著者
秋山 喜代子
出版者
公益財団法人史学会
雑誌
史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.103, no.12, pp.2069-2091, 1994-12-20
被引用文献数
3

This article examins the northern chamber (oku 奥) of the shinden 寝殿 in the early medieval period and found the following facts. The northern chamber (hokumen 北面) of the Palace of the in 院 was used as the office of its retainers (kinshin 近臣) attached to tsunenogosho 常御所, where retainers such as kugyo公卿 and tenjobito 殿上人 usually waited. Jige 地下 were also admitted here. This chamber came to be called johokumen 上北面 when gehokumen 下北面 was formed as the office of samurai 侍, but later was called uchinohokumen 内北面 during the reign of Goshirakawain 後白河院, when the organization of johokumen was established and its office moved to the tenjo 殿上. In tsunenogosho and hokumen, unofficial meetings with the in took place. There the in talked and played with his retainers in a familiar way, inviting low caste entertainers to perform. This character and function of northern chamber was also common to the residences such as the dairi 内裏 and shogun's 将軍 houses. Generally, retainers of the medieval period were people who served their masters at offices in oku. Servants other than kinshin, who served in the front (omote 表) and were not allowed in the oku, were first called gaijin 外人, then tozama 外様 from the later Kamakura era on. Gaijin originally meant "others" or "someone outside the group", but the word became the antonym of kinshin in the later Heian era when tsunenogosho and the office of kinshin were established, from which time on servants came to be classified into kinshin and tozama. This fact might provide a clue to understanding the primitive form of the master-servant relationship in Japan.
著者
湯川 文彦
出版者
公益財団法人史学会
雑誌
史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.124, no.7, pp.1231-1268, 2015-07-20

This aim of this article is to clarify the purpose and enactment process of the three pieces of legislation (Sanshinpo 三新法) passed in 1878, which comprised the first attempt in modern Japan to institutionally integrate local governance, focusing on the ideas of Matsuda Michiyuki, the policymaker of the Ministry of Interior, who was deeply involved in the enactment of the legislation. The research done to date on this legislation has focused attention on its simultaneous respect for tradition and introduction of innovative institutions, while attempting to link it to the civil unrest threatening the government since 1876 in the form of local peasant uprisings. However, due to a serious dearth of source materials, the purpose of enacting the legislation has yet to be clarified. Here the author turns to the papers of Matsuda Michiyuki in an attempt to shed light on Matsuda's career as a local administrator, during which he formed the ideas that became the basis of the 1878 legislation, and to clarify exactly how those ideas influenced the enactment of the legislation after Matsuda entered the Ministry of Interior. The author's findings are as follows. 1) During his career as a local administrator Matsuda aimed at the establishment of a constitutional government in which the bureaucracy and the people held rights and responsibilities autonomously, in accordance with the vision contained in the founding documents (seitaisho 政体書) of the Meiji Government. Then during his governorship of Shiga Prefecture, Matsuda attempted to articulate the idea of local governance consisting of two proposals for institutional reform-one suited to the status quo and one purely idealistic-based on the organizational principle of national interest and the Western idea of public and private law. 2) After entering the Ministry of Interior, it became clear that such an idea of local governance clashed with that of the Legislative Bureau, forcing Matsuda to bring his idea in line with the Bureau with the help of British legal institutions. 3) While this revised concept did become the government's legislative proposal, its definition of "administration" was seen to suffer from ambiguity. However, since the Bureau wanted the broadest discretion possible regarding "administrative" affairs, such ambiguity could not be resolved, resulting in the new legislation becoming complicated with characteristics of both Matsuda's and the Bureau's ideas.
著者
鹿毛 敏夫
出版者
公益財団法人史学会
雑誌
史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.112, no.2, pp.153-190, 2003-02-20

The Otomo family (大友氏), which dominated a large part of northern Kyushu (九州) had a firm intention to trade in Southeast Asia. The Muromachi shogunate (室町幕府) ordered them to remit sulfur for export. Then Otomo Ujitoki managed two sulfur mines in the mountain district of Bungo (豊後). Otomo Chikayo expanded the mining business geographically, and built a big ship called the "Kasuga-maru (春日丸)". The Otomos dispatched trade ships to Korea, China, the Ryukyus (琉球), and several countries of Southeast Asia. In particular, Otomo Yoshishige and Ouchi Yoshinaga, who were brothers, dispatched a fleet to China for trade, but they were considered as smugglers by the government. They went to the coastal areas of the South China Sea, and traded with the merchants who passed through there.
著者
内藤 一成
出版者
公益財団法人史学会
雑誌
史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.106, no.2, pp.234-260, 319-318, 1997-02-20

The political crisis that occurred in Japan in 1916 (Taisho 5) is represents a crucial stage in the transition between 1913 and 1918 from the "Keien" settlement to the era of parliamentary government. Although many historians have investigated the process of this political crisis, which lasted from February to October 1916, they have not fully understood the political situation during 1913-1918, known as "Taisho-zenki". This paper mainly investigates the complicated situation in the House of Peers at the time of the crisis, a subject that has here-tofore been ignored by almost all historians. First, the author attempts to elucidate negotiations concerning succession to the premiership among Okuma, Terauchi and Yamagata, a "Genro", during this crisis. It is generally thought that the crisis was caused by the stubbornness of Terauchi. However, he was the only one with the flexibility to solve the problem. On the contrary, it was Okuma who refused to compromise. Secondly, the House of Peers' Saiwai club, the largest group in the House, was split into many factions. Therefore, they did not have enough power to support the Terauchi Cabinet. Meanwhile, in the House of Representatives three main government Parties, the Rikkendoushi-kai Kensei-kai and Koyu Club, were united. into the "Kensei-kai" to support Takaaki Kato as prime minister. Okuma advised the Emperor to select Kato as his successor; but Yamagata opposed this move and selected Terauchi. Although Yamagata rejected Kato as primier, he did not think the new administration could stand up against both Houses. Nevertheless, contrary to Yamagata's expectations, Terauchi did not receive the support of both Houses, resulting in a new ministry that was fragile legislatively.
著者
黒野 耐
出版者
公益財団法人史学会
雑誌
史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.106, no.3, pp.323-356, 1997-03-20

The volume in the series Senshi-sosho entitled Headquarters of the Imperial Army I holds the view that the imperial defense policy (IDP) was hardly changed by its first revisions and its nature and policy was maintained. Research conducted after the publication of "Senshi-sosho" also basically reinforced this view. This paper argues that the IDP was fundamentally and drastically revised by its first revisions in 1918. The strategic thought behind the original IDP was formulated on the supposition of a short and limited war against one single country either Russia or the U.S.. Therefore, the Army and Navy requested 50 divisions in wartime and 2 fleets consisting of 8 battleships and 8 cruisers. On, the contrary, the revised IDP was devised on the assumption of a long, all-out war against the U.S., Russia and China at the same time from the lessons Japan learned during WWI. The Army upgraded the strategic force from "divisions" to "corps", and the necessary size was determined as 41 corps in all-out war, and the Navy requested. one more fleet of 16 battleships and 8 cruisers. What changed the nature of the IDP on such a large scale ? "The Necessity of a National Mobilization Plan" proposed by vice-chief of staff Tanaka Giichi was approved in 1917. It assumed that Japan would fight a war against several nations simultaneously and denied the strategic concepts based on the lessons from the Russo-Japanese war. It was proposed to make a defense policy that desired a short and limited war due to limited resouces, but also understood that Japan may have to fight a long and enduring all-out war. In its "Explanation of the Budget" to the Ministry of Finance in 1919 in accordancey with the new IDP, the Ministry of the Army requested funds for the construction and maintenance of a main force of 22 corps in peace time and 41 corps in wartime to fight an all-out war against several enemies. The idea of creating corps-oriented forces, however, was not realized; and the force was returned to the 40-42 divisions structure in 1920, because of popular opposition to any kind of enlargement of the army, the financial crisis caused by the depression, and disagreement inside the Army over how to organize an all-out war posture. The first IDP revision had two significant points. First, the concept of "National Mobilization Posture" made clear the vulnera-bility of Japan's limited resources and low manufacturing capacity. Therefore, a consensus was built up not only within the military, but also among politicians, that Japan should seek its insufficient resources in China and build a self-sufficiency structure. As a result, the strategic area of the new IDP was expanded to all of East Asia, including mainland China. As more and more Japanese made their way into China, the U.S.-Japandde rivalry grew more fierce, and the possibility of Anglo-Japanese confrontation heightened. Soon Japan became internationally isolated. Secondly, ideological confrontation over the posture fot an all-out war emerged within the military. Tanaka Giichi and Ugaki Kazushige found an all-out war posture essential and advocated a transformation of the army, while Uehara Yusaku and Fukuda Masataro regarding an early stage of war as vital, insisted on the maintenance of the status quo. This rivalry continued into the Showa era.
著者
加藤 陽子
出版者
公益財団法人史学会
雑誌
史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.96, no.8, pp.1257-1291, 1407-1408, 1987-08-20

Dai Hon'ei 大本営 (Imperial Military Headquarters) refers to the highest office organizing wartime military operations. This office was set up in the 1894 Sino-Japanese War, the Russo-Japanese War, and the War with China which extended into the Pacific War. This paper deals with Dai Hon'ei established at the beginning of the War with China in November, 1937. It has been said that the Dai Hon'ei was very much the same in function as its Russo-Japanese War counterpart, or that it was merely a kind of the General Staff Office whose function was reorganized to meet the demands the war. World War I, as the first total war in human history, however, must have greatly influenced Japanese military authorities and stimulated them to study seriously the war tactics and the wartime systems of the participating countories. We may therefore conclude that the Japanese military authorities took into consideration the results of this careful study when establishing the third Dai Hon'ei. Based on this assumption, this paper discusses the formation process and characteristics of the Dai Hon'ei during the Japan-China War. The first chapter discusses the great changes which took place in the Dai Hon'ei set up in the Japan-China War in comparison with its predecessors. At the time of establishment it increased the authority of such military administrative authorities as the army minister, the vice minister, the director and the chief of military affairs, and the military chief, vis-a-vis the supreme command authorities. The Dai Hon'ei's functional emphasis on the military administrative authorities theoretically should have caused the Prime Minister to be concerned with the Dai Hon'ei, since the army minister was also Minister of State. What leads us to believe that more emphasis was now being placed on the minltary administration is the recognition that in the case of total war the administration and the supreme command should not be separated, but unified in terms of policy and strategy. The second chapter examines the fact that the establishment of the Dai Hon'ei was not an isolated decision, but was made in relation with the Councillor System (Shangi-Sei 参議制), which was created by the government during roughly the same period, and was regarded as a cause of those government reforms which went as far as to totally revamp the cabinet system. Therefore it becomes clear that Konoe Fumimaro and the military authorities attemped to reform the government at the time of the establishment of the Dai Hon'ei, out of consideration that any dualism between state affiars and the military command would cause severe limitations on war mobilization efforts. While the move to the separate the Ministry of State from the Director of the Administrative Affairs was not realized, the successful establishment of the Sangi-Sei, was significant in empowering a minister without portfolio (Muninsho-Daijin-Sei 無任所大臣制). By including the unrealized cabinet reformation plan in the discussion, this paper emphsizes that the establishment of the Dai Hon'ei in the Japan-China War played a number of important roles not only in improving the capabilities for meeting the war demands, but also by being part of the reform plan for a wartime government system.
著者
森山 優
出版者
公益財団法人史学会
雑誌
史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.101, no.9, pp.1587-1622, 1713-1714, 1992-09-20

This paper analyzes the political processes of 'Guidelines for Implementing National Policy' (Teikohu Kokusaku Suiko Yoryo) which was adopted by the Third Konoe Cabinet. During the term of the Third Konoe Cabinet, Japanese foreign policy was formulated at the Imperial Court by the Imperial Head-quarters-Government Liaison Conference (Dai-hon'ei Seifu Renraku kaigi). The decisions of this Conference were more influential than those of the Cabinet. Issues concerning National Policy (kokusaku) proposed by the Army and Navy were debated and constructed at the Liaison Conference. However, the Liaison Conference was unsuccessful in overcoming the structural flaw in the Meiji Constitution which saw legislative power shared between the Cabinet and the General Staff. The Liaison Conference could not override the Cabinet or General Staff in decision making. In cases where the interests of the various government organs conflicted, the Liaison Conference either avoided making a decision, or forwarded policies for imperial ratification that incorporated the interests of all the opposing government institutions by processes called Ryoron-Heiki. It is through these processes of compromise that National Policy was formulated. The formation of the Guidelines for Implementing National Policy is seen as the cornerstone for Japan's decision to go to war. This paper analyzes the political processes involved in the formation of National Policy. It examines the following points. 1)The political goals of the Army and Navy immediately after the establishment of the Third Konoe Cabinet. 2)The reaction of the Army and Navy towards the 'freezing' of Japanese funds in the United States by the United States Government. 3)The influence of assertions as to attacking the Soviet Union. 4) How the Army and Navy perceived the domestic and international situation when the Guidelines was first adopted. The chief aim of the Guidelines originally proposed by the Navy was to accelerate its arming against its potential enemy, the US. The summit meeting between Roosevelt and Konoe was the other dimension of the policy, as Navy Minister Oikawa was optimistic that a successful diplomatic agreement would be reached by the two leaders. The war Offlce stated that if diplomacy failed, the next step was war. The General Staff Office's position was that Japan must set a date for the commencement of war, but at the same time must persist through all diplomatic avenues available to try and reach some agreement. The stance of the Navy office was to continue to prepare its forces for war, but refuse to commit itself to a date when hostilities would commence. In the end, however, a compromise was reached with the deadline for any diplomatic solution being set for early October. This deadline was set immediately after Japanese authorities received a telegram reporting that Roosevelt was positive towards a summit meeting. Furthermore, the Navy Office was also successful in increasing the number of political procedures required in reaching a decision for war, effectively making any such decision harder to obtain. In the opinion of the Navy, a Japanese victory depended on a favourable change in the international situation. In short, the Guidelines was an ambiguous move to compromise. On one hand, diplomatic negotiations were still being pursued. On the other, preparations were being made for war. Yet, the success of either of the two objectives depended upon a change in the prevailing international situation. The inability to reach a decision led to Konoe to dissolve his cabinet in the middle of October, 1941.
著者
神谷 正昌
出版者
公益財団法人史学会
雑誌
史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.116, no.5, pp.659-661, 2007-05-20
著者
森谷 公俊
出版者
公益財団法人史学会
雑誌
史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.104, no.6, pp.1094-1114, 1209-1208, 1995-06-20

The Thessalian Confederacy played an important role in the course of the conquest of Greece by Philip II. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relation between the Third Sacred War and Philip's invasion in the context of Thessalian history. At the time of the outbreak of the Sacred War in 356 B.C., we find no conflict within the Thessalians, but the next year, tyranny was revived in Pherai and set to recover the rule of Thessaly, in alliance with Phocis, who had occupied Delphi and provoked the Sacred War. In oppositon to them, the Thessalians urged Philip to support them, which forced him to concern himself directly with the Sacred War. In 354 B.C., the allied forces of Phocis and Pherai defeated the Thessalians and the Macedonians, and gained superiority in Thessaly. Then, at least three polis stood for Pherai. In 353 B.C., Philip marched south again. In the Crocus Plain, the Macedonian and the Thessalian army enjoyed a great victory over the Phocians and the Pheraians. Philip banished the tyrants from Pherai and recovered the unification of the Thessalian Confederacy. During the same year, the Thessalians appointed Philip as archon of the Confederacy for life. It was the Aleuadai, the great aristocrats of Larissa, who proposed this appointment. They had had friendly relations with the Macedonian royal house since the fifth century, but it was unprecedented for a Greek state to entrust their supreme power to a foreign king. Why did this occur ? In the first place, the Aleuadai aimed at exterminating the Pheraian tyranny and unifying Thessaly under their hegemony. Because they have not been able to control the Pheraian tyranny by themselves since c.400 B.C., they decided to rely on Philip, even if it meant that they had to be content with the position of an ally subordinate to Philip. Secondly, the offensive of Pherai and Phocis in 354 B.C. was so critical to the unification of Thessaly that the Thessalians welcomed Philip as a liberator of the confederacy. Thirdly, there was a profound suspicion among the Thessalian cities. The Aleuadai chose to give the office of archon to Philip, who was a reliable ally rather than to share it with the other cities. Finally, Philip was not a mere foreigner to the Aleuadai, because they and the Macedonian royal house alleged that the Heracleidai were their common ancestors. On the other hand, Thessaly was extremely valuable to Philip both in securing the south frontier of his kingdom and in its abundant resources. Now Philip 'legitimately' gained it. In the end, the complicated situation of Thessalian politics, connected with the course of the Third Sacred War, opened the way to Philip' invasion of the south.