atoms in Democntean atomism And the fear arising from this necessity is that if all atoms were only to collide with one another, since the soul too is composed of them, no voluntary action would exist If that is the case, the testimony that the necessary motion by atom's own weight hinders the voluntariness of action by governing the mind is inaccurate Therefore, the interpretation that the atomic swerve ensures the voluntariness of action by freeing the mind from such a necessity is mistaken To sum up, in Epicurean atomism, the atomic swerve plays the following two roles (A) In his cosmology, the atomic swerve prevents the atom's own weight from causing all things (including all actions) not to occur by the blows of other atoms and makes a beginning of collisions amongst atoms, (B) In his theory of action, the atomic swerve prevents the collisions amongst atoms from causing all actions to occur exclusively by the blows of other atoms and breaks a chain of collisions amongst atoms (though it does not hinder collision itself, needless to say) Incidentally, Epicurus divides all things into three categories and contrasts necessity with chance and what depends on us And since the atomic swerve was exactly introduced to avoid necessity, it must be either chance or what depends on us However, there is much evidence suggesting that the atomic swerve is uncaused motion Judging from this, it is inevitable to conclude that the atomic swerve is a kind of chance Nevertheless, I suppose that the atomic swerve need not be the alternative of chance or what depends on us but can be either of them as the case may be That is, it is just the atomic swerve occurring even without the soul that Epicurus called chance in a general sense And what depends on us eventually means the action that has the atomic swerve occurring within the soul at the beginning of motion

著者

森谷 公俊

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典學研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.33, pp.40-48, 1985-03-29

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The concepts of arche and hegemonia in Isocrates have the following features in the light of analysis conducted from a politico-historical perspective. In the first place, Isocrates attributed a highly moral and ethical value to the concept of hegemonia. In his Panegyricus, he claimed that Athens alone deserved the title of supreme leader of the Greeks because the city had been a benefactor of the Greeks and a protector of all those who had suffered. This claim never changed throughout his political discourses. Secondly, Isocrates located the essence of arche in sea-power which he criticized as bringing misfortune to Greece, and stressed the ethical superiority of land hegemony. He came to this conclusion in his On the Peace as a result of the downfall of Sparta after the battle of Leuctra and the defeat of Athens in the Social War. His position is in sharp contrast to that of Thucydides and Old Oligarch, who insisted on the superiority of Athens as a sea-power. In the third place, he considered the problem of constitutional reform in the light of his concept of hegemonia. He sought the model of the ideal constitution in the age of hegemonia of Athens and Sparta, and described it in contrast to the age of arche. The concepts of arche and hegemonia in Isocrates reflect the political situation of Greece in the middle of the fourth century when Sparta, Thebes and Athens fell one after the other, and differ from those of historians such as Herodotus, Thucydides and Xenophon.

著者

仲手川 良雄

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典學研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.37, pp.1-11, 1989-03-15

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Both isegoria and parrhesia have the meaning "free speech", which seems to have been indispensable to the Greeks, especially the Athenians The aim of this paper is to inquire into the relationship between isegoria and parrhesia, two ways of realizing free speech at meeting It is noteworthy that the parrhesia, which came into being about the last third of the fifth century BC, came to be used widely in a short time and invaded the large sphere of the word isegoria What does this mean historically? The essence of isegoria is manifest in the expression heralds conventionally used to urge free speech in the assembly "Who wishes to address the assembly?" On the other hand, according to Aischines, the expression was formerly as follows . "Who of those above fifty years of age wishes to address the assembly?", this practice of addressing according to age was aimed at obtaining the best counsel for the polis, though it went out of fashion in Aischines' day An attitude of πολει χρηστον (rendering service to polis), which also is proclaimed in Euripides' Suppliants' "Who desires to bring good counsel for his polis to the people?", predominated among Athenians in the moderate democracy It declined remarkably, however, with the rise in radical democracy and the spread of individualism Moreover, we must consider the growth of class antagonism between οι χρηστοι and οι πονηροι, as is proven in Pseudo-Xenophon, Ath Pol 1 2, 1 6, 1 9, 3 12-13 In this situation, the word χρηστοζ might be viewed with a strong tincture of classconsciousness The multitude must have had some doubt as to whether the practice of addressing according to age and the principle of πολει χρηστον were serviceable to them or to οι χρηστοι alone They did away with that practice and introduced the parrhesia, by which every citizen could speak out on whatever he regarded as important and right, free of the restrictions of πολει χρηστον The shift in stress from isegoria to parrhesia corresponded with the momentous change in the actuality and the sense of polis-community

著者

朴 一功

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典學研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.47, pp.98-111, 1999-03-23

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By investigating the Greek word neidw and its cognates in the Republic and other dialogues, Popper believed that Plato is recommending rhetorical propaganda i. e. "talking over by foul means," together with violence, rather than "persuasion by fair means" as instruments of political technique (The Open Society and Its Enemies, 1945). But more important than this criticism is Morrow's claim that even without the foul means, persuasion, as is understood by Plato, involves ominous consequences ('Plato's Conception of Persuasion,' PR62, 1953). Morrow examined relevant passages, particularly in the Laws and concluded that Plato, who could not allow any soul to engage in "the free play of individual criticism" so that it could safely reach maturity, blinded himself to the deeper meaning of Socratic concern for the soul. Yet Socrates' dialectic, in which Morrow sees the spirit of genuine persuasion, does often break down without any agreement being reached when it is carried on with such difficult interlocutors as Callicles and Thrasymachus. Plato took seriously Socrates' failure to persuade them to care for virtue. My purpose is, by examining this line of Plato's thought, to show that his conception of persuasion has the significance drawn from his reflections on Socrates' dialectic. It is not just that the failure of a reasonable conversation would be, as Irwin supposes ('Coercion and Objectivity in Plato's Dialectic,' RIP40, 1986), due to the insincerity or ill-temperedness which the interlocutor displays in refusing to continue cooperative discussion. We know that in the Gorgias Socrates argued that rhetoric alleged to be the art of persuasion was no art but a mere empirical knack, whereas in a later dialogue, the Phaedrus, Plato concedes the possibility of the kind of rhetoric that deserves a genuine craft and sets it forth as the art of leading souls. What this remarkable change actually means will become clear to us when we consider Socrates' method of cross-examination and refutation. His arguments always rest on, and his conclusion step by step logically follows from, premises to which he secures agreement from his interlocutors. But the problem lies in the way in which the agreed-upon premises are accepted, taken, and felt by each interlocutor with his own point of view. Socrates' understanding of some premises does not agree with, and is sometimes irreconcilably different from, the interlocutor's, so that it is hard for them to share the same conclusion. For no statement and no word is a logical formula or a logical symbol to be manipulated in a definite way. Such disagreement has its roots, Plato's theory of the tripartite soul reveals, in their essentially different conceptions of the good that cannot be easily reduced to each other. Now in the Apology Socrates says, "the unexamined life is not worth living" and invites everyone to join in cooperative inquiry. However, when Plato wrote the Republic he had become sceptical, not about the truth of Socrates' memorable words, but about his philosophical activity characterized as inquiry into the truth by examinig himself and others, since everyone does not want to, and cannot, therefore, should not, examine himself or herself in the same way as Socrates does. Plato's realistic view is that no two people are born alike in that there are innate differences which fit them for different occupations. Dialectic requires a natural gift for it. People's different conceptions of the good, however, derive from their dominating desires or motives rather than from their natural gifts. Hence three basic types of men, the philosophic, the ambitious, and the lovers of gain. Plato can, then, no longer believe that the conflict of their value judgements is resolved by Socratic argument, since their experience, intelligence, and ability in discussion are decidedly different. Thus in the Phaedrus he attempts to reinstate rhetoric as the art of persuasion by basing it on psychology and dialectic. Plato was not blind to the deeper meaning of Socratic concern for the soul. Following Socrates, he certainly admits that genuine persuasion requires inquiry into the truth by dialectic, but unlike Socrates, he demands that a person who employs it should select a fitting soul, not every soul, to plant and sow in it his or her words founded on knowledge. Persuasion in other cases, therefore, must involve more or less "noble lies" or compulsion. Such conception of persuasion Plato applied to his own political philosophy. But perhaps the application was an inevitable conclusion for Plato himself who experienced more than once political confusion and violence in the Cave. Whether it may lead to liberation or enslavement of human beings, we can see in it Plato's insight into the significance of his master's philosophical activity. For, as Corn ford argued ('Plato's Common Wealth,' GR4, 1935), he would have foreseen that Socrates' mission pointed to a subversion of all existing institutions, which rest on fictitious devices.