著者

松永 雄二

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.10, pp.73-87, 1962-03-31 (Released:2017-05-23)

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Plato's formula of the One and the Many, as ιδεα and the sensibles respectively, is comprised in the recognition of Beauty itself and many beautiful things, without regard to their being man, horse, clothes etc Strictly speaking, these beautiful things are not beautiful man and horse, etc, but simply 'the many beautifuls'-whereas in Aristotle such a concept is inadmissible in his system a horse as a substance must be recognized as the substratum of the 'beautiful' In Phaedo 102 B3 ff, however, Simmias is said to be grasped independently and absolutely as a participant in the ιδεα(e g in the ιδεα "the Tall" or "the Small") and always remains as he is (i e having identity), no matter what ιδεα he takes In this trend of thought, does Plato recognize Simmias as a kind of substance=substratum, as Aristotle hold ? If so, does not Plato explain only alteration (αλλοιωσιζ) in his "causal" theory of ideas ? And does he recognize the independent reality of the so-called particulars (i e of physical things) apart from the ιδεα ? αλλοιωσιζ, however, even in Aristotle, is not αλλοιωσιζ simply because it is the alteration of qualities In order to be αλλοιωσιζ, the qualities to be changed must be the proper qualities, winch belong to the Substance itself (Arist De gen et corr, A 4, 319b 10 ff) But in the case of Plato the change can never be explained satisfactorily in terms of the changeable things, but only in the fact of their participation in the ιδεα so also the above-mentioned change in Simmias is not the change of his properties, which are primarily attached to Simmias himself The case is, strictly speaking, not then that Simmias became beautiful, but that something beautiful happened in Simmias Therefore Simmias here is only a locus in which Beauty appears-never a substance which has the quality "beautiful" in itself What, however, is Simmias as a locus ? Indeed he may not possess such a quality as beauty, yet we tend to attribute the term "man" and other definitions to Simmias as his inherent qualities But Plato never recognized Simmias as a Substance qua ο τιζ ανθρωποζ, Even in Aristotle, Simmias qua Simmias is not the same as Simmias qua ο τιζ ανθρωποζ, but only something combined with various attributes which belong to the respective categories In Plato, still more, Simmias is never identical with the "man as immanent ιδεα" -Thus, ultimately, both philosophers recognize that Simmias is different from ο τιζ ανθρωποζ, but the understanding of the content of this so-called Simmias qua Simmias is utterly different in the two cases whereas in Aristotle qua Simmias is thought to have all the distinct qualities which characterize the concrete man Simmias, in Plato, the so-called Simmias qua Simmias is understood as having no distinct attributes, when he loses the connection with the ιδεα of man It is this "Simmias" of which Plato speaks when he describes him as the participant in the "Tall" and "the Small" For in the case of Plato two propositions (1) "This fire is hot" and (2) "This fire is beautiful" are differentiated from each other, and may be put as follows the former (1) shows that the ειδοζ "Fire" is combined with the ειδοζ "Hot" eternally and essentially So it is changeable into a universal proposition But in the latter (2), because fire is not always beautiful, it is not a combination between the ειδοζ "Fire" and ειδοζ "Beauty" So in this case we can only assert "this thing is beautiful" In Plato's thought we can never grasp this event in the form "This fire is beautiful" So it follows that the relation between substance and attributes in the system of Aristotle is, from Plato's standpoint, the reverse of the relationship of the One and the Many Aristotle refers the many(View PDF for the rest of the abstract.)

著者

各著者

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.63, pp.99-152, 2015 (Released:2018-03-30)

著者

永井 龍男

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.41, pp.59-69, 1993-03-23 (Released:2017-05-23)

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In De Anima II 12 and III 1, Aristotle argues that the common sensibles (movement, rest, figure, magnitude and number)are perceived by each special sense only per accidens and they are perceived per se by a common sense. To understand Aristotle's theory of the common sense consistently, however, we must answer the following three questions. The first is whether the common sense is an independent faculty of the special senses or not. This needs consideration , because at the beginning of De Anima III 1 Aristotle denies that there is any sence faculty or any sense organ other than those of five special senses. The common sense is a part of the perceptual faculties of the primary (central) sense organ. Likewise, in the case of the special senses, their perceptions are achieved ultimately in the primary sense organ. Then, the faculty of perception which belongs to the primary sense organ is also contained in the special senses. Accordingly, for the common sense, we don't need any sense organ other than those needed for the special senses. In a way, the special senses as a whole contain the common sense. The second question is as follows : Aristotle thinks all the senses are the faculties receiving sensible forms, but what are the forms of the common sensibles? In De Anima 424a17-b3 and 426a27-b7, Aristotle insists that the sense is some sort of ratio(logos), and the former passage suggests that sensible forms are some type of ratios as well, This suggestion is confirmed by the arguments in De Sensu. Then, it is possible to take the forms of the common sensibles as some type of ratios. The interpretation above enables us to construe the form of magnitude as the external ratio of an extension of some object to the extensions of other objects, and the form of figure as the internal ratio between some parts of the extension of an object. The third question is how we can defend the commonness of the common sensibles to the special senses against G. Berkeley's arguments which deny the commonness of magnitude and of figure to sight and touch. If we regard the forms of the common sensibles not as extentions as such but as some type of ratios, we can defend the commonness. Having identified magnitude with extention, Berkeley puts two points. (1) The visible objects(colour, light)and the tangible objects (solidity, resistance)are entirely different, therefore, there are fundamental differences between the visible magnitude and the tangible magnitude and between the visible figure and the tangible figure. (2) The tangible extension(i. e. magnitude) is invariably the same, but the visible extension(i. e. magnitude)varies as you approach or recede. If we deny the identity of magnitude with extension and consider(with Aristotle)that the magnitude is a sort of ratio, then these two points are clarified. For, first, although the visible extension and the tangible extension is radically different, the ratio of some extension to other extensions can be common to sight and touch. And, secondly, it is true that the visible extension of the same object changes according to its distance, but it is possible that in different perspectives the changing extension refers to the same ratio. Thus, we can defend the commonness of the common sensibles against Berkeley's arguments.

著者

小池 和子

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.61, pp.136-139, 2013-03-28 (Released:2017-05-23)

著者

長谷川 岳男

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.42, pp.79-89, 1994-03-28 (Released:2017-05-23)

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The nature of assemblies convened at the synodoi and the synkletoi in the second century B. C. is one of the most inextricable questions in the study of political organizations in the Achaian Confederacy. This is because Polybios' descriptions on the Achaian Confederacy are replete with contradictions. This paper investigated the question above by re-examining the evidence concerning Achaian assemblies. It is generally accepted that the synodos and the synkletos are not terms indicating the bodies of the assemblies. "Synodos" merely means a regular meeting, held four times a year, while "synkletos" means a specially summoned extraordinary meeting. Many scholars have thought that a primary assembly had been originally convened and resolved all subjects in the synodoi, but after regulations were introduced in the late third century B. C. which forbade summoning the primary assembly except for special subjects, e. g. alliance, war or written communications from the Roman Senate, the synkletos was created to deal with important subjects and the synodos began to deal only with routine subjects. This assumption is mainly based on Polybios' description of the synkletos held in Sikyon in 169 B. C. His writings indicate that this synkletos was assembled to discuss military aid to Egypt after an appeal that it was illegal to discuss this subject in the synodos was made. The synkletos was opened not only to the boule but also to all citizens over thirty. Based on this information, the synkletos was generally regarded as a primary assembly which dealt with special subjects. If, however, a primary assembly was convened in the synkletos, two problems arise. First, the membership of this meeting excluded citizens in their twenties and those serving in the Achaian army. This contradicts several passages which imply that the Achaian army occasionaly acted as the equivalent of an assembly. Therefore, it was not an ekklesia that was summoned in the synkletos. Second, military aid was not a subject which required summoning the primary assembly(cf. XXVII. 2. 11-12). Furthermore, several kinds of assemblies could be specially summoned. In concluson, "synkletos" referred not only to a specially summoned primary assembly but also to all kinds of assemblies which were specially summoned (i. e. in the Greek original sense). Therefore, another explanation is required for Polybios' description that the synkletos was specially held in Sikyon. For this purpose, the synodos in the second century B. C. should be examined. Many studies have centered on the synodos and attempted to prove that a specific assembly, either a boule or an ekklesia, was convened in every synodos. Unless, however, one abandons this preconceived idea that earlier scholars have had, the contradictions between the two types of synodoi, a boule and an ekklesia that were mentioned in Polybios' descriptions, are inextricable. By careful examination of the descriptions, it is evident that an ekklesia convened in the synodos dealt with subjects prescribed by the regulations mentioned above to be resolved by an ekklesia, while boulai convened in synodoi dealt with subjects which were not prescribed by the regulations. Besides, Polybios' narrative on the synodoi implies that the magistrates were summoned before a synodos to discuss the subject. In conclusion, one can say that the federal magistrates chose the body of the assembly according to the subject to be dealt with by each synodos as well as by each synkletos. This assumption explains why the synodos held in 168 B. C. could not deal with military aid for Egypt. Since the magistrates summoned an ekklesia in this synodos disregarding that this subject could not be discussed in an ekklesia, a synkletos was specially convened in Sikyon to discuss the matter. One concludes upon these re-examinations that the Achaian assemblies,(View PDF for the rest of the abstract.)

著者

藤澤

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.34, pp.179-180, 1986-03-18 (Released:2017-05-23)

著者

久保 正彰

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.10, pp.100-103, 1962

著者

三嶋 輝夫

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.52, pp.1-12, 2004-03-05 (Released:2017-05-23)

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In the following, I would like first to clarify what Cleitophon actually demands from Socrates in the eponymous dialogue Second, I sketch how Socrates is depicted in it Third, I examine the legitimacy of Cleitophon's demands and, finally, take up the vexed problem of authorship 1 What does Cleitophon demand from Socrates? Cleitophon expresses his demands in various forms Though Cleitophon does not articulate the nature of their relationship, we could take him to demand two things, namely (i) to go beyond a mere exhortation and grasp the matter fully (cf 408d3-4), that is, to define what justice is by giving its peculiar ergon (cf 409b6-c1), and (ii) to give a concrete advice concerning the next step which corresponds to the nature of Cleitophon's soul (cf 410d1-5) 2 What features does Socrates have in the Cleitophon ? Socrates here should be differentiated into two figures the Socrates in the frame dialogue, who directly speaks to Cleitophon (Sc1), and the Socrates indirectly portrayed by Cleitophon (Sc2) Most of the thoughts put into the mouth of Sc2, except for Polemarchus' thesis, can be regarded as basically Platonic, whereas Sc1 shows both Platonic and non-Platonic traits This strongly suggests that the main target of the author is the Socrates of Plato, giving some hint as to the authorship 3 Is the demand made by Cleitophon legitimate? On this, there seem to be three options A Cleitophon's demand (CD) is legitimate because he rightly sees the dangerous consequence of being merely protreptic and leaving the young at a loss without giving any positive guidance B1 CD is illegitimate because he understands neither Socrates' role as a "midwife" nor the meaning of philosophizing in a Socratic sense B2 CD is illegitimate because Socrates actually gave a definite practical principle, namely the absolute denial of doing injustice (adikein) B1 appears to be convincing, but in view of the similar demand made by Glaukon in the Republic II, it is highly likely that Plato himself felt some uneasiness about the aporetic ending of the first book, which undoubtedly stands in close connection with the Cleitophon B2 deserves serious consideration Still, it seems to me that B2 cannot satisfy CD either, so long as Socrates offers no clear definition of injustice itself From all this, I am inclined to agree with A 4 Is the Cleitophon Plato's work ? Apart from other grounds for doubt, the problem of wrongly ascribing the "Harming enemies and helping friends" principle to Socrates still remains the fatal stumbling block to claims of authenticity The only possible way to avoid this would be to regard the Cleitophon as a draft conceived before the Republic I, which seems to me very improbable It is more plausible to assume, as some scholars have already done, that somebody other than Plato wrote the Cleitophon after reading the Republic I, and that Plato, having found Cleitophon's demand to be justified, then wrote the rest of the Republic

著者

池田 黎太郎

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.17, pp.22-27, 1969

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この小論はOresteiaをθρασο&b.sigmav;に基づくδικηの否定という観点から論じようと試みる.周知のようにδικηはこの作品の中心になる重要な思想であり,それを主に「正義・裁き・報復」の意味に分ける.δικηはこの劇の中で,「正義の名によって敵を裁く行為が実は報復にほかならない」というパターンを構成し,報復は報復を呼んで悲劇的な悪循環を生ずる.これがアトレウス家に伝わる呪いの実態であり,オレステースの母殺しはその呪いの頂点に立つ.女神アテーナーはオレステースの罪を裁き,「自らの手」による報復行為を否定すると共に,劇の背後にある市民の抗争をも警告している.この報復のδικηをθρασο&b.sigmav;, τολμαとして把えようとする私の試みは,アトレウス家の呪いと,当時のポリスの問題の特質を示し,この伝承を劇化した作者の意図を明らかにすることができると思う.

著者

瀬口 昌久

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.42, pp.25-35, 1994

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An Eleatic stranger presents the definition that being is nothing but power or function(dynamis)in the Sophist(247d-e). However, this definition is not accepted by the friends of the Forms because they are afraid of the paradox that Reality must be acted upon in so far as it is known(248a4-248e5). They believe that cannot happen to the changeless. I shall attempt to clarify the purpose of this paradox and whether the definition of being as power is maintained. D. Keyt analysed the paradox and found that it is based on five premises (Plato's Paradox that the Immutable is Unknowable, PQ, 19, 1969, 1-14). (1) Real being is completely changeless. (2) Being is known. (3)To know is to act on something. (4)If knowing is acting on something, then that which is known is acted upon. (5)To be acted upon is to be changed. Premises(2)-(5)entail the denial of(1) , which contradicts the belief of the friends of the Forms. Does Plato avoid the contradiction? If so, how? As Keyt points out, no one has claimed that Plato rejects either(2) or(4). I shall consider premises(1) , (3) and(5). Many commentators(e. g. J. Moravcsik, G. E. L. Owen, I. M. Crombie, R. S. Bluck, W. G. Runciman)think that Plato rejects(1). However, they are claiming that the Forms are subject to change only in the sense that dated propositions are true of them, not that the Forms undergo a change of their own nature when they are known. If the Form of Justice is known by an individual, a temporal proposition is added to the Form, and then the Form is changed in an accidental way. However, this view has no textual evidence. On the contrary, it contradicts the statement in the Timaeus that the Forms are timeless (37e1-38a8). W. D. Ross suggests that(3) is the only explicit hypothesis of the five and holds the view that in knowledge the object acts on the mind not vice versa. Ross ignores the fact that the paradox is meant to damage the claim that the power of acting or being acted upon belongs to becoming but not to being (Keyt, p. 4). Other commentators(F. M. Corn ford, H. Cherniss, G. Vlastos)suppose that Plato himself will abandon(5). They think that the spiritual motion distinguished from the physical does not alter its objects. Keyt and A. C. Ray criticize this interpretation on the ground that the distinction between physical and spiritual motion is not drawn in the Sophist. If it had been drawn, the friends of the Forms would not have adhered to(5). I support the denial of(5). The problem is why the friends of Forms stick to(5). I connect the definition of being as power with the perception theory in the Theaetetus(155e-157d). "More refined and subtle people" in the Theaetetus maintain the principle that everything arises from the motion of two kinds of power, the one being active and the other passive. I suggest the definition of being in the Sophist derives from this Heraclitean principle of being. Plato deliberately omits the crucial word "kinesis" in the Heraclitean principle from the definition of being in the Sophist. It is by virtue of this omission that the definition of being can be applied to real being as well as material things. Moreover, when the notion of the active and passive power is distinguished from that of changes or motions, the definition will ensure Plato's view of the communion of Forms. The paradox shows the absurdity which arises when we connect the active and passive power of Forms with motion or change. Plato's aim in the paradox is to establish the view that the power of Forms need not cause changes in its objects. I conclude that the definition of being as power is maintained and not given up after the paradox and is the key to understanding the meaning of real being.

著者

橋本 資久

出版者

日本西洋古典学会 ; 1953-

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 = Journal of classical studies (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

no.65, pp.25-35, 2017

著者

藤繩 謙三

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.9, pp.14-25, 1961-03-29 (Released:2017-05-23)

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The peculiar use of the chariots in the Iliad is usually explained as being due to Homer's ignorance of their use among the Mycenaeans who must have "fought like the Hittites" (D. Gray). Of course, there are some passages in the Iliad which suggest that the Mycenaeans attempted such chariot fighting (e. g. Nestor's advice to his charioteers, -A 297 ff.), and the Linear B tablets attest the existence of some hundreds of chariots in Knossos and Pylos. In spite of these facts, considering the geographical conditions of Greece, we cannot imagine that such tactics were so effective as to be widely used. So I think the assumption doubtful that Homer had forgotten Mycenaean chariot tactics, and having reexamined the text of the Iliad, I point out some evidence against the assumption. (1) Even among the chief heroes we find some who have no chariot for their own use, to say nothing of chariot troops (e. g. Odysseus, Aias of Salamis, Teukros and Aias of Lokris). As this difference among the heroes must be due to the geographical conditions, it certainly existed in the Mycenaean Age. Moreover, since Odysseus and Aias of Salamis are on equal terms with the other heroes, the possession of chariots must have been of little importance. (2) Among the Achaeans, fifteen persons have epithets relating to horses (or chariots), ten of them being of the former generation (e. g. Pelops, Atreus, Peleus and Nestor), and only five in the prime of life (e. g. Diomedes and Patroklos). This curious ratio shows that, though in earlier times horses (or chariots) had been highly esteemed, their value became lower towards the end of the Mycenaean Age. This change suggests that they were not effective in actual battles. (3) While we find many formulae which depict the scenes of jumping down, falling or making a person fall, from a chariot, there is no set formulae in the Iliad which depict an attack from a chariot. But a few passages show that Homer himself (or his immediate predecessors) aimed to depict attacks from chariots, combining spear-throwing formulae with a falling-from-a-chariot formula (Ε 275-97, Θ116-23). Therefore, strictly speaking, it is not Homer but the stock of the traditional formulae, that is responsible for the treating of the chariots as mere vehicles. We cannot assume that Homer or his immediate predecessors should have left out, if there had been any, fighting-from-chariots formulae, since they sometimes wanted to depict such scenes. Moreover, some parallel cases confirm the possibility that formulae which are inconsistent with each other do co-exist. So it does not seem possible that the fighting-from-chariots formulae arose from the many treatments in chariot fighting in the Mycenaean Epics. One is inclined to conclude that with regard to the use of chariots there was no great difference between the Mycenaean World and the Homeric.

著者

鎌田 雅年

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.45, pp.50-60, 1997-03-10 (Released:2017-05-23)

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In Plato's Apology, Socrates claims that he knows nothing good on the one hand and indicates almost absolute confidence concerning the righteousness of his philosophical activities on the other. I think the latter appears in this claim of knowledge of his. "I know it is evil and disgraceful to do injustice and to disobey my superior, god or man."(29b) What is the relationship between this claim of knowledge and his consciousness of knowing nothing good and how does this claim of knowledge make him confident? G. Vlastos thinks Socrates had a special kind of knowledge and so a certain extent of virtue and therefore thought his life was happy. Vlastos regarded Socrates' knowledge in the weaker sense as elenctically justifiable beliefs and considered Socrates' conviction dependant on such knowledge. According to Vlastos, such knowledge always has 'a security-gap,' i. e. the possibility of being false. However, we do not want to decrease this 'gap' at the expense of our daily utilities and try to live with this fallible knowledge. The trial described in the Apology is not a daily event but a situation unavoidable for Socrates' life and death. For this reason, I can not think that the basis for deciding whether our way of life is just or not is on the same level as a simple decision in daily life. Therefore, even if the knowledge in 29b is fallible knowledge in Vlastos' sense, I think it can not explain Socrates' moral conviction about the righteousness of his philosophical activities. In the Apology, one aspect of the knowledge Socrates ascribes to himself is the so-called 'consciousness of ignorance.' Socrates brings forward the god of Delphi as a witness to his knowledge. On his first interpretation of the oracle of Delphi, the god of Delphi allows only Socrates' consciousness of ignorance as a kind of knowledge. The knowledge claimed in 29b and 37b includes moral judgements. Therefore, Socrates' basis for this knowledge has been thoroughly discussed in relation to his claim of consciousness of ignorance. One way to resolve this problem is to take it into account that Socrates apologizes during his trial. In a trial, it is necessary not only to clearly tell his audience what he knows, but also to clarify the basis of his knowledge. But does he need to show the basis of the knowledge-claims in 29b and 37b? What he said there is, if we take his words at their face value, self-evident to his audience, but recognizing what is implied, we(and also his audience)can not accept Socrates' words easily. Namely, he says he chooses the death penalty rather than the banishment from his country. This is what anyone in his audience would expect, but could not be persuaded easily. For without any other condition, anyone of us would wish to avoid the death penalty. But Socrates had an inviolable condition. So in the Apology 29b, he does not simply claim the truth of his beliefs but also emphasizes that there is a firm basis for the knowledge-claim and that he had a resolute will to behave according to his beliefs. I think the very basis which he was ready to bring forward as his witness is at the core of his moral conviction. Socrates brings forward the god of Delphi as a witness for the knowledge-claim in 29b and 37b. However, as previously said, the oracle of Delphi does not issue substantive statements or commands. In short, he 'interprets' the oracle as a command of the god and on this interpretation relates his consciousness of his ignorance to the knowledge claimed in 29b and 37b. I think this interpretation makes his conviction firmer. For the basis of his knowledge is what Socrates can not doubt the truth of, i. e. the oracle of Delphi brought to Socrates from an external source. In addition, he accepted this oracle as seriously as his own consciousness after prolonged philosophical activity(View PDF for the rest of the abstract.)

著者

安西 眞

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.46, pp.1-11, 1998

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As editor's critical sign in the present editions of Bacchylides shows, the supplement α[ιξν, ω] at Bacchylides 2. 1 will certainly be correct. The reference, however, to Pindaric parallels, "N. 5. 2 etc."(etc. means 0. 14. 20 as the history of the supplement demonstrates), which was first made by Kenyon and has been made by Teubner-B. editors and still stands in the ap. cr. of the present edition, is, I am afraid, misleading. αιξον, ελθε (0. 14. 20), and στειχε(N. 5. 2)are of similar meaning(of human physical actions, of going and coming), in the same person(2sg.)that represents "my song", in the same mood(imperative) , and belong to the same poetical tradition(as the variations of homeric "Sing-Muse"). Moreover, all these verbs work as a principal part of the same grammatical pattern, that is, they all work as the finite verb in the same structure[finite verb in the first person or in the persons related to the first person with a connotation of human physical action(go, jump, stop etc.) +participle which stands on human verbal capacity(sing, talk etc.)] Therefore, the reference made by the editors since Kenyon to these Pindaric "parallels" seems on the surface to be reasonable enough. The stylistic backgrounds, however, of each poet are entirely different. In sing-Muse-motif or in I-sing-motif, Pindar consistently uses verbs with connotation of human physical action ; Bacchylides uses them only here. In Pindar's epinicia we find 23 sentences in the grammatical pattern which is just mentioned ; in Bacchylides', on the contrary, αιξον φερουσ' αγγελιαν is a unique instance. Behind their differences in terms of style and sentencestructure shown here I see their basic difference in the mode of epinicionmaking: Pindar heavily relied upon the chorus'(i. e. ego in his epinicia) physical competence in their performance as well as on their verbal capaclty; their physical competence, on the other hand, never entered Bacchylides' mind when he was making his epinician text. Concerning, therefore, both poets' mode of epinicion-making, the ap. cr. could be considered misleading.

著者

引地 正俊

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.13, pp.116-126, 1965

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The story of Leucippe and Clitophon has, more than any other Greek novel, a striking peculiarity in its structure In the introductory part of the novel where Chtophon is first introduced to us, the author (supposed to be Achilles Tatius) himself puts in an appearance as one of the characters, who, admiring the great force of the god of love, draws our attention to Eros depicted in a painting The force of Eros is, through the words of various characters, emphasized repeatedly in the novel the whole world, under the dominion of Eros, is considered to be provided with a "dynamic" harmony But why is that harmony dynamic ? It is made dynamic by Tyche, who actualizes or crystallizes the force of Eros in various ways All the incidents in the story are caused by Tyche (who is identified as the goddess to develop the very plot of the novel) Mehtte, Thersander's wife, who appears in the Book 5, should be regarded as one of such παιδια of Tyche And Clitophon, as a faithful slave to Eros, returns Melitte's violent love behind the back of Leucippe But here the author of the novel puts himself in a dilemma his is now obliged to admit Thersander's love for Leucippe and to give up the heroine's chastity, which has been traditionally important for the composition of novels, for Thersander too might be regarded as one of Tyche's victims burning with the flames of Eros On the other hand, Tyche is used in another sense for the composition of the novel Achilles Tatius, who holds that we are often informed beforehand of the actions of Tyche in various ways, interposes at regular intervals several descriptions of the pictures seen by certain characters and gives us hints of the incidents which are to happen in each successive part of the plot But his "oracular" method of composition is used up while the heroine's chastity is in peril, and the names of Eros and Tyche, which have so far appeared quite often, begin to vanish after the sixth volume, and Thersander soon turns out to be a thorough rascal Then, finally but abruptly, ignoring the plan laid out at the outset, Achilles Tatius puts an end to the novel without any words to thank Clitophon for his long narration and gives us an unsatisfactory impression, which might be attributable to the fact that the author has given up at midpoint the inner structure of his novel together with the outer one

著者

田中 咲子

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.53, pp.34-46, 2005

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It has been already noticed almost for one century that the figure of the dead as well as of the bereaved are often depicted together on white ground lekythoi of the Classical period It has, however, hardly been tried to define the status of the dead, namely whether the figure represents him in his life time or after his death Rather the definition seems to have been avoided This prevaling attitude is influenced by Buschor's view He regards the subject of the scenes as the "Verbundenheit" between two people, and he saids the idea that the bereaved and the dead should be distinguished clearly in the scenes is irrelevant The painters did not intend that Life and death are overlapped in the scenes and they are inseparable However, after I found a remarkable representation on some white ground lekythoi by the Achilles-Painter, his interpretation began to seem questionable to me It is the hand pointing to the earth with forefinger that I have found The painter depicted it three times on his lekythoi in New York , two on the lekythoi with grave stele (1989 281 72, 08 258 16) and one without suggestion of the location (08 258 18) Since the painter left us various exquisite representations of the hands, for example, that very soft hand playing the lyre in Munich, and also, by comparing some hands of the same form but in different contexts by some other vase painters from the time, we can conclude that he painted consciously these three hands to point to the earth Subsequently, what do these hands mean? Do they not mean that the figures belong to the world of Hades? We know from literary sources, for example, the tragedies from the same period, that the Greeks generally had a common idea that the dead lived in the underworld or in the tomb Therefore we can regard the figure of the dead as someone who has already crossed the river Acheron That means that the Achilles-painter intended to distinguish the dead and the bereaved Why therefore can the dead and the bereaved share the same sphere, even though each belongs to the different worlds? I regard the scene that the dead appears in front of the bereaved, especially in the scene with a grave stele, at the tomb It is of course a fantasy But this conception is sometimes seen also in the tragedies Aeschylus depicted the dead Dareios appearing at his tomb(Persai, 681ff), and Sophokles made Elektra speak to the tomb of her father asking him to appear in front of her (Elektra) These examples enable us to consider the scenes on the lekythoi as a representation of the wish of the family of the deceased to see him again In this interpretation the scene and the status of the dead is defined more precisely, but it is not always incompatible with the view of Buschor, because in this interpretation as well the essence of the scene is the "Verbundenheit"

著者

中谷 彩一郎

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.56, pp.89-101, 2008

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This paper examines the reception of Achilles Tatius' Greek romance, Leucippe & Clitophon in Paris in the first half of the seventeenth century, when France took the lead in the vogue for Greek romances in Europe. In section 1, I investigate the readership. Abraham Bosse's engraving representing the stall of Augustin Courbe shows that Leucippe & Clitophon was then regarded as fashionable literature. Achilles Tatius flourished and became popular among intellectuals in Paris. It was translated, discussed, and even provided the nicknames of the salon. Section 2 summarises the literary influence. In the history of French literature, the first half of the seventeenth century is called the baroque age. The baroque refers to a cultural taste, which seeks change and movement, and departs from regulations. Achilles Tatius appealed strongly to this baroque sensibility and acted as a good source for literature. In prose, Nicolas de Montreux, Martin Fumee, Francois de Gerzan, and Honore d' Urfe, to a greater or a lesser degree, imitated scenes from Achilles Tatius, while Jean Herembert's Pandion et Yonice (1599) was solely dependent on Leucippe & Clitophon. In drama, Pierre du Ryer and probably Alexandre Hardy dramatised Achilles Tatius round 1629, and du Ryer's Alcimedon (1632) also has some allusion to the Greek author. Section 3 focuses on du Ryer's play, Clitophon: tragi-comedie. The description of the mise-en-scene by Laurent Mahelot illustrates how the play is spectacular. The plot is filled with varied incidents, adventures of the hero and the heroine over three cities: elopement, shipwreck, pirates, war, sacrifice, the court etc, as of course is the Greek novel. Section 4 treats Abraham Ravaud's romance, L'Angelique, which reflects his own view of Leucippe & Clitophon as a French translator. The opening scene is a pastiche of events specifically derived from Achilles Tatius (the shipwreck, the Scheintod, the attempt to die beside the lover's tomb, the appearance of two barbarians, and the conversation in a locus amoenus) embellished with the in medias res structure from Heliodorus' Aethiopica. It is surprising to find so many events combined in the opening scene, but it is the author's strategy to captivate readers right from the start and keep them in suspense. The final section presents an overview of the theory of prose fiction. In the preface to his edition of Achilles Tatius (1640), Claudius Salmasius traced a history of fiction from the Persian amatoria, the Asian Milesian tales through Arabic narrative to Spain, from which France acquired the romance. In 1641, George de Scudery was the first to call the ancient novel a Roman in the sense of prose fiction, and cleary propounded several rules of romance. And Huet's Lettre a M. de Segrais sur l'origine des romans (1670) not only systematised and developed their ideas, but was also the high-point of appreciation of the ancient novel. It is ironic that his treatise was attached to Zayde by Madame de La Fayette because her La princesse de Cleves (1678) would soon dramatically change the essence of prose fiction.

著者

大芝 芳弘

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.55, pp.149-151, 2007-03-16 (Released:2017-05-23)

著者

山下 太郎

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.39, pp.82-91, 1991

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In Virgil's Georgics, the relation between the end of Book 4 (the Aristaeus story) and the poem as a whole has often been questioned Many scholars have noticed that this story reflects the preceding main themes of the poem the Aristaeus episode reminds us of the theme of labor, while the Orpheus episode tells about the theme of amor and mors But how can we understand the relation between these two episodes? A close analysis of the episodes shows not only how Virgil explains the human condition in the age of Jupiter, but also how he develops the view of Lucretius on civilization, love, and death But here arises another question how can we interpret the fact that the story reflects the significant influence of Homer, with the Orpheus episode at the same time being connected with the Eclogues (esp Eel 6 and 10) ? This fact results in the impression that the story, irrelevant to the preceding didactic part of the poem, is abruptly introduced My answer is that the end of the fourth Georgic may have a hidden function of expressing the poet's career as a primus poet in Rome The Orpheus episode, closely united with the theme of amor and mors in the Eclogues, implies that Virgil has written the Eclogues, while the Aristaeus story as a whole shows Virgil's original point of view on the human condition Further, the impression that the story is closely related to epic poetry suggests Virgil's intention of writing an epic in the future This view is confirmed by another similar example found in the epilogue of Book 2 and the proem of Book 3 First, in 2 475-494, Virgil compares his view of nature and happiness with that of Lucretius, even though the former's view is quite like that of a shepherd in the Eclogues Second, through the description of happy farmers, the epilogue of Book 2 expresses the ideal of the Georgics which reflects the theme of labor in the first half of the poem Third, in the proem of Book 3, Virgil promises to write an epic which will glorify not only Caesar but also Virgil himself In short, this middle part of the poem implies that the poet has already written the Eclogues, and is writing the Georgics now, and will write an epic in the future Just as in this middle part, the end of the fourth Georgic not only reflects the preceding main themes but also, as a kind of sphragis, implies the poet's career as an original poet in Rome

著者

瀬口 昌久

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.42, pp.25-35, 1994-03-28 (Released:2017-05-23)

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An Eleatic stranger presents the definition that being is nothing but power or function(dynamis)in the Sophist(247d-e). However, this definition is not accepted by the friends of the Forms because they are afraid of the paradox that Reality must be acted upon in so far as it is known(248a4-248e5). They believe that cannot happen to the changeless. I shall attempt to clarify the purpose of this paradox and whether the definition of being as power is maintained. D. Keyt analysed the paradox and found that it is based on five premises (Plato's Paradox that the Immutable is Unknowable, PQ, 19, 1969, 1-14). (1) Real being is completely changeless. (2) Being is known. (3)To know is to act on something. (4)If knowing is acting on something, then that which is known is acted upon. (5)To be acted upon is to be changed. Premises(2)-(5)entail the denial of(1) , which contradicts the belief of the friends of the Forms. Does Plato avoid the contradiction? If so, how? As Keyt points out, no one has claimed that Plato rejects either(2) or(4). I shall consider premises(1) , (3) and(5). Many commentators(e. g. J. Moravcsik, G. E. L. Owen, I. M. Crombie, R. S. Bluck, W. G. Runciman)think that Plato rejects(1). However, they are claiming that the Forms are subject to change only in the sense that dated propositions are true of them, not that the Forms undergo a change of their own nature when they are known. If the Form of Justice is known by an individual, a temporal proposition is added to the Form, and then the Form is changed in an accidental way. However, this view has no textual evidence. On the contrary, it contradicts the statement in the Timaeus that the Forms are timeless (37e1-38a8). W. D. Ross suggests that(3) is the only explicit hypothesis of the five and holds the view that in knowledge the object acts on the mind not vice versa. Ross ignores the fact that the paradox is meant to damage the claim that the power of acting or being acted upon belongs to becoming but not to being (Keyt, p. 4). Other commentators(F. M. Corn ford, H. Cherniss, G. Vlastos)suppose that Plato himself will abandon(5). They think that the spiritual motion distinguished from the physical does not alter its objects. Keyt and A. C. Ray criticize this interpretation on the ground that the distinction between physical and spiritual motion is not drawn in the Sophist. If it had been drawn, the friends of the Forms would not have adhered to(5). I support the denial of(5). The problem is why the friends of Forms stick to(5). I connect the definition of being as power with the perception theory in the Theaetetus(155e-157d). "More refined and subtle people" in the Theaetetus maintain the principle that everything arises from the motion of two kinds of power, the one being active and the other passive. I suggest the definition of being in the Sophist derives from this Heraclitean principle of being. Plato deliberately omits the crucial word "kinesis" in the Heraclitean principle from the definition of being in the Sophist. It is by virtue of this omission that the definition of being can be applied to real being as well as material things. Moreover, when the notion of the active and passive power is distinguished from that of changes or motions, the definition will ensure Plato's view of the communion of Forms. The paradox shows the absurdity which arises when we connect the active and passive power of Forms with motion or change. Plato's aim in the paradox is to establish the view that the power of Forms need not cause changes in its objects. I conclude that the definition of being as power is maintained and not given up after the paradox and is the key to understanding the meaning of real being.