著者
小川 功
出版者
滋賀大学経済学会
雑誌
彦根論叢 (ISSN:03875989)
巻号頁・発行日
no.405, pp.76-90, 2015-09

For fundamentalists who believe that tourism is a religious act in pursuit of authenticity, and that tourist destinations should be limited only to authentic places, all imitations with no hint of authenticity should be cast aside. They view most tourism resources as valueless copies of others, cross out one spot after another, and conclude that the only places in the world worth visiting are sites associated with the cradle of civilization. Judging from analyses of tourism in Japan from the early to late modern periods, however, I feel that narrowing down the purpose of tourism to authenticity alone is unrealistic. Amusement parks that emerged in and after the Meiji period of modernization (1868–1912), for instance, were in fact evolved versions of freak show huts from the early modern period, gathering a variety of imitations that offered visitors the fun, simulated experience of going on a real trip. Another typical example is Nara Dreamland, which was built for people who could not afford to travel far across the sea to the United States. With demand lasting into the late modern period for cheap "false" destinations closer to home as a substitute for "true" ones far away, this paper sheds light on examples of imitations that borrow names from famous scenic sites and are received favorably by the public. In some instances, the copying of tourist destination names begins when residents and travelers recognize similarities between a familiar place and a famous scenic site. The image grows until the copied name is written in a travel journal or used as a station name, and in the end the name takes root. In other instances, copying occurs when a scholar, landscape architect, writer, or journalist's impressions of a place are printed and circulated. In this day and age, these conventional scenarios are overshadowed by channels ranging from the mass media to the Internet giving rise to the emulation of overseas place names. The motivation for copying is a strong admiration for the original and the originator. But whereas up to the early modern period this motivation was based on pure faith, beyond the late modern period it changed to the pursuit of commercial profit, and eventually to following successful business models. How well a copied place name is received varies by region. Sometimes, one case of copying can provoke a chain reaction. The names of many beaches around the Chita Peninsula in Aichi Prefecture, for example, are copies of other place names. Imitation entails some sense of guilt, and copiers often end up making excuses to justify the act. Some examples of excuse are proximity to and closeness with the original place, similarity between landscapes, permission from the originator, use of the same material as the original, friendly relations with the originator, and naming by a third party of authority. There are also different levels of copying, starting with a simple appellative or a nickname, going on to the common name of a facility, company, station, or neighborhood, then to official place name, and culminating in the formal name of a municipality. The relationship between copier and community varies as well. Imitation can be agreed upon by all, or endorsed and established; met with silent approval, disagreement, or objection; or face requests for renaming or a return to the former name. Cheap copies that belittle the area's history and culture or are based on poor reasoning tend to be unsuccessful at gaining understanding from the residents and fail to take root. Some station names are soon restored to their original place names because of opposition, and other names disappear from the residents' memory altogether. On the contrary, imitations that are to some degree rational or win the residents' approval tend to endure. One example is Maihama, the home of Tokyo Disneyland in Urayasu City, Chiba, which derives from Miami Beach, Florida, home to Disneyworld. Thanks to the absence of a previous name – Maihama is built on reclaimed land – and the presence of an American amusement park, very few opposed to the imitation of a foreign place name. Evaluating emulation is difficult, since a thing cannot be disregarded simply because it is "false." The Hiraizumi culture that took root and blossomed in the Tohoku region, for example, is looked down on by quite a number of scholars who see it as a mere transplant of the aristocratic culture of Kyoto. And even Kyoto, which we Japanese regard as the origin of Hiraizumi, is an imitation of China in terms of city planning. Tokyo is the originator of a great number of place names copied everywhere today, such as Ginza. But in the early premodern Edo period (1603–1868), this Tokyo was yet another copier that admired and imitated originals from the Kyoto-Ohmi area, like Mt. Hiei and Lake Biwa. Kyoto itself, although home to an ample number of authentic temples and shrines, has its share of imitation: the Omuro Pilgrimage of 88 Temples, a miniature version of the Shikoku Pilgrimage of 88 Temples. This was created by the religious leader of Ninnaji Temple in the Edo period, when traveling to the remote island of Shikoku was difficult. He brought sand from all 88 temples in Shikoku, buried it in the mountain in Kyoto, built 88 halls, and completed a "theme park" where people could make a pilgrimage in just two hours. Since the route in Kyoto served to ease the homesickness of immigrants from Shikoku, there were virtually no protests from originator about the imitation. Even today, people who visit Ninnaji every morning know the place is "false," but they enjoy the remarkable mini course and feel as refreshed as if they undertook a "true" journey in Shikoku. The Omuro site may be an imitation, but it is not the work of commercial developers. It was built openly by an authentic religious figure in temple grounds now designated a World Heritage site, calling out for worshippers to come. This represents "true" and "false" coexisting without conflict, where both "original" and "imitation" continue to play a significant role in their own right.
著者
阿部 安成 加藤 聖文
出版者
滋賀大学
雑誌
彦根論叢 (ISSN:03875989)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.348, pp.129-154, 2004-05
著者
小川 功
出版者
滋賀大学経済学会
雑誌
彦根論叢 (ISSN:03875989)
巻号頁・発行日
no.407, pp.108-121, 2016

When one thinks of unordinary trips, anaround-the-world cruise on a luxurious shipand a transcontinental trip on a deluxe sleepertrain come to mind. Yet this paper will discussthe opposite of these types of travel: namely,low-class trips by what the author calls "fictitiousrailways."The mysterious and fictitious railways run bya private logging train company existed brieflybefore the Second World War on the southernedge of Shikoku Island, and vanished withoutbeing noticed. People used the service to enjoya scenic view of a valley with a famous waterfallfrom a train that did not have a roof or evenseats.Trolley trains on Yakushima Island - a WorldHeritage Site - and the Kurobe Gorge havebeen serving the same function for tourists. Butthe Shikoku one is unique in that a car withseveral adult passengers was pulled by a westerndog up a several-kilometer slope to the waterfall.The train service was sold to tourists by theSightseeing Railways, which was founded andrun by a cooperative association of the ownersof a local mountain and forest. Even thoughthe association was approved by the Ministryof Agriculture and Forestry, it did not have a licenseissued by the Railway Supervision Bureauto operate a commercial train service. Thus, itwas an unlicensed, fake railway company.So why was it able to provide the service?The answer can be found through examinationof similar unlicensed railways operating inHokkaido at the time of its original developmentin the 1930's. Remote mountain areaswhere regular railways were unlikely to be developedwere considered special districts, andthe bureau was lenient concerning train servicesin those areas and did not apply strictregulations there.
著者
酒井 泰弘
出版者
滋賀大学経済学会
雑誌
彦根論叢 (ISSN:03875989)
巻号頁・発行日
no.第394号, pp.38-57, 2012-12 (Released:2013-01-21)

The main purpose of this paper is to explore the economic thought of Frank H. Knight (1885-1972) with special reference to his ideas of risk and uncertainty. Knight, the “Grand Old Man” of Chicago, is one of the most influential thinker American economics has ever produced. Although hefailed to acquire many faithful followers around himself, we can see some traces of his perspective in the work of Martin Bronfenbrenner(1914-1997), a Chicago Ph.D., with whom I established a close acquaintance at Kobe and Pittsburgh. According to Knight, uncertainty must be taken categorically distinct from the familiar notion of risk. Risk means a quantity susceptible of measurement, so that it is not in effect anuncertainty at all. In contrast, uncertainty is ofthe non-quantity type in the sense that it cannotbe described by any distribution function.It is this “true” uncertainty, and not risk, whichforms the basis of a valid theory of profit. Business decisions deal with situations which are far too unique for any sort of statistical tabulation to have any value of guidance. Such true uncertainty gives the characteristic form of enterprise to economic organization as a whole and accounts for profit or the peculiar income of the entrepreneur. We live in the world of risk and uncertainty.The Great East Japan Earthquake of 11 March 2011 has demonstrated a great lesson against the myth of absolute safety, indicating the necessity of rethinking of presumably “unthinkable events.” We can learn new lessons from old teachings : The legacy of Frank H. Knight is still alive and will remain so throughout the new century.
著者
酒井 泰弘
出版者
滋賀大学経済学会
雑誌
彦根論叢 (ISSN:03875989)
巻号頁・発行日
no.第398号, pp.50-69, 2013-12 (Released:2014-01-14)

The main purpose of this paper is to criticallydiscuss and lucidly compare J. M. Keynes (1883-1946) and F. H. Knight (1886-1972), two towering figures in the history of economic thought. It is in 1921 that they both published apparently similar books on risk, probability and uncertainty. While Knight’ contribution on the economics of risk and uncertainty has been well-known and very influential in the economics profession, Keynes’accomplishments on probability and uncertainty have been more or less underestimated in the dark shadow of his most famous book (1936) The General Theory of Unemployment, Interest and Money.The present paper aims to focus on an earlieryet equally important book (1921) A Treatise onProbability, hopefully shedding a new light onhis outstanding ideas and everlasting influenceson his later works including The General Theory.According to Keynes, many probabilities, which are incapable of numerical measurement, can be placed nevertheless between numerical upper and lower limits. Keynes has demonstrated whether and to what extent animal spirits contributes to the working and performance of the market economy. Remarkably, Keynes' concept of probability and uncertainty can be well-compared to Knight's distinction between a measurable risk and a non-measurable uncertainty. I believe that it is high time for us to unify Keynes and Knight into a new,comprehensive approach to very complex human behavior.
著者
酒井 泰弘
出版者
滋賀大学経済学会
雑誌
彦根論叢 (ISSN:03875989)
巻号頁・発行日
no.第400号, pp.82-105, 2014-06 (Released:2014-07-02)

As the saying goes, we can learn new lessonsfrom old teachings. This paper aims to givecritical assessment of J. M. Keynes (1883-1946)and F. H. Knight (1885-1972), two great economistson probability and uncertainty. It is quiteremarkable to see that there are many contemporariesof outstanding achievement in theKeynes-Knight era: A. Marshall (1842-1924),H. Poincaré (1854-1912), M. Weber (1864-1920), Soseki Natsume (1867-1916), TorahikoTerada (1878-1935), and A. Einstein (1879-1955). While these men are somewhat differentin personality and research field, there is onething in common: They are all deep thinkersof unthinkable phenomena such as bubbles,chance, chaos, complexity, crisis, earthquakes,hazards, and sufferings.In the light of the history of economicthought, we understand that some economistsmay be micro-oriented or macro-orientedwhereas others may be concerned with certaintyor uncertainty. We find it quite convenientto classify all the economists from the time ofAdam Smith to the present day into the followingfour groups. They are:(1)micro andcertainty, (2)macro and certainty, (3)macro anduncertainty, and (4)micro and uncertainty. Inmy opinion, the first group is represented by L.W. McKenzie, an authority in general equilibriumtheory and incidentally my mentor atRochester; and the second one by Karl Marx,the founder of the Marxian school. The thirdgroup is led by J. M. Keynes, perhaps the greatesteconomist of the 20th century and theoriginator of the Keynesian school; and thefourth one by F.H. Knight, the grandfather ofthe original Chicago school.According to Torahiko Terada, a famous scientistand essayist, natural disasters will returnwhen they are out of people’s memory. Likewise,academic geniuses will return before oldheroes are out of our scene. At the beginningof the 21st century, it is quite regrettable thatneither Keynes nor Knight is in sight. We needa Keynes or a Knight in order to establish anew, synthetic social science, thus combiningeconomics, psychology, history, biology, physics,and other related fields.
著者
西村 正秀
出版者
滋賀大学経済学会
雑誌
彦根論叢 (ISSN:03875989)
巻号頁・発行日
no.393, pp.38-49, 2012

In "Visual Attention and the Epistemic Role of Consciousness" (2011), John Campbell defends the claim that consciousness is necessary for visual attention. It has been thought that this claim was incoherent with the cases of blindsight where a subject seemed to attend to an object without having a conscious experience of it. In order to dismiss this objection, Campbell appeals to the Boolean map theory of visual attention, a psychological theory developed by Liqiang Huang and Harold Pashler. On this theory, attention consists of two stages, selection and access. The opponents of Campbell suppose that attention is identical to access. This is the reason why blindsight has been regarded as a counterexample of Campbell's claim, because at least a blindsighted subject has an access to an object. Campbell denies this supposition. He argues that consciousness is not connected to access but to selection. If his arguments are sound, we can interpret that a blindsighted subject does not attend to an object because he does not select it consciously. My aim in this paper is to show that Campbell's arguments for the connection between consciousness and selection are not fully convincing.This conclusion supports a slogan endorsed bysome cognitive scientists and philosophers suchthat consciousness is not required for perceptual reference.
著者
藤岡俊博
出版者
滋賀大学
雑誌
彦根論叢
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2015年(冬), no.406, 2015-12-28
著者
森 順次
出版者
滋賀大学経済学会
雑誌
彦根論叢 (ISSN:03875989)
巻号頁・発行日
no.第85号, pp.62-81, 1962-01