著者

中地 美枝

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.50, pp.1-20, 2021 (Released:2022-06-11)

参考文献数

34

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This article introduces to Japanese readers an analysis of the Soviet Union’s postwar pronatalist policy and its effects on gender and society as published in Mie Nakachi, Replacing the Dead: The Politics of Reproduction in the Postwar Soviet Union (Oxford University Press, 2021). In particular, it highlights the evolution of the 1944 Family Law’s formulation and implementation, explaining how the introduction of this policy eventually led to the world’s first legalization of abortion based on the recognition of women’s right to abortion in a country where no feminist movements were allowed.On July 8, 1944 the Soviet government promulgated the new family law. This was in response to the unprecedented scale of demographic crisis the Soviet Union faced after WWII: the loss of 27 million people and an extremely skewed sex imbalance. Millions of women had lost their past partners or future mates in the war. In order to recover from this crisis at an accelerated pace, N. S. Khrushchev, the leader in Ukraine during the war, drafted a pronatalist proposal and sent it to Moscow, where after multiple revisions it became the postwar family law.One of the most significant and questionable features of Khrushchev’s brainchild was the encouragement of the birth of out-of-wedlock children. In order to achieve this goal, the law encompassed several fundamental changes, such as making only registered marriage legal, denying out-of-wedlock children the right to be registered under their fathers’ names, and releasing fathers from legal and financial responsibilities for their out-of-wedlock children. In consequence, women’s standing in gender relations suffered. Moreover, equality between children born in marriage and those born out-of-wedlock, established after the 1917 Revolution, would disappear.Eleven years later, in 1955, the Soviet government re-legalized abortion. Does this mean that the pronatalist policy had ended? If so, did Soviet demography recover from the war, thanks to the postwar pronatalist policy of 1944? Or was this reform a part of the broader de-Stalinization process?This article discusses the policy’s effects on demography, gender relations, and family and argues that the most important context for the reversal of the Stalinist criminalization of abortion in 1936 was not the death of Stalin in 1953, but the ongoing criticism of postwar pronatalist policy coming from Soviet professionals, particularly doctors, female party members, and women, a drumroll that had already begun in the late 1940s. Mariia D. Kovrigina, the first and last female All-Union Health Minister, promoted the idea of women’s right to abortion, which became the core of re-legalization. However, this historic development was muted due to the special, typically Soviet, circumstances of this process. In this way, this article points out possibilities as well as limitations for the reproductive rights movement under state socialism.

著者

永綱 憲悟

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2016, no.45, pp.89-102, 2016 (Released:2018-06-02)

参考文献数

21

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On February 19, 2013, Russian President Vladimir Putin expressed that it would be worth considering “unified Russian history textbooks” that show “respect to all pages of our past.” This announcement has been interpreted as patriotic propaganda or an attempt at re-writing the past to justify authoritarianism in the present. To be sure, we cannot overlook the clear intensification of patriotism under the Putin regime. Also, we cannot deny that Russian citizens’ protests against election fraud during 2011–12 led to Putin’s countermeasures, such as the creation of quasi-social historical organizations, advocacy for unified textbooks, and so on. These measures are clear examples of Putin’s historical politics, by which he means to use history arbitrarily for political purposes.However, it is quite misleading to say that Putin has successfully ordered the history textbooks rewritten to strengthen his own rule. In fact, we see three types of undercurrent concerning the policy on unified history textbooks. First, a group of young politicians with patriotic views advocated the unification of textbooks in response to neighboring countries’ historical politics. Cultural Minister Vladimir Medinsky is a typical example of this group. Second, academic historians such as Aleksandr Chubaryan, director of the Institute of World History, sought to build a basic consensus on historical outlook among historians and people within Russia. Third, there were some liberal groups who opposed any kind of forced textbook unification by the government.Putin monitored these undercurrents, adapting his historical politics as necessary, and avoided dire conflicts between the government and any of these groups. In the end, the “historical-cultural standard” was created, which every textbook must follow. The standard, however, is very general and loose. Therefore, two history textbooks with somewhat different viewpoints were authorized by the education ministry.One characteristic of Putin’s method of governance is the adoption of halfway solutions to disputed issues. They often fail to solve conflicts between groups, and sometimes even preserve them. In this sense, conflicts over historical politics, including those regarding history textbooks, will continue in the future.

著者

保坂 三四郎

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2016, no.45, pp.119-134, 2016 (Released:2018-06-02)

参考文献数

26

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Are there any experts who successfully predicted how the Ukrainian crisis would unfold after the Euromaidan revolution? On the one hand, the “Russian spring” project obviously failed: Vladimir Putin’s call for consolidating “Novorussia” did not catch the hearts of people beyond the limited part of Donbass. For example, after the launch of anti-terrorist operations in spring 2014, even such a Russified eastern city as Dnipropetrovsk turned blue-and-yellow, full with volunteer citizens supporting the government forces, thereby exhibiting the rise of Ukrainian patriotism. However, that was not the end of the story. During the national parliament elections in October, 2014 in the same Dnipropetrovsk Oblast the Opposition Bloc consisting of former Party-of-Regions members that did not endorse the Euromaidan surpassed the president’s party, Petro Poroshenko Bloc. Other eastern regions such as Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia mirrored Dnipropetrovsk in their electoral behavior. These snapshot observations speak for themselves: the social and political dynamics in Ukraine is much more complicated than is routinely described with the popular “east-west divide” discourse.Quantitative research on the mass attitudes in Ukraine often opts for versatile “regions” to explain the social and political cleavages. Most of them, however, treat regions as proxy for historical and cultural attributes common to localities, ignoring the heterogeneous distribution of personal historical memories in a given geographical space. This study tests the explanatory power of individual acceptance of national history in shaping the attitudes toward the Euromaidan, utilizing ordered logit model on nationwide survey data collected from December 2014 to January 2015.The author ran principal component analysis on the responses to the seven major historical events in Ukraine, and identified anti-Ukraine historical component, which denies the Ukrainian Insurgent Army as well as the collapse of the USSR and the country’s independence. In the ordered logit estimation with these principal component scores, the effect of the regional factor was mediated by historical memory in all eastern regions including Donbass, Sloboda, Lower Dniepr and Black Sea. However, explanatory power of the regional variable persists in Podolia and Left bank. This finding suggests the further need for studying interaction terms between historical memory and regions.Furthermore, two-stage least square estimation with instrumental variable was conducted to verify the effect of historical memory on the attitudes to the Euromaidan, which rejected the above hypothesis at a five-percent significance level. This implies that causal arrows run reciprocally between these two variables.The analysis also discovered the carriers of ambivalent “hybrid” memory, who miss the Soviet Union but welcome the independence simultaneously. These findings provide valuable insights into the amorphous nature of the eastern regions that embrace multilayered historical memories, and highlight key challenges for post-Maidan national (re)integration.

著者

小森 宏美

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2018, no.47, pp.54-64, 2018 (Released:2019-10-08)

参考文献数

21

被引用文献数

1

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This article takes the viewpoint of historical comparison to offer a reassessment of Estonia’s nationalization. Estonia has experienced several regime changes in its history and has faced the challenges of nation-building with every alternation. The independence of 1918 and the re-independence of 1991 are especially explored in this article with regard to nationalization, which includes the institutionalization of national cultural autonomy and citizenship policy.In general, national cultural autonomy is considered the means of guaranteeing its minorities the right to self-rule with respect to cultural affairs. Estonia’s independence manifest of February 1918 promised this right to the country’s minorities who included Germans, Russians, Swedes, and Jews. The enactment of the law on cultural autonomy in 1925 accorded Germans and Jews the right of self-rule with respect to cultural affairs in the interwar period. The right of cultural autonomy was also on the agenda during the period of perestroika and the related law was adopted in 1993.According to Brubaker’s definition, Estonia is a coercive nationalizer as well as an active pluralist, pursuing the nationalization as its primal goal along with the official recognition of national minorities. Extant literature explores this intricate situation using discussions on triadic or quadratic nexus, but the question why Estonians took the pluralist approach into consideration when it was still not clear whether their state would be established must be addressed. In this sense, the author of this article would argue that it is worth paying more attention to the continuity maintained with regard to the previous regime.While interwar Estonia’s cultural autonomy functioned rather successfully as a system, the current law is regarded to be completely symbolic. The emblematic nature of the current law emanates primarily from two causes. First, the number of Russians holding Estonian citizenship was quite limited immediately after Estonia’s re-independence. Therefore, most Russians were not entitled to use the associated right. Second, the Estonia’s school system uses the Russian language as its medium of education, which harked to the Soviet period. Hence, Russians as minority did not need to demand the right of education in their mother tongue; at least until the school reforms were instituted. Thus, cultural autonomy was not the priority for Russians.Almost 30 years after the re-independence, Russian politicians who are quite active in the field of Estonian politics compete to postulate discrete forms of nationalization in Estonia and propose varied means of social integration. As more Russians obtain Estonian citizenship, culturally and politically plural approaches to nationalization become increasingly necessary.

著者

宮脇 昇

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2002, no.31, pp.199-218, 2002 (Released:2010-05-31)

参考文献数

53

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This article reviews the relations between the OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe) and Belarus, which has become very tense in recent years. Since joining the OSCE in 1992 as a newly independent state, Belarus soon began showing signs of authoritarianism. In November 1996, President Alexander Lukashenko took steps to strengthen his control over the country by proposing a new constitution that would broaden his authority, extend his term in office from five years to seven years, and create a bicameral National Assembly in the place of the Chamber of Representatives (Supreme Soviet) -- a reversion, as the opposition would call it, to the Soviet era. The OSCE, which had been closely involved with democratization process in Europe, responded in 1998 by sending a mission, the AMG (Advisory and Monitoring Group in Belarus) . After making little progress, it was replaced by the even more powerless OOM (OSCE Office in Minsk) in 2003, as a result of the Belarus government's resistance. This setback by the OSCE coincided with the growing presence in Belarus of the ACEEEO (Association of Central and Eastern European Election Officials), an election-monitoring body which has disagreed with the OSCE on quite a few issues. Meanwhile, it should be noted that Belarus, despite its high degree of political stability and low security risk, still displays significant repression of human rights: The correlation between traditional diplomatic relations and human rights (or democratization) does not appear to hold true in Belarus. In light of this peculiarity, and given the recent weakening of its mission, the OSCE democratization regime in Belarus will continue to suffer in the foreseeable future.

著者

村田 優樹

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2018, no.47, pp.17-34, 2018 (Released:2019-10-08)

参考文献数

48

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This article revisit Ukrainian political history in 1918, a year of turmoil, when three different states arose one after another in Kiev: the Ukrainian People’s Republic, the Ukrainian State, and the Directorate. In previous studies, this year is considered as an integral part of the history of the Ukrainian national movement, which struggled to defend the independence achieved by the fourth Universal (declaration) in January 1918 against foreign intervention. According to this national historical narrative, this effort ended in defeat when Ukraine was incorporated into the Soviet Union. In contrast to those studies, the present article claims that the future political status of Ukraine was not yet decided in 1918; not only an independent state, but an autonomous part of the Russian (con-)federation remained one of the political aims of the Ukrainian activists even after the fourth Universal, and that the development of the idea of the future state system of Ukraine considerably depended on the interests of foreign actors. Lacking sufficient military strength, all the Ukrainian states that formed in 1918 needed outside assistance for their own survival. This paper examines the close interrelationship between the choice of the future political status of Ukraine (independence or federation) and the ongoing foreign policy.After the October Revolution in Petrograd, both belligerent powers in World War I came into contact with various local governments in the former Russian imperial territory, aiming to take advantage of them for their own war efforts. The Entente desired the restoration of the strong Russian state as an ally, demanding incorporation of Ukrainian territory into the future federative Russia. The Central Powers, on the other hand, planned to construct a chain of buffer states between Germany and Russia for the security of German and Austrian eastern borders. This geopolitical consideration led to support for an independent Ukrainian state, as one such buffer state.At first, the leaders of the Ukrainian People’s Republic advocated the formation of the democratic federative Russia. Offered more generous support by Germany, however, they declared independence and signed a treaty with the Central Powers in Brest-Litovsk. This pro-German policy was inherited by the Ukrainian State, which replaced the People’s Republic in April 1918. In November, on the final defeat of the Central Powers, however, the Ukrainian State issued a statement that Ukraine should become an autonomous part of the restored federative Russia. The Directorate, the successor of the Ukrainian State, also adopted the pro-federation policy to gain support from the Allies, the winners of the Great War. Thus, the change of perspective on the state system accompanied the change of foreign policy.While the pro-Entente policy failed because of disagreements with Russian Whites, the flexible Ukrainians finally found a third power―the Bolsheviks. The oppositional socialist group in the Directorate received the status of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic as a de-jure sovereign polity within the Soviet Union. In this sense, the establishment of the Soviet Ukraine could not be seen only as a symbol of the defeat of the Ukrainian national movement; rather, it was more or less a product of the federative idea employed by the Ukrainian activists themselves in those revolutionary years.

著者

角田 安正

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2019, no.48, pp.103-106, 2019 (Released:2020-05-30)

著者

⼤串 敦

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.50, pp.152-156, 2021 (Released:2022-06-11)

参考文献数

10

著者

加藤 美保子

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2019, no.48, pp.1-18, 2019 (Released:2020-05-30)

参考文献数

40

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The Ukraine crisis and subsequent Western sanctions have accelerated Russia’s economic dependence on China. Since the annexation of Crimea, scholars and analysts of Russia’s Asia policy have focused on Russia’s pivot to China and disregarded any preceding diversification policies throughout the Asia-Pacific region. This paper has two purposes. First, the paper aims to explain geopolitical changes in Russia’s Asia pivot policy over the last 20 years by analyzing not only Moscow’s strategic thinking towards major Asian powers―including the US, China, Japan, and South Korea, ―but also the restoration of its relationship with former Soviet partners such as India, Vietnam, and North Korea―. Second, this paper examines the impact of the Russia-US confrontation and the emerging friendship regime between Russia and its traditional partners in light of a Eurasian security order.The first section explains Russia’s strategic thought and policies towards the Asia-Pacific region from 2000 to 2012 by focusing on two factors: 1) The Asia-Pacific region as an emerging political and economic centre in a multipolar world vis-à-vis a US-led unipolar world. 2) The Asia-Pacific region where Russia needs to overcome isolation by restoring traditional diplomatic relations with China, India, Vietnam, and North Korea. The second section explains Russia’s aspiration as a Euro-Pacific power under the third Putin administration before the escalation of the Ukrainian crisis. In this period, Russia’s diversification policy in the Eastern direction expanded to the Pacific region including US allies. The third section describes how Russia accelerated its economic dependence on China under the deterioration of relations with the US by analysing energy and military cooperation with China. The fourth section evaluates the impact of the Russia-US confrontation at the global and regional levels as well as the Russia-China quasi-alliance in a newly emerging order in Eurasia.In conclusion, this paper reveals three findings. First, Russia’s geopolitical direction in its “Pivot to the East” policy developed in three steps: 1) the restoration of relations with former soviet partners to overcome isolation in the region (2000–2012); 2) regaining self-confidence as a great power and seeking aspiration as a Euro-Pacific power (2012–2014); 3) deterioration of relations with the US and subsequent economic dependence on China. This paper reveals that Russia has barely retained its multi vector foreign policy by developing and utilizing relations with former Soviet partners such as India and Vietnam even after March 2014, whereas Russia has accelerated its China-centred foreign and economic policy since the annexation of Crimea, as indicated in other research. Second, while Russia’s “pivot to China” policy is inherently based on economic incentives, Russian leadership views relations with China largely through the lens of US-Russia relations. Currently, as Moscow does not anticipate an opportunity to improve its relations with the US, Russia is unlikely to review its China-centred policy in the short and medium term. Third, the Russia-China strategic partnership is becoming a quasi-alliance in terms of military cooperation. For Russia, the only constructive means to remain a great power in Eurasia is to actively engage in both military cooperation and China-led regional order such as the “Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)”, to prevent further isolation in Eurasia. Meanwhile, its strengthened strategic partnerships with traditional Asian partners―the sole achievement of its early “Asia pivot” policy―will serve well to balance relations with China.

著者

富樫 耕介

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2018, no.47, pp.81-97, 2018 (Released:2019-10-08)

参考文献数

30

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Chechnya is important in terms of issues related to the nature of the state and minorities in the Russian Federation. When considering the Chechen problem, one notices that it has a dual structure. First, as a minority in Russia, the Chechen people have been affected by changes in the Russian state. Most extant research on this issue has examined the Chechen problem by focusing on the Chechens’ relationship with the Russian state.However, there is also another aspect—the form and nature of the “state” sought by the Chechen people has had an impact on both themselves and the Russian side. Existing research has mainly studied the kinds of tensions that “the state” sought by the Chechen people has caused in Russia. Thus, the effects of this “state” on the Chechens themselves have not been adequately studied.This article seeks to consider the Chechen problem by focusing on the nature of the “state” sought by the Chechen people. In particular, it seeks to clarify the kind of influence exerted by the changes in the nature of the “state” advocated by a minority group on that minority group itself. Further, it also considers the current situation and problems in the Chechen Republic.To achieve these aims, this article undertakes two tasks. First, it considers whether the form of the Chechen “state” governed by Ramzan Kadyrov is adequately accepted by its residents. In Chechnya, there have been terrorist activities and revolts by independence-seeking and radical Islamic groups, who do not recognize the legitimacy of the Kadyrov regime. This article analyzes the GTD (Global Terrorism Database) to assess whether the incidents of terror and rebellion have decreased over time to the present.The second task is to consider issues related to the nature of the “state” under the incumbent Kadyrov regime. Terrorism and rebellion are reactions against the government that can be easily observed externally, but there are also cases where these are subdued through strict crackdowns by the government. However, issues that concern the form and legitimacy of the state are often raised during the process of moving toward a stable statehood. Based on a fieldwork conducted in August 2018 and by considering the relationship between the Chechen general public and the “state,” particularly from the dual perspectives of history and public opinion, this article reveals the current problems relevant to the Chechen “state.”In conclusion, the number of terrorist activities in Chechnya as well as in North Caucasus has declined, and the Chechen republic is stable at present. Under the Kadyrov regime, it is difficult to research modern Chechen history because of the loss of research materials due to war and political issues preventing objective research. Therefore, especially the history and experience under the Chechen separatist “state” (1991–2000) are beginning to be forgotten in the current Chechen society. The Kadyrov regime emphasizes the legitimacy of its own “state” by comparing it with the Chechen separatist “state,” which it has labeled as a symbol of chaos, destruction, and destabilization. However, there are differences between the government and the people in Chechnya since the Kadyrov regime ignores the general public. Consequently, this would lead people to doubt the legitimacy of Kadyrov’s “state.”

著者

鳥飼 将雅

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2018, no.47, pp.98-116, 2018 (Released:2019-10-08)

参考文献数

20

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Although the political processes in specific regions of Russia have attracted much scholarly attention since the collapse of the USSR, the number of case studies involving the North-Caucasian ethnic republics has been quite limited. Consequently, a rather shallow and stereotypical understanding emphasizing only limited aspects of the politics in these republics has been represented in the academic discussion. Building on information from local news-sources and interviews in Dagestan, this study highlights three overlooked but important aspects: (1) the consociational nature and instability between the regional and municipal governments in Dagestan politics, (2) the uniqueness of electoral mobilization in Dagestan, and (3) the struggle to consolidate the power vertical following Ramazan Abdulatipov’s appointment as the governor.The consociational nature of Dagestan politics, particularly in the 1990s, has been discussed by several specialists. While this uniqueness was guaranteed by the legal and constitutional framework of Dagestan, the Kremlin’s initiative to force regional governments to revise regional laws to comply with federal laws removed these constraints. However, by scrutinizing the composition of the regional assembly, this study shows that the balance of power among ethnic groups has been maintained informally in contemporary Dagestan. Moreover, an analysis of municipal level elites reveals the independence of diverse actors in Dagestan’s politics, which has resulted in an unstable regime.This study also highlights the difficulty of aligning our understanding of electoral mobilization in Dagestan with the general conception of political machines in the non-Russian ethnic republics. Although, as the literature on Russian electoral politics points out, turnout and support for incumbent candidates and parties in federal-level elections are extremely high in Dagestan, mayoral elections have proved highly competitive, implying that electoral mobilization in Dagestan is not controlled by the regional government but rather by clan groups whose activities are rampant at the municipal level. This finding demonstrates the need to modify the prevailing concept of Russian political machines, which has been based mainly on case studies of ethnic republics such as Tatarstan, to explain Dagastanʼs uniqueness.Finally, governors recently sent from the center have begun to establish the power vertical in Dagestan in order to enforce stable rule by the federal government. The fourth governor of Dagestan, Ramazan Abdulatipov, was the first outsider governor in Dagestan since WWII. His close relationship with the Kremlin enabled him to neutralize several local clans that were firmly rooted in specific municipalities, although this attempt was left incomplete. His successor, Vladimir Vas’liev, had had no ties whatsoever to Dagestan prior to his inauguration as governor. Given his efforts to thoroughly transform Dagestan’s politics, there is an urgent need to observe whether this transformation, with support from the Kremlin, will succeed.Whereas the main focus is on the contemporary political process in Dagestan, the implications of this case study offer a deeper understanding of Russian federalism during Putin’s presidency. Study findings also show the importance of case studies focused on specific regions, even in centralized Russia, in order to expand our understanding of federalism and electoral politics in Russia.

著者

加藤 有子

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2018, no.47, pp.35-53, 2018 (Released:2019-10-08)

参考文献数

48

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In the interwar period, after the end of the partition, Polish literature was finally freed from national themes, and writers could focus more on language. Moreover, languages of the newly independent nations became national languages of their respective countries. Based on the understanding that artistic and social interest in languages increased during this period, this paper explores the concept of a new language in the futurist manifests (1921) and the novel I Burn Paris (1928), both written by Bruno Jasieński. My aim is to present I Burn Paris—regarded as a communist ideological novel—as a work featuring issues related to language, and to show Jasieński’s consequent longing for a new universal language.First, I discuss the recreation of the traditional Polish messianism (i.e., the suffering Poland would be reborn to save the world) by Jasieński, in one of his futurist manifests: “To the Polish Nation. Manifest of Immediate Futurization of Life” (1921). Jasieński rewrote the messianism as a socialist one, according to which the new Poland would reform the old capitalist Europe. This idea of a new world recurs in I Burn Paris as the concept of a new common language.Second, based on archival research, I show I Burn Paris was simultaneously translated into many languages and went through many printings, through that its different versions circulated. This research also shows the role of the international communist network in circulating literary works. Thanks to the network, East European writers writing in minor languages could join the modernist movement centered in big cities in Western Europe or in Russia. This was true also for the writers writing in Yiddish, a diaspora language. Considering these two diasporic networks, I propose to reconsider the West-Eurocentric map of 20th century modernism.Third, I present an unknown version of I Burn Paris with an alternative ending to the standard Polish version. My archival research shows that this version was circulated in Russian by 1934, when the socialist realist version revised by Jasieński was issued. The alternative ending is set two years after the ending of the standard version and mentions that the global revolution has already been accomplished. The novel’s reception by the Polish community in the USSR suggests that the ending was added to the Russian version to protect Jasieński from the expected criticism for the initial ideologically weak ending and the lack of depiction of class struggles. Further, I suggest that Jasieński wrote the alternative ending because it involves a longing for a new common language, which was his ultimate concern in his 1921 futurism manifest to the 1930 article written in Moscow. Jasieński believed that a new world should have a new common language, understandable by everyone and which, in turn, would create a new society.The repeated rewriting hints at Jasieński’s opportunism, but in fact, it was a result of his view on artistic creation. “Every movement ends with its manifest.” He viewed a novel as a performative “manifest,” which he had to ceaselessly overcome to create new one.

著者

生熊 源一

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2017, no.46, pp.72-89, 2017 (Released:2019-02-01)

参考文献数

30

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This paper discusses the problem of characters in Moscow Conceptualism, a unique school of Soviet underground art in the 1970s and 1980s. With their tendency for narrative, artists called Conceptualists invented an original style of creating a character who plays a role as an imaginary author of works made by Conceptualists. In other words, there were some occasions on which Conceptualists thought of their own works as products of a character whom they themselves worked out. They called this figure of the author “An Artist-Character.” As art-critic Boris Groys pointed out by giving an example of characters made by Conceptualist Ilya Kabakov, this invention had a relationship with the problem of self-image in Moscow Conceptualism. How then has this strategy of the characters been developed in texts and works by Conceptualists? There were lively discussions about the concept of “An Artist-Character” among Conceptualists. Therefore, the first half of this paper analyzes various descriptions of it. It was found that a range of meanings attached to this figure had been expanded as follows. In the beginning, “An Artist-Character” meant a relatively simple figure of the fictitious author; however, late examples show us a broader and more abstract conception. In the late 80s, Conceptualists such as Kabakov and Andrey Monastyrsky, started to express the function of detachment from themselves by this term. At the same time, a range in application of this effect also expanded; there appeared such new types of characters as “A Viewer-Character” and “A Critic-Character.” This expanded concept of “characterness” does not end within the bounds of the initial position of “An Artist-Character” as an imaginary author. The second half of the paper seeks to find the expanded function of characters in their activities. Works of the Conceptualists of each generation (Viktor Pivovarov, Monastyrsky and the “Collective Actions” group, Vadim Zakharov) were investigated from the viewpoint of the characters’ theme. What is common to their works is that characters’ images are not standardized by means of reduction, distance, emptiness, and so on. Another aspect of these characters is linked to observation: they can, of course, play a role as outside observers, but the focus is now on the art of being seen and written about, observed and described, which means that the role of characters could be related to the problem of archiving. What matters is that the “Collective Actions” group and Zakharov are known for their archival activity. Zakharov even invented a character called “A Pastor,” which was also the name of a journal he had published from 1992 to 2001. As shown by the figure of the pastor as archivist, the observation of characters has a relationship with documentation in Moscow Conceptualism. In this way, through the figure of characters, the problem of archiving can also be understood as a strategy of images. Therefore, it can be said that the invention of characters in Moscow Conceptualism was the soil for developing the technique of self-description in this community.

著者

門間 卓也

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2016, no.45, pp.103-118, 2016 (Released:2018-06-02)

参考文献数

43

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The Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna Država Hrvatska, NDH) was constructed as a Nazi-puppet state, which spanned across a large part of what is now Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, after the occupation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in April 1941. Because of its close relationship to the Nazi Party, Ustasha—a notorious Croatian political organization—attained power over NDH. Core members of the group emulated the fascist movements during WWI and WWII in Europe and forged ahead with a similar totalitarian policy in NDH, revising previous systems of governance.The highest aim of these reforms was the achievement of national unity, implanting the ‘Ustasha spirit’ throughout the nation. Considering the nationalistic character of the Ustasha movement, it seems reasonable to suppose that ideological discourses on nationalization were consistent inside the regime. However, previous studies have argued that the relationship between Ustasha and Tias Mortigjija—the chief editor of the major weekly newspaper Spremnost from May 1943 to the end of 1944—became tense due to disagreements regarding the editorial policy. Considering the variable nature of Croatian nationalism at that time, which was caused by increasing communist resistance and tangled relations with the Axis powers, the specific course of action of nationalization under the NDH regime must be investigated.This article analyses how Spremnost carried on propaganda work about Croatian nationalism during the period when Mortigjija was the chief director. Regarding the ideology of the Ustasha movement, it must be noticed that the leadership coped with the mobilization of the youth from the outset of NDH, training them as ‘elites’ who would conduct state affairs in the future. Ustasha thus implemented various educational policy measures to establish elitism in the mind of the younger generation (founding the Ustasha Youth, ‘purifying’ the school and the university and so on). As a result of this fascistic attempt, Zagreb University students were encouraged to develop their own political consciousness and became radicalized to adopt a resolution in April 1944 that asserted their loyalty to the Ustasha movement. Despite the discordance with the regime, Mortigjija seemed to sympathize with the appearance of the ‘elite’. The propaganda of Spremnost thus began to feature content associated with the Zagreb University students’ resolution and the student journal Plug, which was published in 1944.Initially, Ustasha defined the image of the Croatian state as one that belonged to the ‘West’, including it in the cultural circle of Europe, and one that had a vital role as a bulwark against the ‘East’. However, through the political rhetoric of Spremnost and Plug, this image was transformed, arguing that the Croatian state was a guardian of the Balkan States and emphasizing the cultural legacy of the ‘West’. On the other hand, the image of Croats was modified to reflect changing religious policies. The leadership reinterpreted Orthodoxy as a traditional faith in Croatia and instituted the Croatian Orthodox Church in June 1942 to assimilate Serbs to NDH.Following this ‘political tolerance’, an article of Spremnost advocated that Croats must possess three types of faith: Catholic, Islam and Orthodoxy. Moreover, it was highlighted and reiterated that the integrated nationalism of Croats was a Balkan-oriented one. In conclusion, the ideological discourse on nationalization in NDH was obviously altered to include religious pluralism during WWII in response to the international environment and to internal conflicts. ‘Balkan’ thus became a symbol of the nation.

著者

溝端 佐登史

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2016, no.45, pp.1-2, 2016 (Released:2018-06-02)

著者

長谷川 雄之

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.43, pp.69-88, 2014 (Released:2016-09-09)

参考文献数

37

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To deal effectively with global security issues and the changing security environment, how to build and develop effective national security policies has been an important issue today. In this context, the function of the National Security Council (NSC) has been focused on, though there are some other decision making bodies, because of its ability that would solve the hard political decisions from cross-departmental perspective. According to the prior researches (Vendil-Pallin 2001, Hyodo 2004; 2009; 2012, White 2008), under the Putin regime (May 2000–) the Russian Security Council has enlarged its function and started to play the more important role of decision-making process in contrast to the Yeltsin era. This trend is going to continue into the Tandem (under the Medvedev administration from 2008–2012) and the Second Putin government (May 2012–). At the same time (May 2000–), to build “vertical power”, President Putin has started several federal reforms, such as series of legislative amendments which changed the formation of the Upper House of the Russian Parliament, the creation of “federal districts”, and the appointments of plenipotentiary representative of the President of the Russian Federation in a federal district. Remarkably every representative was mainly a person from the “Power Ministry” or “Saint-Petersburg” and also holds the status of Russian Security Council membership. Previous works are not enough to examine the enlarged function of the Russian Security Council in the political reforms of the Putin era. This study looks into the role of Russian Security Council in Putin’s centralization like building “vertical power” and aims to provide a viewpoint for present state analysis on the Russian politics. As with every NSC in the world, the Russian Security Council is also an advanced secret organ. Thus, this study points out the personnel policies for the members of the Security Council and representatives in every federal district by analyzing public information such as legal documents (Presidential Decree and Federal Law). Reflected on the legislation of the new federal law on Security on December 28 2010, President Medvedev signed a presidential decree on the revised Regulation of the Russian Security Council. The new Regulation not only tightened its control power to the other state organs, but systematized local meetings held in every federal district, in which the secretary of the Security Council, presidential represent who covers the district, and federal and regional officials participate. In the meeting, the secretary of the Russian Security Council N.P. Patrushev, who assisted Putin for many years from when they worked together at the control division of the Presidential office, plays an important role in “realizing” the state program at the regional level. This paper concludes that the main mission of the Russian Security Council 
includes not only planning the national security policies or military affairs, but coordinating (or controlling) the relationship between federal government and regional leadership.

著者

上野 俊彦

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.43, pp.1, 2014 (Released:2016-09-09)

被引用文献数

1

著者

沼野 充義

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2013, no.42, pp.3-16, 2013 (Released:2015-05-28)

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In this paper I discuss the question of “oneness” and “plurality” and their interactions in contemporary Russian literature and cinema in which Russian national identity is represented in various ways. At the outset of our discussion, I pay attention to the controversy between Solzhenitsyn and Siniavskii in the first half of the 1980’s. While Solzhenitsyn attacked his contemporary liberal Russian dissidents, including Siniavskii, as “pluralists”, the latter ironically criticized Solzhenitsyn as “the founder of new edinomyslie.” The contrast between the two positions can be understood as the conflict between oneness-oriented nationalism and pluralistic liberalism that would continue to be one of the most important undercurrents in contemporary Russian culture. With this controversy in mind as a prehistory, we will then discuss the following works:(1) Solzhenitsyn’s Two Hundred Years Together (2001–2002)(2) Nikita Mikhalkov’s Film 12 (2007)(3) Denis Gutsko’s novel Russkogovoriashchii (2005) and Eduard Bagirov’s novel Gastarbaiter (2007)Two Hundred Years Together is a historical study in two volume devoted to the complex relationship between Russians and Jews through the last two hundred years. 12 is a remake of Sidney Lumet’s famous 12 Angry Men (1957), but it is entirely adapted to the contemporary Russian situation in which the Russian, according the film director, should play the role of the strong protective father-in-law toward other minor nationalities. While the Russianness is not challenged in the above-mentioned two cases and both Solzhenitsyn and Mikhalkov seem to take their Russian national identity for granted, the younger writers, such as Gutsko and Bagirov have completely different starting points: their background and experience do not allow them to speak of Russia in terms of its “oneness.” Gutsko’s autobiographical hero is a Russian, but speaks Russian with a Georgian accent as he was born and raised in Tbilisi, and he experiences absurd difficulties in getting a new Russian passport after repatriating to his mother’s native town Rostov-na-Donu. Bagirov was born in Turkmenistan between an Azerbaijani father and a Russian mother, and his autobiographical hero comes to Moscow to try his fortune in this enormous city abundant with a lot of opportunities open to non-Russian newcomers as well as venomous prejudices and even hatred toward them on the side of Russian inhabitants. In the case of these new writers, we see that in the present “postmodern” situation the classical dichotomy between Russian/ non-Russian is being deconstructed and a search is beginning for a new Russian identity based on fluidity and plurality of identities.

著者

小山 洋司

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2013, no.42, pp.88-102, 2013 (Released:2015-05-28)

参考文献数

26

被引用文献数

1

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Slovenia is the richest country in Central and Eastern Europe. The country joined the European Union in May 2004. Having satisfied the Maastricht criteria earlier than any other new EU member states, the country joined the Euro-zone in January 2007 and then served as the EU Presidency successfully in the first half of 2008. In that sense, Slovenia was the best performer among the post-socialist countries. During the period 2005–2008 the country accomplished a high economic growth. Since the capital market in this country had only a short history, companies depended mainly on debt financing. Many banks were competing with each other for market share. Slovenian banks borrowed a huge amount of funds on international wholesale financial markets and provided companies with cheap loans. In addition to core business activities, companies actively invested in non-core business activities, creating a real estate boom. Due to the Lehman shock, international financial markets suddenly became tight. Slovenian banks became unable to borrow funds from the wholesale markets. Domestic banks, in turn, were obliged to decrease credits to companies and households. Moreover, in the early 2009 external demands, especially demands on the EU markets decreased remarkably, and correspondingly exports decreased. Consequently, the domestic productions decreased. The GDP growth rate recorded –7.8 percent in 2009. Thanks to some increase in exports to the Euro-zone, the economy picked up only in the second quarter of 2010. In 2011, however, affected by the credit uncertainty in the Euro-zone, the Slovenian economy fell into a double-dip depression and further a serious crisis. Many companies went bankrupt, and the banking sector came to have a huge amount of non-performing loans. The type of the Slovenian crisis is different from that of Greece or Cyprus. First, Slovenia had a relatively sound budget until 2008. The country has not aimed to be a tourism country like Greece and Cyprus. Instead, the country had competitive manufacturing industries and her trade and current account deficits were small until recently. Second, the second wave of privatization started in 2006 mainly based on the MBO method, and Slovenian banks financed the MBO. Unfortunately, this move coincided with the Lehman shock. Third, the proportion of foreign-owned banks in the banking sector was small. Domestic capitals account for about 60 percent of the banking sector, but the state has control over major banks. In other Central and East European countries foreign-owned banks have been predominant, and therefore their parent banks have managed to support subsidiaries. In the case of Slovenia, in contrast, the government had to inject capitals to the banks repeatedly to protect the banking system, having negative influence on the state budget. In 2013 the credit uncertainty over Cyprus gave rise to concerns about Slovenia. Outside specialists think that there is no way other than asking the Troika (the EU, the European Central Bank and the IMF) for help, but the government is struggling hard to overcome the crisis by itself without relying on rescue by the Troika. This paper examines why this country fell into such a serious economic crisis.

著者

香川 敏幸

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2012, no.41, pp.111-114, 2012 (Released:2014-05-27)