著者

平岩 俊司

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.53, no.3, pp.25-42, 2007-07-31 (Released:2014-09-30)

参考文献数

14

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In October 2006, North Korea went ahead with nuclear tests in spite of international opposition.The international community had made every effort to stop North Korea from possessing nuclear weapons, but these efforts ended in failure. This study seeks to look at the measures the international community had been taking to control North Korea’s nuclear program, analyze why the measures could not work effectively, and examine future problems in controlling North Korean nuclear activity.The first North Korean nuclear crisis took place in the early 1990s, and ended when the United States and North Korea signed a bilateral Agreed Framework following their negotiations in1994. North Korea agreed to abandon its original nuclear development program on the condition that the world community provided light-water reactors, which were considered to be relatively difficult to divert to military use. The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization(KEDO) was formed with Japan, the United States and South Korea as the primary members to implement the supply of light-water reactors. These efforts paved the way for the rest of the world to control North Korea’s nuclear activities. In 2002, however, the second nuclear crisis occurred. North Korea made it known that it was proceeding with a program to produce highly enriched uranium. Subsequently, the international community launched six-party talks involving North Korea, South Korea, the United States, Japan, China and Russia, with the intention of preventing North Korea from obtaining nuclear weapons. In October 2006, North Korea conducted nuclear tests in the face of worldwide opposition. The global society failed to stop North Korea’s nuclear activities.International efforts were not sufficient to deal with the first nuclear crisis, although North Korea’s nuclear activities were controlled to a certain extent via the agreement with the United States. North Korea’s nuclear ambitions are intended to counter US threats. If the US–North Korean agreement had not been reached, North Korea’s nuclear activities would not have been controlled within any framework. The current ongoing six-party talks will not produce dramatic results unless bilateral negotiations between the United States and North Korea make remarkable progress. The six-party talks have the possibility of acting as an essential framework to maintain East Asian security, as well as managing North Korean nuclear issues. However, the immediate problem is controlling North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. Given this situation, the six-party talks will function only when the bilateral framework between the United States and North Korea works. Once this development has taken place, the six-party talks will then be able to function as a broader framework for further negotiation.

著者

山本 真

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.66, no.3, pp.128-137, 2020-07-31 (Released:2020-09-12)

参考文献数

19

著者

塩出 浩和

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.63, no.1, pp.85-97, 2017-01-31 (Released:2017-03-24)

参考文献数

9

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In Macau, on the 25th of May in 2014, more than 10,000 citizens marched in protest against government’s proposal to pay hefty amounts of retirement benefits to high-rank government officials. There were also citizens who supported the government’s proposal, about 1,000, marched through same route on the same day. Two hundred sixty police officers were dispatched. Despite the size of this political protest in the small Special Administrative Region, no violence took place. Between the night of 27th and the morning of 28th, 5,000 citizens sat-in surrounding the Legislative Committee Building. On the 29th, the government of Macau has submitted to the action of its citizens and withdrew its proposal. The movement was lead by non-communist labour union, anti-communist political parties and individual journalists. It was organized by SNS such as facebook. Why do this kind of non-violence movements succeed in Macau? One important factor is that the population at large in Macau forms a sort of ‘Intimate Sphere’ where people have little antagonistic or hostile feeling towards one another. Historically speaking, the police force of Macau has been reluctant to use physical power to control on-the-street political movements unless the movements are related to constitutional or ‘core interest of the nation’ matters. The court’s decision to support citizens’ freedom to express political opinions in public in 2013 has helped to reconfirm this tendency of police not to engage in political issues. In this small special administrative region, most of the community members have friends or relatives in both sides of political groups or in the police force. This sentiment inherently makes it difficult for political disputes escalate to physical violence. The representative system of Macau is not yet completely institutionalized. However, the several informal ways of soliciting public opinions are effective in this small administrative region. This can be taken as an example or experimental case of future democratization of entire China.

著者

塩出 浩和

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.63, no.1, pp.85-97, 2017

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<p>In Macau, on the 25th of May in 2014, more than 10,000 citizens marched in protest against government's proposal to pay hefty amounts of retirement benefits to high-rank government officials. There were also citizens who supported the government's proposal, about 1,000, marched through same route on the same day. Two hundred sixty police officers were dispatched. Despite the size of this political protest in the small Special Administrative Region, no violence took place. </p><p>Between the night of 27th and the morning of 28th, 5,000 citizens sat-in surrounding the Legislative Committee Building. On the 29th, the government of Macau has submitted to the action of its citizens and withdrew its proposal. The movement was lead by non-communist labour union, anti-communist political parties and individual journalists. It was organized by SNS such as facebook. </p><p>Why do this kind of non-violence movements succeed in Macau? One important factor is that the population at large in Macau forms a sort of 'Intimate Sphere' where people have little antagonistic or hostile feeling towards one another. </p><p>Historically speaking, the police force of Macau has been reluctant to use physical power to control on-the-street political movements unless the movements are related to constitutional or 'core interest of the nation' matters. The court's decision to support citizens' freedom to express political opinions in public in 2013 has helped to reconfirm this tendency of police not to engage in political issues. </p><p>In this small special administrative region, most of the community members have friends or relatives in both sides of political groups or in the police force. This sentiment inherently makes it difficult for political disputes escalate to physical violence. </p><p>The representative system of Macau is not yet completely institutionalized. However, the several informal ways of soliciting public opinions are effective in this small administrative region. This can be taken as an example or experimental case of future democratization of entire China. </p>

著者

野澤 知弘

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.54, no.1, pp.40-61, 2008-01-31 (Released:2014-09-15)

参考文献数

33

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This paper considers the various kinds of activity used to promote the development of Chinese language education in Cambodia. After first surveying the situation, focussing mainly on the rebuilding of Chinese immigrant education in Phnom Penh and the surrounding district, this report aims to consider the problem at various levels caused by other developments in Chinese language education, and the development of the Chinese language education in Cambodia where there is the largest Chinese immigrant school in Southeast Asia. The prosperity of this Chinese immigrant school with the development of Chinese language education is greatly influenced by the national political system, parts which are influenced by relations with China and the sensitive issues concerning anti-Chinese immigrant policy. Therefore, the writer thinks that the status of Cambodian Chinese language education is an important indicator of the current state of the mutual relations between the Chinese immigrant community of Cambodia and the Cambodian government.

著者

鄭 光敏

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.51, no.1, pp.59-75, 2005-01-31 (Released:2014-09-30)

参考文献数

41

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Although deaths in the North Korean famine of 1995–1997 are estimated to be roughly 600,000–1 million in the most recent surveys, only a few attempts have been made to analyze the famine. This paper aims to analyze the causes of the North Korean famine using Amartya Sen’s entitlement approach, which has been widely used in the study of modern famines.The unique aspect of the North Korean famine is that it happened during a drastic change in the entitlement system. As is well known, the main entitlement system in North Korea until the early 1990s was the public distribution system (PDS). However, following the collapse of the PDS, food was increasingly allocated through the informal sector, called the Changmadang in North Korea. After the collapse of the PDS, the food entitlement of the urban population relied mainly on market exchange, though there were other sources of food acquisition. Indeed, a new entitlement system emerged from the informal food market in the middle of the 1990s.However, North Korea had been undergoing a serious economic recession since the collapse of the socialist market in the early 1990s, and therefore many factories and firms could not operate normally. Many workers were threatened with unemployment or non-payment. Furthermore, people were severely restricted by the state not only in respect of private ownership but also with regards to free trade activity. Hence it was not easy for many laborers, especially in local urban areas, to acquire food through market exchange during the transitional stage.The main victims of the famine in North Korea were laborers in local urban areas, especially in North and South Hamgyung. Surprisingly, when the famine reached its peak at the end of 1996 the price index of rice rose to 1206 (taking the informal market price in 1992 as 100). While there was a sudden surge in food prices, the wage rate actually fell in absolute terms and the index of the exchange rate of labour vis-à-vis rice declined from 100 in 1992 to 5 in 1996. Indeed, the violent decline in rice-entitlement of wages that occurred in North Korea at this time was unprecedented in the modern history of famines.To understand the causes of the North Korean famine it is very important to appreciate that it occurred as a result of a number failures of entitlement. The first is the failure of the PDS by regional ‘triage’, etc. (i.e. the cause was not simply a decline in food availability), and the second is the collapse of the exchange entitlement in the informal market during the dramatic transition of the North Korean economy.

著者

渡邊 武

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.59, no.3.4, pp.88-92, 2014-09-15 (Released:2014-09-26)

著者

堀本 武功

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.52, no.2, pp.36-47, 2006-04-30 (Released:2014-09-30)

参考文献数

36

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Indian diplomacy since that country’s independence in 1947 can be broadly divided into three phases: (1) a policy of non-alignment (from 1947 until the end of the 1960s); (2) alignment with the Soviet Union (from the 1970s until the end of the Cold War); (3) the post-Cold War phase of participation in multilateralism and the forging of closer links with the United States.Although the Cold War environment had a considerable influence on India’s foreign policy, certain crucial factors, such as promotion of national interests and a constant desire to pursue an independent diplomacy, played a vital role in the evolution of that policy. The non-alignment policy was an upshot of that exercise, which India stuck to despite enormous external pressures.It essentially meant joining hands with those that shared this perception — this was the beginning of maintaining strategic partnerships — but India obviously looked at the Soviet Union more favorably than the United States. This in turn led Moscow to emerge as a strategic partner for New Delhi, which is the main characteristic of the second phase. It would be wrong to assume that India’s foreign policy was merely a dependent variable of the Cold War.In the more recent and current phase, while taking an active participation in regional multilateral mechanisms, India’s endeavor appears to be to incorporate the United States as a strategic partner. Aside from mutual economic gains, shared concerns and interests, the rise of China seems to be instrumental in shaping the evolving India–US relationship.In short, the Indian diplomacy can be characterized by the struggle to advance its national interests by balancing an independent foreign policy with the international politico-security environment. In this respect, India could be called the ‘France of Asia’. France shares certain values and interests with the United States but pursues its own autonomous policy. India looks like following this line until such time as it becomes a major power.

著者

樹中 毅

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.51, no.1, pp.1-17, 2005-01-31 (Released:2014-09-30)

参考文献数

46

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In the 1920s and the 1930s, Leninism and fascism were the two dictatorship models imitated by the Chiang Kai-shek regime in China. In this study, I would like to discuss the characteristics of Chiang’s dictatorship and the development of his ideology by focusing on how he brought Leninism into his policy and his transformation of Leninism into fascism.The legitimacy of the Kuomintang’s (KMT) party-state was based on the principle of party dictatorship. The KMT’s formal ideology lacked the ability to build a party-state system, and therefore Chiang Kai-shek had to use the prevailing models of dictatorship from Russia, Italy and Germany as his basis.Essentially, Chiang Kai-shek was an anti-communist. Notwithstanding the ideological conflict between Leninism and fascism, Chiang combined democratic centralism and the Führerprinzip into a model of a party-state regime for the KMT. Although there was an ideological conflict between Leninism and fascism, as far as proposing an elitist dictatorship, power centralization, rigid organization and the negation of human rights were concerned, the two ideologies were completely coherent.Chiang Kai-shek attempted to establish the party-state by building centralism and Führerprinzip into a formal system of ideology. Leninism and fascism were most influential under the KMT’s political regime, especially in the following three aspects: (i) the strategy of the National Movement; (ii) the establishment of the revolutionary dictatorship; and (iii) the principle of organization. Therefore, the dictatorship of Chiang Kai-shek can be seen as a mixture of Leninism and fascism.Nevertheless, Chiang did not accept Leninism and fascism unconditionally. Originally, Leninism was created to realize the Marxist revolution, while fascism was characterized by conquest and ethnocentrism; however, Chiang Kai-shek separated class conflicts from Leninism and disconnected fascism from ethnocentrism. In this way, without incorporating the concepts of communism and conquest, the National Revolution Movement launched by the KMT modified the western ideology of dictatorship and turned it into a simple model for dictatorship.What Chiang seriously feared was the lack of the rigid party organization necessary to support the strong one-party politics essential to Leninism and fascism. In fact, because the KMT was organizationally weak, Chiang Kai-shek could not establish himself as a charismatic leadership in the mould of Stalin, Hitler and Mussolini. Although Chiang’s dictatorial regime had the characteristics of the party-state and totalitarianism, its actual method of ruling was different from that of Leninism and fascism. The structure of the one-party dictatorship created by the KMT was an authoritarian regime based on military force.

著者

杉浦 康之

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.54, no.4, pp.70-86, 2008-10-31 (Released:2014-09-15)

参考文献数

71

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This study attempts to establish the limits of the Chinese Communist Party leadership’s perception of Japan based on negotiations over the Fourth Japan-China Private Trade Agreement and the Nagasaki national flag incident. It explains the underlying rationale for and reason why the Chinese decided to break off relations with Japan, what their perceptions of the situation were, and what they had failed to perceive. In addition, this study analyzes the interaction between Chinese intelligence acquisition, data analysis and the perception of Chinese policy-makers. When the trade negotiations began in Beijing in September 1957, China’s policy-makers, albeit wary of the Kishi cabinet’s attitude towards China, were optimistic about the prospects for Japanese domestic approval of Sino-Japanese trade; China’s negotiators were not ready to compromise. After the negotiations broke down, demand for trade with China grew strong in Japan and the Kishi cabinet actively worked towards concluding an agreement, whereby the Chinese leaders, although holding fast to certain principles, displayed a more flexible stance. Negotiations were reopened in February 1958, but there was no change in the ambivalent position of the Chinese policy-makers on Japan and their negotiator won some concessions from the Japanese side. During these negotiations, any arbitrary analysis of information obtained by China’s pro-Japan intelligence agencies was checked and nothing suggested that the policy-makers entertained any noteworthy misunderstandings of Japan. China turned to stronger methods when Taiwan’s objection to the Fourth Japan-China Trade Agreement developed into a dispute between Japan and Taiwan. At the time of Japan’s general elections, Chinese policy-makers tried to encourage a more China-friendly public opinion by criticizing the policy towards China that the Kishi cabinet was practicing, thereby hoping to alter the Kishi government’s position on China. These moves were consistent with China’s existing policy of “Japan neutralization”. However, there was limited domestic criticism of how Kishi dealt with China, a fact that Chinese intelligence agencies were to some extent informed of. Motivated by a disapproval of the Kishi cabinet and high hopes for Sino-Japanese trade, they made arbitrary deductions based on gathered information suggesting that China’s hard-line stance was in fact bringing results. In these circumstances, Chinese policy-makers adopted an even tougher position on Japan in the wake of the Nagasaki national flag incident and decided to break off relations. The Chinese did not intend a complete and permanent cessation of relations, but rather wanted to apply pressure on Kishi. As such, the decision was in line with China’s policy of “Japan neutralization”. On the other hand, Kishi perceived China’s hard-line stance as interference with Japan’s general elections, and chose to observe calmly how events unfolded. Japanese opinion continued to support Kishi government policies. However, China’s pro-Japan intelligence agencies disregarded this fact and produced arbitrary intelligence that China’s hard-line stance was in fact bringing results. Hence Chinese policy-makers persisted with their hard-line stance and did not modify their “Japan neutralization” policy. In retrospect, this chain of events suggests that one cause for China’s failed Japan policy was the failure of its intelligence agencies to comprehend that mounting Japanese domestic demand for trade with China had the potential to alter Japan’s foreign policy. Chinese intelligence analysis had backed up its policy-makers’ hard-line stance, and hence China continued to maintain the ambition of achieving its “Japan neutralization” policy. The limited insight of China’s Japan-related intelligence agencies was the result of the following three factors: firstly, their abilities to collect and analyze intelligence were not yet fully developed;

著者

鈴木 中正

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.19, no.1, pp.18-35, 1972 (Released:2014-09-15)

著者

保城 広至

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.53, no.1, pp.1-19, 2007-01-31 (Released:2014-09-30)

参考文献数

59

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In January 1962, the UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE, now ESCAP) proposed to establish the Organization of Asian Economic Cooperation (OAEC) in order to promote Asian intraregional economic cooperation. However, the proposed organization was never created due to internal opposition from within the region. It has been said that the one of main opposition countries was Japan. The objective of this paper is to look at the various players in the Japanese government, and to eliminate their interests in and problems with the proposed OAEC by analyzing the foreign policy decision-making process within Japan. This approach should reveal one of factors why regional economic cooperation did not make progress in this era.Japan’s policy regarding the proposed OAEC was to refuse to sign the draft declaration establishing the organization, but to propose instead to convene a ministerial-level preliminary meeting to discuss economic cooperation in Asia, including the establishment of the OAEC. The Japanese government declared its full support for such a process. That is, Japan was not necessarily opposed to the proposed organization. This final decision was a compromise between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the Ministry of Finance (MOF), and the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MOAF). MOFA wanted to make the proposed OAEC an ‘Open Asian Community,’ which would include developed countries like the United States. MOF and MOAF, however, opposed any‘ Asian Community.’ MOF was worried that Japan would increase its financial burden by extending credit to the less-developed countries in Asia. MOAF (especially its minister, Kohno Ichiro) feared damaging domestic agriculture due to the increase of intraregional trade. The domestic agriculture problem has been one of the main factors preventing the region from creating a multilateral Asian framework.ECAFE, together with a number of Asian countries, noted the behavior of the Japanese government, and considered the Japanese decision to refuse to sign the draft declaration as opposition to the OAEC itself, and did not try to implement the proposal. As a result of this, the proposed organization faded from the scene and remains only a historical episode.

著者

長尾 賢

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.62, no.1, pp.27-30, 2016-01-31 (Released:2016-02-09)

参考文献数

2

著者

平川 均

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.47, no.1, pp.76-79, 2001 (Released:2014-09-15)

著者

八塚 正晃

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.60, no.1, pp.37-55, 2014-10-15 (Released:2014-10-25)

参考文献数

58

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Official Chinese Communist Party history simply indicates that Deng Xiaoping launched the open-door policy in 1978, largely discounting international factors, such as China’s joining the United Nations and China-U.S. reconciliation. With regards to the pre-1978 era, most studies focused on inter-Politburo politics, because during the Cultural Revolution power struggles often occurred among the leadership. According to the literature, the political situation after the death of Lin Biao is described as the struggle between Zhou Enlai, who aimed at economic reconstruction, and the radicals such as the “Gang of Four,” but they were under the almost complete dominance of Mao Zedong. Previous studies describe how Zhou’s economic policy was at the mercy of politics, and do not analyze his intention and policy. This article reconsiders the conception and limitation of the open-door policy which was launched as a part of Zhou’s policy, considering the importance of the changing international circumstances through analyzing a project designed to import large industrial plants from Western countries. This project was called the “4-3” development strategy, because its total projected cost was US$4.3 billion.Closer examination reveals that the industrial development strategy underlying the open-door policy was formed gradually in the early 1970s, in association with the change in the leadership’s perception towards new international circumstances. Until then, the Chinese leadership had pursued the construction of “the third front” as a preparation for war, which was a massive construction of defense and heavy industries in inland China. However, the change in the international situation in the early 1970s reduced the necessity of preparing for a war. Zhou Enlai and the bureaucrats therefore proceeded with the “4-3” development strategy as a part of a new national strategy, which included the reorganization of the bureaucracy to support the open-door policy and the shift of investment from military industry to agriculture and light industry and from inland to coastal areas. They implemented these policies through modifications of the 4th Five Year Plan.However, there was a conflict between the open-door policy and Mao’s revolutionary diplomatic strategies, despite Mao’s support for the former. The conflict came to the surface as the U.S.-Soviet détente emerged, and the pursuit of the opening was hampered. However, the open-door policy was gradually transformed into a comprehensive industrial policy. As a result, Hua Guofeng and Deng Xiaoping were able to launch a systematic open-door policy soon after Mao’s death.

著者

清水 展

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.59, no.3.4, pp.54-66, 2014-09-15 (Released:2014-09-26)

参考文献数

8

著者

大矢根 聡

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.69, no.3, pp.18-34, 2023-07-31 (Released:2023-08-19)

参考文献数

70

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Since 1988, Myanmar been subject to conflicting movements aimed at democratization and the suppression thereof, exemplified most recently by the military coup d’état of 2021. This paper considers this topic in relation to the broader international structure, in which countries such as the United States, China, and the ASEAN nations have engaged in various forms of democratization and the suppression of the same in Myanmar, giving rise to complex regional and inter­national politics.Theoretical research on international relations has provided an excellent analysis of this international structure. In addition, area studies have produced a wealth of findings on the domestic politics and external actions of various countries; however, it can be challenging to conduct an analysis that combines theoretical research and area studies, as the two disciplines diverge considerably. This study integrates and considers findings from both disciplines as described below.Based on theoretical research, this study identifies the characteristics of the international structure described above after the Cold War and since the latter half of the 2010s. It then confirms how that international structure has been correlated with movements to democratize Myanmar and the involvement of various countries therein. Furthermore, this study examines whether area studies may provide alternative arguments or supplement and revise the findings of theoretical research. Through this process, it may be possible to explain Myanmar’s political disturbances and the involvement of various countries as a fitting combination of international structures and domestic circumstances.The results of this analysis will illustrate, for example, that while Myanmar pursued democratization with support from the United States and the EU in the context of international structures following the Cold War, the military of Myanmar retained its authoritarian grip and built its own hybrid regime. In addition, given the international antagonism between the United States and China, and the distance maintained by ASEAN nations from both countries, it will be explained how these countries are reducing their involvement in Myanmar as political chaos continues following the coup. This study also clarifies how ASEAN functions as a buffer between the inter­national structure and Asian countries.

著者

内田 直作

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.4, no.3, pp.102-132, 1958 (Released:2014-09-15)

著者

LIAN Yi-Zheng

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.68, no.4, pp.47-62, 2022-10-31 (Released:2022-11-25)

参考文献数

27

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The Hong Kong democracy movement began with the Sino-UK Joint Declaration of 1984 on the future of the city after 1997. Among other things, the declaration defined for Hong Kong citizens a limited democracy to be put in place at some unspecified point in the post-1997 period. The scheme promised one-person-one-vote to elect all legislators and the chief executive, which sounded fine until one read the fine print. Described in broad terms with lots of discretionary power for Beijing to maneuver, the scheme reserved the privilege to introduce bills for the chief executive only. Elections for the latter would involve only a small number of candidates hand-picked by Beijing, rubber-stamped by a small electoral committee whose membership system was structured in strong favor of the government. Yet moving towards even this limited democracy proved to be a total failure. For all the 25 years after 1997, the government gave not one inch, even though the movement had impressive records of regularly turning out gigantic crowds—up to some 20% of the city’s population for a four-to-six-hour protest event, drawing from a 60% pro-democracy majority among the Hong Kong people. A major problem of this failure lay in the movement itself, which almost since its inception had adopted and held fast to the strategy of pressure politics, while basically remaining within the system as “loyal opposition”. That strategy involved garnering public opinion based on sheer supporter turnout in strictly peaceful, open and legal protests to force the government to grant concessions. That was a strategy that may well work in already democratic countries or even in non-democratic ones which had weak ruling classes. But in the case of the post-1997 Hong Kong, for the government—a highly capable one now backed by a strong, totalitarian government in Beijing, such pressure politics backed by public opinion no matter how strong could simply be ignored if the government still practiced some restraint. And when it had no more patience for those restraints, the whole movement could be wiped out in a short time, as actually happened after the proclamation of the National Security Law in 2020. The movement developed alternative strategies and approaches after the Umbrella Movement of 2014, but even though it gained incredible strength in the run-up to the explosive events of 2019, it was already too late.

著者

高橋 伸夫

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.34, no.4, pp.96-133, 1988 (Released:2014-09-15)