著者

吉田 裕季

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2005, no.34, pp.157-167, 2005

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The Military convention of Belgrade was concluded between the Allies and Hungary when the First World War came to an end. This convention established the boundary line on the southeast part of Hungary. But this boundary line was violated by the Rumanian Army which crossed it from Transylvania on 15<SUP>th</SUP> December, 1918. Later, this line was modified in favor of Rumania.<BR>About that time the Ukrainian invasion started under the initiative of the French Army. The French Army was obviously defeated owing to a shortage of forces.<BR>Some historians argued that the Ukrainian invasion had an influence on the amendment of the boundary line. They explained that the French policies took a measure in favor of Rumania, because they wished the supplement of the shortages of forces by the Rumanian Army, accepting the territorial demands of Rumania as compensation.<BR>The purpose of this article is to explain in view of the Ukrainian invasion why the amendment of the line was realized in favor of Rumania.<BR>The first chapter makes clear the significances of the Military convention of Belgrade for Hungary, France and Rumania. This convention should accept the Hungarian territorial demands and contribute to extend the French influence on Central Europe through the occupation of Hungary. But for Rumania it would hinder her territorial claims.<BR>The second chapter makes evident through the process of the Ukrainian invasion the factors related with the amendment of the boundary line. It is quite obvious that the French Army was not enough to invade Ukraine, therefore the military authorities suggested to make a profit from the Rumanian Army. The French Army without the indigenous inhabitant's cooperation was overpowered by the Bolshevik Army. For this reason an anti-Bolshevik policy was increasingly regarded as necessary. Besides the Rumanian government had indicated her intentions to render some military services in Russia.<BR>The third chapter concerns influence of the Ukrainian invasion on the amendment of the boundary line through the discussions on the revision in the Peace Conference. There was an atmosphere in the chamber that one should defend the benefits of the Allies. Therefore on the one hand, the demands of Rumania were approved, on the other, the claims of a hostile country, Hungary, were rejected. However it remarked that France proposed to recognize Rumania as an Ally, and submitted the draft for the amendment of the line. Besides the fact that Rumania let her army march across the boundary line to make fait accompli might have served to accord her territorial demands. The French Army, however, did not occupy Hungary, for it considered that this circumstance would permit the Rumanian Army to advance.<BR>Therefore, the French policies must be emphasized as a factor of the amendment of the boundary line in favor of Rumania. In this case, however, a great importance should be attached to not only the shortages of forces, but also to the anti-Bolshevik policy and it should be also taken into consideration that an anti-Bolshevik attitude of Rumania proved to be favorable for France. With reference to the amendment of the boundary line, this policy has not been argued enough until today.

著者

加藤 有子

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2018, no.47, pp.35-53, 2018

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<p>In the interwar period, after the end of the partition, Polish literature was finally freed from national themes, and writers could focus more on language. Moreover, languages of the newly independent nations became national languages of their respective countries. Based on the understanding that artistic and social interest in languages increased during this period, this paper explores the concept of a new language in the futurist manifests (1921) and the novel <i>I Burn Paris</i> (1928), both written by Bruno Jasieński. My aim is to present <i>I Burn Paris</i>—regarded as a communist ideological novel—as a work featuring issues related to language, and to show Jasieński's consequent longing for a new universal language.</p><p>First, I discuss the recreation of the traditional Polish messianism (i.e., the suffering Poland would be reborn to save the world) by Jasieński, in one of his futurist manifests: "To the Polish Nation. Manifest of Immediate Futurization of Life" (1921). Jasieński rewrote the messianism as a socialist one, according to which the new Poland would reform the old capitalist Europe. This idea of a new world recurs in <i>I Burn Paris</i> as the concept of a new common language.</p><p>Second, based on archival research, I show <i>I Burn Paris</i> was simultaneously translated into many languages and went through many printings, through that its different versions circulated. This research also shows the role of the international communist network in circulating literary works. Thanks to the network, East European writers writing in minor languages could join the modernist movement centered in big cities in Western Europe or in Russia. This was true also for the writers writing in Yiddish, a diaspora language. Considering these two diasporic networks, I propose to reconsider the West-Eurocentric map of 20th century modernism.</p><p>Third, I present an unknown version of <i>I Burn Paris</i> with an alternative ending to the standard Polish version. My archival research shows that this version was circulated in Russian by 1934, when the socialist realist version revised by Jasieński was issued. The alternative ending is set two years after the ending of the standard version and mentions that the global revolution has already been accomplished. The novel's reception by the Polish community in the USSR suggests that the ending was added to the Russian version to protect Jasieński from the expected criticism for the initial ideologically weak ending and the lack of depiction of class struggles. Further, I suggest that Jasieński wrote the alternative ending because it involves a longing for a new common language, which was his ultimate concern in his 1921 futurism manifest to the 1930 article written in Moscow. Jasieński believed that a new world should have a new common language, understandable by everyone and which, in turn, would create a new society.</p><p>The repeated rewriting hints at Jasieński's opportunism, but in fact, it was a result of his view on artistic creation. "Every movement ends with its manifest." He viewed a novel as a performative "manifest," which he had to ceaselessly overcome to create new one.</p>

著者

立石 洋子

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2011, no.40, pp.50-64, 2011

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The paper discusses the controversies on the history of non-Russian peoples in the USSR among the Soviet Marxist historians in the 1920s to early 1930s.<br> The development of early Marxist historical science in the USSR was closely related with the policies of the party. The party leaders distinguished the nationalism of the oppressing nations from that of the oppressed nations, and considered &ldquo;great power chauvinism,&rdquo; or Russian nationalism, the main danger. Accordingly, the study of all the peoples in the USSR and the improvement of their cultural level became an important task for scholars, including historians.<br> At the first convention of the All-Union Society of Marxist Historians in December 1928 to January 1929, the study of the history of the peoples in the USSR was declared as the main task of Soviet historians. For the first time, the historians faced the problem of how to interpret the history of non-Russian peoples from the Marxist perspective.<br> One main arguing theme was the evaluation of the Russian rule over the non-Russian peoples. Another main problem was the tendency of &ldquo;the great power chauvinism&rdquo; of the Russian Marxist historians; this issue was raised by Ukrainian Marxist historians, including M. Iavorskii. They criticized some Russian Marxist historians for underestimating the Ukrainian elements in the history of the revolutionary movement in Ukraine and for not acknowledging the independent features of the cultural, social, and economic history of Ukraine. However, M. Pokrovskii, the most authoritative Russian Marxist historian, did not accept the criticism, and thus, the historians never reached a consensus. In contrast, the problems that became serious themes in the Stalin period, such as the evaluation of the Khan who led the rebellion of non-Russian peoples against Russia, or the evaluation of the &ldquo;Holy war&rdquo; by the Muslim population against Russian rule, were given less attention by the historians.<br> At the end of 1929, when &ldquo;the cultural revolution&rdquo; began, not only did the non-Marxist intellectuals receive criticism, but the debate among the Marxist historians became strained. In Ukraine, the criticism against Ukrainian nationalism caused mass political oppression, and the most famous non-Marxist historian, M. Khlshevskii, and Marxist historian, M. Iavorskii, were both arrested. The class factor was put forward in the historical interpretation and this change was reflected also in the study of non-Russian history. The leaders of rebellions against Russia in nineteenth-century Kazakhstan and the North Caucasus and of the rebellion against Poland in seventeenth-century Ukraine came to be evaluated as repressors of the masses, and their dissatisfaction against the ruling classes was considered to be a driving force of these rebellions.<br> In the Stalin period, historians tried to reevaluate the tradition and the leaders of each people and again faced the problem of the harmonization of the class elements and the national character of each people. This problem remained unsolved from the 1920s. Thus, in the discussion of the early Soviet period, we can see the roots of the fierce discussion among the historians and politicians of the Stalin period.<br>

著者

角田 安正

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2019, no.48, pp.103-106, 2019

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2008, no.37, pp.i-xiii, 2008

著者

工藤 仁子

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2008, no.37, pp.42-57, 2008

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This paper attempts to analyze politico-military relations in Russia, providing a perspective on the Putin-Medvedev duumvirate. Political leaders from Boris Yeltsin to Vladimir Putin had needed support from the military for governing the state. The military had expanded its influence on politics, based on this politico-military cooperation. The political leadership had placed its foremost priority on military policy, which had coincided with the military's interests. However, the political leadership is currently seeking to put more emphasis on economic development than military policy, for stabilizing Russia's domestic and external environment. This policy shift may provoke dissatisfaction from the military, which regards the national security as Russia's top concern. Therefore, the political leadership will strengthen its control over the military, for the purpose of keeping political superiority on military. Nevertheless, strengthening control over the military contains a dilemma in which strong objection from the military would lead to secession of the military from the political leadership, losing military support for politics. When the duumvirate collapses, a problem on which leader the military chooses will emerge. Therefore, unless the dilemma is settled, the politics will have to give way to, or pay the price for pacifying the military in case of confrontation with the military.

著者

黒木 英充 小泉 直美 宇山 智彦 小森田 秋夫

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2016, no.45, pp.62-88, 2016

著者

渡辺 聡子

出版者

大阪外国語大学

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13431382)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.11, pp.29-40, 2007-03

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ПpeдcMeрtHoe BидeHиe repoя paccкaзa ЧexoBa <<Apxиepeй>> ocTaBяeT CилbHoe BпeчaTлeHиe. BикapHbIй apxиepeй ПeTp, CbIH дepeBecHcкoro дьяKоHa, <<доCTиг Bcero, чTo бbIлo дocTyпHо чeпoBeкy B ero пoлoжeHии>>. Ho пepeд CMepTbю eMy пpeдcTaBляeTCя, чro <<OH, yжe пpOCTOй, oбьIKHOBeHHbIй чeлоBeK, идeT по пOлю бьICTpo, Beceло, паCTyKиBaя naлоKой>> пOд CолHeчHbIM HeбoM. ЭTOT BeceльIй H CBeTлbIй Oбpaз, изMeHяющий TpeзBоCTи BьIcшero CBящeHHиKa, иHTepпpeTиpOBaли до Cиx пop no-paзHOMy, кaк пpeдcMepTHoe пpoэpeHиe, BOпрC peлигии, BопроC yXодa H T. п. HaM KaжeTCя, чTо B paccкaз BплeTeHьI paэHьIe TeMьI, CoзpeBaBшиe B paзMьIщлeHияX aBTopa пocлeдHиbIx rодоB: TeMьI CBoбодbI, CMepTи, пpиpодьI и чeлоBeкa. Toлкyя эTOT oбpaз, Mь oбpaITиM BHиMaHиe Ha cooTHошeHиe иHдиBидyaдьHorо Mиpa repoя H гpoMaдHоro Mиpa, cToящeгo зa HиM. <<ПpocTOй, обьIкHоBeHHbIй чeлоBeK>> яBляeTCя KлючeBоM CлоBоM эTоrо paccKaзa. Гepoй cTpaдaeT оT oTчyждeHия. HиKTо, дaжe pодHaя MaTb, He гоBоpиT C HиM иCKpeHHо, попpoCTy, пo-чeлoBeчecкH. Bce бoяTCя ero и poбeюT пepeд BьICшиM CaHоM. B <<CKyччHой иCTоpии>>, поCBящeHHой Tой жe TeMe, repoй, зHaMeHиTbIй пoφeccop, xoчeT, чIoбbI блHэKиe люди любили B Hero <<He иMя, He φиpMy и He яpлbIK, a oбbIKHоBeHHoгo чeлoBeкa>>.<ПpоCTой, oбbIKHоBeHHbIй чeлоBeк>> озHaчaeT He пpоCTоTо MоHaXa, дepeBeHCKого дьячKa, коTоpbIM XоTeл CTaTb apxиepeй, a CиMBоличeCKого чeлоBeKa, oCBoбoждeHHoro OT иMeHи, caHa, φиpMbI, оT Bcex φyTляpоB. Ecли бьI paccкaз KоHилCя бeз φиHaлa, изoбpaжaющero Mиp пocлe cMepTи repoи, oбpaз чeлoBeKa, идyщero пo пoлю Beceлo и CBoбoдHo бbIл бbI He бoлbшe, чeM cчacTлиBoe личHoe пpeдcTaBлeHиe. Ho aBTOp пpиaeT eMy yHиBepcaльHocTь, изoбpaжaя paдoCTHyю, Beceлyю Пacxy, CBeTлyю пpиpодy, и cоBepшeHoe зaбBeHиe o cyщeCTBоBaHии apxиepeя. ЭTо гоBориT o Tom, чTo rpoMaдHbIй Mиp пpиHял ero CMepTb кaк cMepTь пpоCTого, обbIкHоBeHHого чenоBeKa. B Mиpe HичTо He изMeHиnоCb и BCe блaoполyчHо. ABTоp HeCKоnbKо paз гоBориT B pacCKaзe o пpиpoдe, жиByщeй CBoeй ocoбeHHOй жизHbю, о BeчHоM BpeMeHи, o бeCKоHeчHой чepeдe чeлоBeчeCKиX жHзHeй. Для общero Mиpa BCе люди пpocTbIe oбbIKHоBeHHbIe cyщecTBa. ABTоp пpeдлаraeT Boпpoc: пoчeMy людH He MогуT бbITb пpоCTbIMи oбbIKHоBeHHbIMи люbMи, поKa oHи жиByT. ИзBeCTHо, чTо y caMoгo aBTopa бbIлa Meчra <<C KоTоMочкой xoдиTb пo бeлy CBeTy>>. ПpeдCMepTHoe BидeHиe apxиepeя-ero бeccoзHaTeлbHoe жeлaHиe, MeчTa ЧexoBa и <<HOpMa>> чeлoBeKa.

著者

石田 修一

出版者

大阪外国語大学

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13431382)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2, pp.29-54, 1998-03

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Широкий фронт советских типологических исследований, развернувшихся в ≪Институте языка и мышления≫ имени Н. Я. Марра в научном центре советских языковедов в 30-40 годы, сегодня принес такие крупные плоды как ≪Контенсивная типология≫. Крупнейшим специалистом в этой области был Г. А. Климов, который, к сожалению, скончался в апреле 1997-го года. В результате развития контенсивной типологии выяснилось, что процесс эволюции человеческого языка представляет собой путь развития и возрастания степени ориентированности грамматического строя на передачу субъектно-объектных отношений. Мне представляется, что в размышлениях советских языковедов о языке во многом проявилось влияние популярных в то время диамата и истмата, независимо от того, осознавали это сами языковеды или нет. Впрочем, в течении длительного времени не находилось точек соприкосновения с отдельнымн языкознаниями, в том числе с наукой о русском языке. Но с точки зрения контенсивной типологии, исследования В. Б. Крысько об историческом развитии залоговых отношеиий русского языка очень нас интересуют. Наследуя традиции А. А. Потебни, А. В. Попова, и, ирежде всего, индоевропеистов Т. В. Гамкрелидзе, Вяч. Вс. Иванова и А. В. Десницкой, он подверг письменные материалы древнерусского языка подробному анализу и убедил нас в том, что и переходность и рефлексивность и пассивность раньше недостаточно дифференцировали, и, самое главное, что в древнерусском языке доминирющей и важнейшей особенностью была аккузативно-генетивная переходность. Это заключение в принципе совпадает с выводом работ А. В. Десницкой о ≪Илиаде≫ Гомера. Это указывает на всеобщий характер эволюции языков человечества, как уже раньше утверждалось Э. Сепир: ≪...позади внешнего хода истории действует могущественные движущие силы (drift), направляющие язык... к определенным моделям..., к типам≫. Мне представляется, что сегодняшние отдельные языкознания теряют цель и перспективы, глубоко забираясь в случайные идеологические тупики. В наше время, в годы нищеты философии, именно контенсивная типология революционно сменит парадигму лингвистической науки и просветлит пути лингвистического мышления.

著者

村田 真一

出版者

The Japanese Association for Russian and East European Studies

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

no.38, pp.47-59, 2009

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Russian society has been drastically changing for the past ten years, especially because of the terrible financial crisis that has struck the worlds' economy in 2009. Due to this process of change, it is very difficult to provide a graphic illustration of today's Russian literature and proffer a treatise on its future. It is nonetheless important and necessary to give a detailed analysis of the current state of Russian literature in order to investigate the direction in which the profound changes occurring in Russia and in Russian art are headed.<br> This paper is aimed at analyzing the novels of the most important Russian writers from the 1990s to the present day and examining how they are perceived by the public of readers in Russia. Many of these novels have yet to be translated into Japanese and are not widely known.<br> In the post-Communist era, a select number of Russian writers began to publish a myriad of works under the banner of "here and now". These works were written using many expressions taken from everyday slang without any direct reference to classical literature. Rather, the writers aimed at representing what they saw "in front of their eyes" and depicted themselves in the micro-cosmos of their own literature.<br> Readers can access all of these works on the Internet. Literature has greatly changed from what we knew it to be a decade ago. Even the Internet has become a great library that anyone can approarch. For example, until the 1990s, writers would argue what the revolution meant for Russia, and politics were often discussed in their works. Nowadays, issues like these are not considered as important in contemporary literature.<br> It is possible to consider "post-realism" as the most appropriate definition of Russian literature from the 1990s hitherto. This concept has been proposed by N. Lejderman and M. Lipovitsky, who worked to combine realism and post-modernism.<br> In terms of analyzing the style of contemporary Russian writers, we can regard V. Erofeev and O. Slavnikova as the representatives of the 1990s and the 2000s. The text of "Overshoes" and "Encyclopedia of Russian Soul" by V. Erofeev, "2017" and "Love in the seventh Coach" by O. Slavnikova show that the same writers can compose in different styles. "Magic-realism", observed in their novels, is also a characteristic of Russian literature which derives from the 1990s.<br> In addition to popular B. Akunin, L. Petrushevskaya, L. Ulitskaya and aforementioned authors, the most important Russian writers today must be D. Rubina, A. Gelasimov, V. P'etsukh, Z. Prilepin, and also M. Shishkin, E. Limonov as the writers of "diaspora".<br> Traditionally, Russian literature has always tried to blaspheme authority, drawing largely on poetry and metaphors to slander establishment. Does today's Russian literature dare to do this? Does censorship still exist in Russia? These are the questions for us to answer.<br>

著者

荒武 鉄郎

出版者

大阪外国語大学

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13431382)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.3, pp.65-101, 1999-03

著者

長谷川 雄之

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.43, pp.69-88, 2014

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&lt;p&gt;To deal effectively with global security issues and the changing security environment, how to build and develop effective national security policies has been an important issue today. In this context, the function of the National Security Council (NSC) has been focused on, though there are some other decision making bodies, because of its ability that would solve the hard political decisions from cross-departmental perspective. According to the prior researches (Vendil-Pallin 2001, Hyodo 2004; 2009; 2012, White 2008), under the Putin regime (May 2000–) the Russian Security Council has enlarged its function and started to play the more important role of decision-making process in contrast to the Yeltsin era. This trend is going to continue into the Tandem (under the Medvedev administration from 2008–2012) and the Second Putin government (May 2012–). &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;At the same time (May 2000–), to build "vertical power", President Putin has started several federal reforms, such as series of legislative amendments which changed the formation of the Upper House of the Russian Parliament, the creation of "federal districts", and the appointments of plenipotentiary representative of the President of the Russian Federation in a federal district. Remarkably every representative was mainly a person from the "Power Ministry" or "Saint-Petersburg" and also holds the status of Russian Security Council membership. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Previous works are not enough to examine the enlarged function of the Russian Security Council in the political reforms of the Putin era. This study looks into the role of Russian Security Council in Putin's centralization like building "vertical power" and aims to provide a viewpoint for present state analysis on the Russian politics. As with every NSC in the world, the Russian Security Council is also an advanced secret organ. Thus, this study points out the personnel policies for the members of the Security Council and representatives in every federal district by analyzing public information such as legal documents (Presidential Decree and Federal Law). &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Reflected on the legislation of the new federal law on Security on December 28 2010, President Medvedev signed a presidential decree on the revised Regulation of the Russian Security Council. The new Regulation not only tightened its control power to the other state organs, but systematized local meetings held in every federal district, in which the secretary of the Security Council, presidential represent who covers the district, and federal and regional officials participate. In the meeting, the secretary of the Russian Security Council N.P. Patrushev, who assisted Putin for many years from when they worked together at the control division of the Presidential office, plays an important role in "realizing" the state program at the regional level. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;This paper concludes that the main mission of the Russian Security Council 
includes not only planning the national security policies or military affairs, but coordinating (or controlling) the relationship between federal government and regional leadership.</p>

著者

久保 慶一

出版者

The Japanese Association for Russian and East European Studies

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

no.33, pp.69-79, 2004

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In Montenegro, there has been a deep divide between those who seek the independence of Montenegro and those who oppose it and seek the maintenance of the Yugoslav federation or the union with Serbia. It is well known that there is a correlation between the ethnic identity and the attitude towards this issue, particularly among ethnic minorities such as Albanians, Muslims (Bosnjaks) and Serbs. While one tends to assume that the ethnic identity is an independent variable that affects the behaviour towards the issue of statehood, I would argue that this assumption does not hold for Serbs. To do so, I firstly examine the correlation between the ethnic identity and the behaviour towards the issue of statehood. Secondly, by examining the census data of 1991 and 2003 in Montenegro, I point out that there seems to have been a significant scale of re-definition of the ethnic identity. In particular, a significant number of those who now regard themselves as "Serb" did not indeed do so only 12 years ago. This suggests that the assumption discussed above is wrong and the causal relations run in the opposite direction: they re-defined themselves as "Serb" because they support the maintenance of the union with Serbia. Thirdly, I briefly examine some factors that might possibly have affected the decisions made by those who regarded themselves as "Montenegrins" in 1991 to support or oppose the independence of Montenegro.

著者

松里 公孝

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2007, no.36, pp.17-29, 2007

被引用文献数

1

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The European Union might possibly have overgrown. Obviously, it cannot play the progressive role in the Black Sea Rims which it has played in regard to Eastern Central Europe and the Baltic countries. This paper examines this hypothesis by focusing on the constitutional reform in Ukraine and petit imperialism in Turkey. In the midst of the Orange Revolution, the Orange forces and the former pro-Kuchma parliamentary majority had reached a compromise, a substantial component of which was the amendment of the constitution, targeted at modifying the existing semi-presidential system by strengthening the parliamentary oligarchy. For this purpose, they rudely violated the constitutional procedure for its amendments. This amendment failed to create a mechanism for balancing the president and prime minister and caused the endless disorder in Ukrainian politics in 2006-08. This process revealed that the Orange forces were not the torchbearers of European values, such as constitutionalism and rule of law. In the Eastern and Southern parts of Ukraine, the Party of Regions evolved into a modern organized party. This is exceptional since clientelist parties usually decline after losing power. Thus, there would seem to be no &ldquo;clashes of civilizations&rdquo; between the allegedly pro-European Western and pro-Eurasian Eastern parts of Ukraine.<BR>Despite the reforms achieved in Turkey during the last several years, Europe did not accelerate the EU accession process for Turkey, but, on the contrary, launched bashing of this country, referring to the Armenian genocide of 1915. Turkey's reaction to these double standards (in comparison with the EU's generous attitude towards no less problematic Romania and Bulgaria) differs from that of servile Eastern Europe. Turkish intellectuals proudly argue that their real purpose is to Europeanize Turkey, and the EU accession is no more than a way to achieve it. Turkey's Presidency of Religious Affairs (<I>Diyanet</I>), representing Sunni Islam, is actively conducting Islamic diplomacy, in particular, in Muslim regions of the former USSR. Turkey cannot abandon its special concern in the Caucasus and Near East because of the existence of their brother nationalities, Turkomans and Azerbaijanis, as well as of their trans-border enemy, the Kurds. Overall, Turkey will remain a small empire, though this does not seem to contradict its democratizing endeavor.<BR>Thus, in Ukraine, those who pretend to be friends of Europe have discredited democracy and other European values. Europe's double standards regarding EU accession have not discouraged Turkey, which combines small imperialism with gradual democratization. Under such situation, the European Union seems unlikely to become a dominant political actor in the Black Sea Rims.

著者

藤原 克美

出版者

大阪外国語大学

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13431382)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.3, pp.257-278, 1999-03

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Ранее в статьях за 1997г. было уже написано о деятельности и особенностях учреждений АО ≪Концерн ≪Ростекстиль≫, созданного на основе бывшего государственного учреждения РСФСР. Оно еще выполяет функцию, которую в свое время исполняло бывшее министерство, но постепенно сокращается еговлияние на отдельные предприятия и промышленность в целом. С другой стороны, в последние годы наблюдается ≪давальческая≫ система, в которой производственное предприятие перерабатывает сырье давальца и возвращает ему готовый продукт (ткань), полученный при переработке этого сырья и получает при этом деныи, затраченные на переработку. Важным моментом этой системы является отсутствие оборотных средств на предприятиях. Такая схема используется и внутри ≪Ростекстиля≫, и между посредниками, и производственными предприятиями. Эти посредники-коммерческие Фирмы, изначально торгующие только хлопком, сейчас, благодаря ≪давальческой≫ системе, проникают в текстильную и в легкую промышленность, при этом выкупая пакеты акций известных, но плохо работающих предприятий, и тем самым, в особенности крупные посредники внедряются в текстильную промышленность. В представляемой статье приведен пример АО ≪Текстильной Фирмы ≪Контекс≫. В 1997 году ≪Контекс≫ стал владельцем АО ≪Камыщинский комбинат≫ и благодаря этому на комбинате налажено регулярное производство. У них сейчас хорошие отношения. К сожалению, такие благоприятные отношения не всегда обеспечиваются при ≪давальческой≫ системе. Так же подвергается глубокому осуждению то, что ≪давальцы≫ навязывают предприятиям ≪кабальные≫ условия-низкую плату. Кроме того, и посредникам трудно реализовать отечественные текстильные изделия или одежду на рынке. Поэтому не ясно, намерены ли посредники-давальцы полностью владеть господствующими акциями текстильных предприятий и вложить в них капитал или нет. Но известна борьба нового посредника с ≪Ростекстилем≫ по поводу, например, получения госзаказа по межправительственному контракту на покупку хлопка из Узбекистана, и расхождение мнений о необходимости государственной поддержки.

著者

横川 和穂

出版者

The Japanese Association for Russian and East European Studies

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

no.33, pp.106-121, 2004

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The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the reforms of local public finance in Russia that have been carried out during the first term of the Putin administration from 2000 to 2003. The building processes for home rule and local pubic finance institutions in Russia started during the 1990s, although it was after 2000 that a comprehensive fiscal reforms focusing on municipalities ensued. Therefore, after a brief survey of the problems during the 1990s that caused reforms to be necessary, this work attempts to examine a"Program for the Development of Fiscal Federalism in the Russian Federation in the Period until 2005"that was introduced in 2001 and gave an orientation for reforms of intergovernmental fiscal relationship.<BR>The program tried to strengthen federal control over local public finances, by introducing uniform rule at federal level for the delegation of expenditure authority, revenue distribution, and intergovernmental transfers, that have to be applied to all levels of government. It also aimed at improving the efficiency of local public finances by strengthening the fiscal independence of the municipalities.<BR>As a result of the reforms, local government retained less taxable revenue source, causing them to depend more heavily on fiscal transfers from federal and regional government. This change imposed certain constraints on the expenditure patterns of local governments, and caused changes in the local public service systems; subsidies for housing and public utilities were reduced, while social assistance to residents was increased. However, the actual reform process did not necessarily embody the ideals of the program in the sense that did not strengthen the fiscal independence of the municipalities.<BR>It can be said that distinguishing feature of fiscal reforms under the Putin administration is an attempt to concentrate more fiscal resources within the federal budget while simultaneously strengthening political control over municipalities. And thus federal government tried to restructure the lax management of local public finances through reforms from above.