著者

三谷 惠子

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2013, no.42, pp.17-31, 2013 (Released:2015-05-28)

参考文献数

36

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As a cultural space, Bosnia was formed on the borders of Western and Eastern Christianity, Islam, and Judaism. Religious diversity in the heartland of the Balkans did not cause serious conflict, but rather fostered coexistence, until the end of the Ottoman regime. However, the nationalism that emerged in surrounding areas during the nineteenth century penetrated Bosnia, where the question of national belongings became increasingly pressing in the twentieth century. The collapse of Yugoslavia under the slogan of the “brotherhood and unity” was followed by war; multiethnic Bosnia disintegrated into three ethnic components, those of the Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs, and two political entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Republika Srpska. This paper deals with the representation of Bosnia in the literary works of native Bosnian writers; it focuses on the polysemic feature of “the border” and reveals that the diverse portrayal of Bosnia in these works reflects each writer’s experience and the more general social situation. In his short story, “Letter from the Year 1920,” Ivo Andrić presents Bosnia as “a land of hatred” and profiles its religious diversity as generating intercultural conflicts. The depiction of Bosnia as demarked by multiple cultural borders is characteristic of Andric’s compositions; this short story reveals a striking picture of such a Bosnia, one that echoes the writer’s experience in the two disastrous wars of the first half of the twentieth century. Hasan, a character in Meša Selimović’s novel The Dervish and Death, which was published in 1966, describes the Bosnian as an in-between, unfinished creature, deprived of any particular cultural identity. In this depiction, Hasan discloses the internal state of Selimović, an atheistic communist who values traditional Muslim culture. At the same time, the Bosnian depicted by Hasan reflects the condition of the Muslims of Yugoslavia until the end of 1960s, when they remained a vague ethnic group without any official nationality. Andrićʼs character Maks Levenfeld, who depicts Bosnia as a land of hatred, reappears in Dževad Karahasan’s “Letter from the Year 1993,” first published in 1996. In contrast to Andrićʼs Maks, Karahasan’s character describes Bosnia as a multicultural space in which people “jealously” maintain their cultural diversity. Bosnia here is conceptualized as a domain of intercultural communication, and the borders once featured by Andrić as dividing lines are profiled as interstitial spheres that create a society with internal cultural diversity. By reversing the picture represented in the letter of Andrićʼs Maks, Karahasan tries to recover his Bosnia, whose society is balanced by cultural diversity. The different presentations of Bosnia in three writers correspond to diverse conceptualizations of “the border”—Andrićʼs as dividing lines; Selimovićʼs as in-between places where people without clear identification dwell; and Karahasanʼs as interstitial spaces that can generate intercultural relationships. Each also reflects a different phase in the history of Bosnia, from the time immediately after World War II, through the Yugoslav regime, to the collapse of the multinational state.

著者

堀江 典生

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2013, no.42, pp.32-44, 2013 (Released:2015-05-28)

参考文献数

39

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This paper investigates “Chinese diaspora,” the term used by the Russian media and in Russian scholarly articles to describe the Chinese residing and working in Russia either permanently or temporarily. Although Russia’s perceived threat of Chinese migration to Russia has calmed as compared to the 1990s, Russian citizens are still intolerant of Chinese inclusion into Russian society and the apparent unwillingness of the Chinese to adapt. Hostility against the Chinese can be avoided by understanding their activity in Russia, as well as the roots of Russian society’s stereotyping of the Chinese. This paper focuses on the term Chinese diaspora because it has not previously been theoretically considered. In addition, whether this Chinese presence in Russia qualifies as actual diaspora has not been thoroughly examined, despite its wide use to describe the Chinese currently residing and working in Russia. The aim of this paper is to examine how the term Chinese diaspora as a metaphor operates in Russian society, as well as how the boundary between Russian citizens and the Chinese has been maintained not by diasporic motivation, but by Russian motivation to perpetuate it. This paper first examines how the term Chinese diaspora is used by the Russian media and in Russian scholarly articles, and then describes how this usage differs from the definition of diaspora in the theoretical sense and from how the Oversea Chinese worldwide define themselves as diaspora. This paper also examines the diasporic ties between Chinese migrants and their home countries and diasporic practices from a historical perspective. Chinese diaspora should be analyzed by the diasporic stances, projects, claims, idioms, practices, and so on, that are motivated from the diaspora side, even if they passively accept or adapt their diasporic stances. This analysis finds that there is no diasporic cohesion between new and old Chinese immigrants to Russia in term of their origins, and no consistent and well-organized diasporic practice. This paper’s investigation makes it clear that the Chinese diaspora in Russia does not presently exist from the perspective of diasporic theory and social practices. The term Chinese diaspora is a metaphor designed by Russia to maintain the boundary between Russian society and Chinese migrants. The grouping of Russia’s Chinese population into this putative diaspora keeps them arbitrarily bounded by the host society. With this grouping, biased views against Chinese immigrants remains as a device to instigate new threats against them or inflate existing threats, even if those who speak about the Chinese immigrants welcome them or not. The term Chinese diaspora in the Russian context should be used carefully. Its use hinders the Chinese by stereotyping them as a putative diaspora, provoking an inexplicable disquiet among the host citizens that keeps them intolerant of Chinese immigrants.

著者

五十嵐 徳子 加藤 有子 蓮見 雄 羽場 久美子

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2013, no.42, pp.45-71, 2013 (Released:2015-05-28)

著者

貝田 真紀

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2013, no.42, pp.72-87, 2013 (Released:2015-05-28)

参考文献数

24

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This paper attempts to clarify the political behavior of non-governmental and non-profit organisations in modern Russia based on a questionnaire-type survey carried out from December 2003 to March 2004 in Moscow and St. Petersburg. The survey was designed by Prof. Yutaka TSUJINAKA (University of Tsukuba), Prof. Itsuro NAKAMURA (University of Tsukuba), and Prof. William Smirnov (Institute of State and Law, Russian Academy of Sciences) with an aim to analyze the relationship between non-profit organisations and political actors: the central and local governments, political parties, politicians, the mass media, and others. The questionnaire is called the “Japan Interest Group Survey” (JIGS), because it was initially designed to determine the situation with interest groups in Japan. Since then, it has been developed into a global research project, conducted in 15 countries. Russia is among these countries in a similar survey form. In this paper, I examine the political behavior of Russian organisations using JIGS data. Many scholars have analyzed Russian civil society from multiple angles after the collapse of the USSR, based on the assumption that civil society would develop smoothly under a new political system. However, NPOs and NGOs did not grow as expected, because “marionette organisations” controlled by the government dominated Russian civil society. These organisations receive grants from the government directly or indirectly, and in many cases they are managed by retired government officials. Also, these organisations invariably support the government and often participate in government-sponsored conferences as “civil society representatives.” Researchers have claimed that such organisations do not contribute to the development of the civil society, whereas organisations opposed to the government depend largely on donations from abroad. Furthermore, scholars have demonstrated that the Russian people rarely trust outside organisations and systems, but tend to trust personal networks with relatives, friends, and acquaintances. This is seen as one of the reasons why the Russian people tend not to participate in NPO activities. As a result, it is the accepted view that Russian civil society is weak owing to weak NPOs and NGOs. While I recognize that Russian civil society is quite different from civil society in the developed Western countries, it is still important to analyze the actual situation of NPOs in Russia, where there were 85,185 “non-profit organisations” and 108,736 “public associations” in 2012. It is safe to assume that these organisations have some influence on Russian politics, and the question of their lobbying behavior remains open. Thus, I consider here the subjective influence of these organisations on problem-solving, the proposal or altering of policies, the frequency of their contact with administrations and political parties, political activities during elections, and lobbying methods. It is beyond the scope of this paper to address all the questions and responses to the questionnaire-survey, but I attempt to discuss the organisations’ political actions based on the above six points. In conclusion, I found that Russian organisations are very confident in problem-solving in their working areas and that they succeeded in proposing or altering policies more often compared to similar organisations in other countries. They have frequent contact with administrations, especially locally, and they often engage in exchanges of opinion. On the other hand, the organisations do not have close contact with political parties and do not participate in political campaigns during elections. Also, the organisations prefer the outside lobbying method (through mass media, demonstrations, etc.) to inside lobbying (through the politicians, political parties, administrations, etc.).

著者

古川 哲

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2013, no.42, pp.103-120, 2013 (Released:2015-05-28)

参考文献数

14

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It is well known that the style of Andrei Platonov (1899–1951) underwent a notable change during the first half of the 1930s. This article aims to concretely analyze how his writing evolved during this period by comparing two of his novellas: Efirnyi trakt, written in 1927, and Dzhan, written in 1935. These works were written, respectively, before and after Platonov altered his style. However, there is another reason to compare these two works in particular. These novellas have entirely different themes; however, they contain similar elements in their plots. Therefore, they are relatively easy to compare in order to show how the author’s style underwent a transformation. Efirnyi trakt is about physicists who explore a way to increase or decrease materials at will. In contrast, Dzhan is about a youth who is sent from Moscow to rescue an ethnic group that is facing almost certain destruction in the Sary-Kamysh basin in Central Asia. Despite the apparent differences between these two works, each has a protagonist with a high level of education, and who, while eager to accomplish his mission, suffers a setback. A closer look at these works makes it clear that the position of the protagonist in relation to the natural environment undergoes a critical change. In other words, the relationship is turned upside down. In Efirnyi Trakt, the physicists are active agents dealing with the natural environment, and they exploit it for their own gains. In Dzhan, the young man is vulnerable to predation by eagles, and is therefore relatively passive to nature. In Europe after World War I, Platonov was not unique in characterizing the man by putting emphasis on his passiveness. However, Platonov was original in expressing the passivity of man with respect to the natural environment, not only through the expression of feelings and reflections of the protagonists but also by inverting the relationship between his protagonists and the natural environment. A comparison of these two novellas makes this clear. It is well known that since the mid 1930s, Platonov attempted to write works that faithfully accorded with the principles of socialist realism. Yet, despite his efforts, as seen in Dzhan, his own literary cosmos kept evolving.

著者

加藤 美保子

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2012, no.41, pp.28-44, 2012 (Released:2014-05-27)

参考文献数

71

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This article explains the opportunities and problems of Russia’s foreign policy towards the Asia-Pacific region (APR) under Putin’s third presidency. On 7 May 2012, president Putin signed Executive Orders for “implementing plans for developing Armed Forces and modernizing military-industrial complex” and “measures to implement foreign policy.” The first section of this article analyzes these documents from the viewpoint of Russia’s policy towards the Asia-Pacific region and points out the need for paying attention to the changes in the security environment both in Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia during the past 12 years, which have been ignored in previous research on the background of Russia’s assertive Asia policy. The above two documents show the significant changes in the Russia’s Asia-Pacific as follows. Firstly, the former document announces Moscow’s intention to develop the Navy, first and foremost in the Arctic areas and in Russia’s Far East with the aim of protecting the Russian Federation’s strategic interests. Secondly, the latter documents showed the national interests in deepening an equal, trust-based partnership and strategic cooperation with China, strategic partnerships with India and Vietnam, and developing mutual beneficial relations with America’s traditional allies, that is Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand. Given those changes, the second section of this article strives to demonstrate the qualitative changes in the relations among three major powers (the U.S., China and Russia) in the Asia-Pacific region by focusing on the trade balance, demand-supply situation of energy resources, and security issues. Finally, the third section discusses how Russia’s foreign policy towards APR will be affected by China’s advancement to the Arctic sea and the South China Sea and also the U.S. military shift to APR. In conclusion, this paper makes three points. First, unlike the old triangular relations in the Cold War era that were characterized by predominance of military capacity, both the areas of common interests and conflicts were diversified from trade, energy resources to traditional and non-traditional security issues in today’s U.S.-China-Russia relations. Second, China’s advancement to the Arctic sea through Sea of Japan has the potential to provoke the military competition between Russia and China, however this situation may offer an opportunity to deepen the cooperation between Russia and the U.S. in maritime security. Third, this article points out that the heightening tension between the U.S. and China as well as China and Vietnam in the South China Sea provides Russia with an opportunity to engage in regional affairs, for example, participation in the East Asia Summit. However, strategic partnership both with China and Vietnam complicates Russia’s attitudes towards Vietnam.

著者

日野 文

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2012, no.41, pp.45-60, 2012 (Released:2014-05-27)

参考文献数

53

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The conceptualization of new wars has altered the way in which we comprehend violence, identity, and politics in the post-Cold War era, and reconfigured our conviction of ethics, morality, and ‘the political.’ In particular, the second implication of the conception of new wars is significant, as that the de novo proposed ethics, morality, and ‘the political’ de-legitimize the conventional Westphalian mode of understanding modern politics, and offer a possibility of universal cosmopolitan platform, the politics of inclusion, for dealing with violence. This article, from a social constructivist perspective, aims at reconsidering the new wars thesis and more specifically the epistemological problem behind the proposed cosmopolitan solution. My problematization of new wars thesis brings to the fore the Yugoslav conflict as the main empirical reference point, aiming to reveal the discursive construction of the representation of the conflict as an embodiment of the characteristics of new wars. Any representation is a paradigmatic form of reality and has in itself a representational temporarily. It is because the construction of representation is subject to the circumstances directly transmitted from the past and the circumstances directly influenced by particular spatio-temporal contexts. Therefore, the representational construction of the Yugoslav conflict as an archetype of new war has to be understood as a mode of perceiving the seemingly incomprehensible violence witnessed within the post-Cold War context. By offering a reading of new wars thesis as a rhetorical paradigm, this article suggests two problems of the thesis and proposed cosmopolitan solution. First, the characterization of the Yugoslav conflict as an archetype of new wars is not particularly helpful to alter the history-long balkanist representation of self/other relationship; instead it has reinforced some negative connotations of Yugoslavia as the other. That is, the thesis transforms mere appearances of the conflict into the essence, which reinforces otherness and inferiority of Yugoslavia. This essentialization constitutes a ground for rationalizing a new ‘civilizing’ mission of the West under the guise of global civil society with its seemingly universal ethics and morality. Hence, the second problem is that the cosmopolitan solution for new wars is not as inclusive as it proposes itself to be, as that its inclusiveness is dependent upon certain conditions derived from particular western ethics, morality, and ideal type of how society ought to be instituted. Because ethics, morality, and ideal type of society are not singular but plural conceptions, linking them to the cosmopolitan politics of collective deliberation simply indicates exclusion of something unethical, immoral, and defective from the very politics of cosmopolitan solution. Though ‘the political’ within the cosmopolitan global civil society might be based on freedom and public deliberation, the antagonistic dichotomies are inherent features of ‘the political’ of such a global platform. That said, this article concludes that the new wars thesis has effectively constructed another paradigm of representing Yugoslavia, and importantly rearticulated the relative superiority of civic West, by reifying the polarity of heterogeneous domains, such as West and non-West, us and them, civic and ethnic, and ideal and defective.

著者

溝口 修平

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2012, no.41, pp.61-75, 2012 (Released:2014-05-27)

参考文献数

29

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Russia’s federalism in the 1990s had two different characteristics: the legal equality of federal subjects and bilateralism. While the constitution, which was adopted in December 1993, regards all the federal subjects (regions) as “legally equal”, it also allowed the center and regions to sign bilateral treaties to transfer some of their powers to each other. These treaties forged the asymmetry of Russia’s federal system and undermined the central government’s capacity in the 1990s. This paper aims at explaining the reason why such complex institutional settings were introduced in the constitution. Previous studies have argued that after the constitutional crisis in October 1993, President Yeltsin pursued the concentration of power on the center-regional axis by emphasizing the legal equality of all the federal subjects. At the same time, the concept of bilateralism was also brought in the federal system. In this manner, the constitution has different orientations in itself, but it remains unclear why such ambiguous institutional settings were made in Russia. In the course of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia started drafting a new constitution. While Yeltsin intended to grant himself strong power in the constitution, he couldn’t get enough support from the parliament on this point. Thus, he tried to win over regional leaders to his side in order to gain support for his own constitutional draft. In June 1993, he convened the Constitutional Conference, where a lot of regional leaders took part and played a great role in working on a new draft. Although the provisions of strong presidential power were approved in the Constitutional Conference, there were some disputes over the center-regional relations. One of them was whether the draft would include “the special status of republics” or “the legal equality of all the subjects.” Faced with such a state of confrontation, Yeltsin arranged a compromise between the two by both giving the republics “sovereign state” status and proposing that all the federal subjects should be “legally equal among themselves in relations with the Federal bodies of state power.” Another issue was the relations between the central government and the Republic of Tatarstan. As Tatarstan started negotiating with Moscow over a bilateral agreement in the late Perestroika period, it refused to sign the Federal Treaty in March 1992 and kept on the negotiation. In the Constitutional Conference, Tatarstan demanded that such a peculiar position should be taken into consideration in the constitutional draft, and this demand was accepted. In July 1993, the Constitutional Conference adopted the draft, which acknowledged such bilateral treaties as one of the ways to determine the scopes of authority and powers between the center and the federal subjects. This clause remained in the final draft, in spite of the fact that Yeltsin pursued the concentration of power after the crisis in October 1993. In this way, while he partly centralized the state structure at the last stage of making the constitution, he left the concept of bilateralism in the constitution. This bilateralism subverted the ability of the federal government, and exacerbated political and economic turmoil in the 1990s.

著者

六鹿 茂夫

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2012, no.41, pp.76-90, 2012 (Released:2014-05-27)

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In the study of semi-presidential systems, it has been claimed that there are often conflicts between the president and the prime minister. This hypothesis can also be applied to cases in Romania. However, in Romania, the outcomes of these conflicts have been varied. In the first two conflicts between the president and prime minister in 1991 and 1998, the prime ministers were forced to resign, while the two most recent cases in 2007 and 2012 led to the suspension of the president by parliament. Can all of these cases be explained by the same hypothesis about semi-presidential systems? If so, we may suppose that conflicts are merely changed in a formal sense from being between the president and prime minister to being between the president and parliament, and that the basic characteristics and structure of the conflicts between them remain essentially unchanged. However, if these cases cannot be explained by the institutional hypothesis alone, we may suppose that some structural change must have happened in recent Romanian politics. We argue that the latter is the case. What then is the structural change that has recently occurred in Romania’s politics? In order to answer this question, firstly, we review the variety of hypotheses on the relations between president and prime minister in semi-presidential systems, and examine their validity in relation to the cases in Romania. We confirm that these hypotheses could adequately explain the relations between president and prime minister in Romania until around the period of the country’s accession to the EU. However, we also observe that, after that period, the essential characteristics of relations between these state organs changed so profoundly that these hypotheses could no longer explain them. Secondly, as a first step to understanding how these relations had changed, we analyse the political process of the suspension of the president by the parliament and government in the summer of 2012, and we notice that the struggle over judicial independence developed in parallel with the conflicts between the president, prime minister, and parliament. Thirdly, we examine the political struggle over judicial independence, and discover that there were two forces struggling over it. One was the status-quo forces attempting to maintain the current structure of a politically-dependent judiciary which easily facilitated corruption, and the other was the forces attempting to restore the independence of the judiciary and reduce corruption. The balance of power between these two forces was overwhelmingly favourable for the former until around the time of Romania’s accession to the EU. Since then, however, the latter has started to gain strength, as Romania has sought to fulfil the conditions for the EU accession, such as judicial independence and the elimination of corruption. As policies for judicial independence and anti-corruption have been producing concrete results, the struggle between the competing forces also has been intensifying, including the struggle between the state organs of president, prime minister, and parliament. Therefore, the conflicts between these three state organs cannot be explained by an institutional analysis of the semi-presidential system alone. They should be also analysed from the point of view of structural conflicts over essential issues in Romanian politics as a whole.

著者

門間 卓也

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2012, no.41, pp.91-107, 2012 (Released:2014-05-27)

参考文献数

32

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The author examined the context of political violence which happened in June 1928 in the national parliament of the First Yugoslavia, referring to both national relations between Serbian politicians and Croat ones on one hand and relations between a Serbian party, National Radical Party (NRS), and a Croat party, Croat Peasant Party (CPP) on the other. This political violence broke out due to serious national problems in the First Yugoslavia; however, the context linking conflict between national parties with their nationalism, “Context of Violence”, is still not clear in previous studies on the political history in the First Yugoslavia. This is why the subject of this paper is focused on imagined “Context of Violence” dependent on political leaders’ attitudes toward other political leaders. In the First Yugoslavia, political relations between NRS and CPP had been influenced profoundly by their partnership with Svetozar Pribićević, who was the leader of Independent Democratic Party (IDP) and was considered as the main political representative of Serbians in the region of the former Hapsburg Empire, called “prečani”, in the First Yugoslavia. As long as he supported NRS, there was little national confrontation in the parliament because political power of CPP was limited as an opposition party. Yet, in 1927 when Pribićević chose by a political decision to cooperate with Stjepan Radić, the leader of CPP, a new structure of conflict came into the parliament. That was the territorial conflict between parties originated from the region of the former Serbian Kingdom and from the region of the former Hapsburg Empire. It was because the region of the former Serbian Kingdom was the base of support for NRS, while the region of the former Hapsburg Empire was the base of support for Peasant-Democratic Coalition (PDC), a coalition party established in 1927 from CPP and IDP. This division which appeared in the parliament was interpreted for NRS as a serious political crisis for two reasons. First, under this political situation, NRS was faced with an obstacle to mobilization of Serbians. Second, politicians belonging to PDC, designated as “prečanski front”, in the parliament enhanced the possibility of dismembering the First Yugoslavia. Especially, Radić unfolded harsh criticism to the effect that NRS gov­erned in such a way as to ruin political and economical equality among nations and frequently disturbed parliamentary procedures. As for Radić’s position, his stubborness for NRS was justified from the political crisis over Croats and their historical territory. At that time in the parliament, the ratification of the Nettuno convention from which Croattia was to suffer disadvantage resulting from intrusion of Italy to Dalmatia was placed on the agenda. Radić repeatedlly required NRS to refuse their sanction to the Nettuno convention and blamed them for political confusion in the First Yugoslavia. This paper makes it clear that “Context of Violence” for NRS and CPP derived from their fears of both the territorial conflict which interrupted Serbian nationalism and a threat to Croats caused by Italy’s laying claim to Dalmatia against the First Yugoslavia. These two political problems over the First Yugoslavia remained as such even after beginning of the dictatorship, entailing a risk of breaking up the nation and the state.

著者

大矢 温

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2012, no.41, pp.108-110, 2012 (Released:2014-05-27)

著者

片山 博文

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2012, no.41, pp.115-117, 2012 (Released:2014-05-27)

著者

吉井 昌彦

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2012, no.41, pp.121-123, 2012 (Released:2014-05-27)

著者

立石 洋子

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2011, no.40, pp.50-64, 2011 (Released:2013-05-31)

参考文献数

44

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The paper discusses the controversies on the history of non-Russian peoples in the USSR among the Soviet Marxist historians in the 1920s to early 1930s. The development of early Marxist historical science in the USSR was closely related with the policies of the party. The party leaders distinguished the nationalism of the oppressing nations from that of the oppressed nations, and considered “great power chauvinism,” or Russian nationalism, the main danger. Accordingly, the study of all the peoples in the USSR and the improvement of their cultural level became an important task for scholars, including historians. At the first convention of the All-Union Society of Marxist Historians in December 1928 to January 1929, the study of the history of the peoples in the USSR was declared as the main task of Soviet historians. For the first time, the historians faced the problem of how to interpret the history of non-Russian peoples from the Marxist perspective. One main arguing theme was the evaluation of the Russian rule over the non-Russian peoples. Another main problem was the tendency of “the great power chauvinism” of the Russian Marxist historians; this issue was raised by Ukrainian Marxist historians, including M. Iavorskii. They criticized some Russian Marxist historians for underestimating the Ukrainian elements in the history of the revolutionary movement in Ukraine and for not acknowledging the independent features of the cultural, social, and economic history of Ukraine. However, M. Pokrovskii, the most authoritative Russian Marxist historian, did not accept the criticism, and thus, the historians never reached a consensus. In contrast, the problems that became serious themes in the Stalin period, such as the evaluation of the Khan who led the rebellion of non-Russian peoples against Russia, or the evaluation of the “Holy war” by the Muslim population against Russian rule, were given less attention by the historians. At the end of 1929, when “the cultural revolution” began, not only did the non-Marxist intellectuals receive criticism, but the debate among the Marxist historians became strained. In Ukraine, the criticism against Ukrainian nationalism caused mass political oppression, and the most famous non-Marxist historian, M. Khlshevskii, and Marxist historian, M. Iavorskii, were both arrested. The class factor was put forward in the historical interpretation and this change was reflected also in the study of non-Russian history. The leaders of rebellions against Russia in nineteenth-century Kazakhstan and the North Caucasus and of the rebellion against Poland in seventeenth-century Ukraine came to be evaluated as repressors of the masses, and their dissatisfaction against the ruling classes was considered to be a driving force of these rebellions. In the Stalin period, historians tried to reevaluate the tradition and the leaders of each people and again faced the problem of the harmonization of the class elements and the national character of each people. This problem remained unsolved from the 1920s. Thus, in the discussion of the early Soviet period, we can see the roots of the fierce discussion among the historians and politicians of the Stalin period.

著者

堀江 典生

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2011, no.40, pp.65-78, 2011 (Released:2013-05-31)

参考文献数

22

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This study examines the extent of job structure reorganization in Russian enterprises with an emphasis on path dependency on Soviet-type job classification. Human resources is an organizational source of competitive advantage. HRM (human resource management), introduced to Russia by Western countries, is presumed to help Russian enterprises reform their management, but its practical application is difficult for most Russian enterprises that are used to the “Russian Classification of Workers and Employees Occupations and Wage Grades,” regulated by state and inherited from the Soviet era, in their personal management and wage system. Most researchers have focused on cultural diversity in introducing Western HRM to Russian enterprises, but have not paid attention to the job design within these enterprises. We conducted an in-depth interview of a company’s human resources managers to understand the organizational structure of the HRM department and their recent development of HRM practices. We also conducted a large-scale interview survey of executives from more than 430 Russian companies to obtain their view of their HRM practice. The company we visited for the in-depth interview was a former state enterprise with a long history from the Soviet era. The organizational structure designed for the human resources management department lacks the function of conducting job analysis, and thus the main tasks of the department remain the same as those during the Soviet era. They insist that the wage system of this company has changed from the old regime, but these changes concern merely flexibility of wage rates, not job redesign. In addition, using a large-scale interview survey, we examined their dependency on the job classification inherited from the Soviet era, the frequency with which they conduct job analysis, their dependency on the wage system inherited from the Soviet era, and the extent of job enlargement. Our findings indicate that most enterprises still employ the “Russian Classification of Workers and Employees Occupations and Wage Grades” and do not have their own job design. The wage system also heavily depends on the wage grades regulated by the Russian government. They frequently conduct job analyses, but we suggest this has not been conducted for the purpose of job redesign. The executives believe that their jobs have enlarged, but they have enlarged without job redesign. Therefore, we conclude that Russian enterprises have not developed their newly introduced Western HRM in their course of management reform, and most still employ the rigid job classification and wage system inherited from the Soviet regime to manage their employees. But these companies still have survived economic crises and their factory workers have kept working in each job module classified by the state. Human resource management in Russia has not been substituted by western human resource management. It has evolved from the Soviet-type HRM to a Russian HRM with the introduction of some western HRM practices.

著者

山添 博史

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2011, no.40, pp.79-90, 2011 (Released:2013-05-31)

参考文献数

46

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The aim of this article is to provide an analysis of the nature of Russia’s security issues with China by focusing on two areas. Firstly, the study will see examples from Russia’s bilateral security relationship with China. Secondly, the analysis will subsequently provide an overview of the countries’ wider global interests. Resultantly, the article hopes to show that there exists no governing principle per se in Moscow’s relationship with Beijing but rather a cautious case-by-case approach. Reconciliation over border demarcation, an issue that spilled over into the actual conflict in 1969, has been critical in assuaging security relations between Moscow and Beijing. In their settlements of 1997 and 2004, both China and Russia made significant concessions on this issue despite fierce opposition within each country. This negotiation process was combined with the development of their relationship from reconciliation towards “strategic partnership.” However, Moscow’s efforts were driven by a longstanding desire to remove unstable elements on the border rather than an actual aspiration for greater security cooperation. Furthermore, Russian arms sales to China were a significant factor in their relationship and did reinforce China’s modern military capabilities especially towards the sea. However, arms trade has declined since 2007, largely due to the changing interests of Russian manufacturers and the Chinese equipment program. An export of RD-93 engines to China was suspended following the claim from a military industry executive that such components would be used in the construction of FC-1 fighters, a major export competitor to Russia’s own MiG-29. A dichotomy therefore exists in Russia between those seeking export income and those who wish to keep Chinese military capability below their own. Interestingly, Russian exports to India, a potential rival to China, are not so constrained. The first joint military exercise between China and Russia called “Peace Mission 2005” involved thousands of troops and was partly driven by a desire to show power and solidarity. Yet recent military exercises correspond to each country’s practical needs. In the “Peace Mission 2010” joint exercise, China for example focused on long-range flight capabilities. Russia meanwhile devotes more time and resources to joint exercises with former Soviet partners within the Collective Security Treaty Organization than it does with China. Finally, China and Russia share resistance to Western humanitarian intervention and pressure for democracy yet both countries found it hard to coordinate their opposition efforts in the 1990s due to varying interests. In the late 2000s each of Russia and China increasingly conducted independent foreign policies, confident in their increased international influence. But whilst common interests make both countries take similar approaches, coordination between them remains scant. In conclusion, the progress of each security issue depends on practical situations related to it rather than an overarching concept between Beijing and Moscow, such as that which used to determine relations during the Cold War. Whilst both share common non-interventionist policies, these are more often sought independently rather than cooperatively. In essence, a deeply embedded fear of China makes Russian bilateral policy cautious, eager not to turn China into a security concern.

著者

兵頭 慎治

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2011, no.40, pp.91-93, 2011 (Released:2013-05-31)

著者

油本 真理

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2011, no.40, pp.94-97, 2011 (Released:2013-05-31)

著者

藤嶋 亮

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2012, no.41, pp.3-18, 2012 (Released:2014-05-27)

参考文献数

37

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Fierce and continuous political battles broke out in Romania immediately after its accession to the European Union (EU) in 2007, with President Traian Băsescu’s leadership style as the main issue. Băsescu declared that he would be an activist president, a “player-president,” who would advance his own political agenda, control the parliamentary majority, and actively shape policy. He fulfilled this vision to some extent and won the re-election; however, the Romanian Constitution stipulates the role of president as a mediator and obliges him/her to adopt a nonpartisan stance. Moreover, since the late nineties, semi-presidential systems in Central and Eastern Europe (except the former USSR) have tended to be more parliamentarian, shifting supreme executive power from the president to prime minister. Thus, Băsescu’s presidency poses the difficult and interesting question for scholars: Why and how might President Băsescu behave as a “player-president”? To answer this question we must analyze the resources for presidential leadership in the semi-presidential context. Here we can identify three factors of particular importance: the president’s constitutional power; partisan power, focusing on the nature of the parliamentary majority and relationship between the president and majority; and the president’s popularity. The present study describes and analyzes the successes and failures of Băsescu’s initiatives during the period between December 2004 and August 2012 from the perspective of these three factors. Specifically, we focus on the following three situations in which the president’s action became a serious issue: “government formation,” “intraexecutive conflict,” and “referendum.” To examine specific constellations of political resources available for each actor, especially the president, we take the constitutional text as our starting point. The Constitution’s ambiguity allowed the president to expand his formal institutional capacity. For example, according to the Constitution, the Romanian President must consult with the parties in Parliament when nominating the prime minister. However, Băsescu always declared that he would nominate a member as the prime minister from the party or alliance that supported him before he officially consulted other parties in Parliament, and he continued holding initiatives to choose the prime minister. Here, two other factors played an important role. Băsescu was the recognized leader of the parliamentary majority, especially between December 2008 (when his party, the PDL (former PD) became the top party in the general election) and spring 2012 (when the governing coalition collapsed). Furthermore, the president maintained high popularity until the economic crisis worsened and his PDL government introduced austerity measures in spring 2010. His partisan power and popularity enhanced Băsescu’s constitutional power, making him a president with considerable material power. In addition, the president is the only office holder who is popularly elected nationwide. Therefore, winning the post gave him additional leverage, especially immediately after winning the elections. In this context, the threat to dissolve Parliament, which is very difficult according to the constitutional provisions, could be a bargaining chip for him. At the same time, the lack of party discipline and cohesiveness expanded the president’s room for maneuvering. However, Băsescu’s actions to avoid “cohabitation” (sharing power) as much as possible caused political polarization and led to the suspension of the President by the Parliament twice.

著者

湯浅 剛

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2012, no.41, pp.19-27, 2012 (Released:2014-05-27)

参考文献数

23

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The institution of the presidency in post-Soviet Central Asian countries is static, aside from the turmoil in Kyrgyzstan. The same person has held the post for a long time and is authorized by legislative procedures, such as referendums, to prolong his presidential term. In Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, there has been no change in the government since independence. However, presidential leadership in these two countries is a variable for understanding the mechanism of authoritarian regimes in the region. In this essay, the author argues several topics for research on governance in Central Asia, that have been insufficiently covered by previous works. First, trends of political transition in the region are better understood through analysis of leadership in competitive authoritarianism. Quoting Robert C. Tucker, the author identifies two types of presidents in Central Asia: “Event-making” leaders and “eventful” ones. Second, referring to Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way’s work, the author takes the position that leadership is less important than international and domestic structural variables such as leverage and linkage from the West (Europe and the United States). The author discusses the case of Kazakhstan to argue that state organizations and the ruling party have been strengthened in order to support presidential leadership. Other Central Asian countries are also developing the personalization of political power using these institutions for governance.