著者
佐々木 宗雄
出版者
公益財団法人史学会
雑誌
史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.116, no.4, pp.512-536, 2007-04-20

The research that has been done on the ancient Japanese state governed under the ritsuryo 律令 codes, which is based on the pioneering work of historians Ishimoda Sho and Yoshida Takashi, has recently been deepened by Otsu Tooru in his comparison with the Tang Dynasty. However, research has yet to be done on the Ritsuryo State from the point of view of fiscal administration on the local level and how this local character was transformed beginning in the tenth century. The present article is an attempt to delve into such matters. Local matters of the Ritsuryo State system were put in charge of sub-provincial district (gun 郡) administrators (gunji 郡司), who were supervised by the central government through provincial governors (kokushi 国司), whose performance was monitored by inspectors called yodo-no-tsukai 四度使. These central government inspectors submitted reports on both local administrative and fiscal affairs during the term of office of each successive governor. Local fiscal administration was based on taxes levied on yields of arable land allocated by the state to individuals (so 租), a part of which was accumulated in district storehouses as shozei 正税, and lent to cultivators at interest to defray administrative expenses. In this sense, the ritsuryo system was operated on a dual structure. The momentum for the system's transformation was provided by growing ties of dependency between members of the central aristocracy and commoners to whom land had been allocated (hyaku-sho 百姓) in the midst of a decline in the administrative authority of gun administrators. The central government began appoint ing tax farmers as deputy provincial governors (zuryo 受領) to take direct control over the hyakusho under their jurisdictions. Ac cording to the procedure that was instituted in a ministry of state order issued in 902 AD, the central government and provincial/districts were to allocate arable land to local hyakusho and collect from them a part of the harvest (sozei 租税) and a part o the fruits of their labor (choyo 調庸), together referred to as kanmotsu 官物, resulting in a system that fiscally unified the center and the provinces. This system, characterized politically as a "dynastic" state (ochokokka 王朝国家) was fiscally supported by taxes collected in accordance with the ritsuryo codes being channeled into stipends and rewards for the central aristo-bureaucracy (including state controlled religious institutions) on the strength of tax farming and proxy provincial administration conducted by zuryo. In addition to stipends from public tax stores, both the secular and religious aristocracy was allowed tax exemptions on their own proprietary holdings and permitted to organize their own labor forces (yoriudo 寄人) However, such privileges were not the results of grabbing exclusionary or feudal rights of coercion and ownership, but rather depended on controlling the administrative mechanism linking the center and the provinces. The result was a totally centralizes political entity created by unifying the dual structure characterizing the Ritsurvo State.
著者
澤本 光弘
出版者
公益財団法人史学会
雑誌
史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.117, no.6, pp.1097-1122, 2008-06-20

It was in 926 AD that Bohai was conquered by Yelu-Abaozhi 耶律阿保機, founder of the Kitai 契丹 (Liao 遼) Dynasty and was designated as Dongdanguo 東丹国. There were many aspects of Dongdanguo that had escaped researchers until 1992, when the inscribed epitaph of Yelu-Yuzu 耶律羽之 was discovered. In this article, the author first investigates the genealogy contained in the inscription and concludes that the leaders of Yelu Abaozhi's tribe (迭剌部 Dielabu) participated in the governance of Dongdanguo. At that time, the Dielabu had been broken up in order to control its burgeoning power over the other seven tribes, necessitating a redistribution of land and people for the purpose of herding. Dongdanguo was established by allocating authority over Bohai to such members of the Dielabu as the brothers of Yelu-Yuzu. In other words, in the background of the establishment of Dongdanguo there lay not only the problem of governing the former subjects of Bohai, but also the aspect of a nomadic state distributing land and human resources among its members. Secondly, the author puts the bureaucratic chaos of Dongdanguo described in the existing source materials into better perspective based on the inscription. Here, the former bureaucratic system of Bohai, with such offices as Daneixiang 大内相, was not only kept in tact to govern Bohai, but was also instituted as a means for organizing Kitai tribes ; that is, adapted to Kitai society itself. Finally, concerning the reason for moving the capital of Eastern Kitai to Liaoyan 遼陽, the inscription shows that king of Kitai was involved in a decision based on the proximity of Liaoyan to the territory controlled by the Dielabu, rather than the conventional explanation that the move was motivated by the desire to monitor the activities of Yelu-tuyu 耶律突欲, the king of Dongdanguo. There is also the view in the research to date that Dongdanguo did not in fact exist, but the discovery of the inscription clearly shows that Dongdanguo was incorporated into the ruling class of Kitai tribal politics, adapted to its nomadic society and was a functioning polity.
著者
菊地 大樹
出版者
公益財団法人史学会
雑誌
史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.104, no.8, pp.1361-1396, 1517-1518, 1995-08-20

While persons known as jikyosha 持経者 have been recognized in the research literature as holy people (ヒジリ), it is still not clear what the practice of "jikyo" actually involved. In this paper the author intends to understand jikyosha within the context of the historical development of Japanese society. In the Nihon Ryoiki 日本霊異記, jikyo appears to be on a level with incantation in the sense of learning sutras and reciting them from memory. In the eighth century under the ritsuryo state reciting the Lotus Sutra and Saisho-o sutra by heart was a requirement for entering the Buddhist priesthood. This policy was strictly maintained until the mid-tenth century, during which time it was a widespread custom for novices to memorize sutras while performing begging in the streets and asceticism in the wild. The ritsuryo code for Buddhist priests and nuns was abandoned, and jikyosha then appeared as holy people with their bases of activity in the mountains and forests. There are many place names related to jikyosha in the source materials concerning Shugen-do 修験道 (mountain asceticism), meaning that many legendary ascetics like those of Omine 大峯 and Kumano 熊野 were regarded as jikyosha and were in a position to perform the Buddhahood ceremony (abhiseka 潅頂) and grant legitimacy with engi 縁起 to other mountain ascetic. The recital of sutras from memory was considered to be a magical, mystic training requiring supernatural virtue and determined by the practice of one's past life. Mountain asceticism and sutra recital are similar in the aspect of attaining magical character, and both were in fact complementary to each other. The promotion of sutra recital by the ancient state shows its intention not only to absorb its magical power, but also control and limit it. During the eleventh and twelfth centuries, demonstrations of magical power took genuine form in response to the demands of the society. The divine service of jikyosha for aristcrats and provincial governors in their small Buddhist chapels and ceremonies involving some 1000 jikyosha in the Lotus Sutra tradition were seen throughout the country, even though the actual number of jikyosha was small. Sutra recital was not only an important part of special ceremonies, but also became part of yearly or monthly Buddhist liturgies. Shunjo-bo Chogen 俊乗房重源 was a representative jikyosha of the time. He was during his prime a mountain ascetic, and during his activities in the great Kanjin 勧進 of Todaiji temple, he often mobilized jikyosha in the ceremony of his own planning. During his last years, he was active in promoting memorization of the Lotus Sutra among children and organized 1000 jikyosha events. Through an analysis of Chogen's activities, the author shows the definite establishment of a place for jikyosha activities within the Ken-mitsu 顕密 Buddhist temple like Todaiji. The paper concludes with an investigation of why from the thirteenth century the general Buddhist laity were allowed to memorize and recite sutras, a consideration of the broader meaning of the practice, in addition to a discussion of themes for future study, like the relationship between jikyosha and Nichiren 日蓮.
著者
遅塚 忠躬
出版者
公益財団法人史学会
雑誌
史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.99, no.5, pp.612-616, 1990-05-20
著者
福島 恵
出版者
公益財団法人史学会
雑誌
史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.119, no.2, pp.181-204, 2010-02-20

In 2005, a tomb of a man by the name of Li Dan 李誕 from a place called Jibin 〓賓 who died during the Northern Zhou 北周 Period was unearthed in Xi'an 西安, China. We know from the tomb's epitaph that Li Dan was from Jibin and that he obtained his official position because he was a kind of "Brahman" 婆羅門種. From this information the consensus seems to be that Li Dan was of Indian (Kashimere) origin, but since there are various theories as to the exact location of Jibin, it is difficult to conclude anything about his origins. In the present article, the author attempts to clarify exactly where Jibin, where Li Dan was born, was located and considers what Li Dan intended to do in China. First, the author does a work up of the content of Li Dan's epitaph, and then introduces newly discovered epitaphs of Li Da 李陀 and his wife An 安 and of Li Xu 李吁. Judging from the content of all three epitaphs, the author concludes that 1) the men were father, son and grandson, respectively and 2) by her family name, An, the wife of Li Da, was of Sogdian origin. The existence of close marital ties between Li Dan and the Sogdians, which has already been speculated about, because of the proximity of Li Dan's tomb to and the tombs of contemporaries, An Jia 安伽, Kang Ye 康業 and Shi Jun 史君, is now a matter of historical fact. Secondly, the time when Li Dan's epitaph was engraved coincides with the time in which the location of the placename Jibin in Chinese was moved from Gandhara to Kapisi, because Gandhara had lost its position of importance due to the decline of Ephthal. Kapisi lies within the linguistic sphere of Bactrian, which is an eastern dialect of Iranian, like Sogdian. Dasa 陀娑, which is Li Dan's adult name (zi 字), can be found among common Bactrian names. Considering these facts within the context of the close relationship between the Li clan and the Sogdians, the author concludes that the Jibin mentioned in Li Dan's epitaph in fact refers to Kapisi, which was populated by Iranian Bactrians. Furthermore, since the Bactrians were well-known as traders, it can be assumed that Li Dan came to China for the purpose of commerce. And thus, the three epitaphs of the Li clan are important historical sources for unfolding the ways in which a group of Bactrians and Sogdians, tied together by marriage, extended their trading activities in the far away eastern land of China.
著者
設楽 薫
出版者
公益財団法人史学会
雑誌
史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.96, no.7, pp.1142-1159, 1255-1254, 1987-07-20

Historians specializing in Muromachi politics during the rein of the 10th shogun Ashikaga Yoshiki 足利義材 have thus far focused their attention on his banishment in 1493 (the Meio Incident), which resulted in the assumption of power by the Hosokawa family. Very little interest, however, has been shown toward the problem of Yoshiki's shogunal governance itself. By analyzing the characteristics and background of Yoshiki's direct judgments (gozen sata 御前沙汰), the author attempts to redress this imbalance and also to improve our understanding of the actual status of Yoshiki's reign. The shogun's direct judgments were usually recorded in the ukagaigoto kiroku 伺事記録, a record kept by the officials who screened matters for the shogun's approval. The record for 1490 and related documents illuminate the shifts in procedure and personnel affairs after the Onin War. The judgment process originally took place only in the presence of the shogun, but Yoshiki always received applications and transmitted his decisions through a rapporteur (moshitsugi 申次). Two reasons for this change can be adduced : (1)the new process provided an effective means of dealing with the increasing number of suits and applications, regardless of when the next shogunal audience was scheduled or what personnel were on duty ; and (2)the shogun's cloistered father, Yoshimi, exercised the real power within the administration, although he had himself never been shogun. The rapporteurs were selected from among those long-term confidents of Yoshimi and Yoshiki, such as HAMURO Mitsutada 葉室光忠, TANEMURA Gyobu 種村刑部 and ISSIKI Jibu 一色治部. Yoshimi and his son lacked confldent retainers within the court at the time of Yoshiki's succession, because Yoshimi had been the very leader of anti-shogun Western force during the Onin War (1467-1477). Yoshimi and Yoshiki therefore tended to place greater trust in their long-term confidents than in those who newly came into service at Yoshiki's court. As close retainers these rapporteurs were entrusted with supervising matters involving the shogun's direct judgment. The shogun's liege vassals can be divided into the three categories : (1)those who had served with him before the Onin War, that is, men who were not hereditary servants of the bakufu ; (2)those who came to serve under Yoshimi during the Onin War ; and (3)those who came into service after Yoshiki's succession. Most of the persons whose names came up in gozen sata documents represented categories (1) and (2). Shogunal confidence in them was 'high' but his reliance on them inevitably led to feelings of estrangement on the part of hereditary servants of the bakufu. This, in turn, hastened the decline of Yoshiki himself in the Meio Incident.
著者
津田 拓郎
出版者
公益財団法人史学会
雑誌
史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.123, no.2, pp.205-230, 2014-02-20

The primary purpose of this article is to offer a new perspective on the use of the written word by the government of the Carolingian through an examination of the "capitularies". The capitularies are traditionally recognized as "the edicts of the kings"; and it is widely accepted that their "Golden Age" occurred during the reign of Charlemagne and Louis the Pious. The research to date has concentrated mainly on manuscripts, but this method is not appropriate for an analysis of the governmental system of the Carolingian age, because manuscripts were composed some time after the initial authoring of any given text and show us only information about their later phases. In order to clarify the earliest phase, the author explores references to the use of documents in narrative sources. His results show that with some exceptions, there are only two categories of information about the use of the written word which emerge in the narrative sources; namely lex (or "texts that should be added to lex") and "texts on behalf of the church". In view of the quantity of such cases, there is little diversity during the Carolingian age, a fact that would belie the alleged "Golden Age"; moreover, references to texts for the church can also be found in the east Frankish kingdom, which historians have considered as a land where no capitulary was issued. The reason for the discrepancy between the author's conclusions and the conventional view concerning a "Golden Age" lies in the fact that many "capitularies" of Charlemagne and Louis were texts which had only subordinate functions for the communication, for in the later Carolingian age the communication system had been transformed into a face-to-face system via assemblies; and rulers had not as much need for such texts as before. There are also indications that in the west Frankish kingdom fundamental changes appeared to have occurred in the use of the written word by the government. The age of Charlemagne and Louis the Pious can be called the "Golden Age" of those texts that had only subordinate functions in communicating the wishes of the kings ; that is to say Charlemagne and Louis the Pious should be not regarded as "great legislators who issued many written edicts". Therefore, we should reexamine the use of the written word in each kingdom without considering the text category of "capitulary".
著者
満薗 勇
出版者
公益財団法人史学会
雑誌
史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.118, no.9, pp.1643-1666, 2009-09-20

The purpose of this article is to examine the effect of cash on delivery service on the development of the mail order business in prewar Japan. C.O.D. was established as a postal service in 1896, and helped decrease the business cost incurred by time lags between the settlement and delivery of parcels. In addition, the fact that C.O.D. was provided as a governmental postal service was significant in three ways. First, a nationwide postal network was made available to users, including those in rural areas. Secondly, settlement and delivery was implemented without any problem. Thirdly, suppliers who dispatched goods via C.O.D were regarded as reliable dealers. Consequently, the mail order business was made available to all suppliers, regardless of their sales volumes, and developed rapidly, to the extent that by 1922, Japan rose to second in the world behind Germany in the number of C.O.D. parcels delivered in 1922 (no statistics are available for the US and UK). However, after 1923, the service experienced little growth, owing not only to such environmental factors as the Great Kanto Earthquake of 1923, the Showa financial panic of 1930, and the increase of retail outlets; but also because 1) it was impossible to prevent fraud on the part of unscrupulous businessmen peddling goods of inferior quality, due to the failure to implement an inspection system, and 2) the decision on the part of the postal service to end door-to-door delivery of C.O.D. parcels due to budget constraints. Consequently, the number of parcels returned to sender increased, burdening suppliers with the cost of postage and handling and the loss of a sale opportunity for the returned goods.
著者
佐藤 公彦
出版者
公益財団法人史学会
雑誌
史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.91, no.1, pp.43-80, 145-143, 1982-01-20

Eight trigrams sect (Pa-kua-chiao 八卦教) was the most popular religious secret society in north China through the Ch'ing dynasty, and in the process of its expansion we can often find a lot of boxing training by its members. In this paper we will consider the relationship between the Eight trigrams sect and boxing training such as I-ho-chuan (義和拳), etc.. Eight trigrams sect is said to have been founded by a man called Li Ting-yu (李廷玉) in either the Shun Chih (順治) or Kang Hsi (康煕) reign periods at the beginning of the Ch'ing dynasty. It was organized according to the principle of the division into eight trigrams, and also divided into a "Wen" (文) or literary sect, and a "Wu" (武) or military one which had widely developed itself ; the society consisted of four "Wen" trigrams and four "Wu" trigrams. The combination of Eight trigrams sect and boxing training had already taken place in early Yung Cheng (雍正) period. In the Wang Lun (王倫) rebellion (1774), which was raised by a society called Ching-Shui-Chiao (清水教), a branch of the Eight trigrams sect, the boxing styles used inside the sect had been Pa-kua-chuan (八卦拳, Eight trigrams boxing), Chi-hsin-hung-chuan (七星紅拳 Seven star red boxing), and I-he-chuan (義合拳, Righteous harmony boxing). From this we can see that the I-ho-chuan was the same as the White Lotus religion or more precisely as the boxing which had combined with the military sect of Eight trigrams sect, Ching-Shui-chiao. From the incident of the I-ho-chuan in 1778, 1783 and 1786, we can guess that the I-ho-chuan had close relationship with the Li (離) trigram, a branch of the Eight trigrams sect. In 1813, Eight trigrams sect raised an uprising. A careful examination of the materials on the boxing in this uprising such sources as those on general leader of the military sect, Feng Ke-shan (馮克善), the group members led by Sung Yueh-lung (宋躍〓) and the case of Ke Li-yeh (葛立業) who learned and practiced I-ho school boxing (義和門拳棒), show that I-ho school boxing had been practiced inside Sung Yueh-lung's group in the Chili-Shantung boundary area, and that this group belonged to the chain of Li trigram. Hence we can easily identify the I-ho school as one of small regional group in the Li trigram in Eight trigrams sect. It becomes clear that the reason why boxing was combined with the Li trigram, representative of Wu trigrams, depends on the principle of organization. The boxing practiced in the Eight trigrams sect had been influenced by its religious thought, and came to have incantationary-religious characteristics, The I-ho-chuan and Eight trigrams sect in Chin-hsiang (金郷) county seem as though they were in conflict, but this example proves that there was a close relationship between the two. It is clear that historically boxing such as the I-ho-chuan, Pa-kua-chuan, etc., expanded widely in the north-west Chili-Shantung boundary area and south-west region of Shantung, by maintaining continuous relationship with Eight trigrams sect. Another phenomenon, however, also appeared. Social disturbance and confusion after the late Tao-Kuang (道光) period, brought about a wide expansion of the boxing training that was not directly related with Eight trigrams sect. The boxing which had combined with Eight trigrams sect, though taking on religious character, gradually started to secede from it, was accepted as a function of violence or defence in rural society. In the Hsien-Feng (咸豊) and Tung-Chih (同治) Periods, boxing which had permeated into rural society gradually came to be related to "Tuan militia" (団) and the "Allied village societies" (lianzhuanghui 連荘会) coexisted with the order of rural society, and built up the social foundation for the organization of I-ho-chuan society. Eight trigrams sect, not only scattered widely in this way, but also combined forces with bandits in the process of the mutual permeation with these military plunderers' groups. Thus some societies -such as Long Spea
著者
太田 敬子
出版者
公益財団法人史学会
雑誌
史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.101, no.3, pp.327-366, 490-491, 1992-03-20

The Mirdasid dynasty ruled Aleppo and its region in northern Syria from 415 A.H./1025 A.D. to 473 A.H./1080 A.D.. The Mirdasid was a family of the Kilab tribe (Banu Kilab) which belonged to the northern Arab tribes. Banu Kilab, taking advantage of political disorder caused by the decline of the 'Abbasid's rule, had extended their influence into the Aleppo region. The Mirdasid principality was founded upon their strong military power. This paper aims to investigate the first period of the Mirdasid dynasty on the point of foreign policy and influence in the international relations. From the middle of the tenth century, the Aleppo region had been threatened by two powerful foreign states; the Fatimid Caliphate in Egypt and the Byzantine empire, both of which aimed to annex this region. Under such circumstances, Salih b. Mirdas, the first prince of the Mirdasid dynasty succeeded in gaining control of Aleppo city with support of a Syrian Arab alliance. To extend their power, the Mirdasides made use of the balance of power between these Great Powers and their limited ability to advance their territorial ambitions into Syria. The principal approach to their foreign policy was to negotiate with each of them, receive their recognition for possession of Aleppo, and then nominally establish an independent state under their patronage. However, before receiving their recognition, the Mirdasides had to engage in some battles with them. As a result, Thimal, the third prince, succeeded in obtaining recognition as the ruler of Aleppo from both of the Great Powers and stabilized the supremacy of the Mirdasid dynasty in the Aleppo region. However, the author has also ascertained that this success owed much to the internal affairs of the Fatimid caliphate and the Byzantine empire and changes that occured in the diplomatic relations between them. The author also examines concretely the position of the Mirdasid princes in international relations. As a result, she has found that their subordinate posture in the diplomatic negotiations did not mean a dependent character. It should be noted that recognition from foreign powers to be the governor of Aleppo was indispensable for the Mirdasid princes to achieve stability within their states ; and to receive such recognition was the principal purpose of their foreign policy.
著者
後藤 敦史
出版者
公益財団法人史学会
雑誌
史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.124, no.9, pp.1583-1606, 2015-09-20

The research to date on the fleet of the United States North Pacific Exploring and Surveying Expedition (NPSE), which visited Shimoda in May 1855, has concluded that the fleet's aim was to test the effectiveness of the treaty of peace and amity between Japan and the United States, known as the Kanagawa Convention (concluded 31 March 1854), under direct orders issued by the US Secretary of the Navy, despite the fact that the Convention had not yet been concluded when the NPSE departed from Norfolk, Virginia, in June 1853. The purpose of this article is to reveal more concrete detail the diplomatic purposes and reasons behind the NPSE's visit to Japan. It was in August 1852 that the NPSE was scheduled to be dispatched to survey the North Pacific maritime region, as part of US Navy and State Department policy aimed at challenging British hegemony and protecting whale fisheries in the region. While these objectives were similar to those of Commodore Perry's expedition to Japan, the NPSE also intended to negotiate with countries that Perry had not visited. This means that both Perry's expedition and the NPSE were equally important to US diplomacy regarding the North Pacific region. However, the two expeditions did not always cooperate. For example, the NPSE had to suspend its surveying activities when it arrived at Hong Kong in May 1854, because Perry had concentrated his vessels in Japan, leaving no US ships in the South China Sea to protect American merchants during the confusion created by the Taiping Rebellion. Finally, the author shows that when the NPSE did arrive in Shimoda, its aim was to open negotiations with Japan, not on the orders from the Navy, but on the decision of the NPSE Commander John Rodgers himself. Before heading for Japan, the NPSE visited the Ryukyu Kingdom, where Rodgers judged that the treaty between the Ryukyus and the United States, which had been concluded by Perry, was being violated by the government of the Ryukyus, a perception that probably influenced his decision to proceed to Japan. Contrary to the widely held view, the author shows that the Secretary of the Navy did not order the NPSE to visit Japan with the purpose of testing the effectiveness of the Convention of Kanagawa and calls for a reconsideration of the character of US diplomacy regarding the Pacific Ocean region, in general, and Japan, in particular during the mid-19th century.