著者

加藤 久子

出版者

The Japanese Association for Russian and East European Studies

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2003, no.32, pp.175-177, 2003 (Released:2010-05-31)

被引用文献数

1 1

著者

辻本 政雄

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2002, no.31, pp.146-163, 2002 (Released:2010-10-27)

参考文献数

52

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The thesis based on the so-called Harvard SCP Theory deals with the mechanism and the implication of the development of the regulatory reform in the natural gas industry in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland by showing how the market structure of the industry has been reformed and how the performances in terms of social welfare have been improved. Moreover, the thesis shows the reform marks an epoch-making achievement in that it has given the industry new responsibility to support international society and that the regulatory policy has been elaborated from the stage of deregulation and pro-privatization to the more comprehensive stage of pro-competitive policy by adopting the vertical separation of the industry as well as by ensuring reliable supply and fare competition in the transitional economies.

著者

藤森 信吉

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2002, no.31, pp.164-180, 2002 (Released:2010-05-31)

参考文献数

24

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This paper aims to analyze the development of parliamentary systems in Ukraine.Since independence, Ukraine held parliamentary elections three times (1994, 1998, 2002) .There are many articles which analyzed these elections. Their approaches were characterized by two. First of all, they were using the left-right ideology scale to analyze them. For instance, parliamentary camps would be classified by this scale. The Communist party of Ukraine was located on the left edge, on the other hand Ukraine nationalists parties were located on the opposite side. Secondly, the political party was their central analysis unit in these studies.However, these approaches have two problems. First, ideology issues are not the central matter of current political arena. It is insignificant to use this scale to classify today's the political parties. Second, political parties are less important actors during the elections and the session of the parliament. As for elections, independent candidates and the electoral blocks are dominant. Also, parliamentary procedures are ran by the fractions, which are the compositions of independents, parties and blocks. There is little coincidence between the three. This is especially for independents who are less ideologized and frequently change their belongings. Once those deputies form their own parties or fractions, few of them are alive by the time of the next elections. Third, these less ideologized deputies, called “Centrist, ” become more important within the current political arena. We should consider these forces as a main unit of our research.The Centrists begin their career as a high rank bureaucrat or directors of large state industries. Since each of them individually retained certain political resources, they did not form any organization such as political party. The rise of the Super-Presidentilaism and the large scale economic reform as well as the introduction of proportional representation, all had an impact on these Centrists. New counter-elites emerged from the privatization and diversification of economic interests, confront old elites. This drove old and new elites to organize each political structure to compete against each other. Also, they had a interest to support the president not to revive old communist regime.Last year's elections proved the above mentioned tendency. The ideologized parties lost their momentum. On the other hand, the Centrists' parties gained more seats than the previous elections. Furthermore, we observed that the Centrists' split into pro and anti presidential camps within the parliament. This will be the strong evidence of how Ukrainian parliament works well.

著者

柳原 剛司

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2002, no.31, pp.219-237, 2002 (Released:2010-05-31)

参考文献数

26

被引用文献数

1 2

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In 1998, Hungary started a pension reform, which involved partial privatisation of the system and partial introduction of the fully funded (FF) scheme. The reform aimed to improve the financial sustainability, the incentive structure, and the transparency of the system. It also aimed to achieve the system's fairness by separating the principles of“social solidarity”and“social insurance”.But, after the FIDESZ-led government came to power, the pension reform was not carried out as scheduled. The FIDESZ-led government made some institutional changes that partially reversed the 1998-reform.This article examines the original reform plan and institutional changes under the FIDESZ-led government from three viewpoints: 1) financial sustainability of the pension system; 2) incentive structure and the system's transparency; and 3) the system's fairness. We also evaluate pension reforms carried out since mid-1990s in relation to the processes of system transformation and EU accession.By investigating institutional changes in detail, we show the 1998 pension reform was inadequate to its three purposes mentioned above, because it incorporated measures softening the shocks expected from the original reform plan. Although there is no doubt that the 1998 pension reform was a drastic one, actors had to make numerous compromises during in the agreement formation process and the legislation process. Consequently, the system maintained a larger scale of redistribution than originally proposed by the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Welfare and the PIF (Pension Insurance Fund) self-government.We also show that the changes made by the FIDESZ-led government resulted not from differences in thinking about pension systems but from populist politics that was imposed heavier burden on both contributors and pensioners.We conclude by pointing out there are many unsolved problems, opacities and uncertainties regarding the future course of Hungary's pension system reform.

著者

上野 俊彦

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2002, no.31, pp.239-241, 2002 (Released:2010-05-31)

被引用文献数

1 1

著者

溝端 佐登史

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2003, no.32, pp.3-18, 2003 (Released:2010-05-31)

参考文献数

40

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After the Russian financial crisis of 1998 issues such as the sustainability of economic growth, economic inequality and poverty have become points of contention both in Russia and in the world. The main purpose of this paper is to investigate economic disparity and inequality and their influence over market transition in Russia, and to consider how people behave under conditions of economic inequality.First of all, globalisation and the market transition in Russia has brought about increased international disparity. As a result of the investment gap, the real disparity in economic power is greater than it seems. At the same time, domestic economic disparities in Russia have expanded during market transition. There is a striking contrast among industries. There are growing sectors like exports, resources and energy, average sectors and stagnating sectors such as light industry and machine assembly. Equipment age structure and investment capacity also gives an account of industrial disparities. In addition, regional differentiation is striking with Russia's economy often referred to as “one metropolis capitalism”. We can observe an increase in regional disparities in unemployment rate and in the share of loss-making enterprises, which suggest different levels of adaptability to the market.Is Russia egalitarian in relation to income and assets? Considering the Gini coef-ficient, inequality increased in Russia during the transition process. It is important to appreciate that changes in inequality were very large and occurred during the early years of transition. Income and expenditure of households indicate such changes. Revenue from business activities and property income are increasing, while wage differentials have maintained their influence. Among expenditures, the share of savings is increasing. Consumption differentiation can be observed among non-basic goods like consumer durables. These phenomena suggest the existence of a segmented market. The redistribution effects of social transfer, however, have been preserved and we cannot neglect them under the flat income tax system. Thus, empirical evidence suggests heightened inequality and social stratification has accompanied government failure.However, the population of Russia has not always reacted destructively regarding inequality and poverty. The nature of industrial disputes also suggests weak resistance and low levels of dissatisfaction. First, economic inequality has led to the exit of losers who have sought additional revenue in the informal sector. Second, families have enlarged their economic activity, which compensates for income shortages. Third, there is a gray area between the official labour market and unemployment. According to the new investigation, the informal employment includes more than 15% workers. Fourth, elasticity of wages is strong and stimulates the second job. Finally, Russian enterprises have kept their social function in the transition period. The above re-sponses are based on the legacy of the former system and they have the twofold effect of both easing and intensifying inequality. Economic inequality and the specific reactions to it to a large extent reflect the peculiarities of the Russian market.

著者

保坂 哲郎

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2003, no.32, pp.19-36, 2003 (Released:2010-05-31)

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This paper attempts to analyze changes in the Russian local population movement from the viewpoint of social differences in this area. First, peoples returning from outside the country principally move to the Russian European districts due to un-stable living conditions. Second, the tendency towards over-centralization in Moscow's population is highlighted conspicuously. Third, an another side, population outflows from cities and farm villages under the jurisdiction of Siberia, Far East districts are intense. Fourth, increased urban decay is common except in some of the resourceexploitation areas, and this paper suggests that the Propiska system would speed up this trend.Furthermore, natural population dynamics are studied. First, this study looks at the development of the aging of Russian European village populations and intense population decrease. Second, geriatric and chronic diseases in the Central districts are serious and are particularly related to alcohol consumption. Third, a high death rate from infectious diseases can be seen in Siberia and the southern districts, a phenomenon common to many“developing countries”. This may be due to the large range in Russian inland social levels.Changes in the population dynamics in this period are magnified by these varying social differences. In addition, the Propiska system has strengthened limitations on the movement, and the division of a unified labor market between cities and farm vil-lages has not yet been overcome.The main reason for Moscow's over-centralization could be explained by its economic role (mainly, enlargement of financial systems and the service trade) . However, the Propiska system seems to strengthen it. Thus, Moscow's over-centralization tendency is accelerated while, at the same time, including a policy which is aimed to contradict it. The aging population, a lack of a sufficient work force, and increases in illegal immigrants are worsening, while Moscow is enjoying“saecial privileges”.The above-mentioned population movements have weak“pull factors”, and“push factors”such as social and economic crises are powerful. Moreover, this movement itself is unstable. However, in the long term, the enlargement of Moscow, its ever increasing economic and social dominance, and increasing differences in society will continue to be problematic.Therefore, a policy that aims at general development in the Far East district, city inflow regulation problems (eg. actions to stem the farm village problem), a decrease in the death rate and a rise in birth rates (social stability and measures to protect geriatric and chronic diseases) would become necessary in the future in order for the Russian Federation to maintain its character as a unified nation.

著者

吉井 昌彦

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2003, no.32, pp.37-47, 2003 (Released:2010-05-31)

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The economic disparities in Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) consist of three levels. The first one is a domestic one, that is, disparities among central and peripheral regions in one country. The second one is among central and peripheral countries in CEECs. And the third one is among EU 15 countries and CEECs, that is, among central and peripheral countries in Europe.In this paper, we have considered why these disparities have occurred, whether they will disappear or be magnified, and how to diminish them.The main conclusions are:—The economic disparities have caused by the initial conditions and transition policies in CEECs.—They will not diminish, at least in the short period.—CEECs, especially Southern and Eastern countries, have to enhance their efforts to close the gaps and to accomplish the task “Return to Europe”.—External factors such as aids from the EU are also important for attaining the aims.

著者

兵頭 慎治

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2001, no.30, pp.171-174, 2001 (Released:2010-05-31)

著者

角田 安正

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2002, no.31, pp.20-37, 2002 (Released:2010-05-31)

参考文献数

22

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The Maskhadov regime relied on Islam to resolve feuds among major leaders in Chechnya after the first Chechen war ended in 1996. Taking advantage of the situation, the Wahhabi expanded their influence in the republic. The Wahhabi were comprised mainly of Arabic political Islamists, who had fought against the Soviets in Afghanistan and come to Chechnya to participate in the first Chechen war.In the summer of 1998, Osama Bin Laden, a new sponsor of the Wahhabi in Chechnya, began to establish a close relationship with anti-Maskhadov leaders (field commanders) attracting them by his abundant funds and his idea of establishing a unified Islamic republic in the north Caucasus. Encouraged by Bin Laden, Chechen armed forces attempted to invade the Russian republic of Dagestan in August 1999.As Moscow lost no time in launching a counter attack, another Chechen war commenced. The Chechen conflict posed a threat to Russia in that it might not have only undermined Russia's territorial integrity, but could have also become a pretext for western countries, including the United States, to meddle in Russia's domestic affairs. Russia tried in vain to persuade Washington that Chechen separatists were disguised international terrorists and that Russia suffered from the same terrorism as the U.S. had during 1998 with American embassy attacks in Africa. The United States continued to attach importance to the human-rights aspects of the Chechen issue. President Vladimir Putin, taking office in 2000, was not able to make the U.S. change its attitude toward the Chechen problem as his predecessor, Boris Yeltsin, had likewise found impossible.In Russia, moreover, some forces, especially the military elite, were opposed to cooperation with the United States. They alleged that none other than the U.S. had played a role in stirring up the situation in the north Caucasus. Thus, there would be no cooperation between the two countries for an anti-terrorist struggle.The situation abruptly changed after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. U.S.-Russian relations as concerned terrorism seemed to take a 180 degree turnabout. Close analysis of the relationship, however, would show that Russia gave way more in the U.S. direction than vice versa. President Putin allowed Central Asian countries to accept U.S. military presence two weeks after the terrorist attacks, with the Republic of Georgia to follow suit during the spring of 2002 in defiance of the resistance of the political and military elite in Russia. He expected to ease their frustrations by successfully suppressing Chechen armed forces as a result of promoting cooperation between Russia and the United States. He also expected that Washington would admit Russia's war in Chechnya to be a war on terrorism. Such expectations, however, were not met.The political forces in Russia, therefore, having assumed a negative attitude toward cooperation with the U.S., grew more frustrated. President Putin was forced to take steps to soothe their feelings. When he implied that he was ready to dispatch Russian troops to the Pankisskoye Gorge in the Republic of Georgia to eradicate Chechen fighters during September 2002, he intended to assuage the political and military elite which had not welcomed the U.S. military presence in Georgia from its inception.

著者

沼野 充義

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2002, no.31, pp.38-55, 2002 (Released:2011-04-19)

参考文献数

16

被引用文献数

1

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The purpose of this paper is to discuss a remarkable aspect of contemporary Russian and East European literature after the perestroika: fragmentation as a literary device. The preliminary assumption for this approach is that these areas can be, in spite of their diversity, treated productively as a cultural sphere integrated loosely by their common geopolitical experiences.By “fragmentation”I mean the device of structuring novels (and prose works in general) with fragments, not following any consistent development of plot. Although this device is not new to the 20th-century novel, it became particularly conspicuous in the contemporary literary scene of Russia and Eastern Europe in the 1990s. What runs parallel to it is the collapse of monolithic value judgment system which dominated Socialist countries before the perestroika. A dramatic illustration of this is the split of the Writers Union of the USSR and the consequent irreconcilable conflict among various factions of writers.Karen Stepanian maintains that one of the most characteristic aspects of postmodernism in contemporary Russia is the belief that existence consists of arbitrary fragments. It explains clearly why contemporary writers in Russia and Eastern Europe have developed a tendency toward “fragmentation”. In this paper I discussed the following cases as remarkable examples of this tendency: Galkovskii's The Endless Cul-de-sac (1988), Prigov and Moscow Conceptualism, Kabakov's total installation The Palace of Projects (1995-98), Bitov's The Inevitability of the Unwritten (1998), Erofeev's The Encyclopedia of the Russian Soul (1999), Pavic's Dictionary of the Khazars (1984), and Esterházy's works.However, in Russia there recently appeared a certain tendency toward what might be considered reintegration of fragments. Works with such a tendency are filled with nationalistic sentiment, aiming after the reacquisition of the superpower that Russia used to possess. Pavel Krusanov's The Bite of the Angel (2000) is typical of such a tendency. Some recent Russian films, such as Nikita Mikhalkov''s The Siberian Barber and Aleksei Balabanov's Brother 2, also come in this category.The tendency from fragmentation to reintegration (from the collapse of the superpower to the return to it) can also be seen in the recent political movement of the group “Idushchie vmeste”. In July of 2002, Vladimir Sorokin, the most outstanding representative of Russian postmodernism, and his publisher Ad Marginem were indicted by “Idushchie vmeste” for “circulation of pornography”. This incident shows the ongoing severe conflict in Russia between the postmodern camp and the anti-postmodern camp.

著者

千年 篤

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2002, no.31, pp.123-145, 2002 (Released:2010-05-31)

参考文献数

18

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The Republic of Macedonia has a complex ethnic structure. The majority group consists of Macedonians with about two-thirds of national population. Among ethnic minorities, Albanians overwhelmingly dominate over other minority groups, with a share of about a quarter of the population. Although ethnic conflicts had not arisen on the surface since the independence, ethnic relation undoubtedly was a sensitive issue in Macedonian society.In early 2001, the Macedonian Crisis took place. After the armed conflict extending over half a year, an agreement for disarmament was settled between the government and Albanian guerillas in August. In accordance with the agreement, constitutional amendments were approved in the parliament in November. The crisis was over. However, this does not mean that an ethnic problem has been solved in Macedonia. It is considered that various factors that led to the Macedonian Crisis still exist in Macedonian society. One of them is economic inequality between ethnic groups. Although such economic inequality was not a direct cause of the crisis, it must be associated with escalating ethnic conflicts.The purpose of this paper is to characterize Macedonia's ethnic problem, with focus on economic inequality between ethnic groups. This is done by investigating two hypotheses: (A) Distinct economic inequality exists between ethnic groups; and (B) Economic inequality between ethnic groups has widened since the independence. Three variables were chosen to assess these hypotheses: i) per capita income (social product), ii) unemployment rate, and iii) educational attainment. Although it is not an economic variable, education was chosen because it represents the level of human capital that is strongly associated with individual lifetime incomes.The results generally support hypothesis (A) but reject hypothesis (B) . Distinct ethnic disparity was found for all three variables throughout a period of study. However, the widening of ethnic inequality was found only for education. The educational level of Albanians, on average, has declined markedly after the independence. On the contrary, a gap in unemployment rate between Macedonians and Albanians has narrowed in late 1990s. Also, the widening of ethnic inequality in per capita income was not observed during the period 1986-1995.There are two remarks regarding these results. First, the fall in the education level of Albanians may be attributed to their own decisions. Throughout the period of transition, unemployment rates were consistently high, reaching above 30%. The rates were especially high for young adults, reaching more than 50%. Under such circumstances, it may be a rational decision to start working in the informal sector and accumulate business experiences that would be more effective than pursuing formal education in order to establish their careers in an emerging market economy. This attitude is considered to be stronger for Albanians because working in the informal sector has been common in Albanian society since the Yugoslav era. Second, hypothesis (B) for per capita income was generally rejected; however, when the year 1989 was used as a reference year under socialist regime, it could not be rejected. This implies that if Albanians viewed 1989 as a representative year before the independence, they would likely feel that their living standards declined both in absolute and relative terms compared with those of Macedonians during the period of transition.

著者

樹神 成

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2001, no.30, pp.7-24, 2001 (Released:2010-05-31)

参考文献数

35

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This article focuses on the legal backgrounds and aspects of the reform of Russian federation initiated by President PutinOf course, the reform of Russian Federation is an important event in Russian politics. But without understanding the legal background and aspects, we can not comprehend the feature of Russian Federation reform fully, because the federation reform by President Putin is a reaction to the fact that some of federation subjects have formed its own legal system since the early stage of the transition in Russia, and others began to legislate its own laws and decrees after the adoption of new Russian Constitution. As a result, Russia came to have two legal system, federal law and regional law, and the legal aspects became more important in the relation between the federal center and federation subjects. Putting it in another way, it is not enough to restore to political negotiations in order to resolve the problems and conflicts between the federal center and federation subjects.Since the beginning of the transition process in Russia, the federation reform has been a main and difficult issue. 1993 Russian Constitution provides that Russian Federation is a democratic federal rule-of-law state and federation subjects each are equal subjects of Russian Federation. It divides jurisdictions between Russian Federation and federation subjects - the jurisdiction of Russian Federation, the joint jurisdiction, the jurisdiction of federation subject. At the same time, 1993 Russian Constitution allow concluding treaties on the delimitation of scopes of authority and powers between the federal center and its subjects (power-sharing treaties) . In 1993 Russian Constitution the relation between the division of jurisdiction provided by Russian Constitution and the delimitation of scopes of authority and powers decided by the treaties is not sufficiently clear.1993 Russian Constitution has two contradicting elements. On one hand, it allows Russian Federation to be stronger in the sphere of the legislative power and judiciary power. The Article 76 of the Constitution provides that on issues within the jurisdiction of Russian Federation federal constitutional laws and federal laws shall be adopted and on matters within the joint jurisdiction federal laws shall be issued, in accordance with which federation subjects shall adopt their laws and decrees. According to the Article 71 of the Constitution“law courts; Prosecutor's Office; criminal, criminal-procedural and criminal-executive legislation; amnesty and pardon; civil, civil-procedural and arbitration-procedural legislation; legal regulation of intellectual property”belongs to the federal jurisdiction. Because of this the federation subjects have few powers in the sphere of the judiciary power. Russian judiciary system has common features of that of unitary states. On the other hand, 1993 Russian Constitution contains unique articles, the origin of which can trace back to the principles of the federation embodied in the form of USSR. Article 11 is a typical example of this.President Eltsin concluded 49 power-sharing treaties with individual federal subject from 1994 to 1998. While some of power-sharing treaties contributed toward maintaining the Russian Federation, the conclusion of the power-sharing treaties served as a method for Elttin to get the supports from the federation subjects. Power-sharing treaties individualized the relations between federal center and federation subjects. On the contrary, Putin's challenge is to establish the legal order between federal center and federation subjects. While under the federal structure stipulated in Russian Constitution the federal center has strong powers, the federal center did not have enough ability to force the federation subjects to comply with Russian Constitution and federal laws. President Putin became aware of this weak point in the Russian Federation.

著者

田中 宏

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2001, no.30, pp.25-39, 2001 (Released:2010-10-27)

参考文献数

23

被引用文献数

1

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More than one decade has passed since“Berlin wall”fell down in 1989 in the Eastern Europe. This transformation has opened the door for East European countries to be integrated into the global economy. What influence did this globalization put on the regional changes in the transition of Eastern Europe?The purpose of this paper lies in analyzing the problems of these regional changes, aiming at breaking through the limits of research studied on the basis of the analysis unit of the state, industrial sector and enterprise.Chapter 1 characterizes the regional changes of Eastern Europe as follows, (1) rising and expanding of the new regional differentials in the whole European continent, (2) expanding of north-south differentials inside the Eastern Europe, (3) appearance of the new 4 types of area differential inside any East European country (leading areas, loser areas, negatively continuative areas and new entry areas in market transition), (4) administration, infrastructures, institutions and policies concerning the region are being restructured and newly shaped, upon which pressure of joining the EU has given a decisive influence.Chapter 2 is confined to Hungary, analyzing how the area-territorial structure has been changed under the influence of foreign capital investment inflows. The point to understand here is that the multilateral functional elements accumulated in the long term in the local areas constitute their characters by coming in touch with FDI.Chapter 3 is devoted to review the above regional changes in the historical perspective of 20th century, during which this East European region has been transformed three times. The industrialization in the beginning of 20th century gave birth to disproportionate and uneven regional development. Introduction of state socialism after the WW II produced the convergence of regional unevenness and contractions in a degree with some differentials among the areas left to some extent. And then, at the end of this century, the regions are faced with the alternative choice of mercantilist type development of regional economy or multinational firm one.As for this choice, developing of post-Fordism in the whole European continent has put great influence upon regional development in the Eastern Europe.

著者

小泉 直美

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2001, no.30, pp.55-77, 2001 (Released:2010-10-27)

参考文献数

44

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During 10 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has become a middle-class power, while the United States as the only superpower is increasingly inclined to behave on its own way in the international scene. How is Russia trying to cope with the US? This question is closely related to a broader issue, i.e. how Russia is making its adaptation during the system change of international relations.This article attempts to answer this question by addressing itself to the issue of strategic stability. Under the Cold War system the strategic stability between the US and the Soviet Union was attained by controlling offensive nuclear weapons with defensive nuclear weapons promised not to develop and deploy by both sides. But since the end of the Cold War, nuclear proliferation has become perceived bigger threats, which pushed the US to the development of the National Missile Defense (NMD) . Thus Russia wants to maintain the old strategic stability, while the US wants to develop the NMD. The negotiation started between the two.First we analyze Russian behavior in the nuclear arms negotiation and the intention of various actors with the specific emphasis on the arguments on the military reform. Then at the latter half of the article we examine Russian attitude toward the issue of non-proliferation problems. This time we focus on the situation of military industrial complex and its reconstruction process, and also the specialists' arguments on the matter. We will analyze them from the end of the Cold War until September 11, 2001. The reason why we stop at September 11 is to show that Russia did not suddenly change on September 11.As conclusions we argue that first, Russia initially tried to maintain the old strategic stability but it turned out to be impossible to do so because of her financial constraints and the urgent need for military reform. President Putin slowly began to stop Russia's pretending a superpower by renouncing his previous goal to maintain the strategic parity with the US. Then, on September 11, 2001, he grasped at the chance and decided to become a big power in the new US-led international system.Second, when it comes to a new threat, nuclear proliferation, Russia was also slow to recognize its significance because its huge military industry needs to export military weapons in order to survive. And we find that while making efforts to secure the US non-proliferation commitments, Russia is also trying to sell more weapons to even the 'rouge nations' like Iran. But now the US can't stop those commitments for its Key words; strategic stability/START/NMD/nuclear non-proliferation/Iran

著者

辻本 政雄

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2001, no.30, pp.79-95, 2001 (Released:2010-05-31)

参考文献数

58

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This thesis deals with regulatory reforms and privatization of network industries (transport, energy and telecommunication) in three Central European transitional economies (Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland) by focusing on the necessity of the strategies in airline industry with the conclusion that the measures, irrespective of the effectiveness of some of conventional governmental regulations and protections, are surely expected to strengthen their core-competences as well as to overcome the socialist legacies of lack of capitals, business knowledge and world-wide networks, which contribute to balancing the national budget, boosting economy and increasing consumer welfare in the Central European countries which have been eager to join the European Union, because that symbolizes the Return to Europe or the Return to History: the three Central European economies have been highly approved for the rapidness of the system conversion, the three carries enjoy almost the same performances (in terms of the number of passengers etc.) and share the same agenda such as joining in some world-wide alliance for global competition.The thesis is composed of three parts: the 1 chapter gives the general direction and the 2nd gives the historical reasons of regulations and state-owned services, necessity of regulatory reforms and privatization after the system conversion and finally the trends and aims of joining in world-wide networks, especially some European Networks, and the final part generalizes the thesis.

著者

富山 栄子

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2001, no.30, pp.96-111, 2001 (Released:2010-05-31)

参考文献数

59

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With the transition to a market economy, Russia became a significant market for Japanese manufacturers in the 1990s. In the same period, Japanese companies began to enter the Russian market themselves. There is, however, little existing research into entry strategies used by those companies for their entry procedure. In this paper I have selected Canon as a case study and investigated the unique features of the marketing environment in Russia as well as the impact these features have had on entry strategies used in the region. The purpose of the paper is to assess whether entry strategies, theory and practice developed in Western free-market economies is being used to help guide the Russian market, to analyze how Japanese companies have responded to those markets and the kind of entry strategies they have adopted thus far.In 1997 Canon set up the Moscow office of its Finnish corporation ‘CANON NORTH-EAST OY’ and began exporting directly to Russia. Canon's entry mode to establish its subsidiary outside Russia cannot be explained under existing theories. Why, when it began to export directly, without using Japanese trading companies, did it establish its subsidiary in Finland and not in Russia? Takeda's Entry Model argues that a company begins by exporting, then establishes a sales subsidiary in the actual market, ultimately establishing its own production subsidiary. However, Canon chose to establish its sales subsidiary in Finland primarily because it was too great a risk for them to use the target country. The company claimed that they could not predict how corporate tax would change because the legal system in Russia was so unstable. Subsidiaries have to abide by local law. It was therefore, risky for Canon to undertake operations in Russia. In addition, the key merit of establishing subsidiaries is that a company will be able to realize the “completion of sales”. However, in Russia, if a Canon subsidiary based in Moscow imported directly to Russia and did not use local distributors, it would not be able to compete with those Canon products imported by independent local distributors. Consequently Canon chose Finland. The established market entry modes are applicable in Russia, but must be modified in relation to the specific features of the Russian market. If the foreign market is not ruled by law, as in Russia, a company may decide to establish a sales subsidiary offshore.

著者

橋本 あかね

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2001, no.30, pp.112-128, 2001 (Released:2010-05-31)

参考文献数

64

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This paper explores how Russian regional governments engaged in privatization policy and what kind of impacts their unique policies had on federal-level policy aims.Implementation of privatization policy can be divided into three periods: The first period, from October 1992 to July 1, 1994, is called “voucher privatization”, the second (to March 1997) is called “money privatization” and the third, “individual privatization.” The federal government had specific aims such as: effective management of enterprises, development of investors and revenue gains.At first, regions were opposed to the privatization and some of them implemented various independent schemes: suspension of the policy, renationalization, control of competition, demand for federal property, etc.Such regional differences originated from the regions' particular economic situation, their leaders' economic/political orientations and countermeasures to the economic crises. The number of reported cases of regional privatization policy has gradually declined, thus it appears as if the differences among regions has diminished. However, the phenomenon can be attributed to gradual institutionalization of federalism and officially enlarged and endorsed regional competence rather than the interpretation that leaders abandoned their policy.Engagement of regions bore both positive and negative consequences. First, Russian fast privatization could not be implemented without the regions' cooperation. Second, the regional governments alleviated the pain of reform by maintaining the employment and old-style social safety net system.On the other hand, however, improvement in management efficiency, the main aim of the federal government, was undermined. Moreover, the policy discrepancy between the federal and regional level hindered the economic transparency of all of Russia, which foreign investors found an political risk. This leads to the further delays to structural reform.Regions placed their particular aims above those of the federal government. This invited a situation in which various ransitional strategies coexisted. On the other hand, the federal government ultimately allowed and endorsed such regional discretions. As a result, while difficulties with the transition were mitigated in some regions, negative impacts can be observed with respect to efficiency, investment climate, and market transparency. These effects amplified the problems already inherent in the federal policy.

著者

廣田 拓

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2001, no.30, pp.129-145, 2001 (Released:2010-05-31)

参考文献数

16

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The main objective of this article is to study the impact of international factors on democratization. After the end of Cold War, both democratic consolidation and a free market-oriented economy have been accepted as universal values in Central Europe. Thus, international actors from the EU, WB, and IMF to Western social organizations, such as foundations, NGOs, and churches launched into democratic assistance. Among them, I focus on the role of Western foundations' assistance that support societies in development and in transitions to establish democratic norms and values.According to existing literature, there are four ideal types of international influence. First, the ideal type is “contagion, ” which implies the demonstration effect. By developing the technology of communication, the experience of democratization in one country spreads to others. The second type represents “consent, ” based on prevalent norms and expectation through some foundations, NGO or international organizations, which enlighten the people who are not accustomed to democratic norms and attitudes. The third, the type of international influence is “control, ” which includes punishments, economic sanctions and rewards given by external forces. They encourage the transformation of a non-democratic into a democratic country. Finally, the fourth type shows “conditionality, ” which intends to make a non-democratic regime restricted by a donor country or some multilateral organization. Currently, this ideal type of international pressure is prevalent throughout the world.Therefore, I pay attention to the role of foundations' assistance through “consent, ” that is why their aid programs include both party-reform, political institution-building and establishing social infrastructure of democracy. These roles of foundations will empower civil society forces to reform the state.In the case of Poland, under Communism for forty years, the Polish state dominated by the Communist party controlled all spheres of social and political life. Thus, transition to democracy means rebuilding civil society, a task which more than sixty Western foundations took part in supporting. Even while the authoritarian regime controlled all state-society relations, some democratic dissidents, like intellectuals and non-official labor unions, could continue to exist under Communist rule, because Western foundations, such as German foundations or NED, had provided democratic aid to Poland through the network of foundations' assistance. In the transition phase, some foundations tried to reform partyorganizations. Others coped with economic problems or provided the social infrastructures of a democratic regime to build civil society. After the transition to democracy, Poland faces obstacles to keep civil society united for cooperation and collective action. As the authoritarian regime is no longer there, the challenge has shifted from cooperating in a common goal of removing old rulers to the functioning of various groups and organizations in civil society. So, the democratic government may experience a democratic competition between the interests and views of each group in the population. In this point, foundations' assistance through “consent, ” can only deal with the difficulty of integrating them in democratic consolidation.Thus, a democracy will be consolidated when democracy becomes routinized and deeply internalized in social, institutional, and even psychological life as well as in calculations for achieving success, through foundations' assistance.

著者

柳沢 秀一

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2001, no.30, pp.146-169, 2001 (Released:2010-05-31)

参考文献数

63

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On September 17, 1939 the Soviet Red Army invaded Eastern Poland, following the German invasion of Western Poland some two weeks earlier. In the occupied territory, which contained Western Ukraine (Galicia and Volhynia) and Western Byelorussia (Belarus), Poles were deported in the short period leading up to the German invasion of June 1941. It is estimated that from 250 thousand to 1.65 million Poles were subjected to deportation. This brought about a major transformation in the social and economic structure of the area.This article examines how the deportation of Poles influenced the transformation of social and economic structure in the Western Ukraine (Galicia and Volhynia) . Considering this problem, we also actress Soviet rural policies - land reform and collectivization, then explore correlation between deportation and the two policies.After annexation the People's Assembly of Western Ukraine was elected to power. On October 28, 1939 the Assembly formally announced the confiscation of land belonging to great landowners, monasteries, and state officials. By the end of 1939, 2, 753, 000 hectares of land in Galicia and Volhynia had reportedly been confiscated representing 29.9% of the total land of two regions held by landowners and monasteries.Simultaneously, the first deportation of Poles began. A decree that was issued by the Soviet government declared that Polish military settlers (osadnikis), should be removed from Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia. In February 139, 590 people were deported to Siberia, Ural and so on. The land reform and deportation of Poles led to the increase of Ukrainian landed farmers, including middle peasants (stratum-serednyak) .In January 1940, the Soviet authorities began formal collectivization, or kolkhz (collective farm) in these regions. By June 1, there were 2, 866 kolkhz in Galicia and Volhynia, representing 205, 137 peasant households, or 12.8% of the total number of households. These households had 796, 827 hectares of land in their possession, or 14.9% of the total land in the regions. As for Galicia and Volhynia, the Soviet authorities were preoccupied with the defense of the western borderlands from 1939 to 1941.On the eve of war there were the two waves of deportation that occurred. The first mass deportation which was completed on April 1940, including families of Polish official, gendarmes, landowners. 320 thousands people were deported from Galicia and Volhynia and Western Byelorussia. At this time, including Ukrainians, that were activists and opponents to collectivization. In the second mass deportation refugees consisted of Poles (41%) and Jews (59%) . The forced deportation of Poles removed the active elements of the Polish population from Galicia and Volhynia, and brought social and economic transformation in these areas. But this could not create a material base for the collectivization of two regions. In fact collectivization did not fully materialize and land reforms continued. On March 241941, on official land reform decree was issued.As a result, in Galicia and Volhynia, the deportation of Poles, especially active elements, such as osadniki created a material base for the increasing number of Ukrainian peasant arriving. This led to a major transformation in the social and economic structure, “depolonization”, of these regions.