著者

木本 麻希子

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.43, pp.105-120, 2014 (Released:2016-09-09)

参考文献数

48

---

This study aims to clarify Sergei Prokofiev’s compositional characteristics and techniques used in his late piano sonatas through both aesthetic and theoretical analyses based on the manifestation of his so-called “five lines.” This research also focuses on the historical background and conceptual origin of his five lines to highlight his usage of these lines in his works. In his autobiography, Prokofiev specifically mentioned that his five lines permeated all his compositions. These lines have distinct musical characteristics: classical, which takes a neo-classical form in pieces such as sonatas or concertos and is indispensable for exploring the form and structure of his piano sonatas; modern, which is mainly found in his harmonic language, including melody, orchestration and dramatic features; toccata or motor, traceable to the Toccata Op. 7, which is one of Robert Schumann’s solo piano works, and its driving energy from its repetitive rhythmic pattern reflecting the industrialization of the early 20th century; lyrical, which reflects a thoughtful and meditative mood and links long melodic lines, showing Prokofiev’s romanticism; and grotesque, a term used by his contemporaries that Prokofiev himself described as “scherzo-ish.” In addition, Prokofiev’s five lines manifest his standing in music among his contemporaries, and compositions based on them echo several aesthetic ideas such as neo-classicism, primitivism and constructivism. Prokofiev’s musical career in piano sonatas is generally divided into the following three periods. The first period constitutes his formative years in Russia, namely 1891–1918 (Piano Sonatas Nos. 1–4); the second period includes his years in the USA and Europe, namely 1918–1936 (Piano Sonata No. 5), and the third period includes his final years in the U.S.S.R., namely 1936–1953 (Piano Sonatas Nos. 7–9). Prokofiev wrote many works during this latter period, which include ballet music for “Romeo and Juliet” Op. 64 and “Cinderella” Op. 87 and film music for “The Queen of Spades” Op. 70, the opera “War and Peace” Op. 91, and Symphony No. 5 Op. 100. Above all, his late Piano Sonatas (i.e., No. 6 Op. 82, No. 7 Op. 83, and No. 8 Op. 84), commonly referred to as “The War Sonatas” since they were composed during the Second World War, are most representative of his piano writing. However, previous analytical studies on his late piano sonatas allow plenty of scope to reconsider these works for an aesthetic and historical investigation against the political background at the time (such as against the existing socialist realism). This study explores Prokofiev’s five lines principle and its compositional practice against the social background in his later works to illustrate the composer’s approach during the political repression of the time. The results of this investigation show that, despite the intense political pressure in the U.S.S.R. during the 1930s and 1940s, Prokofiev managed to maintain his own musical identity and expressive style through his manifestation of the five lines concept.

著者

石郷岡 建

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2006, no.35, pp.46-59, 2006 (Released:2010-05-31)

---

This article analyzed the so-called “Orange Revolution” in Ukraine. The “Orange Revolution” is widely understood by the western media and countries as a part of political, democratic changes in the former Soviet Union, and also very often called or mentioned as a “Democratic Revolution.” The author has a different opinion and a strong feeling of uneasiness to call it as a “Democratic Revolution.”However it is rather difficult to explain those changes such as The “Rose Revolution” in Georgia (2003), the “Orange Revolution” in Ukraine (2004), the “Tulip Revolution” in Kyrgys (2005), as simply a coincidental happening. There should be some explanation of similarities and should be a comparative analysis.From this point of view the author picked up the general election in Ukraine which was held in March, 2006, and made an analysis of political changes in Ukraine as a whole.The result of the analysis showed the following: 1) The most of the people in Ukraine have now a feeling of the disillusion by the “Orange Revolution.” 2) The political confrontation in the “Orange Revolution” were based on the geopolitical different direction of the West and the East. This confrontational pattern has not changed so much before and after the revolution. 3) The direction of the West and the East are completely opposite, and almost impossible to compromise. The Ukrainian society is divided by the West and the East, and the power balance is very narrow and full of the tension. 4) However the new element of political changes is now emerging within the Ukrainian society. Especially the economical changes based on the development of the market economy are now becoming more important for the Ukrainian politics, and should not be ignored.After the election in March, 2006, the former “Orange Revolution” coalition forces tried to establish a new government, but failed. Instead, the opposition pro-Russian forces with the leader of Mr. Jankovich, have succeeded to form a new government. This outcome can be also explained by the economical changes in Ukraine.After the collapse of Soviet Union the so-called socialism system were broken down one by one, but all the former socialist countries had same (or similar) problems and difficulties. Behind those problems and difficulties you can find out always the friction among the society because of the introduction of market economy. In this context it may be possible to find out the logics and rules of political changes in postsocialist countries based on the analysis of the economic developments. The author has a hypothesis that behind the “Color-Democratic” revolution the economic factor, especially the development of market economy has played a very important role.

著者

村井 淳

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2003, no.32, pp.145-161, 2003 (Released:2010-05-31)

参考文献数

17

---

Crimes are mirrors of society. This article analyzes the contents of the Russian criminal statistics that began to be released to the public from the end of the Soviet era and examines the changes of the Russian society behind the crimes.There are three particular periods when crimes in Russia rapidly increased from 1982 to 2002. The first period is 1983, one year after the general secretary Brezhnev died. In 1983, the number of thefts remarkably increased, but the increase rate is not as prominent as the other two periods. The second period is 1989-1992, before and after the collapse of the Soviet Union, when the number of crimes increased because morality and social order collapsed due to the following: introduction and expansion of the market economy, the social maladaptation of the returned soldiers from Afghanistan, and the confusion brought by the collapse of the Soviet Union. From 1989 to 1992, atrocious crimes such as murders, rapes and robberies especially increased. The third period is 1998-1999. The financial crisis in 1998 deprived millions of people of their savings and wages. From 1998 to 1999, the number of robberies, thefts and drug-related crimes increased. After Putin was officially elected as president of Russia in 2000, however, the crime rate increase slowed and, crimes started to reduce in number in 2002.Today the most serious crimes are crimes related to drugs, psychotropic medicines and deadly poisons. Drugs such as heroin and poppy seeds come to Russia mainly from Afghanistan and Tadzhikistan through Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz and Turkmenistan, and the part of them flows out to Ukraine and Western Europe. Drugs are expanding to smaller cities in Russia, not to mention the large cities. A large number of crimes, including drug-related crimes, are rapidly increasing in Khabarovsk, Tyumen', Ekaterinburg, Irkutsk, Kaliningrad, Novosibirsk, and so on. Of late, the number of crimes in Moscow is more than that in Sankt-Peterburk. Behind that, there exist movements of Russian Mafias.The unemployment rate rose after the collapse of the Soviet Union and became the highest in 1998 (13.2%) . The number of crimes, criminals and prisoners increased in proportion to the unemployment rate. Moreover, the number of crimes caused by the unemployed especially increased. This phenomenon, of course, was related to the economic conditions behind it. Among the young, those who don't go to school and have no job, increased in number and they tend to commit crimes such as robberies and thefts. In 2002, the number of crimes in Russia reduced a little, but the number of murders and drug-related crimes were larger, and the number of thefts were smaller compared to America, Japan, Britain, France and Germany. It seems that a large amount of illegal drugs flows underground in Russia.Now not only does the Russian government have to reinforce anticrime and anti-Mafia measures, but also have to reinforce the redistribution of wealth for the week, to promote national welfare, to regulate corruption of government officials and to promote tax collection in order to reduce the number of crimes. To do so, first of all, the government must further develop the economy and accumulate wealth.

著者

宮川 真一

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2002, no.31, pp.181-198, 2002 (Released:2010-05-31)

参考文献数

60

---

In Russia, “fundamentalism” in the Russian Orthodox Church has been on the rise since the early 1990's. “Russian Orthodox Fundamentalists” stand for restoration of autocracy, restriction against the Jews and the confessions other than the Orthodox one, the imperial principle of state structure, the Russian Orthodox Church status as the state church, for complete rejection of the concepts of democracy and human rights (in particular, as concerns the freedom of conscience), opposition to any forms of Western influence within the country and struggle against it beyond its borders, and compulsory imposition of “Orthodox values” in every-day life, culture and even economy. Their worldview is based on extremely mythologized notions about the pre-revolutionary Orthodox monarchy.Inside the Russian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate, Metropolitan of Saint Petersburg and Ladoga Ioann, a person of a greatest authority among the conservatives, prodused the most convincing arguments in favor of a “fundamentalist” position. Many Orthodox “fundamentalist” leaders including an activist Konstantin Dushenov, Editor-in-Chief of “Orthodox Rus” newspaper, have followed Ioann. Some church bishops and the clergy of the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad and of the True Orthodox Church have represented “fundamentalist” circles in these churches. A number of Orthodox brotherhoods, such as the Union of Orthodox Brotherhoods, the Christian Regeneration Union, the Union of Orthodox Citizens, ideologically hold extremely nationalist positions. Same as the similar extra-Church groups, such brotherhoods are not supported by the bishops, but it is impossible to expel anybody from the Church for political views and the nationalist brotherhoods continue working actively. Moreover, right-wing extremist organizations, such as “Pamyat”, “Black Hundred”, “Russian National Unity” actively cooperate in many regions with Russian Orthodox Church clerics. These persons and organizations can be classified into “fundamentalism” and “quasi-fundamentalism” for the moment. The clerics in the Russian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate, the Russian Orthodox church Abroad, the True Orthodox Church are the former. The Union of Orthodox Brotherhoods, the Christian Regeneration Union are included in it. The Union of Orthodox Citizens and the right-wing extremist organizations are the latter.“Russian Orthodox Fundamentalists” fight back to defend their national and religious identity and worldview, fight with fundamentals of “Autocracy, Orthodoxy, Nationality”, and fight against their enemy. such as Western Europe, globalization under the name of God. “Russian Orthodox Fundamentalism” is similar to Russian Right-wing Extremism, and both of them are violent and aren't tolerant. “Russian Orthodox Fndamentalists” base their core identity on religion and they try to construct structual violence. Russian Right-wing Extremists emphasise race, nationality, state in their identity and they resort to physical violence. In addition, Russian New Right-wing Extremism borrow various ideologies othar than Russian Orthodox Christianity.In 2002, conflict between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Roman Catholic Church has come to the surface. It seems that since the early 1990's the unstable balance between “fundamentalists” and the Patriarchate has been gradually shifting in favor of “fundamentalists”. It is impossible to ignore the influence of “Russian Orthodox Fundamentalists” at the aspects of politics, society, and public opinion in Russia today.

著者

仙⽯ 学

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.50, pp.59-71, 2021 (Released:2022-06-11)

参考文献数

24

---

The article documents and compares the childcare support policy reforms in Central Eastern Europe implemented after the Global Financial Crisis. On the one hand, Estonia and Poland have maintained or expanded their childcare support policies after the crisis. Especially, Poland has expanded both cash benefits for families and public childcare during this period. On the other hand, Hungary and Slovenia have decided to cut back on childcare support measures during this period. While Slovenia was forced to cut back on childcare support due to the financial crisis, Hungary has intentionally adopted policies of focusing on the middle class with children by expanding tax credits and reducing cash benefits. As a result of these policies, the employment situation for women improved in Estonia, but it worsened in Slovenia, and the situation remained largely unchanged in Hungary. As for Poland, despite the expansion of measures to support childcare, the employment situation of women has not improved. This situation is provably caused by the fact that the ruling party of Poland, Law and Justice (PiS) emphasizes on the traditional role of women based on Catholic values.

著者

清水 聡

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2008, no.37, pp.58-68, 2008 (Released:2010-05-31)

被引用文献数

1

---

On March 10th, 1952 the USSR sent a document called “Stalin's Note” to the representatives of the Western Powers; the USA, the UK and France. It proposed both making a “peace treaty” with Germany and unifying Germany. For seven years following the end of World War II, Germany had been divided into two states. The separate governments of West and East Germany were provisionally formed in 1949. To resolve this situation, “Stalin's Note” proposed that Germany form a Unified Government and establish a “peace treaty” on a principal of neutrality. However, the USA, the UK, France and the West German leader, Konrad Adenauer, were pursuing a policy of West European Integration of West Germany, and rejected “Stalin's Note” forthwith.Since the Western Powers didn't accept “Stalin's Note”, the real intention of the USSR has remained a big mystery in post WWII history. Academic disputes continue to this day, as to the real intentions of the Soviet Diplomacy. These disputes are roughly split into two groups. One group, the positive group, argues that “Stalin's Note” was a peaceful attempt to establish a “Neutral German State”, while the other, negative group, believes that it was an “Obstructive Operation” to disturb Western diplomacy and cut off the military connection between West Germany and the Western Powers.Following the end of the Cold War, historical materials were released in the former East Germany. Researchers had hoped to find the truth of “Stalin's Note”. Many papers have been presented by historians specializing in diplomatic history of Germany and the USSR, but the disputes have not ended between the positive and the negative groups. This paper investigates the truth of “Stalin's Note” and its relation to the Cold War through rethinking its problems from the viewpoint of the East German leaders. As a result, this investigation finds that East German leaders had formed two groups; supporters of “Stalin's Note, ” the domestic group, and dissidents, the Moscow group.

著者

岩倉 洸

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2019, no.48, pp.90-102, 2019 (Released:2020-05-30)

参考文献数

40

著者

土田 陽介

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2019, no.48, pp.41-54, 2019 (Released:2020-05-30)

参考文献数

15

被引用文献数

1

---

This paper examined the effect of the belt and road initiative by the Chinese government on the Central and Eastern European countries (CEEs), with focusing on the motorway project in Montenegro, named Bar-Boljare highway.For the Montenegro government, this project had been the national desire since its independence. But the European Union (EU) had not accept to assist Montenegrin highway project because of economic inefficiency and so on. In such a circumstance, the Chinese government supported the Bar-Boljare highway project by supplying loans 687 million euros to enhance its influence on the CEEs. As a result, the government of Montenegro increased its debt by 10 percent point of GDP. Western society criticized the China government because its loans made Montenegro to public debt crisis. However, this view was only one-side based on western values.The analysis in this paper concluded that the conflict between EU and China on Montenegrin highway project worked as one of the external pressures on forcing EU rethink its enlargement strategy to the Western Balkans, the peripheral countries in CEEs. Joining other pressures, for example, geopolitical confliction with Turkey and Russia and so on, EU changed its enlargement stance to Western Balkans from negative to positive. EU has started a summit with Western Balkans to communicate deeply. But EU has not yet provided the financial support for economic development.These facts asked EU whether its expansion strategy is correct or not. Its passive stance to Western Balkans allowed expansion of the Chinese political and economic power to there. If EU regards Western Balkans strategically important regions, EU must change its passive support stance to more vigorous one. As the same time, EU needs improve its lack of determination.

著者

ムヒナ・ヴァルヴァラ

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2018, no.47, pp.180-198, 2018 (Released:2019-10-08)

参考文献数

29

著者

伊東 孝之

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2015, no.44, pp.5-28, 2015 (Released:2017-08-18)

---

When World War 1 broke out, most of the nations in Eastern Europe identified themselves with the existing Empires. Poles were mobilized into the three Empires that divided them. They ran the risk of fighting against each other. Germans in the Russian Empire fought in the Russian army against Germany. As the war progressed, however, they became aware of their ethnic identity. They were discriminated against by the authorities or the populace of the ruling nationality. Or they were manipulated by the belligerent nations against the enemy. A lot of new states came into being in Eastern Europe after the war in the name of national self-determination. Most of them, however, were not “ethnic states” in the proper sense of the word. They included many citizens of different ethnicity. On the other hand, as a result of the Russian Revolution a state based on the completely new principle came into being: the Soviet Union. It adopted ethnicity as the constituting principle of the state and formed a federation of ethnic republics. Ethnic republics were, however, just on paper. There were no institutional arrangements that would promote citizens’ allegiance to the given republic. The all-mighty Communist Party of the Soviet Union is the institution that should secure citizens’ allegiance to the federal center. So long as the ideological mobilization worked, they managed to succeed in resurrecting citizens’ civic loyalty to the state as a whole. As the international tension mounted in the course of the 1930s, the Soviet leadership started to look with mistrust on national minorities on the periphery which resulted in the mass murder in Eastern Europe. The famine in 1932–33 in Ukraine was the first case. It was no natural, but man-made disaster to which 3.3 million people fell victim. It was caused by the excessive requisition of grain that the authorities forced through for the ambitious industrialization program. Ukraine had to pay a particularly heavy toll for it. Those who tried to resist were blamed for “Ukrainian nationalism” and “actions to serve the interests of the enemy”. Most of the victims of the so-called “Great Purge” in 1937–38 were citizens of national minorities in Eastern Europe. They were suspected to be spies for Japan in the case of the “Kulak operation” and for Poland in the case of the “Polish operation”. 625,000 people were incriminated and shot to death. During World War 2 Germans and Soviets did ethnic cleansing in a huge scale in Eastern Europe. Germans considered Eastern Europe as nothing more than suppliers of raw materials, foods and labor forces, and were not interested in integrating peoples there. They starved to death about one million inhabitants of Leningrad and 3.1 million soldiers of the Red Army most of whom were conscripted from Eastern Europe. 5.4 million East European Jews fell victim to the German extermination policy after July 1941. Soviets, on the contrary, were interested in integrating peoples they captured. However, they shot to death most of the elite who cooperated with the previous regime and exiled “enemy nationalities” en masse to Central Asia or Siberia. Beneath the German-Soviet war another ethnic cleansing unfolded: Ukrainian nationalists killed about one hundred thousand Poles and Jews in Volynia. (View PDF for the rest of the abstract.)

著者

生田 泰浩

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.43, pp.121-134, 2014 (Released:2016-09-09)

参考文献数

23

---

The perspective of a split of modern Ukraine into the East (Donbass) and the West (the rest) remains one of the most pressing issues in the discussions over pessimistic scenarios of the current unfolding crisis. While the US and the EU have imposed an array of sanctions on Russia in response to the annexation of Crimea and the crisis in the Donbass region, the first Minsk ceasefire has failed on the ground. From this point of view, this study aims, firstly, to clarify the actual conditions that explain the so called “east- west division” in modern Ukraine, based on an analysis of previous research and qualitative data, and putting a particular focus on the timeframe from Euromaidan to the war in Donbass. In the following section, this study aims to explore the actual conditions prevailing in Ukrainian society and in people’s minds as a result of the changing dynamics themselves, using reference data from the Kyiv International Institution of Sociology and the Razumkov Center, in addition to the questionnaire survey that was conducted by the author. The actual information provided by statistics and sociological research indicates that the issue of the country’s split is a kind of myth and is basically a product of an artificial concept inspired mainly by both internal and external political actors. In other words, the division in Ukraine stems from political struggles rather than an east-west divided society originating in the cleavage of Ukraine as well as in Europe and Russia. Indeed, at the time of the Euromaidan demonstrations in Kyiv, protestors made it clear that the challenge was not between one region and another, but between the corrupt elites and the people, whatever region they are from. It is obvious that Euromaidan, in essence, was aimed at achieving the drastic political reforms, however, the Crimean and Donbass crisis should be defined as a political phenomenon, which includes the external factors. Although the current situation should be defined using the above-mentioned elements, some analysts still argue that the crisis has exposed deep divisions in Ukrainian society between the European-oriented west and the Russian-oriented east. However, this understanding is not adequate, and it maybe more correct to state that no single factor can capture or explain this crisis. What is happening in Ukraine is complicated and is driven by many factors. This means that we should take into consideration changes in the social environment of Ukraine as well as the other factors that exists in Ukrainian society and that caused the “division”. In this process, it becomes clear that the consciousness of civil society has produced some positive changes in demonstrating a sense of solidarity. On the other hand, political and economic issues significantly influence the Ukrainian society, and they are the conceivable cause of this divided society. Nevertheless, this study is still ongoing and needs further consideration before revealing what the causal co-relations and its final conclusions are.

著者

木村 汎

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.43, pp.156-159, 2014 (Released:2016-09-09)

著者

塩川 伸明 柴 宜弘 田口 雅弘 望月 哲男

出版者

The Japanese Association for Russian and East European Studies

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2010, no.39, pp.26-56, 2010 (Released:2012-06-20)

著者

光吉 淑江

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2005, no.34, pp.133-145, 2005 (Released:2010-05-31)

---

This article examines how Soviet maternalist policies were implemented in Western Ukraine, a newly acquired Soviet territory in the wake of the Second World War. While the 1944 Soviet Family Code, especially the campaign for “Mothers with Many Children, ” has often been seen as the culmination of the Stalinist pronatalist policies-virtually encouraging extramarital affairs in order to produce children-, its meaning, perception, and methods of implementation were not uniform even in the authoritarian Soviet society. A close examination of the archival documents on the newly created women's departments in the Western Ukrainian party committees reveals that the “Mothers with Many Children” campaign and other state maternal supports served to justify otherwise extremely unpopular Soviet policies in the region. The essentialized gender role of “mother” was a rare measure of Sovietization that did not require special skills, training, or political education, and therefore would not have caused much resistance, bloodshed, or even hesitation. The Western Ukrainian women often quickly learnt how to exercise their new rights in defence of their lives in order to survive the difficult postwar material situation, thus becoming important, if not active, agents in the establishment of the Soviet regime in the region.

著者

小崎 晃義

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2002, no.31, pp.107-122, 2002 (Released:2010-05-31)

参考文献数

20

---

It is well acknowledged that Russian Federation's radical economic transition policy, the so-called ‘shock therapy’, caused deep economic depression. In the early 1990's Russia suffered a catastrophic decline in GDP, industrial production, and living standards, which was accompanied by an acute expansion of income disparity and mass involuntary unemployment.The shock therapy, however, caused a greater damage in the social aspects of Russian people. The magnitude of this shock is graver than the phrase ‘painful change’ suggests, which was an expression often used by Russian political leaders. All aspects of society have been affected, including the health care and condition of the population. Above all, the most significant consequence is the rapid decline in number of population and life expectancy, caused by sharp rise of mortality during the early 1990's.What is the main reason for the significant number of premature deaths in Russia for this period? It is generally believed that there are three possible hypotheses: decline in living standard, degeneration of health care system and destruction of the environment. All these hypotheses seem to be plausible. However, it is also clear that there is some evidence to disprove each one of them.This article tries to find the most plausible cause to explain the rapid rise of mortality in Russia during the early 1990's and to reveal the social background of this phenomenon.Many factors appear to be operating simultaneously, including economic and social instability, high rates of tobacco and alcohol consumption, depression, and deterioration of the health care system. Nevertheless, ‘adaptation syndrome’ from the physical and psychological stresses of shock therapy is the most important cause.

著者

久保 慶一

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2002, no.31, pp.73-90, 2002 (Released:2010-05-31)

参考文献数

37

---

In the Dayton Agreement, the engagement of the international community in Bosnia was originally supposed to last only for a year and to come to a close after the elections in 1996, turning over the responsibilities to the new governments. In reality, however, the international community has been continuing, or even intensifying its engagement after the general elections. Why has the international community continued its engagement? As an answer to this question, the present article points out that the elections and the establishment of new governments have not resulted in the autonomous political stability in Bosnia, but actually lead to the political instability. The present paper attempts to demonstrate it by examining the Bosnian case from two viewpoints: (1) stateness problem, and (2) problems with the institutionalization of ethnic power-sharing.The stateness problem occurs when “there are profound differences about the territorial boundaries of the political community's state and profound differences as to who has the right of citizenship in that state.” As Linz and Stepan pointed out, democracy is impossible until the stateness problem is resolved. In Bosnian case, the stateness problem occurred in 1991-1992 when Muslims and Croats wanted the independence of Bosnia, while Serbs opposed it and attempted to secede from Bosnia in order to join the Third Yugoslavia. Even though the Dayton Agreement achieved a compromise, it was far from the resolution of the stateness problem. The differences of the conceptions of the state persisted even after the Dayton Agreement, especially between Bosniaks and Serbs. This is one reason why the elections have not lead to the political stability in Bosnia, since the ethnic parties continued to be elected to the public offices, and they kept putting the stateness problem on the political agenda.Another reason why the elections have not lead to the political stability is related to the institutionalization of the ethnic power-sharing in Bosnia. In Bosnia, the political system based on the consociational model was introduced by the Dayton Agreement, acknowledging the three ethnic groups as “constituent nations” and introducing equal representation and mutual veto system of these nations. However, the introduction of a consociational type of ethnic power-sharing has not lead to the political stability in Bosnia, firstly because it has led to the ineffectiveness of the political system, and secondly because it has given centrifugal incentives to the politicians, inducing them to act as a representative of their respective ethnic group and to take a tough stance against representatives of other ethnic groups.These are two reasons why the elections have not lead to the autonomous political stability in Bosnia. This is why the international community has been continuing its engagement: it has been necessary to secure a minimum stability for Bosnia. In order for Bosnia to achieve the autonomous political stability, the two problems pointed out in the present article must be resolved. It remains to be seen whether - and how -the resolution of these two problems would be possible.

著者

亀山 郁夫

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2001, no.30, pp.40-54, 2001 (Released:2010-05-31)

参考文献数

29

---

This paper aims to trace the descent of ‘enthusiasm’ in the twentieth century Russian cultural history as well as understand the Totalitarianism under the Stalinist authority and its consequences in the late twentieth century. In doing so, we started by categorizing the concept of ‘enthusiasm’ into the ‘earth-grounded type’ and the ‘authority-oriented type’.The mainstream symbolist movement in the early twentieth century Russian culture obtained an eschatological tendency under the influence of Sorov'yov's school. Later, Ivanov opened up a way to the Primitivist movement by recognizing the role of ‘symbol’ within the Dionysian integration. Such is an example of the ‘grounded’ type of enthusiasm.Nourishing on such enthusiasm, the Russian avant-garde art movement blossomed. After the Russian revolution, the Russian avant-garde art, through artist such as Mayakovsky and Meierhold, realised the enthusiasm in both directions. On the other hand, there were artists such as Eisenstein who attempted to integrate to the Stalinist authority by deploying an anthoropological imagination, even though tending towards the ‘earth-grounded’ enthusiasm.The era of the ‘Thaw’ was also the era in which the spirit of integration (sobornost') originated in the Russian Orthodox tradition flourished. But since Stalin's death the centripetal force of enthusiasm was lost. The process of anti-Stalinism failed to realise the regression towards world history, and caused the new era of closure called ‘the post-Utopean era’. The characteristic of ‘informal culture’ which existed between the ‘Thaw’ and the Breshnev era is understood as the movement attempting to overcome the Stalinist influence through intense sophistication of the concept of ‘distance’.Even though the Soviet socialist declined through the influence of high-tech revolution in the Western Europe, the recent Postmodernists devise Russian history with the concept of ‘emptiness (pustota) ’, identifying Russia as the state of simulation without reference. Such Postmodernists attempt to harmonize with the Totalitarianism, but at the same time seek for a way to overcome Stalinism as they skillfully attempt to secretly innovate the rigid dichotomous framework.

著者

神山 孝夫

出版者

大阪外国語大学

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13431382)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.5, pp.1-43, 2001-03

---

The aim of the present paper is to propose a new view on the development which the Proto-Indo-European (IE) so-called syllabic liquid is assumed to have gone through in the Slavic branch. It challenges the widely accepted one, originated from Miklosich and having been authorized since Leskien's Handbuch. In the last stage of the IE linguistic unity its phonological system contained the syllabic liquid, which was not preserved principally in any branch of the linguistic family in question, and which, as a rule, developed a secondary anaptyctic vowel so that the syllabicity of the liquid could be avoided. The earliest stage of the Slavic prehistory (Proto-Slavic: PS) employed a close vowel, i or u, before the ex-syllabic liquid, which process is basically common to Baltic and Germanic as well. Just before the break-up of the Slavic linguistic unity (Common Slavic: CS) the sequence developed into "reduced vowel jer (b/b)+liquid (r/l)" in the traditional notation. Old Church Slavic (OCS) reflex of the sequence, when it is situated between consonants, is spelt "r/l+b/b", which was supposed to be realized phonetically as a syllabic liquid again. This idea was first uttered by Miklosich in 1850, but seems to be generally misunderstood and attributed to the leading Junggrammatiker Leskien, under whose authority it has been accepted by the absolute majority of scholars since his influential work Handbuch came out. But, we dare say, the generally accepted phonetic realization of the OCS sequence is far from probable, in that, above all, it must presuppose an ad hoc loss of jers exclusively in this position, and, furthermore, OCS has another set of sequences which are equally noted as "r/l+b/b", but directly continue the IE sequences "r/l+i/u", thus must be read just as they are written, i.e. "liquid+vowel". It is by no means imaginable that such a strict orthographic system of OCS should have permitted the same notational sequence to correspond to two completely different phonetic realizations. Occam's razor would tell us here that it is far more probable to posit that OCS applied metathesis, triggered by the law of the open syllable, in the sequence in question, which thus must have been pronounced as it is written. And, what is more, it holds true regardless of its origin: stemming from the IE syllabic liquid or not. This development is assumed to be common not only to all of the south Slavic languages, but also to Slovak and, to some extent, Czech, whereas the others to the north (Russian, Polish, etc.) did not experience this process and finally lived with the closed syllable in "jer+liquid" which was left behind in the earlier syllable opening processes. The author has come to this conclusion independently, but feels encouraged because it turns out that this view is also shared virtually with such brilliant scholars as Schleicher, Sakhmatov, Martinet, Brauer and Cekman. Provided that the above mentioned reasoning is plausible, we can conclude in addition that the law of the open syllable expired considerably earlier than the loss of jers in Slavic linguistic history.

著者

光吉 淑江

出版者

The Japanese Association for Russian and East European Studies

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

no.34, pp.133-145, 2005

---

This article examines how Soviet maternalist policies were implemented in Western Ukraine, a newly acquired Soviet territory in the wake of the Second World War. While the 1944 Soviet Family Code, especially the campaign for "Mothers with Many Children, " has often been seen as the culmination of the Stalinist pronatalist policies-virtually encouraging extramarital affairs in order to produce children-, its meaning, perception, and methods of implementation were not uniform even in the authoritarian Soviet society. A close examination of the archival documents on the newly created women's departments in the Western Ukrainian party committees reveals that the "Mothers with Many Children" campaign and other state maternal supports served to justify otherwise extremely unpopular Soviet policies in the region. The essentialized gender role of "mother" was a rare measure of Sovietization that did not require special skills, training, or political education, and therefore would not have caused much resistance, bloodshed, or even hesitation. The Western Ukrainian women often quickly learnt how to exercise their new rights in defence of their lives in order to survive the difficult postwar material situation, thus becoming important, if not active, agents in the establishment of the Soviet regime in the region.

著者

前⽥ しほ

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.50, pp.21-41, 2021 (Released:2022-06-11)

参考文献数

47

---

This paper discusses female allegorical statues, that is, Motherland and the Lamenting Mother, as Soviet monuments and memorials about the German-Soviet War of the Second World War. In general, we do not meet female citizens in public monuments because modern nations purge women from public spaces to private areas, that is, family spaces. Instead of individual women, they use images of allegorical women, for example, the Archaic goddess Nike/Victoria as a symbol of an imagined community and Marianne in the French Republic.In Soviet war monumental/memorial space, we meet such a symbolic gender structure: Red Army soldiers and allegorical females. In this case, we consider the Archaic goddess featured in Motherland and the Lamenting Mother statue. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, in the process of restructuring war memorial spaces, newborn nations have removed male statues, for example, Lenin, revolutionists, politicians, generals, academicians, artists, and Red Army soldiers, which commemorate great Soviet hegemony. In contrast, female allegory stays in public spaces even today because female unindividual statues are an empty medium that can introject any concept.It was found from the result of fieldwork in the former Soviet Union that Motherland, which has occupied a position as national symbol in the Russian Federation, has lost power to unite nation and people. In fact, the Motherland statue had not been built in Estonia, Lithuania, Azerbaijan, or Central Asia. Regarding Latvia, Moldova, Belarus, and Georgia, we meet small-size variants. On the other hand, Lamenting Mother statues, who mourn for the war dead, have been raised in the whole country, even today. Local communities find space to share the pain of loss of relations and friends, homes, property, and life, in memorials in the shape of the Lamenting Mother, who is similar to the Holy Mother.We are here concerned with the implications of social and cultural context of these two female allegories. In the first chapter, we focus on the period of Khrushchev. Stalin had oppressed all war memory and, after his death, people began to narrate personal experiences about war and build memorials for the dead in burial places. We cannot find a clear distinction in early female allegory statues. The 20th anniversary of the Victory, that is, the year 1965, brought a fundamental change in war memorial-commemoration spaces. In those days, Nike-type statues were raised as national symbols to unite the nation and people, such as The Motherland Calls at the top of Mamai Hill to commemorate the Battle of Stalingrad. In the second and third chapters, we illustrate distribution, location, size, shape of Motherland and Lamenting Mother statues in detail. Next, in the fourth chapter, we classify Lamenting Mother statues according to type of icons of the Holy Mother: Eleusa, Pieta, Our Lady of Sorrows, and Orans. We consider that the cult of the “Lamenting Mother” is based on the faith of the Holy Mother. Next, we surmise that early Christianity had united the faith of the Holy Mother with the cult of local great mothers in the course of Christian religion in Europe. Similarly, Islam assimilated local great mothers in Central Asia. It is possible that Soviet people, including Muslims, had a basis for accepting the Soviet secularized Holy Mother. And, finally, we examine threat factors inherent in the Lamenting Mother-type statue.