著者

松井 洋子

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.118, no.2, pp.177-212, 2009-02-20

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After the Dutch Factory was moved from Hirado to Deshima in 1641, there are three known cases in which its members brought women to Japan. In this article the author examines these cases in order to reconsider the popular notion that foreign women were banned from Japan during the Edo period. The first case dates from 1661, when the newly appointed governor and the Dutch residents of Fort Keelung, situated in the northern part of Formosa, evacuated with their families and servants when the island was attacked by Cheng Ch'engkung. There were about 30 women among them, and they were all permitted to land on Deshima without problems. They stayed until the departure of the ships bound for Batavia. Two babies were born and baptized during that time, and one couple was married. This case leads us to conclude that neither the Japanese nor the Dutch thought that foreign women were prohibited from coming to Japan. The second case involved Mrs. Jan Cock Blomhoff, who accompanied her husband, the newly appointed chief factor, to Japan in 1817 along with their son, nurse, and maids. The Governor of Nagasaki at first permitted them to come ashore, but after further consultation with higher ranking officials in Edo, he refused the women and the son permission to stay in Japan. Mrs. Blomhoff did not give up, however, and tried to petition herself, but was rejected, with governor confirming that the wives of Dutch and Chinese traders were prohibited from accompanying their husbands, due to the lack of a precedent. The third case relates to a Dutch clerk, De Villeneuve, who was accompanied by his wife in 1829. The Dutch Governor-General in Batavia had allowed him to take his wife, notwithstanding the prohibition of 1817. The Japanese authorities immediately refused her entry and ordered the chief factor to accurately inform his superiors about this prohibition once again. These three cases lead the author to conclude that foreign women were first banned from entering Japan in 1817, but that the Dutch did not adequately understand the prohibition until 1829 and argue the necessity to reconsider the process of issuance, transmission and implementation of orders concerning foreigners by Japanese authorities during the Edo period.

著者

松方 冬子

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.114, no.9, pp.一四九七-一五二八, 2005-09-20

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This article focuses on the letter sent by Willem II, king of the Netherlands, to the Japanese shogun in August 1844, in order to reconsider if its aim was really "to recommend the opening of Japan", as conventionally thought. The author examines the decision-making process within the Dutch government before sending the king's letter and concludes that the main inducement for sending the letter was to gauge the issuance of a new decree in 1842. They wanted to find out if the Bakufu intended to abandon its seclusion policy totally or to make only minor concessions. The second purpose was to make a breakthrough in traditional Japanese-Dutch relations through the authorities in Nagasaki. The Dutch government knew that information could be lost or censored before it reached the highest levels in Edo, because of many intermediaries between the Dutch chief factor in Nagasaki and the Bakufu. At that time, the Netherland was facing a fiscal crisis resulting primarily from the loss of revenue that followed Belgian independence in 1830. Thus the Dutch government resigned itself to dispatch of a special envoy to Japan on fisial grounds, and ordered the chief factor instead to do the mission. The author argues that the main points of the king's letter were to confirm if Bakufu officials understood the changing circumstances in East Asia, and to discern whether the Bakufu intended to open Japan to international trade. On the second point, the Dutch government clearly received a very distinct answer to its inquiry, which showed the sending of letter was successful for the Dutch government. The author is doubtful that the Dutch government expected the letter to help expand trade with Japan. It is because she found no mention of their urge to open Japan in the Dutch governmental documents and because they did not provide any actual process for opening the country, for example a draft of a commercial treaty, in the king's letter itself. Apparently, the letter carried advice to open Japan, but it was only as an expedient to avoid armed conflict supposedly with Great Britain, which seemed to attempt commercial relationship with Japan next China after the Opium War. The Dutch government in fact did not want such new relations between Japan and Western powers, and valued the Bakufu's answer as a new permit for monopolizing the Japanese trade. Their attempt at direct communications beyond Nagasaki was not successful. The direct road to Edo was closed by the answer from the Bakufu councilors for the king's letter.

著者

坂口 太郎

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.122, no.4, pp.459-497, 2013-04-20

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In recent years, particular attention has been drawn to the retired Emperor Go-Uda's 後宇多 promotion of esoteric Buddhism and it surrounding cultural and political environment as the staging ground for the "anomalous (igyo 異形) monarchical regime" of his son Emperor Go-Daigo 後醍醐. This paper discusses the relation between the Daikakuji 大覚寺 line of imperial descent and its "monzeki" 門跡 (Buddhist temples designated for tonsured members of the imperial family, also referred by the title of monzeki) during the late Kamakura and Kenmu 建武 Regime periods, by focusing on prince-monk Shoen 性円 (Go-Daigo's brother), who was chosen as the Daikakuji Monzeki. Little is known about the early life of Shoen, who is generally referred to as "Daikakuji-miya"; however, the author's investigation of yet unpublished historical sources place him at Yasui Monzeki 安井門跡 (Rengeko-In 蓮華光院), which was affiliated to the Ninnaji-Goryu 仁和寺御流 branch of Shingon Buddhism. Given the additional fact that Go-Uda originally planned to take control of Ninnaji-Goryu, the author concludes that Shoen's assumption of Yasui Monzeki was part of his father's overall religious policy. Then Go-Uda founded the Daikakuji Monzeki, providing it with proprietary estates and sub-temples, and transfered his son to Daikakuji, making Shoen his possible successor. The author also points out that in his struggle with Ninnaji, Go-Uda bestowed on Shoen the second highest princely rank and such imperial household treasures as the cintamani jewel. Moreover, in his later years Go-Uda repeatedly performed esoteric Buddhist rituals for the protection of the Daikakuji line, and had Shoen participate in them to train him for his future calling. After Go-Uda's death, Shoen became the abbot of Daikakuji, supporting Go-Daigo, who sent his own son Gosho 恒性 to serve as a priest at Daikakuji, and the fact that Gosho would later be banished to Etchu 越中 Province by the Kamakura Bakufu and then assassinated shows without a doubt that he was part of the plan to overthrow that military regime. Hence, it is likely that because of its control over a large number of proprietary estates, Go-Daigo depended heavily on the Daikakuji Monzeki in his plans to overthrow the Bakufu. As for Shoen during the Kenmu era, in addition to his performance of esoteric Buddhist rituals, he served as a general on the field of battle. Moreover, after the fall of the Kenmu regime, Shoen continued to serve the Southern Court. Since the publication of Amino Yoshihiko's seminal work on the period in question, the research has been focused on the Shingon priest Monkan 文観, in order to elucidate the religious aspects of Go-Daigo and his reign. However, if one considers the historical developments from the time of Go-Uda, it becomes clear, as this article shows, that it was not Monkan, but rather the Daikakuji Monzeki allying with the Daikakuji line of descent led by Shoen, which lent the primary support to Go-Daigo's regime from within the walls of Shingon Buddhism.

著者

棚橋 信明

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.98, no.8, pp.1436-1437, 1989-08-20

著者

佐々木 政文

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.124, no.4, pp.552-575, 2015-04-20

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The present article examines the implementation of Japan's mass state ideology indoctrination policy through Buddhist temples and Shinto shrines within the undercaste ghettos (hisabetsu buraku 被差別部落) of Nara Prefecture during the 1910s, in relation to changing trends in religious belief systems on the local level. The majority of residents of the ghettos of Nara Prefecture, which remained as segregated residential communities originally created for scheduled castes under the social stratification system instituted in the premoden age were traditionally adherents of the Jodo Shinshu 浄土真宗 sect of pure land Buddhism and thus were not deeply versed in beliefs regarding Shinto gods or particularly active in related festivals promoted by the Meiji state since the 1870s. In response to this adherence to Buddhist beliefs and ceremony, Nara Prefecture adopted, following the Russo-Japanese War, a Buraku Improvement Program, which attempted to strengthen adherence to state religious ideology through such projects as revising Pure Land millenarian beliefs emphasizing the afterlife, inculcating the concept of "shinzoku nitai" 真俗二諦 (there being no contradiction between following the teachings of the Buddha, while submitting to the secular authority of the Emperor), the elimination of special social status for Shinto shrine patrons (ujiko 氏子), the installation of Shinto altars in the home, universal allegiance to the national flag and the promotion of pilgrimages to the national Shinto shrines. The author analyzes the program's implementation as a process by which modern Japan's policy regarding the ideological indoctrination of its imperial subjects proactively attempted to mobilize local residents alienated from their traditional beliefs and modes of worship into the state's new system of ritual centered upon the new Shinto pantheon, stressing the divinity of the Emperor. At the same time, as the agents of its Buraku Improvement Program the Prefectural authorities attempted to enlist the Buddhist priests of local ghetto temples, which had been for centuries an integral part of the daily lives of local residents. The Program also called for these priests to promote the Prefecture's austerity program of frugality and increased household saving. These activities were hindered by the fact these same clerics were totally dependent on the local community for their livelihood, in accordance with the Buddhist vow of poverty (dana 檀). As anexample of this dilemma, the author cites the expectations expressed by ghetto community leaders who had formed the Yamato Doshikai 大和同志会 prefectural civil rights advancement association in 1912 that their communities' temples and priests would participate in the activities of the improvement program, while on the other hand condemning the temples as religious organizations economically exploiting their parishioners. It was during the First World War, in 1916, that Nara Prefecture's policy of state ideology indoctrination of ghetto residents began to include the introduction of Shinto shrines directly into ghetto communities ; for example, preparing designated sanctuaries on the grounds of existing temples, from which to worship Emperor Meiji from afar. This change in policy was an attempt to place the community leaders of each ghetto as the key enablers for local religious reform, in the search for a new set of beliefs by which to promote state ideology.

著者

上島 有

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.97, no.11, pp.1829-1868, 1936-1937, 1988-11-20

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Many attempts have been made to classify ancient and medieval documents written in Japanese. The method which best reflects the essential nature of the documents is classification according to the document style (様式). In Japan, the following document styles have been generally adopted : (1)Kushikiyo-monjo (公式様文書), (2)Kugeyo-monjo (公家様文書) and (3)Bukeyo-monjo (武家様文書). This method of classification corresponds to the three major political systems from ancient to medieval times, namely, (1)the Ritsuryo state (律令国家), (2)the aristocratic (Ocho) state (王朝国家) and (3)the warrior (Buke) political regime (武家政権). However, if we think of a particular document style as consisting of a common writing style (書式) and overall form, for example, not only do we find many differences between Kansenji (官宣旨) / Senji (宣旨) and Inzen (院宣) / Rinji (綸旨), which have been classified as Kugeyo-monjo (公家様文書), but we also fail to find any common features among these documents. The same is also true of documents classified under Bukeyo-monjo (武家様文書). Therefore, the author proposes that the following classification may be more. suitable : (1)Kushikiyo-monjo (公式様文書), (2)Kudashibumiyo-monjo (下文様文書) and (3)Shosatsuyo-monjo (書札様文書). The author attempts to confirm this point by investigating such aspects of writing style as (1)the sentence structure (文体), (2)the identification of the sender (差出書), (3)the name of the addressee (宛名), (4)the identification of official ranks (位署書) and (5)the method of signing the document (署名の仕方) ; such aspects of form as (6)the calligraphy style (書体), (7)how the paper is ornamented (紙面の飾り方), (8)the choice of paper type (料紙の使い方) and (9)how the sheets are pieced together (紙継目の固定の仕方) ; as well as such procedural practices as (10)the transmission of orders (遵行手続) and (11)rules for drafting the documents (書式作成手続規定). The classification proposed here corresponds to the division of the ancient and medieval state into (1)the Ritsuryo state (律令国家), (2)the early oligarchic (kenmon) state (前期権門国家) and (3)the later oligarchic state (後期権門国家).

著者

藤田 朋久

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.103, no.3, pp.442-443, 1994-03-20

著者

木村 秀海

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.94, no.1, pp.38-66, 127-126, 1985-01-20

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The aim of this paper is to clarify the fundamental structure of Western Chou bureaucracy by using Western Chou Bronze Inscriptions. After demonstrating that in Bronze Inscriptions we must interpret 〓 (original from of Chung 〓) as Tseng-i 増益, and 〓 (another from of Ching 京) as Kao 高, Ta 大 and 〓 (original from of She 歙) as Tsung-she 総摂 and Cheng-chang 正長, I reinterpret the Bronze Inscriptions and come to the conclusions as follows : 1.In the Western Chou period, there existed three government offices : Ching-shih-liao 卿事寮, Kung-tsu-liao 公族寮 and Ta-shih-liao 大史寮, and every bureaucrat belonged to one of them. 2.Ching-shih-liao was the government office of Royal Domains which took charge of political and military affairs of Iiu-shih 六〓 in Tsung-chou 宗周 and those of Pa-shih 八〓 in Cheng-chou 成周. This office also assumed the character of royal government which could issue military commands toward feudal vassals. The chief of this office was Ta-shih 大師 and the subchief was Hsiao-fu 小輔. This office had five lower offices : Ssu-tu 〓土, Ssu-ma 〓馬, Ssu-kung 〓工, Shih-shih 師氏 and Tsou-ma 走馬. Every office consisted of one chief and two subchiefs. All of them were attached to either Pa-shih or Liu-shih, one chief and one subchief to Liu-shih, and one subchief to Pa-shih. 3.Kung-tsu-liao was the office which took charge of the royal home management. This office was deeply connected with Ching-shih-liao through conveying the King's and Queen's orders, and conveying requests appeals of officials ranked higher than Shih-tai-fu 事大夫 to the King. The chief of this office was Ta-tsai 大宰, and the two subchiefs were Hsiao-tsais 小宰 under whom came Shan-fu 善夫. The Shan-fu organization consisted of one chief and two subchiefs. 4.Ta-shih-liao was the office of secretariats where close attendants of the King made drafts and kept documents. The chief of this office was Nei-shih-yin 内史尹 (Ta-shih 大史). He had two subchiefs, Tso-nei-shih 左内史 and Yu-nei-shih .右内史 5.In the middle of the Western Chou period, the names of the officials were changed as below. The earlier period of Western Chou Ta-pao (大保) Hu-chen (虎臣) Hsiao-chen (小臣) Tso-tse (作冊) The later period of Western Chou Ta-shih (大師) Tsou-ma (走馬) Shan-fu (善夫) Nei-shih (内史) 6.The Western Chou bureaucracy adopted the fief rank system other than the official rank system. The four fief ranks known by now were Ching-shih 卿士, Shih-tai-fu 事大夫, Ya-shih 亜事 and Lu 旅.

著者

井ノ口 哲也

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.120, no.9, pp.1569-1577, 2011-09-20

著者

青木 然

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.123, no.11, pp.1929-1968, 2014-11-20

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This article studies the perceptions of Korea and China among the people in Japan during the latter part of the 19th century. The antecedent research has explained that the people had become to transfer their own sense of inferiority to their East Asian neighbors, whose Westernization had been stagnant, and disdained them because the people's opposition to Westernization had been crushed by means of the suppression of the revolt. This interpretation ignores the contradictory situation of a nation of people unable to internally resolve their own opposition to Western culture, while looking down on other nations based on those same Western standards. In order to show the way such a contradiction was dealt with in the Japanese mass consciousness, this article takes up the popular entertainment, especially kodan (講談), the Japanese traditional storytelling, to extract the Japanese people's understanding of Western culture and their hopes represented by the images of Korea and China on a deeper level than what was expressed in rebellion. In presenting the evidence, the author attempts to clarify the features of narrative of the popular entertainment in order to interpret its depiction of Korea and China in terms of popular understanding by focusing on the mentality of popular entertainment, as well as the changes of national entertainment policy, trends and social contexts. In concrete terms, the author identifies two conflicting types of narration in popular entertainment at the time: the satirical style that originated on the urban scene during the late Edo period and the oratorical style, which first appeared during the 1880s, against a backdrop of increasing migration from the countryside into the cities. In the performances taking up such events of the early 1880s as the Imo Incident (July 1882) in Seoul, Korea and the Sino-French War (1884-85), we find satirical narrative showed its twisted sympathies with "obstinateness" of the forces of resistance in both countries and ridiculing the shallow Westernized behavior of the Japanese people. On the other hand, when dealing with the 1st Sino-Japanese War, the oratorical style pours invective and abuse upon the Chinese, while the satirical performances objectified them and counteract with words of sympathy for the Koreans and Chinese. In the presence of such conflicting narrative styles, the Japanese people became aware of Korea and China not only as scapegoats for its own oppression, but also as a means of escaping from the constant anxiety of being confined within the limits of the Western code of civilized behavior. However, the difficulty in confronting the fallacy of its civilized self-image became expressed in the Japanese people's hesitation to empathize with its Korean and Chinese counterparts. Such a way of adopting Western civilization, which skillfully grants dispensation from self-denial, can be called, in the opinion of the author, one of the "privileges" accorded the masses living under imperial rule.

著者

水野 智之

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.106, no.10, pp.1791-1817, 1997-10-20

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In the present paper, the author attempts to clarify the process by which the family pedigrees (Kamon 家門) of aristocrats (kuge-shu 公家衆) were confirmed (ando 安堵) by the Muromachi shogunate, in order tb investigate the relationship between the shogun and the emperor during the period. First, the author focuses on the Muromachi shogunate from the regime of Ashikaga Takuji to that of Yoshiakira and examines the significance of the shogun confirming the status of main family (honke 本家) and concludes that such certification was not on the same level as chiten-no-kimi 治天の君 confirmations, which included the element of vassalage, but rather was carried out in order to quell rebellion and disputes within the warrior class. The author then turns to the question of how the shogun got involved in confirming the pedigrees of aristocratic families. He states that during the Northern and Southern Court period such confirmation was made by the emberor; however, from the Kanno era (1350-52), opinions on such matters submitted to the emperor by the Muromachi shogun (buke shisso 武家執奏) came to exert more and more influence on obtaining aristocratic status. Such actions were designed to bring the aristocracy into service to the shogunate. The author then focuses on the regime of Ashikaga yoshimitsu, in order to shed light on the process leading up to the shogun's confirmation of aristocratic pedigree. In this sense Yoshimitsu's shogunate can be divided into three periods. During the early and middle years of the regime, aristocrats sought confirmation of their proprietorships from Yoshimitsu on a personal basis, and this tendency strengthened during the later years of the regime. In. an investigation of the background and significance of shogunal confirmation of aristocratic families, the author sites that in the case of Yoshimitsu, 1) very cordial relationships exited between the atistocracy and the shogun, 2) it was a time when pedigree inheritance within aristocratic families has become unstable, and 3) confirmation was granted via personal liege to Yoshimitsu. Finally, the author views the period spanning the shogunates of Ashikaga Yoshimochi and Yoshimasa, in order to examine further developments in shogunal confirmation of aristocratic pedigree. During this period, confirmation would be granted either by the shogun in conjunction with the emperor or by the emperor alone. As to the relationship between the shogun and emperor under this state of affairs, the role played by Yoshimitsu in maintaining and recognizind aristocratic pedigree was gradually transferred to the emperor, as the shogun's function became limited to confirming proprietary rights related to aristocratic pedigree.

著者

坂口 太助

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.119, no.10, pp.1718-1742, 2010-10-20

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Japan lost more than eighty percent of its vessels during the Pacific War (1941-1945), mostly due to submarine attacks. These massive losses caused not only the interruption of maritime communications, but also greatly contributed to the collapse of the Japan economy. Within the research to date, it has been pointed out that the Imperial Japanese Navy did not establish a command dedicated to protecting maritime communications until November 1943, leading to the conclusion that the prime cause of the massive losses was the Navy's focus on front line battles rather than protecting maritime communications. However, the author of this article argues that this research has not paid enough attention to the process by which the General Escort Command was formed and proceeds to reexamine that process and the Navy's response to the maritime communications issue through the perceptions of the Japanese government and Imperial Army. The number of vessels lost between December 1941 and March 1943 exceeded the prewar estimate. However, many of these losses were sustained in transport operations to the front; and the number of vessels destroyed by submarine attack while transporting resources back to the homeland was below expectations. Lacking one large fleet like an escort command at that time, the response of the Navy to Allied submarines was to assign groups of smaller units to each area. Rather than submarine attacks, it was the situation at the front that was more closely related to the loss of vessels, due to requisitions by both the Navy and the Army for vessels to replace ships lost at the front. The author argues that this was the main factor in the decrease of vessels available for transporting resources. The government, Army and Navy all attached their highest priorities to establishing dominance at the front and the promotion of building new ships. After the Allied Forces' counteroffensive and the commercial destruction being caused by submarines became more and more evident, the Navy decided to review its organization for protecting maritime communications and consequently established the General Escort Command to control existing units. According to the trends of vessel loss during the war, it is clear that organizing a special command had not been necessary until the spring of 1943. Therefore, the author concludes that the focus on the front did not necessarily mean slighting maritime communications and that the Navy responded to the issue at the appropriate time.

著者

平井 上総

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.118, no.4, pp.576-589, 2009-04-20

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This article attempts a textual criticism of the Chosokabe Motochika Shikimoku (hereafter Keicho Shikimoku) purported to have been promulgated in Tosa Province during the Toyotomi Hideyoshi regime in the second year of Keicho (1597). The article begins with a comparison between Chosokabe family institutions and the content of the Keicho Shikimoku, by focusing on a set of provincial-wide bylaws (Chosokabe-shi Okitegaki) promulgated during that same time. The comparison reveals marked differences between the two documents in both wording and institutional arrangements. The author concludes that the content of the Keicho Shikimoku conflicts with Chosokabe family custom in many ways. Next, a comparison is made between the Keicho Shikimoku and the legal codes promulgated by the Yamauchi family for it Tosa Han fief during the Tokugawa Period, revealing similarities between the two documents in both content and form. The author concludes that the so-called "Keicho Shikimoku" was not a legal code of the Chosokabes, but must have been compiled after the formation of Tosa Han sometime during the 17^<th> century or after. In order to pinpoint the date of compilation, the author compares the Keicho Shikimoku with revisions made in the Tosa Han legal codes between Kan'ei 18 (1641) and Genroku 3 (1690), and discovers that the greatest similarity occurs with respect to the revisions made in Kanbun 3 (1663). Moreover, the fact that the Keicho Shikimoku prohibition on samurai attending dance performances and sumo wrestling tournaments reflects the actual situation during the several years following Kanbun 3 also suggests that the 1663 legal code for Tosa Han was its source. As to the reason why the Keicho Shikimoku was written, the author argues that it was an attempt by local samurai facing extinction in the midst of the political upheaval that occurred in Tosa during Kanbun 3 to reinforce their legitimacy by emphasizing historical ties to the Chosokabe family. The author concludes that the Keicho Shikimoku was a fictitious legal code modeled after legal codes in force in Tosa Han during the late 17^<th> century and shows that the Chosokabe family did not use the phrase "ichiryo gusoku" 一領具足 (allowing cultivators to arm themselves; later how local samurai-cultivators referred to themselves) in any of the legal codes it promulgated or any official document it issued, indicating that ichiryo gusoku was merely a popular phrase, not an official legal institution.

著者

桑野 聡

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.114, no.1, 2005-01-20

著者

水上 たかね

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.122, no.11, pp.1876-1902, 2013-11-20

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When selecting capable personnel to man its Army and Navy, both of which were founded during the last years of that regime, the attribute known as "wazamae" 業前, meaning certain rare and desirable skills, was a key point for the Tokugawa Bakufu. Although there has been previous research on personnel selection, an analysis of the actual situation, particularly actual cases among the lower ranks, has been lacking due to limited historical materials. Furthermore, the situation of the Navy is not as well understood as that of the Army. Therefore, in this article, the author examines the actual conditions under which naval officers were appointed by utilizing the documents formerly stored in tamonyagura 多聞櫓 (the battlement enclosures) of Edo Castle. The article begins with an analysis of the changes that took place in the posts held by naval officers and the way in which appointments were made according to their social status. Methods differing from the norm were adopted in the case of lower ranking officers, putting great emphasis on "wazamae," regardless of individual social or family status and hereditary stipend. These methods made it possible for capable people to play important roles in the Navy, while minimizing changes in social status and expenditures. However, the Navy was not satisfied with these methods and attempted to grant social status and privileges appropriate to their officers' "wazamae" and assigned duties. Next, the author considers the ideas of both the Navy and the Bakufu's central authority during the Keio 慶応 era (1865-68) concerning "meshidashi" 召出 (lit. to summon; but also meaning to grant fiefs or stipends as reward for being taken into the service of the shogun) held by the sons and brothers of direct Bakufu retainers and indirect vassals (baishin 陪臣) demonstrating exceptional "wazamae". Despite the Navy's hope to employ their new personnel selection method, an obstacle existed based on the principle that the recipient of such a fief or stipend served the shogun as the head of a "family" in accordance with that family's status and hereditary stipend. Therefore, while the Navy continued to request that their officers receive meshidashi, the grants were controlled by the Bakufu's central authority, in particular, through restrictions against forming branches of direct retainer families. This occurred against a backdrop of the expansion of departments requiring "wazamae" and the establishment of shared precedents regarding appointments and promotions. Finally, the author takes up reforms in the naval officer personnel system carried out after the battle of Toba-Fushimi. Although the reforms were epoch-making in basing appointments upon "wazamae" rather than family status, the gap between the treatment of the heads of direct retainer families and that of other members was not easily bridged. Even after the reforms at the end of the Tokugawa period dismantled Japan's premodern military system, the warrior class continued to exist firmly upon the basis of the traditional "ie" 家 (family) institution.

著者

高林 陽展

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.120, no.4, pp.461-495, 2011-04-20

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This article offers a historical account of "mental hygiene" in England between 1890 and 1930, based on medical journals, newspapers and parliamentary publications, in order to document the process by which medico-political ideas and practice for the prevention of mental disease were established. Mental hygiene has been widely linked with the negative aspect of social exclusion, as seen in the persecution of the mentally disabled under the Nazi regime. However, it is a little known fact that the science of mental hygiene also aimed to increase mental productivity through preventive measures. In England, during the period in question, psychiatrists promoted programs for the "early treatment of mental diseases". "Early treatment" here specifically refers to the establishment of more accessible psychiatric facilities on an outpatient basis and a voluntary admission system, both of which were expected to encourage more people to use psychiatric services. In terms of the published discourse surrounding the subject of "early treatment", the author argues that books and articles were written and disseminated not only to maintain mental health for the sake of national productivity, but also to serve and strengthen the professional interests of psychiatrists, who had been forced to work under competitive market conditions due to the 1890 Lunacy Act. In this latter sense, the subject of mental hygiene became a verbal instrument for protecting the rights of members of the profession to earn a living.

著者

村上 司樹

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.118, no.6, pp.1210-1219, 2009-06-20

著者

松丸 道雄

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.104, no.12, pp.2093-2095, 1995-12-20

著者

中島 圭一

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.102, no.12, pp.2073-2105, 2220-2221, 1993-12-20

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Le shidosen est le plus important des systemes de credit administres par les temples durant l'epoque de Muromachi. Il se distingue par un taux d'interet exceptionnellement bas et par la securite de ses creances qui ne peuvent etre prescrites meme en cas de tokusei (徳政). Le shidosen est essentiellement une caisse alimentee par les dons de croyants du zen desireux qu'on celebre apres leur mort un office pour leur ame tous les ans ou tous les mois, et ce jusqu'a la fin des temps. A cette fin, il est necessaire de faire fructifier ces fonds sans prendre de risque. C'est pourquoi les temples appliquent un interet reduit et se tournent vers des emprunteurs qui ne risquent pas de leur faire defaut. De maniere generale, le recouvrement des creances au moyen age reste aleatoire. Mais les temples traitent avec une clientele sure: leurs propres bonzes et les doso (土倉) qui utilisent cet argent pour pratiquer l'usure, financer la levee des impots dans les domaines ou l'achat de nouvelles terres. Au debut du XV^e siecle, alors que les bonzes du zen se lancent dans ce type d'entreprise, beaucoup de doso sont crees par des employes de doso plus anciens dont l'origine remonte a l'epoque de Kamakura. La demande massive de fonds emanant des nouveaux usuriers va de pair avec le developpement du shidosen. Le bakufu de Muromachi (室町幕府) accorde a ce systeme un privilege: lorsqu'une annulation generale des dettes est decretee par tokusei, les creances du shidosen Sont maintenues, car le bakufu a fait du zen la religion officielle. Mais a l'epoque de Sengoku, les seigneurs feodaux remettent en cause ce privilege pour ne plus l'accorder qu'a certains temples a titre de faveur. Puis a l'epoque d'Edo, le privilege disparait avec les tokusei eux-memes. En outre, les temples recoivent desormais des subventions du bakufu et le shidosen perd de son importance.

著者

秋山 喜代子

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.102, no.1, pp.64-88, 163-162, 1993-01-20

被引用文献数

1

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Regarding the problem of where and by whom children were raised, our general belief is that they were usually brought up by there own parents after ie 家 system was established in the medieval era. In fact, however, many were entrusted to foster parents as satogo 里子, which meant that lords committed their children to the care of their servants, both male (menoto 乳父) and female (menoto 乳母). These children were called yashinaigimi 養君. Satogo was different from the same term used for the custom from the early modern era on, when children were adopted by farmers living in suburban areas. This article aims to examine the overall ideas about upbringing and guardianship of children in the medieval era. Children who became yashinaigimi were those born of mistresses, those who could not expect to inherit the household, and those who had no caretakers or guardians for reason that their fathers had died or that their maternal relatives were not in power in the case of the Imperial family. These children were discriminated against and ill-treated, and lived lives evidently different from the legitimate children who were brought up in the house holds of their fathers and were privileged in many ways. Male and female menoto guarded and supported yashinaigimi instead of their parents, or their maternal relatives in the case of the Imperial family. Yashinaigimi lived with their menoto until the age between eleven and thirteen, at which time they were considered adults and thus expected to live independently. Male yashinaigimi usually became priests and many of the females became nyobo 女房. What should be noted as a political feature of this system is that some yashinaigimi, who were basically eliminated in the nomination for succession to the throne, were suddenly enthroned in time of war or by the sudden death of an Emperor. In such cases, the familles of their menoto played the role of guardians in place of maternal relatives. Such a custom, which was established in the early 12th century in parallel with the systematization of ie inherited by the legitimate children, became more prevalent in the late medieval era during which the ie system was firmly established, and was finally transformed into the adoption system of the kinsei era.