著者

楊 典〓

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.114, no.12, 2005-12-20

著者

中野 良

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.114, no.4, pp.四九五-五一八, 2005-04-20

---

This article analyzes the problem of Japanese Army military exercises conducted during the Taisho Era, a topic to which the research to date on the Army has paid little attention. Nevertheless, such military exercises during that time were very important in the influence they exerted on various relations between the Army and local communities. The author first finds that the military exercises conducted by the Army's 13th Division met with difficulty due to a lack of interest in such activities on the part of residents around where the Division was stationed and their reluctance to supply the Army with recruits. The reason behind such difficulty was, according to the division commander, the tendency to conduct exercises repeatedly in the same area, leading to the suggestion that alternative regions be selected. Actually, alternating sites had been stipulated in the Army manual for military exercises, but the 13th Division had failed to comply with such regulations. Secondly, during that same time, the tactics being employed in military exercises had come under criticism among Army officers, who complained about contradictions in exercise planning and terrain, as well as in coordinating troop movements. Many suggestions were made as to how to improve the situation, but were not implemented, leading to the decision to repeat exercises in a given region and the dilemma encountered by the 13th Division and the local communities around it. Finally, the Army did take steps to correct the problem, such as loosening regulations concerning terrain and geographical conditions, thus increasing the number of regions where exercises could be conducted, in the hope of improving relations between Army divisions and local residents. Armament reductions also helped alleviate fixed military burdens, but in earnest solutions to the problems at hand were put off for later generations.

著者

黒沢 文貴

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.108, no.12, 1999-12-20

著者

大久保 文彦

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.103, no.6, pp.1059-1095, 1222-1224, 1994-06-20

---

In this article the author investigates the background and origins of the discharge of Inspector-General of Army Education Mazaki Jinzaburo in July 1935, which resulted in a dispute over army personnel. He focuses on 1)the three Army Chiefs Council (陸軍三長官会議), which was the scene of the discharge procedures, 2)the formation process of 1913 the Arrangement Regulating Duties of three Army Departments and 3)related the Agreement of three Chiefs. In the first chapter, the author analyzes the defense offered by Mazaki up to his discharge, showing, in contrast to conventional opinions, that his views concerning both the Council and the agreement related to the Arrangement surfaced just before the finale to the case. In chapter two, the author demonstrates how Army Minister Hayashi knowing of the Arrangement provision devised counter-measures on how to deal with the Council, intentionally ignoring the Agreement. In chapter three, the author traces the formation process of the Arrangement back to 1913, indicating that the Army Ministry bureaucratic reforms aimed at abolishing the ministerial appointment of active duty military officers was opposed by the Army. This opposition appeared in a revision of the ministerial duties item in provisions. This was the direct cause of the establishment of the Arrangement in the midst of peacetime institutional revisions that the Army feared would enable Imperial edicts to override military decrees. In chapter four, the author takes up the personnel aspect, showing the evolution within negotiations between the General Staff, who wanted to nominalize the authority of the Army Minister and a reluctant Army Ministry over a plan for a personnel section with the three chiefs to be the major decision makers. In opposition to the General Staff who wanted the establishment of such a section according to peace-time organization, the Army Ministry Personnel Bureau Appointments Section attempted to eliminate its effectiveness and authority. What happened in the end was the inevitable division in personnel affairs known in the research literature as "Addenda to Army Secret Memorandum No.120 : The A and B proposals". The "B Proposal", which contained many of the elements for a Personnel Section, should not have gone any farther than simple agreement between the three Chiefs and in fact the authority over the June petition to the throne was held by the Army Minister. But, being only a provisional action, the petition clearly asked for a decision to be made at a later date. After the promulgation of bureaucratic reforms and the consequent resignation of the Army Minister, the right to petition the throne was transferred to the Chief of General Staff, who thus had the last word on the final petition submitted in July. The research up till now has denied the effectiveness of the "B Proposal" on the grounds that its contents were missing from the final petition. However, at the June phase of the petition the "B Proposal" was clearly stated as a subordinate provision to the "A proposal" ; and if the July petition is considered to be a final decision concerning a revised "A Proposal", it is impossible to state for certain that the "B Proposal" was not also accepted. If we keep in mind the sense of urgency shown by the Army, the content of both the June and July petitions should be considered as one entity. Therefore acceptance was given to the June petition through a process that lasted until July. It is for this reason that the effectiveness of the "Agreement" between the three Chiefs cannot be refuted, and the three Army Chiefs Council, given elements of a Personnel section by this petition, became, as Mazaki Jinzaburo reasoned, a personnel decision making apparatus with each Chief having an equal say in the matter.

著者

小林 道彦

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.98, no.4, pp.488-523, 600-602, 1989-04-20

---

Conventional understanding about the 1907 Japanese government's "Imperial Defense Policy" may be summarized in the following three points. 1)This policy shows the extent of the "political independence" of the "military" after the Russo-Japanese War. 2)The conflict between army's "state of Asia" position and the navy's "island empire" position was not dissolved by this policy. 3)Therefore, the army's demand for 25 divisions and the navy's demand for 8 battleships and 8 armour-clad cruisers, an "excessive" military buildup, were both included in the section which outlined military power necessary for national defense. This article aims at reconsidering the above conventional evaluation of the "Imperial Defense Policy", through examining the 'defense environment' and the process by which the post Russo-Japanese War military buildup policy was formed. The author's conclusions are as follows. 1)After the Russo-Japanese War, the "defense environment" became very favorable for Japan because of the virtual disarmament of the Russian navy and of Japan's obtaining a lease over Kwantung region (northeastern China). Under this "new situation", the supreme commanders of the army and the navy shifted from a defensive to an offensive position, in their "1906 Strategic Plan for Imperial Army". Up until this time such a "Plan" was annually formulated upon a hypothetical attack on the Japanese mainland. In contrast, from this time, they began to plan an attack on Mainland China. It should be also noted that both the army and the navy regarded Russia as a real enemy. 2)The favorable turn which took place in the 'defense environment' influenced the planning of the Military Armament Management Plan. Due to the Russian army's retreated from Manchuria more speedily than Japan had expected, a compromise was struck between Yamagata's demand for 25 peace time divisions and Kodama's demand for 19 ; and the army's expansion target was put at 20 divisions for the time being. Due to the disappearance of an urgent "threat" from Russia, and the Russian ships which Japan got as spoils of war, naval strength was maintained as that expansion of the level. 3)The "Imperial Defense Policy" was formulated under close cooperation between the army and the navy. In order to respond to the "new situation" after the Russo-Japanese war, the conception of "small imperialism" was discarded, and the army was conceptualized as a direct military force assuring the maintenance and expansion of the Japanese interests on the Continent, while the navy was put in the context of an assisting force in such expantion through securing sea-lanes to the Continent. In terms of the necessary military force, 19 peacetime divisions and 5 battleships and 7 armour-clad cruisers were decided as the consequence negotiations between the military and the Ministry of Finance. In other words, this decision on the amount of armaments was realized only after agreement was received from the civil government. Therefore, the civilian part of the government did have something to do with this decision. Consequently, the process of deciding the "Imperial Defense Policy" does not prove the political autonomy of the "military" at that time.

著者

長谷川 貴彦

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.111, no.8, pp.93-102, 2002-08-20

著者

平野 正

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.85, no.12, pp.1613-1652, 1720-1721, 1976-12-20

---

The December 9 Movement was a starting point of the anti-Japanese mass movement and the anti-Japanese national united front. The students in Peking started this movement after making their own organizational and political preparations. These efforts led to the great December 16 demonstration parade and also to a movement led by the Southward Expansion Propaganda Group, which aimed at student cooperation with workers and peasants. In addition, the December 9 Movement had a great impact on students throughout the nation, as a student movement arose in every city. These provincial movements were spontaneous protests stimulated by the events in Peking. The student movement in Shanghai was markedly so, but it was overtaken by pro-Kuomintang rightist students and its main political line became the organization of the National Salvation Association. Thus the fate of its original goals was quite different from those of its counterpart in Peking. Yet, the leftist politics shown in the Southward Expansion Propaganda Movement created tension between student activists, and the average student, and so local government authorities took advantage of this chance to suppress this movement. So the sthdent movement was obliged to become dormant. However, by adopting a united front policy, the student movement recovered and came to play a role in the national united front. This policy, aimed at consolidating the student movement, consisted of forming a nation-wide student organization. Consequently there arose the Chinese Students' National Salvation Association, an organization that played a great part in forming the united front. Meanwhile the activities of the Southward Expansion Propaganda Group were taken over by the National Liberation Vanguard Group, which was very important in supporting the student movement on the grass-roots level. After the outbreak of the Anti-Japanese War it extended its activities in the provinces, playing a vital role also in strengthening the anti-Japanese National United Front and arousing local groups to participate in the effort. But, for this very reason, the student movement was suppressed by the Kuo-mintang government in August 1938 and was compelled to go into illegal underground activities. However, the student movement that had begun with the December 9 Movement not only proved to be the initiation of the Chinese People's Liberation Struggle. But also it proved to be a movement of enormous historical significance both for the formation and development of the anti-Japanese national united front and for the advancement of the unification of student groups with those of the workers and peasants.

著者

西本 昌弘

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.107, no.2, pp.192-218, 318-319, 1998-02-20

---

Introduction and Overview of the Two-volume Set Entitled Nenchu-Gyouji in the Collection of the Higashiyama Bunko : An Existing Version of Fujiwara-no-Yukinari's Shinsen Nenchu-Gyoji

著者

鶴間 和幸

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.89, no.2, pp.230-237, 1980-02-20

著者

平間 洋一

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.100, no.6, pp.1103-1114, 1193-1192, 1991-06-20

---

During negotiations over the twenty-one demands in put to China, Britain had more interest in China than America. However, the attitude of Britain's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sir Edward Grey, towards Japan was very passive and one of extreme caution, since he wanted to avoid any breach with the Japanese. Therefore, he did not give the Chinese any hint of support. However, Grey proposed that Japan should refrain from advancing any demands that could be considered to compromise the integrity or independence of China as it would be hard to "reconcile such demands with the terms of the Alliance" But, Grey's cautious approach was ignored by Foreign Minister Takaaki Kato. Kato's adopted such an aggressive stance despite the opposition of the Genro (the Emperor's supreme adviser), politicians in the Diet, the press, and a combination of militaristic pressure and nationalist opinion. Although Kato needed Britain as an ally during the negotiations with China, Grey's telegram of warning did not put any pressure on him and his attitude did not change. One of the aims of this paper is to add some background to the reason why from a military point of view. Kato continued such a strong and agressive attitude towards Britain. At this time, Britain was in a desperate position given the threat of a German breakthrough on the Western Front, while the Central powers were forcing a Russian retreat in the east. At this crucial stage in the war, the Japanese navy continued to render valuable assistance in the search of German ships, in the protection of trade, in the convoy of troops, and in helping the allies with material assistance in the conduct of the war by supplying arms and ammunition. Under such military circumstances, Japanese assistance was essential to British success, so it was desirable not to antagonize Japan. This paper's second view point concerns the influence of the Japanese Naval assistance in violatating the Indian garrison of Singapore, and Kato's "psychological moment" in convection with this incident. Prior to the twenty-one demands and the violation of the Indian Garrison of Singapore, there was already tremendous friction between Kato and Grey. Kato was annoyed at Grey attempt to place strict limits on Japanese military and naval operations in China and the Pacific. Furthermore, Grey proposed that Japan be controlled by a combined French, Russian and British operation. Kato was able to reject Britain's proposals because of Britain's precarious situation in the war. Britain had to change herself geographically for Japan, because of a desperate situation. Britain had to request the dispatch of a cruiser to North America, another three weeks later for the Indian Ocean, and still another one month later for the Dardanelles. Britain's weak position at the time goes some way towards explaining "the bulldozer tactics" of Kato. During this critical situation, the violation of the Indian Garrison of Singapore occurred and negotiations over the twenty-one demands began. The Navy sent the cruisers Tushima and Otowa to Singapore and rendered "Admirable and effective" assistance. Because of the Japanese assistance of arms and ammunitions, protecting convoys and chasing German merchant cruisers, Grey sent seven telegrams of appreciation for the Japanese assistances. Further, he acknowledged in three telegrams the dispatch of the cruiser Ibuki for convoy escort, three cruisers for the American Squadron chasing the German Far-East Squadron, and for the rescue operation of a merchant ship in the Indian Ocean. Such a continuous stream of telegrams must have provided Kato's "psychological moment" support for his agressive attitude toward Britain. Further, the weakness shown when Britain had to kill 50 Indian soldiers in her own colony gave Kato confidence to maintain his diplomatic independence and to keep his position in the cabinet despite strong opposition from the Genro and the press.

著者

西田 かほる

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.106, no.9, pp.1587-1629, 1997-09-20

---

This paper deals with traditional shinto priest (shake 社家) organization, particularly how and why individual shrines attempted to free themselves from that organization, in the Kuninaka 国中 region of Kai 甲斐 Province, in order to investigate how shrine briests conceived their position within early nineteenth century Japanese society. There were a total of 160 medium and small sizd shrines in the Kuninaka region (including Yamanashi, Yatsushiro and Koma districts, but excluding the Kawauchi territory), whose shake consisted of two priests each. These shake were organized under the Fuchu Hachiman 府中八幡 Shrine, the guardian shrine of Kofu 甲府 castle, into a prayer rotation system by which shake would alternate by taking shifts of two nights and two days in continuous prayer for the country's safety, etc.. The shake organized into this system opposed the Fuchu Hachiman Shrine, which had established its superiority over this organization during the early eighteenth century, and during the early nineteenth century made attempts to secede from the system. In this paper, the author concentrates on such efforts made by the Kanda Tenjin 菅田天神 Shrine in Kami Ozo Village, Yamanashi-Gun. The Kanda Tenjin Shrine was the traditional holder of the Takeda 武田 family's cultural treasure known as the "Tatenashi Yoroi" (shieldless suit of armor) worn by the famous marksman Shinra Saburo Yoshimitsu (1045-1127). The author relates that in 1793, on the occasion of the shogun's inspection of this treasure, the head priest of this shrine became involved in widespread economic activities and attempted to confirm his family's legacy as the shrine's leader. The author then turns to the events happening on the provincial scale, investigating from the standpoint of disputes over Shinto ritual how social status and group affiliation according to religious registries (shumon ninbetsu-cho 宗門人別帳) were confirmed and the problem of honorific titles accompanying official appointments. The author also takes up the questions of the reasoning presented by shake for seceding from the prayer rotation system and the hollowing out of traditional institutions that confirmed shrine family status. The author sheds light on the process and background to these secession activities, by which shake within the rotation system refuted the claim of the Fuchu Hachiman Shrine to its traditional superiority over them. The author concludes that such activities and ideas were by no means unique to Kai Province, but represented phenomena arising throughout late Tokugawa era society. In this sense, we can regard the hollowing out of the prayer rotation system as a positive historical development.

著者

佐藤 健治

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.103, no.11, pp.1925-1951, 2037-2035, 1994-11-20

---

In this paper, the author attempts to show the conditions by which ancestor worship supports permanent families through a study of funeral and memorial services held for the heads of the Fujiwara Regent families. Through an investigation of those who presided over these ceremonies, how they were carried out, and the way in which they were financed, the author follows the process of how the various memorial services were ritualized into established family customs. He attempts to clarify the origin and characteristic features of these customs as regent family events and their significance within ancient aristocratic society. Concerning funeral services, the Fujiwara Regents were originally given state funerals in accordance with provisions under the ritsuryo codes stipulating that the presiding officer be appointed by the government and that funereal gifts be sent from the public coffers. However, beginning with the funeral of regent Tadahira in the mid-tenth century, both practices were abandoned, thus removing the ceremony from state control in terms of both personnel and material support, turning the event into a family affair. With respect to the ceremony itself, before the funeral of Tadahira the main practice consisted of the reading of an imperial order before the casket. This practice was done away with beginning with Tadahira's funeral, and the whole ceremony was changed so that the state would have no involvement whatsoever. Here we can observe how during the latter half of the tenth Century the funeral services for the Fujiwara Regents were transformed from affairs of state to family-centered events. Turning to the memorial services. Called chuin (an initial period of mourning lasting seven weeks) and shuki (the first anniversary of the death), in Heian period aristocratic society the former was marked by a Buddhist ceremony (gohoji) designed as a public demonstration of remembrance, while the latter was marked by a ceremony (shonichi-butsuji) that was merely a family memorial service. In particular, the gohoji ceremony, which was directed from the family to aristocratic society as a whole, concentrated on signifying the succession of the new family head, and in the case of the Fujiwara family it was a ceremony equal in stature to an affair of state and signified its transformation into the "family of the Regent" within aristocratic society. The latter half of the tenth century, when this ceremony was first established, marked the formation of families whose continuing existence was based on the succession of family heads. In the memorial service called nenki (yearly anniversaries of a death), there are the elements of an event carried on through one generation and an event Hasting from generation to generation. It was usual for the death of a family head to be commemorated yearly throughout the lives of his sons or grandsons; but if the family decided that funds were available, this memorial service could be upgraded to a semi-permanent yearly family event. While the former custom was based on the vertical father-son clientship relationship, the latter was guaranteed through a horizontal relationship involving the participation of all family members in deciding to hold the event and using the family's wealth to finance it. In practice, the latter event became a relatively modest version of the former and became closely tied to a consciousness, of Fujiwara Regent family membership. The idea of the permanent family organization and the funeral and memorial services reinforcing it came into existence during the latter half of the tenth century with the above described Fujiwara Regent family practices, practices that stress the patriarchal relationship between fathers and sons and guarantees by all family members that the events would be continued for generations to come. As long a these relationships existed, these ceremonies would be carried out. It is in this way that the establishment of such a yearly calendar marked

著者

砂田 徹

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.110, no.5, pp.1029-1033, 2001-05-20

著者

申 美那

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.110, no.12, 2001-12-20

著者

前川 祐一郎

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.119, no.3, pp.328-351, 2010-03-20

被引用文献数

1

---

In this paper, the author aims to clarify the criminal conflict resolution zaika no seibai (punishment of crimes) during Japan's late medieval period through accommodation, adjustment, and regional arbitration of inter-group conflicts. Specifically, after identifying the different types of conflict resolution, this paper focuses on the seibai form, which involved the demolition or burning down of the injuring party's dwelling. In addition to analyzing the manner in which crimes were handled, the relationship between these practices and criminal conflict resolution by public authorities during the late medieval period is explored. The results are as follows. 1. In conflicts during this period, accommodation sometimes took on the character of a criminal proceeding: an accommodation was reached between the injured party's group and the injuring party's group, in which the injuring party's group inflicted a punishment (seibai) on the injuring party for the crime. According to the countervailing logic of this form of accommodation, punishment of the injuring party by the injuring party's group was seen as equivalent to revenge for the crime by the injured party. 2. The accommodation ritual of geshinin to kemuri, which entails the burning down of a dwelling, is different from the form of accommodation and conflict handling described in (1). In this form of accommodation, the injuring party was not excluded from the group to which he belonged. Also, in this form of accommodation, the countervailing logic behind the injured party's revenge was considered fundamental-an attempt was made to establish accommodation by diminishing as much as possible the legitimacy of exacting revenge, and compelling the injured party to accept the injuring party's apology. Accordingly, this form of accommodation sought to abjure any examination of the injuring party's offense. 3. These two forms of accommodation both tended to handle offenses in the context of conflicts between small groups or interested parties; that is, these crimes were not perceived as crimes against the social order as a whole. However, amid this prevailing tendency in the latter half of the 16th century, the ikki (league) of the local lords of Omi Province, presumably on the grounds of a violation of the social order of the region as a whole, punished an entire self-governing village (soson) that had resorted to military force. As the representative of these local lords, the vassal corps of the sengoku daimyo Rokkaku family, entered into the Rokkakushi-shikimoku, the legal code of the daimyo, which punished self-governing villages that resorted to military force in conflicts. This suggests that the drive toward criminal conflict resolution by public authorities in the late medieval period was at least partially a response to demand from local venues of conflict resolution.

著者

加藤 陽子

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.99, no.9, pp.1507-1546, 1655-1656, 1990-09-20

---

What does the February 26th Incident mean in the history of modern Japan? Masao Maruyama calls it the epoch-making event that distinguished the maturity of the Fascism movement from its infancy in his "Thought and Movement for Fascism in Japan". Following the February 26th incident, power shifted quickly towards the civilian and military bureaucracies. Historians have therefore made much of the administrative decision that Hirota's Cabinet made in May 1936. In 1899 Yamagata Aritomo had arranged the issue of an imperial decree, to the effect that only generals and admirals on active duty could be appointed to hold military ministerial portfolios. In 1913, under strong pressure from parties in the Lower House, the decree was amended to permit the appointment of retired of officers. The new Cabinet organized by career diplomat Hirota accepted the Army's demands and revised the decree (gen-eki bukan sei fukkatsu) without strong opposition. Among historians it has been the popular view that the revised decree allowed the Army to control the life and death of Cabinets. Between 1913 and 1936, in fact, no retired officer was ever called upon to hold a service ministry portfolio. Did the revised decree in 1936 make much difference ? The purpose of this article is to examine (1)the reason why young officers in the Army (rikugun chukenso) sought to revise the decree; (2)their eagerness to reform the conventional council system of the Army; and (3)the struggle between the Army and political parties during the 70th Diet session. The author suggests the following. (1)The young officers under the direction of Colonel Ishiwara Kanji, insisted that the decree be restored to its original form. It was to restore the Army ministerial portfolio's authority to personnel changes. Between 1913 and 1936, the authority was shared with the Chief of General Staff (sanbo socho) and the Chief of Military Education (kyoiku sokan). The newly designated Army minister had to purge many rebellious officers and the "Imperial Way" faction of senior officers from the Army. (2)The Army persuaded the members of the Cabinet and Privy Council under a promise to abolish the council-one of the Army's institutional prerogatives-putting up a candidate for the Army ministerial portfolio.

著者

北村 暁夫

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.97, no.10, pp.1758-1759, 1988-10-20

著者

岡本 真

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.124, no.4, pp.528-552, 2015-04-20

---

Previous research on the dispatch of tribute ships from Japan to Ming China (kenminsen 遣明船) during the Sengoku period claimed that the Ouchi Clan of the northern Kyushu and western Chugoku regions achieved a monopoly on this activity after the Ningbo Incident of 1523, in which ships dispatched by the Ouchi Clan attacked a ship dispatched by the Hosokawa Clan of the Kinai and Shikoku regions. However, whether this commonly accepted theory reflects the actual situation is questionable. The purpose of this article is to examine this theory by focusing on the ships referred to as "Sakai Totosen" 堺渡唐船 (tribute ships planned to embark from Sakai to China) in the primary sources, considering specifically the parties involved in their dispatch, their crews and passengers, the purpose of their dispatch, and their overall historical significance. First, the parties involved in the project of dispatching these ships are discussed. The sources, including Tenbun Nikki 天文日記, a mid-16th century diary written by the abbot of Honganji Temple, indicate that these ships planned to embark from Sakai and were prepared by the shogunal deputy (kanrei 管領) Hosokawa Harumoto and the Sakai merchants. The other players, Honganji Temple and the Ichijo Clan of Tosa Province, merely supported this project, while Sengoku Daimyo Ouchi Yoshitaka and Hatakeyama Tanenaga attempted to prevent the dispatch. Next, regarding those aboard the ships and the purpose of their dispatch, the author introduces two newly discovered diplomatic documents from Katto 活套, a mid-16th century miscellanea concerning Sakai, the content and dates of which prove that they are related to these ships. According to these documents, the ships were to be outfitted like their predecessors as bearing official tribute to the Ming Court. The Zen monk Chushuku Shojo was meant to be on board as ambassador along with the physician Nakarai Akifusa. The purposes of the dispatch were 1) to present the tribute goods carried by the previous Hosokawa ship and supposedly left behind in China after the Ningbo Incident; 2) to acquire the return of personal belongings of the previous ship; 3) to secure the release and return of Song Suqing, the member of the previous ship; 4) to acquire new tallies (kango 勘合) for tribute trade along with the related gold seal from the Chinese authorities; and 5) to secure permission for Nakarai to study Chinese medicine. Finally, concerning the historical significance of these ships, it is clear that Hosokawa Harumoto and the Sakai merchants intended this project to continue diplomatic negotiations with the Ming Dynasty, which had been carried out by the Muromachi shogun Ashikaga Yoshiharu and the shogunal deputy Hosokawa Takakuni in the aftermath of the Ningbo Incident. The transfer of the previously unknown provisional tally for tribute trade issued in the Jiajing period (Kasei jun-kango 嘉靖准勘合) illuminates the process leading from the original negotiations to this project. Furthermore, when comparing this project with the ships dispatched by Ouchi Yoshitaka in 1539, we find that both were meant to recover cargos related to the Ningbo Incident and to acquire new tallies. While it was previously thought that the Ouchi Clan eliminated competition from the Hosokawa Clan following the Ningbo Incident, the information above shows that the rivalry over the dispatch of tribute ships actually continued unabated.

著者

李 成市

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.124, no.7, pp.1269-1271, 2015-07-20

著者

新見 まどか

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.124, no.6, pp.1077-1113, 2015-06-20

---

The study of the history of Tang China which focuses on the transition from the Tang to the Song Dynasty has recently broadened its purview from the Han Chinese world proper to the whole region spanning eastern Eurasia. In the present article the author focuses on the mid-ninth century civil disturbances occurring among the governors (jiedushi 節度使) of fanzen 藩鎮 regional garrisons and their relationship to the Dynastic transition, taking up the concrete example of the rebellion of Liu Zhen 劉〓, the governor of Zhao-Yi 昭義 in Eastern Shanxi Province. Despite the overwhelming opinion that the rebellion represents an "exception" in the fanzen civil disturbances, the author's analysis of Liu Zhen's close advisors shows that the incident should be directly understood as an element of fanzen civil unrest as it developed after the An Lushan 安禄山 Rebellion (755-63). Moreover, the fact that the imperial court took on the task of quelling Liu's rebellion reflects the defeat of the remnants of the Uighur nomadic empire that had risen during that time on the Tang Dynasty's northern periphery. Also, through its divide and conquer tactic of appealing to common interests it shared with Liu's army, the court was able to avoid one threat by negotiating over succession to the three garrisons of Hebei. However, due to the large demilitarization of the region after the rebellion, a huge outflow of surplus military personnel into Henan took place, resulting in region becoming racked with brigandage, smuggling and outright rebellion. Given the situation described above, the author concludes that the rebellion of Liu Zhen and China's policy regarding the three garrisons north of the Huanghe, as well as the instability characterizing Henan were for the Tang Dynasty problems not exclusively "domestic" in nature, but rather linked to what was going in the hinterlands of Inner Asia. That is to say, from the An Lushan Rebellion on, in addition to need to defend its northern borders, the Tang Dynasty had to amass a huge military campaign into the hinterlands for the defense of the northern three garrisons. Then during the reign of Emperor Wuzong, with the destruction of the Uighur Empire, the court deployed its northern defense forces to quell the fanzhen rebellions raging in the interior. Via such efforts, the court was also able to secure the northern three garrisons, thus almost simultaneously eliminating any military threat to the Middle Kingdom. This is why the court then embarked on the demilitarization of the remote hinterland fanzhen, which were now deemed unnecessary. Consequently, the demobilized troops having no place to settle turned into a domestic source of civil unrest. The rebellion of Liu Zhen was therefore an event which symbolizes the changing situation of the mid-ninth century, in which reverberations caused by the destruction of the nomadic empire of the steppe rumbled through the Taihang Mountains into Hebei, and eventually became an indirect source of civil unrest in Henan.