著者

⽮⼝ 啓朗

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.50, pp.88-103, 2021 (Released:2022-06-11)

参考文献数

78

---

Why did Russia abandon the Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi, which was Russo-Turkish alliance, and accept the Straits Convention, which was signed by 5 powers on 13 July 1841? Previous studies have cited three reasons for this: (1) Russia’s weakened influence over the Ottoman Empire, (2) Russian Foreign Minister Nesselrode’s orientation toward the Concert of Europe, and (3) France’s isolation. However, how did Russia evaluate the ability of its alliance partner? Using a commitment problem as an analytical framework, this study will clarify the security problems which Russia perceived in the Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi and how it attempted to rectify them through the Straits Convention.In the first half of the 19th century, Russia, seeking to keep the Ottoman Empire vulnerable, gave military support to the Empire, which was reeling from the First Egyptian-Turkish War. After being approached by the Ottomans for an alliance, Russia signed the Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi with the aim of expanding its influence over the Ottoman Empire and prohibiting the passage of foreign warships through the Dardanelles. However, this treaty not only caused a fierce opposition from Britain, which Russia had not expected, but also threatened the security of the Black Sea coastal region, which she had hoped.What did Russian policymakers think of these security threats? First, the Russian Military Officers questioned the Ottoman Empire’s military capabilities and believed that they would have to occupy the Bosphorus and Dardanelles in the event of a war with Britain, regardless of the intentions of their allied partner. Nesselrode also saw the Ottoman Empire as incapable of resisting British and French pressure and recognized that the conflict with Britain posed a serious threat to Russia’s security environment. And when the Second Egyptian-Turkish War broke out, Russia began to fear that it would be drawn into a war with Britain in the Straits region.In this situation, Russia tried to defuse the situation by participating in the conference of the five European powers. Russia approached Great Britain to abrogate the Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi and conclude a new agreement that would prohibit the passage of warships through the Bosporus and Dardanelles. Russia believed that a new agreement, based on the Concert of Europe, would be more credible in its commitment to prohibit the passage of warships through both straits than the Russo—Turkish bilateral alliance. Although it was also Russia’s goal to isolate France at the London Conference, Russia believed that its commitment to the ban on passage through the Straits could be maintained with the agreement of the four powers, regardless of France’s consent. It can be said that the abrogation of Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi was the result of seeking a more reliable guarantee to replace the Ottoman Empire, which was uncertain about its commitment to the Dardanelles blockade, besides easing tensions with Britain.

著者

堀⽥ 主

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.50, pp.104-125, 2021 (Released:2022-06-11)

参考文献数

74

---

This article explores the pivotal but largely unwatched 1985–1986 Soviet diplomacy over the Stockholm Conference, also known as the Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE), in terms of its broader domestic and international contexts. It explains why and how the Soviet Union made concessions to Western proposals in the Stockholm negotiations after Gorbachev took office. Regarding the most contentious issue of the on-site inspection, the following three people — the new General Secretary, the Foreign Minister with no diplomatic experience, and the diplomat on the ground — collaborated to create the unprecedented Soviet decision. The long-held Soviet secrecy collapsed because the triangle stifled both the conservative KGB’s and military’s opposition. The Stockholm agreement, reached after two and a half years of negotiations, was the first multilateral East–West security accord since the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and the first arms control agreement involving the two superpowers since SALT II in 1979. It is also remarkable that its success was one of the first achievements for Soviet diplomacy in the ambitious Gorbachev period. However, the real significance of the conference lies in Soviet concessions in areas previously deemed unacceptable. The Kremlin, which had long adhered to secrecy, accepted the West’s proposal for on-site inspections. This paper is organised into four main parts. The first chapter deals with the end of the Gromyko era after Gorbachev’s advent. From the beginning, the new leader had a vision of improving international relations but no concrete plan. Meanwhile, the old-fashioned Foreign Minister, who had long dominated Soviet diplomacy, showed continuity in foreign policy from the pre-Gorbachev period. The second chapter analyses the period immediately following Eduard Shevardnadze’s appointment as Foreign Minister. Shevardnadze, who had no diplomatic experience, strengthened the bottom-up mechanism of actively incorporating his colleagues’ views. The increased discretion of negotiators on the ground significantly impacted the future of Stockholm. The third chapter focuses on the discordance between the words and deeds in Soviet diplomacy following Gorbachev’s spectacular declaration in January 1986. While the leader actively announced new initiatives, actual Soviet diplomacy did not profoundly change course. This chapter also stresses that the Chernobyl nuclear incident was not the decisive impetus for reaching the Stockholm agreement. Finally, the fourth chapter describes the confrontation between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the General Staff. The quiet war behind the Kremlin walls brought complex improvisation into the Soviet decision-making process and negotiation stance.

著者

栗原 克⼰

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.50, pp.126-147, 2021 (Released:2022-06-11)

参考文献数

30

---

One of the pathologies of modern democracy is the crisis of representation (parliamentarism).As a countermeasure against the dysfunction of representative democracy, ways to improve it have been argued in each country.One of them is the vocational representation system.This is a way to have the economic and social interests of a complex and diverse society represented in politics, and the idea is to form a representative system from vocational organizations rather than from region or interest.Although this vocational representation system has diminished its influence in terms of its effectiveness after the war, it has not lost its meaning as an institutional theory.The “Civic Chamber” of the Russian Federation discussed in this paper, which started its activities in 2006, was created to deal with the dysfunction of the parliament, and the way it was structured is reminiscent of the vocational representation system, but is it similar to the vocational representation system?This paper aims to gain a perspective for evaluating this Civic Chamber of Russia by looking at the characteristics of its representative system, after tracing the amendments made to the law regulating this institution after its enactment.As a premise for it, the author examined the process leading up to the establishment of the Civic Chamber, and then introduced the process of enacting the law that regulated this institution.Then, based on the enacted law, the outline of the Civic Chamber was examined for its purpose, authority, composition and organization method, and commentators’ evaluation of this law was introduced.The law governing the Civic Chamber enacted in 2005 has been revised many times since then, and this paper considered the revisions that have brought about major changes.The following points were examined in order to gain a perspective to evaluate the Civic Chamber.a. Is the Civic Chamber based on a representation system from social organizations?b. Is it dependent on organizations?c. Is it an advisory body?d. Is it a democratic system?e. Why are its components from organizations limited to social organizations and non-profit organizations?From these points of view, it is necessary to pay attention to the trends of the Civic Chamber, including the verification of the effectiveness of the examination of legislative bills, etc. and the status of activities, and the following can be pointed out as the characteristics of this new institution.The Civic Chamber in Russia was institutionalized by the Putin administration in response to the need for a system that complements political representation by incorporating social elements with the aim of restoring confidence in politics and social integration. In addition, it can be regarded as an attempt to create a representative of society that is neither a vocational representative having the aspect of representating interests nor a group representative as seen in the early Soviet elections, and in terms of making a system that relies on diverse organizations, it can be seen as a form of “associative democracy” as advocated by Paul Hirst. However, if it is likened to P. Hirst’s claim, it is “associative democracy from above”.

著者

越野 剛

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.50, pp.148-151, 2021 (Released:2022-06-11)

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.50, pp.157-158, 2021 (Released:2022-06-11)

著者

⻑島 徹

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2020, no.49, pp.106-125, 2020 (Released:2021-06-12)

参考文献数

20

著者

山脇 大

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2020, no.49, pp.126-143, 2020 (Released:2021-06-12)

参考文献数

41

---

Climate change has been recognised as an important policy issue that affects nature and socio-economic systems of all continents and oceans over the last few decades. In order to achieve the ambitious goal of ‘keeping a global temperature rise to less than 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels’ by the Paris Agreement agreed at COP 21 in 2015, formulation and implementation of climate change policies, especially mitigation ones to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions have been recently advanced all over the world.Russia, as one of the largest energy-resource rich countries and GHG emitters, has been also in the process of modernisation towards a low-carbon society, especially after the occurrence of global financial crisis in 2008-2009. Under this circumstance, the formulation and implementation of climate change policies have recently begun in earnest in Russia through its signature on and ratification of the Paris Agreement effective in 2016. These policies in Russia, however, often end in failure.In this context, this present paper firstly clarifies the current situation of climate change and its causes such as GHG and air pollutants emissions in Russia, followed by the critical consideration of previous studies on this global thematic issue. By revisiting the formulation and implementation process of Russian climate change policies with a special focus on its multi-stakeholders, this paper tries to explain why these policies are not materialised in Russia, that is, factors influencing on its policy failure.Throughout a series of analysis, it becomes clear in this paper that Russian environmental administration has been weakened whilst the government spending with environmental purposes on a downward trend in Russia after starting market transition in the 1990s. This paper also derives that institutional arrangements in the governmental committees enable Russian oil and gas companies to do lobbying for reflecting their interests on relevant policies. Besides, it becomes unveiled that residents and civil society organisations (CSOs), as one of representative protesters demanding policy reforms through social movements, have an insignificant influence on climate change policies in the case of Russia.This paper then concludes that these factors are crucial propositions given to Russian climate change policies to materialise its transition towards a low-carbon society as well as big challenges to be overcome for its future sustainable growth.

著者

有⽥ 耕平

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2020, no.49, pp.167-181, 2020 (Released:2021-06-12)

参考文献数

30

---

In the 1920s, Mikhail Mikhailovich Zoshchenko wrote about 600 satirical short stories. Many of these satirical works depict the old-fashioned bourgeois culture in pre-revolutionary Russia.One of the aspects of this bourgeois culture, which Zoshchenko picks up and criticizes in his short stories, is theatricality. In this paper, I describe how Zoshchenko defines theatricality and analyze his criticism of theatricality.The theatricality which I elaborate in chapter 1, can be found in Zoshchenko’s storytelling, which is called “skaz”. This is a Russian oral form of narrative. In memoirs, the contemporaries often pointed out how the actors read aloud Zoshchenko’s works with theatrical tone and gesture. A single storyteller, who performs in skaz controls the whole story and plays all characters himself. Therefore, he can reproduce his story with his own theatricality and contrasts it with the excessive pre-revolutionary theatricality of the characters. I discuss the theatrical technique of skaz and Zoshchenko’s critique on the pre-revolutionary theatricality.In the second chapter, I analyze the theatricality of Soviet theater. In 1920s, Russian avant-garde was very influential art movement. Theater-directors abandoned old conventions and expand their artistic world. In this chapter, I examine three works of Zoshchenko that criticized Russian avant-garde, especially, theatricality of Nikolai Evreinov.In the third chapter, I analyze cultural ideology in theater. In Russia, theatrical culture of the 19th century followed a certain etiquette. Zoshchenko’s protagonists always enter the theater without proper costumes and little money. The characters quarrel over theatrical manners and are thrown outside. This conflict reveals the nature of Russian theatricality, which removes uncultured people from the theater and rejects Russians on basis of their social-cultural background.In the fourth chapter, I examine “The Elecrician”, which is Zoshchenko’s most remarkable in terms of dealing with his criticism of theatricality. In this work he succeeds to put all elements of theatricality together and clarify the mechanism of theatricality. Later he revised The Electrician and changed the end of the story in order to avoid his critique on theatricality. From then on he stopped incorporating critique on theatricality in his works.In the fifth chapter, I examine five works of Zoshchenko which deal with electrification in the Soviet Union. By comparing the various editions of these works, including The Elecrician, the high number of revisions that Zoshchenko conducted himself becomes obvious. I addition, I demonstrate that the problems concerning the enlightment of Soviet electification are similar to the problems of theatricality that I elaborated in the second chapter. Zoshchenko tried to unite people with different cultural backgrounds into one collective under the reign of Stalin. Finally, Zoshchenko draws the ideal image of the electrified communal apartment in his work “Last story” In this story, a pre-revolutionary woman changes her mind and transforms into an honorable Soviet citizen. This story shows that Zoshchenko’s criticism of theatricality disappeared because people of different cultural background were united in the electrified communal apartment, which represented the future of the Soviet Union.

著者

⼭添 博史

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2020, no.49, pp.182-185, 2020 (Released:2021-06-12)

著者

宇野 真佑⼦

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2020, no.49, pp.186, 2020 (Released:2021-06-12)

著者

斎藤 慶⼦

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2020, no.49, pp.1-25, 2020 (Released:2021-06-12)

参考文献数

75

---

This paper examines the content of and some difficulties which arose in Bolshoi ballet cultural exchange programmes offered by the Soviet government. These programs were offered to a number of countries; I have focused on the countries of Japan, France, the United Kingdom and the USA in the first part of my paper. These four countries were where the most ambitious productions of the Bolshoi company were held in the latter half of the 1950’s. In the second half of my paper I focus specifically and in more detail on the cultural exchanges between Japan and the USSR. The Bolshoi ballet played a significant role in exchanges between the former Soviet union and the rest of the world, as it was symbolic of the USSR’s diplomatic relations. I limited the timespan for the investigation from 1953 to 1964, when Nikita Khrushchev strategically increased dispatches of cultural organizations to the world trying to expand Soviet influence during the Cold War period.In the mid to late 1950’s, the Soviet ballet tours to France (1954), the United Kingdom (1956) and the USA (1959) were lead by the respective governments on the basis of mutual exchanges. However the Japanese government wanted to avoid such exchanges because they were afraid of the ideological impact of communism on the people and more were interested in economic growth than in cultural diplomacy. Despite this, private organizations in Japan hungered for such cultural exchanges in the arts and sciences, and had an active say in who came from the USSR. The 1957 Bolshoi ballet tour to Japan was also organized by a private impresario and it was received with wild enthusiasm by the Japanese people. The Japanese government granted visas to some applicants but not others; it depended on the political sway of the organizations involved. Sadly sending Japanese advocates to the USSR would involve high costs so the numbers sent there were much less than those who came to Japan. In other countries the exchanges were much more balanced but political relationships with the USSR did cause interruption to the programmes. This would suggest that the success of cultural exchanges depends more on politics than content.In the 1960’s the Japanese-Soviet political relationship deteriorated because of the new Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan (1960), the restart of nuclear tests by the USSR, the Northern Territories dispute, the break up of the relationships between the Japanese and Soviet communist parties concerned with the Partial Test Ban Treaty and so on. However Soviet Russia kept sending high caliber representatives to Japan in similar numbers to before. Some of the Japanese organizations involved dropped out of the exchanges, while others joined. This happened due to changing public feeling towards the USSR, shifts in political relations, and changing relations between the organizations and respective governments. It was in this atmosphere that the Soviet government counted on ballet to maintain diplomatic ties with Japan. The Kirov Ballet’s Japan tour (1961), and the joint concerts of the Tchaikovsky Memorial Tokyo Ballet School with Soviet famous dancers (1961 and 1963) helped to set the notion that Russia led the world in ballet. The Soviet government was convinced of the effectiveness of the ballet in demonstrating the strength of Soviet culture without fear of rivalry from other countries, and expanded the exchanges within this field.

著者

⼩野 亮介

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2020, no.49, pp.26-51, 2020 (Released:2021-06-12)

参考文献数

122

---

This paper focuses on the 1918–1921 Japanese military mission to Central Asia, stationed in Urumchi, Ili (Gulja), Tarbagatay and Kashgar. Japanese General Staffs dispatched several officers to Xinjiang to support the Siberia Intervention. This paper reviews the mission’s activities and concerns on intelligence, economic interests and propaganda, especially those of the so-called ‘Japanese consul in Gulja’, Captain Nagamine.The Japanese mission had a keen interest in the developments of the Russian Civil War in the Semirech’e and Semipalatinsk Oblasts. In Ili, Nagamine built relationships with the White Russian consul, leaders of nomads and others. Japanese officers reported activities of White Russian Cossacks in detail. Meanwhile, the Governor Yang Zengxin, was suspicious about possible conspiracies among members of the Japanese mission, Russian consuls and the Cossacks. Yang reported to Beijing that Japanese officers had attempted to bring the Japanese army to Xinjiang on the pretext of a joint defence and to interfere in Ili by letting the Cossacks advance into Bolshevik’s Vernyi, which would pass through Xinjiang’s territory. In addition, a report from Kashgar hinted that the Japanese army supported the anti-Soviet guerrilla Basmachis in the Fergana Valley. In early 1920, the Cossacks were defeated by the Red Army and fled to Xinjiang. Nagamine witnessed the disarmament of Commander Annenkov, with whom the Japanese in Urumchi seemed to have maintained a relationship even after Nagamine’s departure from Ili.The Japanese mission also attempted to promote economic interests in Xinjiang. According to Etherton, the British consul-general in Kashgar, Japanese products flowed into Xinjiang in 1919, and Japan was considered a possible rival of Britain over the Xinjiang market. The Japanese mission tried to open a consulate in Xinjiang. In Urumchi, the Japanese entered into talks with ‘Russian’ merchants—who were in fact Muslim Turks—where they discussed Japanese naturalisation and Japanese protection. However, the talks failed. Despite his suspicion, Yang also relied on the Japanese for economic development. He consulted Major Narita in Urumchi about a large loan to construct a light railway and drill for oil. However, this offer was cancelled by order of Beijing. The Japanese General Staffs and Ministry of Foreign Affairs coldly refused Narita’s proposal.Moreover, the Japanese mission engaged in propaganda towards Muslim Turks for some obscure agenda related to Pan-Asianism, Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism. According to Etherton, the Japanese avoided any direct support or propaganda towards the Turks. Later, Nagamine stirred up accusations that Britain would occupy southern Xinjiang. He also had a relationship with Tatar Pan-Turkist, an ex-officer of the military organisation ‘Harbi Shura’. Kaneko and Otaki, stationed in Urumchi, frequently visited Ottoman activist Ahmet Kemal İlkul in jail, who had been sent to Xinjiang from Constantinople in 1914 and engaged in educational and Pan-Turkic activities. Thus, it was rather natural for the Japanese to pay attention to İlkul.Although not successful or long-lasting, the activities of the Japanese military mission to Xinjiang illustrate Japan’s interests in post-1917 Central Asia. Military intelligence about the Cossacks was their main object, but at the same time, they developed economic and propaganda interests that targeted Central Asian Turks, including Tatars. Certainly, such activities raised concerns with Yang and Etherton. In short, the Japanese mission to Xinjiang was one of the examples in which Japan tried to carve out a role in the Great Game of the early 20th century.

著者

ブルナ・ルカーシュ

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2020, no.49, pp.52-61, 2020 (Released:2021-06-12)

---

Czech literature was first recognized in Japan in the 1920s and early 1930s. Among literary works published during this period, which were few in number and mostly second-hand translations from English or German, three books - one play and two novels - require special attention. Karel Čapek’s dystopian play R.U.R., originally written in 1920 and first staged in 1921, was translated into Japanese in 1923 and became the first major work of Czech literature ever introduced in Japan. Just like in other parts of the world, the play attracted attention of both critics and readers. Several other translations were published soon after and the play was also successfully staged in Tsukiji Shōgekijō Theatre in 1925. A few years later, in 1930, Japanese translations of two other essential works of the inter-war period Czech literature were published – Jaroslav Hašek’s acclaimed antimilitarist novel The Good Soldier Švejk and Ivan Olbracht’s socialist novel Anna The Proletarian, a book which is now almost completely forgotten.The main objective of this paper is to explore the relation between the literary concepts adopted and constantly argued by the critics and writers of the Proletarian Literature, predominant literary movement at that time, and the reception/interpretation of foreign literary works, in this case works of Czech literature. Based on the analysis of the newspaper advertisements, book reviews and other related texts this paper shows that the reception was determined by the concepts and notions the Proletarian critics valued and that the leftist literary critics tended to emphasize those elements of these literary works they considered to be conveying the Proletarian ideals. On the other hand, Olbracht’s Anna The Proletarian, a novel praised by its translator Ichiko Kamichika as a must-read for every proletarian woman, was targeted by Japanese censorship for its radical political thoughts and was eventually published with large parts of the text censored.Consequently, this paper concludes that Czech literature introduced and translated in the inter-war period was interpreted in different ways and valued for different reasons than it was originally in Czechoslovakia.

著者

下社 学

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2020, no.49, pp.82-91, 2020 (Released:2021-06-12)

参考文献数

7

---

In this paper, from the perspective of economic exchange between Japan and Central Asia (Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan), the current situation and challenge, as well as future prospects, will be described through the work of promoting trade and investment.One of the characteristics of economic exchange between Japan and Central Asia is that the forms and fields of business developed by the target countries differ significantly, and one is that the public and private sectors are working together unexpectedly. One can point out that neither Japan nor the target countries can be decisively important economic partners, and as a result, exchanges remain at a low level.The lack of information is at the top of the challenge in developing economic exchanges between Japan and Central Asia. Also the difficulty of logistics, the vulnerable foreign exchange circumstances and the compliance problem are major bottleneck for commercial activities for Japanese companies.Although rosy expectations for future economic exchanges are forbidden, there are several directions for efforts that can contribute to building win-win relationships.

著者

ベルタラニチュ ボシティアン

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2020, no.49, pp.92-105, 2020 (Released:2021-06-12)

参考文献数

31

---

The present article tracks the evolution of Japan’s engagement with Central Europe after the end of Cold War. More specifically, it looks into the development of V4+Japan partnership within the context of post-Cold War foreign policy of Japan. The main argument revolves around two questions. First, in light of democratic backsliding in Central Europe, the article enquires into the basis of strategic relevancy and rationality behind the V4+Japan partnership. Second, it looks into the potential for future evolution of the relationship in the context of the post-Brexit EU-Japan relationship. The major conclusion rests on the premise that V4+Japan partnership, although weakly institutionalized and asymmetric in nature, retains meaning as long as it remains contingent on the values and principles of the EU-Japan strategic dialogue.

著者

花田 智之

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2019, no.48, pp.107-109, 2019 (Released:2020-05-30)

著者

角田 安正

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2018, no.47, pp.204-206, 2018 (Released:2019-10-08)

著者

角田 安正

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2019, no.48, pp.55-71, 2019 (Released:2020-05-30)

---

This paper compares three versions of Nikita Khrushchev’s secret speech: a Russian booklet that was allegedly published in 1959; the official Russian edition, published in Moscow in 1989; and the US Department of State’s version, published in English in 1956. This paper argues that although the booklet of 1959 was a forged imprint, its text cannot be summarily dismissed as false.The official text of Khrushchev’s speech, delivered to the closed session of the 20th congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on February 25, 1956, was published by the party in 1989. A note at the end of the text mentions that it is identical to the original text from March 1, 1956 (not to the text of February 25, 1956).The US Department of State’s version of the speech was printed in the New York Times on June 5, 1956. The text is identified as being a direct or secondary translation of the official text from March 1. Subsequent newspapers reports and research findings from the mid-1990s reveal that the original text had first passed through the hands of the Polish United Workers’ Party before reaching the Israel Security Agency, and finally the United States.By comparing the text of the 1959 booklet, the official 1989 edition, and the US Department of State’s version concurrently, we observe the following:(1) The 1959 edition of Khrushchev’s secret speech is a variant of the original version from March 1, 1956.(2) A number of subtle differences in wording exist between the 1959 edition and the 1989 edition; however, these differences are so minor that they are unnoticeable in the Japanese translation.(3) Despite these differences, the “precision” or “accuracy” of the 1959 edition is only slightly inferior to the version produced by the US Department of State. If the US Department of State’s version differs from the official one by only 5 percent, the 1959 booklet differs from the official version by approximately 7-8 percent.(4) We present the following hypothesis to explain why the 1959 version is less accurate than the version produced by the US Department of State. Both the US Department of State’s version and the 1959 edition were derived from an identical text, which was possibly in Polish. However, while the former has a “parent-child” relationship with its original, the 1959 edition is a secondary derivative, which means that it should be considered a “grandchild” of the Polish text.

著者

宇野 真佑子

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2019, no.48, pp.72-89, 2019 (Released:2020-05-30)

参考文献数

45

---

This paper aims to analyze the articles relating to the World War II (WWII) published in the weekly Croatian newspaper Danas (Today), a prominent print medium for mass circulation that did not agree with the Croatian Democratic Union’s (HDZ) and the League of Communists of Croatia’s (SKH) understanding of the WWII.Debates about the WWII became heated in former Yugoslavia from the late 1980s, especially in Serbia and Croatia. As discourses regarding the past serve to legitimize the politics of the present, there exists abundant literature focusing on the media coverage, the politics of memory, and the discourse regarding the WWII in the Yugoslav media. However, there is insufficient research investigating the opposition in Croatia that did not share the HDZ’s and the SKH’s interpretations of the WWII. Attending to such opinions expressed on the eve of the fragmentation of Yugoslavia will help the study of the alternative plan of state-building mooted during Croatia’s transitional period.Franjo Tuđman, the HDZ president who also became the president of the Republic of Croatia in 1990, criticized the official history of Yugoslavia promoted by the communists and instead offered a nationalistic interpretation of the WWII, attempting to rehabilitate the wartime regime led by the pro-Nazi Ustasha. Tuđman called for a “national reconciliation” that aimed to accomplish reconciliation between Partisans and Ustasha by claiming that both sections strived to achieve the independence of the Croatian state. Conversely, the articles in Danas criticized both, the official history of the communists and the new nationalistic narrative offered by the HDZ. Nonetheless, Danas partly followed communists’ official version of history, although it also focused on the mass killings committed by the Yugoslav Partisans and denounced the lack of research on Yugoslav historiography. The politics of memory in Croatia, such as a commemoration event in Bleiburg, was also a matter of dispute in articles published in Danas, which criticized the politics of the HDZ as using the past for political purposes just like the communists.This paper demonstrates that the articles published in Danas in 1990 called for reconciliation between the Serbs and Croats instead of a nationalist settlement among the Croats because it was considered to be an unavoidable task when Croatia aimed at the accomplishment of integration into Europe. Danas and the liberal oppositions placed significance on the political and cultural pluralism of Europe, while the HDZ focused on state-building that was based on the notion of a Croatian nation. However, the idea that both the Serbs and Croats should come to terms with the crimes committed during the WWII was unacceptable to the Serbs in Croatia, who eagerly tried to use their past as the basis of the legitimation of their political goals. Eventually, the opposition could not bring about a settlement between the Croats and Serbs in Croatia. Further research is required to ascertain the reason why the claims of the Croatian opposition failed to attain wider support.

著者

神原 ゆうこ

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2018, no.47, pp.65-80, 2018 (Released:2019-10-08)

参考文献数

40

---

In Central Europe, the Hungarian minority have been forced to become the national minority in some countries following border changes in the region during the twentieth century—in particular, Slovakia, which counted among its population of 5 million people around 450,000 ethnic Hungarians. The Hungarian minority could not be ignored, especially in Slovak politics, and its party participated in the Slovak government from 1998 to 2006. This demonstrated to the world in general and to Western European countries in particular that Slovakia had become a European democratic country that could accept minority politicians in its government. Ethnic Hungarians had been a minority in (Czecho)Slovakia for at least 70 years, but they became significant political actors only after the end of the repressive communist government, which did not recognize their right to be active or speak as an ethnic minority. Democratization and the related idea of supporting political change from the socialist regime helped promote the establishment of minority solidarity.This study investigated the effects and limitation of minority solidarity, as influenced by such democratic values as collective ideas as freedom of expression, civic activity, market economy, Western political orientation, and minority rights and protections. This research adopted an anthological approach based on fieldwork in southern Slovakia, where the Hungarian minority lives as a regional majority. The author conducted interviews with community leaders in the southern Slovak society and observed participants’ events and activities.In late 1980s, the Hungarian minority in Slovakia were able to obtain information directly regarding Hungary, which had reformed its economic and political system earlier. Bolstered by the example of the Hungarian condition, they were able to easily imagine a democratic world, and this drove the Hungarian minority to participate in social movements aimed at changing the regime, not only because they were eager to improve the minority condition but also they had struggled under the less reformed Czechoslovak society. Vaguely proposed democratic values and associated rhetoric attracted more minorities, further establishing minority solidarity. For the Hungarian minority in Slovakia, demands for democratic reforms subsumed ethnic identity, as calls for change and democratic rhetoric were more acceptable to the Slovaks than the protection of minority rights.However, democratic values alone were not enough to sustain minority solidarity for 30 years. Currently, minority politicians and activists continue to secure rights and protections for ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia; however, doing so conversely undermines the effectiveness of democracy as the voice of the people given the diversity of the population. This has led to tensions in the Hungarian minority community between those desirous of ensuring the purity of the ethnic Hungarian community in a multicultural society and those desirous of living peacefully with Slovak neighbors in their daily lives. Adding to this erosion of solidarity among minorities, the recent transformation of Hungarian politics as the ideal goal of the past for ethnic Hungarians will likely move the current minority to consider new types of minority politics.