著者
中橋 誠
出版者
日本倫理学会
雑誌
倫理学年報 (ISSN:04830830)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.67, pp.163-174, 2018

Heidegger's term <i>Eigentlichkeit</i> is generally translated into <i>authenticity</i>. This translation often leads us to the assumption that there is something authentic. But Heidegger uses this term to express human <i>Dasein</i>'s modus. He says <i>Dasein</i> is to be grasped through <i>how Dasein</i> is, contrasted with other entities which are grasped through <i>what</i> they are. This means that <i>Dasein</i> is always variable and has no regular modus, including an authentic one. This being taken into consideration, the conclusion is drawn that <i>authenticity</i> is inappropriate to express <i>Eigentlichkeit</i>.<br> The term <i>Eigentlichkeit</i> in the thought of Heidegger is chosen "in a strict sense". The sense of this term lies in <i>eigen</i>, which is <i>own</i> in the primary meaning. Following this, we should translate <i>Eigentlichkeit</i> into <i>own-ness</i> or <i>ownedness</i>(<i>eigen</i>, i. e. <i>own</i> is the past participle in its origin). This translation matches with the way <i>Dasein</i> exists; <i>Dasein</i> exists in a modus in each case, which means that <i>Dasein owns</I> his or her temporary modus in each case. <i>Eigentlichkeit</i> is <i>owned</i> by <i>Dasein</i> in each case. Therefore, Dasein can lose <i>Eigentlichkeit</i> in each case, <i>Dasein</i> can be in its negation(<i>Uneigentlichkeit</i>) in each case.<br> The above matches also with the definition of <i>Eigentlichkeit</i> and <i>Uneigentlichkeit</i>. They are both based on the fact that <i>Dasein</i> is in general determined by <i>mineness-in-each-case</i>(<i>Jemeinigkeit</i>). <i>Dasein</i> is always concerned about whether <i>Eigentlichkeit</i> is <i>owned</i> or not.<br> Heidegger regards the business of philosophy as the preservation of the power of the most elemental words. Otherwise, the words would be flattened by the common understanding and levelled off to that unintelligibility which functions in turn as a source of illusory problems. This is true specifically of the term <i>Eigentlichkeit</i>.
著者
木村 史人
出版者
日本倫理学会
雑誌
倫理学年報 (ISSN:04830830)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.67, pp.175-188, 2018

In <i>Being and Time</i>(<i>Sein und Zeit</i>), Martin Heidegger points out that the personality of a person who is aware of their mortality is individualistic, and they seem not to have relationships with others. By contrast, in <i>The Human Condition</i>(<i>Vita activa oder Vom tätigen Leben</i>), Hanna Arendt emphasizes the relations between others as "action"(Handeln).<br> In this article, I first of all endeavor to compare the "being-with"(<i>Mitsein</i>)in <i>Being and Time</i> with the "action" in <i>The Human Condition</i>, and from there attempt to reinterpret the <i>Dasein</i> as a performer of the action. This argument indicates that we are "with" others precisely in actions involved in unpredictable possibilities.<br> Secondly, I focus on authenticity, which is disclosed when the <i>Dasein</i> is anticipating death and the existential structure of our "who" is revealed. It would appear that "individualization" and "no relation" negate being with others in the world, but this existential metamorphosis into authenticity is our transformation into <i>Dasein</i> as a performer of action in the world with others through our becoming aware that we are each a unique "who" who cannot be defined in the world.<br> Death as the most extreme possibility is neither a predictable possibility nor an unpredictable possibility on the line that extends from the present into the future, but it shows that we ourselves are beings with potential in the sense of making these possibilities.<br> By clearly showing the relationship between authenticity and the performer of the "action", I endeavor to point out that the thoughts of Heidegger and Arendt are not opposing, but rather complement each other. Finally, this article shows that it is precisely because plural "whos" who are the most unique "beings with potential" when anticipating death face each other that actions have the characteristics of newness and initiative as if they were a "second birth."
著者
佐々木 正寿
出版者
日本倫理学会
雑誌
倫理学年報 (ISSN:04830830)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.67, pp.189-202, 2018

In der heutigen Zeit der Wissenschaft und Technologie bewegen wir uns überall und vor allem mit dem Prinzip der Nützlichkeit. Heideggers Betrachtung in seinem Vortrag „Die Frage nach der Technik" zufolge wird der Mensch in der Struktur der modernen Technik ausschließlich dazu herausgefordert, das Wirkliche als „Bestand", d. h. Nützliches, zu bestellen. In der Struktur der modernen Technik wird das Wirkliche immer bloß als „Bestand" entborgen. Demgemäß hat der Mensch in der Struktur der modernen Technik keine andere Möglichkeit der Entbergung mehr, und er würde dann die Möglichkeit verlieren, sein eigenes Wesen zu erkennen, wonach er eigentlich zum Entbergen gehört. Darin hat Heidegger die Gefahr der modernen Technik aufgezeigt, und gerade dort hat er aber in der Kunst, vor allem im Dichterischen, eine Möglichkeit des „Rettenden" angedeutet.<br> Der heideggerschen Erläuterung der Dichtung Hölderlins zufolge wird das Seiende in der Dichtung durch die dichterische Nennung mit dem wesentlichen Wort erst zu dem ernannt, was es ist. Mit anderen Worten: In der Dichtung wird das Seiende mit dem wesentlichen Wort als das Seiende enthüllt. Dieses Wesen der Dichtung hat, meiner Interpretation nach, der Haiku-Dichter Matsuo Basho schon früher verstanden und selber in solcher Weise Haiku-Gedichte verfaßt. Auch bei ihm zeigt sich die Dichtung qua poiēsis, wie Heidegger gesprochen hat, als die Entbergung, d. h. die Erkenntnis der Wahrheit der Natur.<br> In diesem Sinne könnte die Dichtung gerade im Zeitalter der modernen Technik zur Rehabilitierung der vielfältigen Möglichkeiten der Entbergung beitra gen. Vom heideggerschen Gesichtspunkt her würde die Dichtung also uns den Menschen dazu erwecken, die „Unverborgenheit" des Seienden zu hüten. Demnach dürfte man in der Dichtung eine Möglichkeit des „Rettenden" im Zeitalter der modernen Technik anerkennen.
著者
濵田 洋輔
出版者
日本倫理学会
雑誌
倫理学年報 (ISSN:04830830)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.67, pp.233-246, 2018

This paper aims to contribute to the research into the philosophy̶in particular, the ethics̶of Arnold Gehlen: one of the most famous representatives of "philosophical anthropology." At the same time, it endeavors to make a contribution, albeit slight, to ethics in general by critically analyzing his ethics. Because the meaning and problems of Gehlen's ethics cannot be fully understood without knowledge of the main point of his philosophical anthropology̶that is, his fundamental view of the human being̶this paper first discusses this view and then proceeds to explore his ethics. In the first part, I explain Gehlen's belief that, unlike all other species, the human being is independent from(almost)all biological instincts and is consequently the totally cultural(non-biological)being. In this part, I also explain that this belief cannot be supported from the perspective of modern biology(evolutionary theory). In the second part, I illuminate that, in contradiction to his fundamental view of man, Gehlen's pluralistic ethics takes biological components into consideration. I demonstrate at the same time that, besides this theoretically problematic contradiction, there are many other problems in his ethics: unclear and inconsistent explanations of four fundamental moral principles, contradictory arguments about the sharp antagonism between the moral principle of institution(state)and the morality of the Enlightenment(which promotes some other moral principles), etc. Finally, I argue that, in spite of all these problems, Gehlen's ethics has at least one advantage over the ethics of philosophers such as Habermas and Honneth, who criticize his ethics on many points: in contrast to the latter ethics, Gehlen's ethics admits and is open to a certain meaning of biological(evolutionary)elements in our social and moral life̶a meaning that seems to be undeniable in light of modern biology(modern evolutionary theory).