著者

田中 利光

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.40, pp.1-11, 1992

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Plato said that names are instruments with which we differentiate things according to their nature and teach one another something(388B10-C1). The text is written in the figure Hysteron Proteron. It appears to be commonly unnoticed. By the correctness of names, Plato means two states which concern names. One is the correctness in the sense of using names as instruments correctly(cf. 387C1). The other is the correctness in the sense that names in themselves are fine as instruments(cf. 388D6-7). Plato's view on the correctness of names in the first sense is as follows : Determination is not according to a man's fancy, but according to their nature by names which their nature prescribes(cf. 387B11-C4, D4-8). In this connection 'names' does not mean the sound only, but the combination of sound and meaning. If we pay attention to sound only, we cannot understand why truth-falsehood of names and Protagoras' theory became the topic in the Cratylus. When Hermogenes first argues that the correctness of names is not natural but conventional and arbitrary, names which he has in mind are combinations of sound and meaning. When he later mentions that names for the same things differ with languages(385D9-E3)in order to support his view, names that he mentions imply their sounds only. In this point, he is confused. Plato denies Hermogenes' view, but it is a matter of course that Plato recognizes the fact Hermogenes mentions. Plato describes the fact in the style of a myth(390A4-7). The importance of Plato's view on the correctness of names cannot be understood well if we pay attention to their sounds only. It is best understood, in connection with what is said at Thucydides 3, 82, 4. Plato's view on the correctness of names in the second sense is as follows : It is to have a likeness to "that which is a name(Collective Singular)" (389D7). Also, names given by custom have it to some degree. To what degree? It is the dialectician that judges it case by case(388D6-390C12). If fine names are to be given as custom, it requires the dialectician as its supervisor (390D4-5). The nomothete is not the philosopher(Cf. Guthrie, ib. p. 6. n. 3.), but custom personified. Plato repeats a part of the above-mentioned view after an introductory phrase "Cratylus is right in saying that...."(390d9). Thus, Cratylus' view appears to be approved. However, in the rest of the Cratylus, Cratylus' theory of names is refuted completely. How should this point be interpreted? I understand that Socrates pretends that Cratylus is right in the view assumed to be his(an example of Socratic irony) ; otherwise, it should be understood that the circumstantial participle λεγων is used not modally, but conditionally(cf. Crat. 387C1, Phikb. 34A10, Laws 727A2, 862A1). The rest of the Cratylus considers what the correctness of names is like and shows that it is not as Cratylus thinks. Then, what is it like? I think we can see concretely what the correctness in the second sense is like, e.g. at Rep. 433A8-B1, 533D4-5 and what the correctness in the first sense is like, e.g. at Rep. 476D5-6.

著者

神崎 繁

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.32, pp.41-53, 1984

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Many scholars treat the first part of the dialogue (384 c-391 b) as the exposition of Plato's own views about the correctness of names because of its similar phraseology to that of the Republic X and its critical remarks on the Protagorean background of Hermogenes' conventional theory of names. But this treatment not only drops the demarcation between Plato's position and Cratylus', but also prevents them from understanding the overall structure of the dialogue. For, as Bernard Williams recently revealed in his brief but excellent paper, it is Cratylus' natural theory of the correctness of names that Socrates attempts to elaborate with Hermogenes in the next part (391 b-427 d) and then he sets about to refute with Cratylus himself in the final part (427 d-439b). According to my interpretation, however, Plato's strategy is already mentioned to some extent in the first part of the dialogue. Because a name-giving role personified as νομοθετη&b.sigmav; is said not only to precede a name-using role as διδασκαλικο&b.sigmav; but also to be supervised in turn by the dialectician, διαλεκτικο&b.sigmav;, who uses names for discussion. And I suppose these three personified figures to represent the positions of Cratylus, Hermogenes and Socrates respectively. So the main theme in succeeding arguments of the dialogue as well as the dialogue itself seems to be under dialectical supervision. This is a noeud initial of the dialogue. I suggest, therefore, that the notorious etymological section in the second part displays various deviational forms of name-relation from such integral linguistic practice with names as the dialectic. For, though we find in the text somewhat confusing expressions with the same verb 'δηλουν' (to show) , e.g. 'someone shows something by a name.', 'a name shows something to us.', 'a name shows something.', etc., we can presume from them an underlying structure: A shows p with n to B (where A and B are persons, p is a thing, and n a name). This underlying 4-place relation is transformed into the various expressions found in the text without changing the meaning of 'show' in it. But the etymological explanation urges us to think the verb 'show' equivocal like this: A legislator as a name-giver showed^1 something with a name, from which descended name shows^2 it to us. Thus, etymological study turns out to be nothing less than research for original intentions or thoughts of the name-giver-they are usually expressed by a verb 'βουλεσθαι'-, for such intentional factors take advantage of the time- and semantic gap between giving names and deciphering their descendants. But, of course, research for such factors may be uncertain and arbitrary. To do without it, there must be a direct relation between names and things : 'a name shows^3 something'. Being interpreted by similarity, this binary relation though it is also transformed from the same 4-place relation above gets another meaning of 'show': 'a name is a copy of something'. It is this final position of Cratylus' natural theory that is to be refuted in the third part of the dialogue. If we demand the correctness of names for its own sake i.e. apart from our integral linguistic practice, we cannot but rely on either the correspondence between language and reality or tacit consent among people without reference to our understanding the reality whatever we acknowledge it to be. So we must try to understand the truth (that is not the same thing as the correctness anymore) with names and the other linguistic components in the dialectical integrality. This denouement seems to have been already anticipated in the noeud initial of the dialogue.

著者

田中 あや

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.62, pp.39-50, 2014

著者

新島 龍美

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.41, pp.36-47, 1993

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<p>This paper examines the so-called Protreptic parts of Plato's Euthydemus (Euthyd. 278E-283B[=PL(1)]; 288D-292E[= PL(2)]), and investigates the characteristics of wisdom or knowledge to show the basic misunderstanding of the traditional interpretation. I (1) The argument as a whole derives from the concern of Socrates' and others' that young Cleinias will become as good as possible (Euthyd. 275A) , so that the matter of 'becoming good' is meant to apply to us as well. The argument of PL(1) can be summarized as follows : (i) the realization of our happiness through possession of many good things; (ii) the demand that we use these things correctly to attain some benefit ; (iii) the requirement of wisdom or knowledge to guarantee correct use ; (iv) the necessity of searching for and loving wisdom or knowledge, namely philosophy. (2) From this summary, PL(1) seems to be Plato's real argument in favor of philosophy, and to indicate the Socratic eudaimonism. However, its more complicated figure is revealed as our investigations proceed : (a) The four 'cardinal' virtues are treated in the same way as wealth and other good things, namely as 'things' (πραγματα; 282A2). Meaning that they are supposed to be able to stand in some way independently from their owners, namely ourselves. (b) Such a treatment will almost inevitably invite these questions : what does using temperance, courage, or justice mean ; what is correct use ; what is the content of the benefit resulting from their correct use, and who are 'we' that supposedly benefit by their correct use. It is in the basic understanding of wisdom itself that these kinds of questions culminate. Yet they are unanswered and remain implicit in PL(1). Traditional interpretations believe that PL(1) shows Plato's real speech recommending the activity of philosophy. However, our scrutiny has shown that the situation plausibly suggests a problematic feature of Protreptic Logos, and if PL(1) ended with a declaration of the necessity of philosophical activity, such an interpretation could be sustained. Yet, in fact, PL(2) which clearly continues PL(1) finally ends with an anopia or impasse. II (1) PL(2) asks the question: if philosophy is the acquisition of some wisdom or knowledge, which wisdom or knowledge must we rightly acquire? The argument is still led by both the question of how we benefit and consideration of the context of acquisition or possession and use(cf. 288E1-2 ; 289B4-6 ; 290D5-7). PL(2) then proceeds to the test of kingship or royal art which is apparently the most plausible candidate, if it is knowledge that can achieve and supply our happiness. Consideration of knowledge, finally arrives at the question, in what respect are people good, and in what aspect are they useful. These remain unresolved. (2) We insist that we must take this ρπορια or impasse as such, and search for its significance and origin. (a) That final ironical situation signifies that 'being good' can not possibly be evaluated by connecting good things with ourselves through the context of possession and use. (b) The origin of this impasse can be traced back to the thought that we can be good or happy by possessing many good things. These things were, in fact, unreflectingly and unquestionedly presupposed to stand as good even outside ourselves. The final indecision within the most crucial point of determining in what respect we are good is undersood to suggest that our being good or happy, can not justly be considered by the presupposition of such a grasp on 'good' things. We could say that the more we are inclined to such a possessive thought, the more suggestive and significant the perplexing situation can be for all of us. Philosophy, when considered the acquisition of knowledge to obtain some type of benefit, remains empty and senseless. We can not, therefore, accept the</p><p>(View PDF for the rest of the abstract.)</p>

著者

中務 哲郎

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.34, pp.26-37, 1986-03-18 (Released:2017-05-23)

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ヘロドトス『歴史』のテーマは何か,という大問題にこのような小論で答えようとするのは,いわば「鶏刀を以て牛を割く」類の暴挙との誹りを受けるかもしれないが,以下に筆者の考えの大要を述べてみたい.

著者

木原 志乃

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.50, pp.12-23, 2002

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In this paper, I would like to examine the change of the soul (psyche) in fr 36 and reconsider the significance of Heraclitus explaining the soul in the physical process In fr 36, Heraclitus says that the soul becomes the water, the water becomes the earth and vice versa There is little agreement as to what the changes of the soul should be It is a disputable question whether the reciprocal changes in fr 36 are in macrocosm (that is, the extinction or production of the soul from its relation to the sea and the earth cf fr 30 and 31) or in microcosm (that is, the physiological process of the soul from its relation to the blood and the flesh) Many commentators have interpreted it as being in macrocosm However, I do not share this interpretation First, I will examine the two typical interpretations in which the soul in macrocosm is supposed (Kirk and Kahn) According to Kirk, the soul is equated with cosmic fire and 'the death of the soul' means the death of individuals in an eschatological context However, this interpretation is unsound when Kirk must suppose the relation of two fires, between 'a fiery soul' of individuals and the 'cosmic fire' Although Herachtus indicated 'the soul out of water', Kirk discounted this point and supposed falsely the soul out of cosmic fire through respiration On the other hand, Kahn intended that the soul is equated with the air Inasmuch as Heraclitus described the soul as 'dry' or 'wet', so Kahn considered that 'fire' is not suitable as a substitute for the soul from the expressive viewpoint in the fragments Although Kahn's interpretation is a correct one in view of his insistence that the soul is not fire, he overcomplicated the relation between the 'airy soul' of individuals and (cosmic) fire or water The soul as the fire or the air, which is also macrocosmic, is not suitable for the explanation of 'the death of the soul' The important point is the relationship between life and death We must recognize that, for Helaclitus, the psyche has the fundamental meaning of 'life force' and that his 'life and death' is a unity of opposites Heraclitus did not uncritically accede to antecedent ideas of the soul The traditional problem of immortality is reconsidered by Heraclitus in fr 36 The 'death of the soul' is not the biological death of the individual Rather, his use of the soul enables him to combine these aspects of the life and death of individual I would like to emphasize this point and elucidate that the soul includes death and is incessantly renewed as life by death Heraclitus refused the traditional idea that the soul of individuals continues separate from the body after death For him, the soul is not a transcendental substance separate from the body, but constantly maintains the material aspects of the bodily force So for Heraclitus the soul is not like an airy or fiery element or a cosmic soul, but the constitutive principle of the life force That is the meaning of the physiological process This suggests that the soul in fr 36 is a principle for physiological activity as the subject of the life force Finally, I wish to conclude by referring briefly to two connected contents of the soul, as a subject of this physiological activity and of the cognitive activity in other fragments.

著者

鈴木 照雄

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.7, pp.116-122, 1959

著者

鈴木 照雄

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.7, pp.116-122, 1959-03-30 (Released:2017-05-23)

出版者

日本西洋古典学会 ; 1953-

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 = Journal of classical studies (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

no.68, pp.149-151, 2020

出版者

日本西洋古典学会 ; 1953-

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 = Journal of classical studies (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

no.66, pp.120-122, 2018

著者

鈴木 幹也

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.25, pp.20-31, 1977

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Aristotle attempted to reduce the thought structure of Empedocles' On Nature to his own unique philosophical pattern by interpreting Empedocles' four indestructible elements as being the material causes, and interpreting Love and Strife as the efficient causes. Judging from Theophrastus' Physical Opinions, Frag. 3, the basis for Aristotle's reasoning is thought to be contained in the couplet of Empedocles' Frag. 17. 7-8; αλλοτε μεν φιλοτητι συνερχομεν ει&b.sigmav; απαντα αλλοτε δ' αυ διχ' εκαστα φορευμενα νεικεο&b.sigmav; εχθει and particularly in the participle φορευμενα found in the latter half. In other words, Aristotle interpreted (φορευμενα to be a passive voice, from which he deduced his understanding of the four elements as being the material causes, and Love and Strife as the efficient causes. The present writer, however, cannot agree to such an interpretation of φορευμενα. The writer here attempts to reject one of the traditional viewpoints in the history of philosophy-the Aristotelian schematic understanding of Empedocles-by elucidating that the φορευμενα in question is not a passive voice but rather a direct reflexive intransitive middle voice, through the examination of three points, namely: (1)other groups of expression illustrating the spatial movement of the four elements; (2)similar verses in Empedocles Frag. 20. 2-5; and(3)usage of the verb φερω which has the same etymological origin as φορεω.

著者

澄田 宏

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.20, pp.56-59, 1972

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Heraclitus' Fr. 101 (DK) is regarded as one of the fragments referring to the basis of his philosophical thoughts. But there is little reference to it in most of the studies of Heraclitus' philosophy. This is, I suppose, because of some difficulty in the interpretation of Fr. 101. For instance, the fragment is given different interpretations from the two different sources and it is isolated from any of his other fragments. The purpose of this essay is to approach the problem of its interpretation with the help of his other fragments, especially Fr. 22 which is something like a proverb. The author examines the meaning of each word of Fr. 22 in which there is the participle form of the same verb as used in Fr. 101. In Fr. 22, where are found at least four terms of his philosophy, i. e., 'much', 'little', 'earth' and 'gold', the verb 'search' is paraphrased in his analytical way into two other verbs, 'dig' and 'find'. Then my work is to make clear the meaning of the whole passage. Fr. 22 is a kind of proverb saying that whoever seeks for something valuable will. take much pains and get small profits. Now there rises some doubt whether he was talking by metaphor about his own philosophical method. The preferable way to get the true meaning of this metaphor is, I believe, to refer to the following fragments one after another: Frr. 29, 104, 41, 32, 90, 118; 10, 40, 35; 55, 107, 56. The conclusion is as follows: (1) Fr. 22 suggests his philosophical method of recognition and so its metaphor proves to be a formula of recognition. "The subject that searches 'digs' (se. perceives or inquires) the medium and 'finds' (sc. understands and recognizes) the object." (2) The object is called by many different names, but in fact it is 'one'. (3) On the other hand the medium is a sensible object whose structure is of many forms. The medium is significant for the investigator only when it is related to the object. (4) The subject is the soul, ψυχη. Now self-search is one way of philosophical research. To this, therefore, must be applied the formula. If not applied, it is obvious by reference to Fr. 45, that self-search does not take any means i. e., the medium. But the same fragment seems to say that to "discover" is needed for the soul to know everything. So to "find" or "discover" is to research without digging or perceiving. Self-search is research in absence of the medium. It is self-discovery. I think self-search may be proposed to be a major premise of Heraclitus' philosophical thoughts of ψυχη.

著者

納富 信留

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.46, pp.44-55, 1998

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<p>Critias is known as the leader of the cruel "Thirty Tyrants", who governed defeated Athens after the Poloponnesian War(404/3 B.C.), and killed over 1500 people under their reign of terror. Critias raises two important issues in the history of philosophy. First, as a relative of Plato, he seems to have influenced young Plato ; Plato later says in the Seventh Letter that he was initially attracted by Critias' invitation to the oligarchic government, but soon got disappointed on seeing its evil deeds(324B-325A). Second, Critias is regarded as a major cause of the decision to bring Socrates to trial in 399 ; the Athenians believed that Socrates was guilty of "corrupting youth" because he had educated anti-democratic politicians, such as Critias and Alcibiades(cf. Aeschines, 1. 173). These events kept Plato away from real politics and forced him to contemplate politics in philosophy. I believe that Plato confronted the issues concerning Critias in his early dialogue, the Charmides, in which young Critias plays a major role in discussing sophrosyne(temperance or prudence). However, the commentators have scarcely considered political issues in this dialogue, probably because they take the "evil image of Critias" for granted. First, therefore, I reexamine the historical figure of Critias and show how his image was created. It is Xenophon who is most responsible for making up our image of Critias. He describes Critias as a cruel tyrant and ascribes all evils of the Thirty to his personal motivations. Xenophon's account in the History of Greece II. 3. 11-4. 43 reflects the strong reaction against oligarchy in democratic Athens, and originates both in his hostility against the Thirty and his intention to defend Socrates' education(Memorabilia 1. 2. 12-38, 47). This has concealed the Thirty's real political intentions under the "evil image of Critias". On the other hand, we have some positive evidence to indicate that the Thirty originally intended to restore justice and morality in Athens (Lysias 12. 5 ; P1. Ep. VII 324D) ; they executed the sycophants("villains" in democratic Athens). We cannot deny the possibility that Critias and his group seriously aimed for ideal justice, and philosophical examination of the ideology of Critias is therefore necessary. The problem lies in what they understand as justice and sophrosyne. This is the main target of Plato's examination of Critias in the Charmides. Most commentators have ignored the political aspect of the dialogue. Sophrosyne is(unlike Aristotle's definition in the Ethics)a major political virtue along with justice, and the leading ideal for the Spartans and the oligarchs. Sophrosyne is said to bring about good government(Charm. 162A, 171D-172A, D). A crucial point in interpreting the Charmides is how we can understand the shift and relationship between several definitions of sophrosyne which Critias provides. He often gives up his earlier definitions easily and presents new ones ; there seems no logical relation between these. I see his definitions not as logically consequent, but as implying and revealing Critias' underlying ideology. I focus on two shifts : the first comes when Critias abandons his first definition "to do one's own", and gives a new definition "to know oneself" (164C-D) ; the second shift explicates "to know oneself" as "knowledge of the other knowledges and of itself" (166B-C). In each case, the direct cause of shift is Socrates' using an analogy between sophrosyne and techne (skill). Critias opposes Socrates' analogy and tries to separate two kinds of knowledge : self-knowledge and particular skills. Since the relation between the two is explained in terms of "rule" and "supervise" (173C, 174D-E) , I conclude that the clear distinction between the two</p><p>(View PDF for the rest of the abstract.)</p>

著者

生島 幹三

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.13, pp.87-97, 1965

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This article is intended to analyse the part of the dispute between Thrasymachus and Socrates in Book A of "Republic", in relation to the preceding part of the book, i e Polemarchus' definition of "justice" and Socrates' criticism of it Polemarchus defines "justice" as "to do good to the friends and to do evil to the enemies" This principle of the right action is composed of two rules, opposite to each other and applied in each case to only one of the two groups of men Socrates, in his criticism, expelling "to do evil" from "justice" and extending over the whole the rule applied to the friends by Polemarchus, seems to suggest "to do good (to everybody)" as the general principle, advocating, as it were, the cause of "justice" On the contrary, Thrasymachus recommends "to do evil to others", i e "injustice" as the punciple, applying to everyone except oneself the rule that Polemarchus has done to one's enemies only In Thrasymachus' view, "to do evil to others" is one's own good (as it were, justice, δικαιον), while "to be righteous" is another one's (i e the stronger man's) good and one's own evil From Socrates' standpoint again, if we might infer so, "to do evil to others" is the gravest evil to oneself, and despite his unerring skill in the art of evil, an unjust man is in the grandest error in mistaking it for a good and is possessed of grossest ignorance, and he is less strong and more unfortunate in the true sense than a righteous man The problem of justice is, on the other hand, treated by Thrasymachus in relation to the law and the ruler who makes it, and thus is given a public meaning (not only a private one) in the whole state or community But the two disputants differ diametrically from each other as to what the ruler and his τεχνη essentially consist in Throughout the whole of their dispute, Socrates appears to be triumphant, but we should rather think that the question is, in reality, of the difference of standpoint between Socrates, who thinks a man always does good when he knows good and evil and who considers the whole community to be a world all composed of brothers, and Thrasymachus, who again regards the society as a battlefield where everyone fights with others for his own good, which is nothing but another's evil When refuting Thrasymachus, however, Socrates is found showing in the sharpest contrast his own views and their implications, by means of treating from his own point of view the problems presented by his opponent

著者

西川 亮

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.17, pp.28-38, 1969

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トラシュロスがデモクリトスの作品を四部作に分類して配列した目録の中に,認識論的傾向のものを扱ったとおもわれる若干の作品名が残されているが,その内容に至ってはほとんど知られない.もしそれについて考察を試みようとすれば,セクストス・エンペイリコスやガレノスによって引用された断片や,アリストテレスやアエティオスなどの記録,さらに諸感覚についてのテオプラストスのかなり詳細な記述などによらなければならない.しかし皮相的にみれば,これらの資料間における齟齬が,統一的見解を阻んでいるかのように見做される.むろんデモクリトスのいわゆる認識論についての資料の処理にすでにかなりの努力が払われてきた.ここでは,それらの諸資料を三区分し,その間の差異を検討して,デモクリトスのいわゆる原子思想における認識論的問題の一端にふれてみたい.

著者

戸塚 七郎

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.21, pp.118-121, 1973

著者

酒井 健太朗

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.64, pp.27-38, 2016

著者

仲手川 良雄

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.37, pp.1-11, 1989-03-15 (Released:2017-05-23)

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Both isegoria and parrhesia have the meaning "free speech", which seems to have been indispensable to the Greeks, especially the Athenians The aim of this paper is to inquire into the relationship between isegoria and parrhesia, two ways of realizing free speech at meeting It is noteworthy that the parrhesia, which came into being about the last third of the fifth century BC, came to be used widely in a short time and invaded the large sphere of the word isegoria What does this mean historically? The essence of isegoria is manifest in the expression heralds conventionally used to urge free speech in the assembly "Who wishes to address the assembly?" On the other hand, according to Aischines, the expression was formerly as follows . "Who of those above fifty years of age wishes to address the assembly?", this practice of addressing according to age was aimed at obtaining the best counsel for the polis, though it went out of fashion in Aischines' day An attitude of πολει χρηστον (rendering service to polis), which also is proclaimed in Euripides' Suppliants' "Who desires to bring good counsel for his polis to the people?", predominated among Athenians in the moderate democracy It declined remarkably, however, with the rise in radical democracy and the spread of individualism Moreover, we must consider the growth of class antagonism between οι χρηστοι and οι πονηροι, as is proven in Pseudo-Xenophon, Ath Pol 1 2, 1 6, 1 9, 3 12-13 In this situation, the word χρηστοζ might be viewed with a strong tincture of classconsciousness The multitude must have had some doubt as to whether the practice of addressing according to age and the principle of πολει χρηστον were serviceable to them or to οι χρηστοι alone They did away with that practice and introduced the parrhesia, by which every citizen could speak out on whatever he regarded as important and right, free of the restrictions of πολει χρηστον The shift in stress from isegoria to parrhesia corresponded with the momentous change in the actuality and the sense of polis-community

著者

松平 千秋

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.17, pp.136-138, 1969-03-25 (Released:2017-05-23)

著者

松本 仁助

出版者

日本西洋古典学会

雑誌

西洋古典学研究 (ISSN:04479114)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.5, pp.37-50, 1957-03-30 (Released:2017-05-23)